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KATAR'IN DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA YUMUŞAK GÜCÜN
ROLÜ

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THE ROLE OF SOFT POWER IN QATAR'S FOREIGN POLICY

Ph.D. DISSERTATION

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DECLARATION OF SCIENTIFIC ETHICS AND ORIGINALITY

This is to certify that this MA thesis/Ph.D. dissertation titled “The Role of Soft Power In Qatar’s Foreign Policy” is my own work and I have acted according to scientific ethics and academic rules while producing it. I have collected and used all information and data according to scientific ethics and guidelines on thesis writing of Sabahattin Zaim University. I have fully referenced, in both the text and bibliography, all direct and indirect quotations and all sources I have used in this work.

İbrahim Karataş

May, 2020

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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF SOFT POWER IN QATAR'S FOREIGN POLICY

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This dissertation focuses on the role of soft power in Qatar's foreign policy, which has transformed it into a model country and has made the country become a success story in terms of exertion of soft power. Analyzing Qatar's soft power is a necessity as only few countries have shown such conspicuous accomplishment. Theoretically, the study argues that there are primary powers, such as hard power and economic power, and derivative powers, such as soft power. In addition, it contends that power, rather than size, matters in defining whether a state is small, middle, or large. Finally, it claims that international relations theories fail to explain Qatar's policies. The study also tries to introduce 'combined power' and 'hired power' to the literature. Regarding Qatar, based on the research laid down in the manuscript, this study concludes that Qatar has become a middle power through its soft power tools, such as foreign policy, foreign investment, foreign aid, and Al Jazeera media network. Besides, hosting Fifa 2022 World Cup will sharply boost its image. The distinction of Qatar is that it hardens its soft power for its ends, such as ensuring its sovereignty, contending with its regional rivals, and becoming an influential international player. In terms of scope, the study limits its analysis to the period between 1995 and 2020. Concerning methodology, both quantitative and qualitative researches were used in completing the dissertation. In addition to articles, books, reports, news, and state documents that were reviewed throughout the study, special interviews were also conducted with Qatari officials, academicians, journalists, and expatriates in Doha. This study is expected to contribute to the existing literature regarding power, states, and international theories by elucidating the case of Qatar.

Keywords; Qatar, Soft Power, Middle East, Foreign Policy, Small States

ÖZET

KATAR'IN DIŐ POLİTİKASINDA YUMUŐAK GÜCÜN ROLÜ

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Doktora Programı, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İliŐkiler

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Bu tez, Katar'ın dıő politikasında yumuőak gücün rolüne odaklanmaktadır -ki Katar bu sayede yumuőak gücün uygulanmasında model bir ülke olmanın yanısıra bir başarı hikayesi de yazmıőtır. Katar'ın dıő politikasını analiz etmek bir gereksinimdir. Çünkü çok az ülke bu bağlamda bu kadar dikkat çekici bir başarı göstermiőtir. Kuramsal olarak, çalışma sert güç ve ekonomik güç gibi ana güç türleriyle yumuőak güç gibi türev güçlerin olduėunu iddia etmektedir. Diėer yandan, devletlerin büyüklüėü için ölçünün nüfus veya toprakların büyüklüėü deėil devletlerin gücü olduėunu öne sürmektedir. Son olarak, uluslararası iliŐkiler teorilerinin Qatar'ın politikalarını izah edemediėini iddia etmektedir. Çalışma ayrıca 'birleŐtirilmiő güç' ve 'kiralık güç' kavramlarını literatüre kazandırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Katar bağlamında, tez için yapılan araŐtırmalara dayanarak, bu çalışma Katar'ın dıő politika, dıő yatırımlar, insani yardım ve El Cezire medya grubu gibi yumuőak güç araçları sayesinde orta büyüklükte bir devlet olduėunu iddia etmektedir. Ayrıca, FIFA 2020 Dünya Kupası turnuvasına ev sahipliėi yapmak imajını önemli derecede artıracaktır. Katar'ın münhasırlıėı Őudur ki; ülke, yumuőak gücünü sertleŐtirerek egemenliėini güvenceye almak, bölgedeki rakipleriyle çekiŐmek ve etkili bir uluslararası oyuncu olmayı başarabilmektedir. Çalışma kapsam olarak 1995 ile 2020 yılları arasındaki dönemle sınırlıdır. Yöntemsel olarak nitel ve nicel araŐtırma türleri kullanılmıő olup, konuyla ilgili makale, kitap, haber, rapor ve devlet dökümanlarına bakılmasının yanısıra, Doha'da bürokrat, gazeteci, akademisyen ve yabancı iŐçilerle röportajlar yapılmıőtır. Bu çalışma Katar'ı inceleyerek aynı zamanda güç, devletler ve uluslararası iliŐkiler teorileriyle ilgili literatüre katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler; Katar, Yumuőak Güç, Ortadoėu, Dıő Politika, Küçük Devletler

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Qatar is a small state in size and it is located in the Middle East, a region where conflicts within countries or between countries frequently occur. Ensuring sovereignty and security in such troubled region is quite difficult, considering the fact that global powers are also present for their own interests. While the outsiders are lured by oil, regional countries or groups fight because of sectarian and ethnic reasons. Even if a country opts for neutrality, it cannot avoid the effects of clashes. If the country is both small and rich, repercussions might be even worse. In such conditions, states try their best to keep good relations with other countries in efforts to avoid attacks. Kuwait followed such a policy in the 1980s but it could not stop the Iraqi invasion, despite the fact that it helped Iraq to fund the war against Iran. On the other hand, other small states bandwagoned themselves with regional powers or joined alliances.

Prior to Emir Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani era that began in 1995, Qatar acted no different from the other small states. Before him, the Sheikhdom was a satellite country of Saudi Arabia. As soon as Sheikh Hamad came to power, he followed an independent foreign policy, which caused fury among other GCC states and culminated in a counter-coup in 1996. However, Emir Hamad repelled the coup and competed against his country's old allies. Besides securing the sovereignty of his country, Emir Hamad followed an active and aggressive foreign policy, which did not match with that of the neighboring countries and thus disturbed them. Moreover, he founded Al Jazeera TV network to fight his regional rivals. Al Jazeera's coverage challenged the region's status quo as it broke censorship and enabled the free flow of information. For the first time, Arab people were able to hear an opposing voice. Although such a move annoyed the authoritarian regimes and led to hostility between Qatar and regional powers, the Sheikhdom did not step back. With the deployment of US troops to ensure Qatar's security, the Qatari regime began to act like a regional middle power and challenged the clout of other states in the region, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Qatar eventually could become an influential actor in the region thanks to its soft power stemming mainly from hydrocarbon revenues. While the Sheikhdom began

investing abroad to make profit and gain new friends, it acted as a reliable broker in conflicts. Yet, even brokerage disturbed great regional powers since they saw Qatar's mediation diplomacy as an intervention to their traditional role in the region. When the Arab Spring began, Qatar left mediation diplomacy and started to intervene in revolutions by supporting opposition groups against authoritarian regimes. Indeed, Qatar and its global TV network, Al Jazeera, played a great role during the Arab Spring. However, Qatar's interventionist foreign policy led to more strife with other regional countries. Currently, Qatar is under the blockade of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt due to the use of soft power.

Qatar's use of its soft power is so influential that it set the agenda of the region many times and it still has the potential to change the Middle East's political structure. Its soft power is quite salient and inspiring. In order to understand the politics of a small Arab state, conflicts in the Middle East, the role of uncensored media in a region where the flow of information is under scrutiny, and even international relations theories, Qatar's use of soft power and its resources must be studied. This study aims to reveal how influential soft power can be when used by a small state like Qatar.

1.1 Research Topic

The concept of soft power had not been a matter of concern until the late 20th century due to reliance on hard power and the belief that hard power is sufficient to make someone do what someone else wants. However, experiences in international politics have shown that soft power is a *sine qua non* tool to achieve many goals. Hence, many countries have started to invest in soft power, established institutions and dedicated personnel to enforce it. Soft power is so influential that it may empower even a small state enabling it to act as a middle power. This study will examine the role of soft power in Qatar's foreign policy. Qatar is a small country spanning the Qatari Peninsula. Its sole neighbor is Saudi Arabia while the rest of its territory is surrounded by the Persian Gulf. Being an independent country since 1971, Qatar has been under the reign of the Al Thani family since 1868. The incumbent Emir is Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, who succeeded his father Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani in 2013.

Qatar, with its \$180-billion GDP and former Emir Hamad bin Khalifa's reforms, has become a very effective country in the Middle East region. Its foreign policy is quite assertive compared to its size in any context. As Steinsson and Thorhallsson (2017:3) affirm, a small state is one that has a small population, geographical area, and military power. Although Qatar meets the criteria of being a small state in terms of population and geographical area, its use of soft power instruments and its impact on regional policies are, thanks to its active involvement in international politics, more like those of middle powers. Moreover, Qatari soft power possesses unique aspects, such as having one of the most influential TV networks, Al Jazeera, mediation in foreign policy, and involvement in regional conflicts.

This study examines Qatar's soft power based on political (foreign policy), economic, and socio-cultural resources. In terms of political sources, Qatari diplomacy has been involved in many cases of mediation with the objective to increase its reputation and respect in the international arena. Additionally, it aims to solve its security problem through mediation, as it is apparent in its efforts to host American and Turkish forces against external threats. Qatar is geopolitically misfortunate as it is a small state in the Middle East where conflicts continuously occur and the fear of potential threats from its neighbors exists. However, despite the security problem, its diplomatic goals are beyond defending the state that it even followed interventionist policies during the Arab Spring. While Qatar is a non-democratic state, it supported democratization processes during the Arab Spring as per its foreign policy goals, such as increasing its influence in the region and punishing regional rivals. In addition, despite being a Wahhabi state, it supported non-Wahhabi factions, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, also known as Ikhwan, for reasons to be explained below. On the other hand, Qatar's military (hard) power is not strong enough to defend the country as it has nothing more than 12,000 soldiers and few jet fighters.

Economically, it uses investments as a tool of soft power. Qatar has bought and has become a shareholder of quite a lot of companies in other countries. While such commercial procurements allowed Qatar to make a profit, they also serve to improve Qatar's relations with other countries and attract foreign societies. Qatar is also well-known for its foreign aid to underdeveloped countries. The Qatari foreign ministry stated that humanitarian aid organizations based in Qatar had had activities in 100 countries aimed at helping needy people (The Peninsula Qatar, 2017). Yet, Qatari

foundations' assistance has provoked criticism due to, allegedly, being involved in non-humanitarian activities, and for that reason, the neighboring countries have recently threatened to use hard power against the country. Furthermore, Qatar has signed agreements with almost 50 American PR companies (FARA, 2019) and funds foreign institutions for lobbying.

When it comes to the socio-cultural aspect, Qatar will host the FIFA World Cup Championship in 2022, for which it has begun constructing stadiums and other facilities worth billions of dollars. It has also had other sports investments. For example, *beIN Sports* broadcasts live matches in the Middle East and North Africa, France, Spain, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Turkey, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand. Buying famous football teams is another area in sports that Qatar allocates vast investments. While it bought Paris Saint Germain of France, it also negotiated with Turkish football teams such as Başakşehir (Sputnik, 2017). While Qatar is additionally a high contender in media and competing with superpowers with Doha-based Al Jazeera media company, it also funds foreign media outlets (The National, 2014). Doha has also established an education city that hosts famous American universities, which contributes to enhancing the knowledge level of the country.

1.2 Purpose of the Dissertation

Despite being a small country in terms of territory and human resources, Qatar has become an assertive state that utilizes its soft power thanks to revenues earned from its vast natural resources. A close examination of Qatar's foreign policy, media, image-making, public diplomacy and nation-branding achievements is necessary to understand its success or failure level in terms of soft power. In other words, the impact of soft power on Qatari foreign policy should be analyzed. In connection with soft power, Qatar's size, in terms of power and its capacity, is aimed to be clarified. Because while its size places it in the category of small states as per Steinsson and Thorhallsson (2017:3), its active diplomacy of mediation and interventionist policies make it act like a middle power, which is measured not by size but factors like GDP, functionality and behaviors (Jordaan, 2003:165). Such a salient story deserves more focus in an era when soft power has a great impact on states' foreign policies. On the

other hand, a study on Qatar's soft power will enable us to understand the limits and repercussions the Emirate faces.

What is more, examining Qatar's foreign policy is critical to comprehend the ongoing and previous conflicts among Gulf states that are hostile towards the Emirate today. It is not Qatar's military power that provokes the neighboring countries, like UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain as well as non-neighboring countries, such as Egypt and Israel, but its soft power that tries to reshape the region. Qatari media, particularly Al Jazeera TV, played a crucial role during the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring, regardless of the outcome, reached the current point with Al Jazeera's coverage. Moreover, not only does Qatar fund the opposition groups in Libya, Syria, and Egypt, asking for more freedoms in their countries, it also influences foreign governments via lobbying agencies. Accordingly, understanding what Qatar has achieved or failed through its soft power will provide a comprehensive acumen on regional conflicts and politics. Therefore, one of the goals of the present study is to contribute to the understanding of Middle East politics via Qatar's foreign policy, the main tool of which is soft power.

First, by analyzing soft power in Qatar's foreign policy, this study aims to reveal the extent of the impact of soft power on Qatari's foreign policy. Qatar has become an influential power by relying solely on its soft power as it is small in terms of hard power and size of population. The study uncovers how the Emirate uses it so effectively and fill the gaps stemming from its weakness in other areas. Second, the study tries to prove that soft power can sometimes be the default power when hard power is weak. As it will be shown in Qatar's case below, a state can secure itself and even become an active player in international politics if it subtly wields its soft power. The third goal in this study is to prove its argument that soft power can transform a small state into a middle power. Qatar does not behave like a small state, but rather a middle power. What makes the country so assertive is its economic power and soft power, the later of which derives from the former. While the study does not equate soft power with hard power in terms of influence, it argues that the latter can still secure a country and even raise its level of power, i.e. from a small state to a middle power. Fourth, it also analyzes the benefits and drawbacks of soft power by examining the Qatari case. In the end, it concludes that Qatar has huge benefits and a few losses due to misuse or excessive use of soft power. Fifth, the study also shows how Qatar utilizes its institutions in exerting soft power. As it will be demonstrated later in this thesis,

Qatari institutions, from diplomacy to companies, including media organs, serve the Sheikhdom's state ends at maximum level. As details will be given below, the keyword for Qatar is "maximum". Finally, to what extent Qatar's soft power overlaps with Joseph Nye's concept of soft power is another focal point of this study. It argues that Nye's concept explains Qatar's situation in general terms, but there are also some aspects that cannot be found in the literature on soft power. For example, this study confirms that individuals also have soft power and that they can boost state soft power with their policies.

In addition, the study also analyzes whether international theories explain Qatar's policies or not. While some of its policies fit various arguments of theories, some others do not comply with theoretical views. Qatar's foreign policy is explained from a theoretical perspective, and overlapping or contradicting aspects with theories are clarified in the text.

1.3 Scope and Content of the Dissertation

This dissertation will focus on the role of Qatari soft power by examining its sources and will be limited as outlined below.

First of all, the analyses in this study will cover events that occurred from 1995 to the present. In terms of foreign policy, policymakers, the evolution and characteristics of Qatari diplomacy, alliances, geopolitical impact, and relations with neighbors are examined. As far as socio-cultural aspects are concerned, Al Jazeera, religion, education, cultural diplomacy, and the FIFA 2022 World Cup are analyzed. In addition, foreign aid and investments are elucidated from a soft power perspective. On the other hand, domestic and economic issues are off-content. Besides, comparison with other countries is rarely made.

1.4 Research Questions

This dissertation aims to answer several research questions.

The first research question is: (1) does Qatar punch above its weight when it comes to soft power?. The study argues that soft power is as influential as hard power in the

case of Qatar. Although surrounded by hostile neighbors, and even enforced a blockade by the same countries, it has been able to secure itself and simultaneously has tried to increase its clout in the region and world politics. Thanks to its soft power, Qatar has its hands involved in almost all regional conflicts despite its limited power. Considering its influence in the region, the Sheikdom should be called a middle power rather than a small state since only a middle power can have such behaviors and functionality.

The second research question is: (2) how Qatari soft power tools contribute to Qatar's foreign policy? First of all, Qatar's soft power is derived from its economic power. Qatar uses its financial resources to mediate and intervene in regional conflicts. While it has been successful in mediation, its interventionist policies have failed. In addition, Qatari investments have led to finding new friends against their hostile rivals. In other words, Qatar buys friendship via investment and friendship. Moreover, Al Jazeera is the biggest soft power tool it possesses. The TV network was so influential, particularly during the Arab Spring, that uprisings were called the 'Al Jazeera revolution'. Qatar could have increased its influence in the region, had Muslim Brotherhood factions come to power after the revolutions.

The third and final research question is: (3) can Qatar's foreign policy be explained by the existing international relations theories and concepts? Qatar is a small state in size but acts like a middle power as opposed to that envisioned by various theoretical strands within the realist theory. The actor in Qatar is not the state but individuals, a fact that is incompatible with rational theories. While it bandwagons with the US, it also follows an aggressive policy, surprising realists again. Moreover, it benefits from interdependency but it is economically less dependent on greater powers, which is a situation that simultaneously both contradicts and complies with liberalism. Finally, while it heeds identity, norms, and rules, it also undertakes the responsibility of constructing such concepts in the Arab world, reminding constructivists what they missed. In constructivist theory, a country chooses between existing norms and rules. Yet, the theory does not mention whether countries introduce new ones or not. On the other hand, concepts like soft power and small states should be improved further and new concepts must be introduced. This study introduces two new concepts regarding power types: "combined power" and "hired power". Overall, existing theories and concepts do not exactly describe Qatar's distinctive policies. Yet, it can be argued that

liberalism appears to have greater explanatory power in comparison to other theories on the subject in the case of Qatar.

1.5 Significance and Distinctive Contributions of the Dissertation

Since Qatari soft power has distinctive aspects, this study is expected to contribute to the literature by bringing about new findings and ideas. First, international relations theories look at the events from different perspectives and make explanations as per their arguments. No theory explains all developments that occur in the context of a particular academic discipline. For example, while realist international relations theory counts on the power and accepts the state as the only actor, it ignores other factors, like individuals and the economy. When Qatar's case is examined theoretically, it can be seen that it is not in line with any theories. Thus, by examining Qatari soft power, this study aims to reveal gaps in international relations theories on the subject of soft power, middle power, and small power. For example, the claim that small states do not deal with macro issues has proven to be wrong in this study. Moreover, in association with the constructivist theory, how countries construct or revive identities is examined with regard to Qatar. In addition, the study tries to show that soft power is as much important as hard power if the former is used subtly. Besides, concepts about the greatness of states are questioned and new criteria are offered in the calculation of the status of a state. Finally, new concepts, like "combined power" and "hired power", are introduced in the existing study. In the same vein, the study tries to prove why smart power should not be accepted as a power type.

On the other hand, Qatar's foreign policy, politics in the Middle East, sources of regional conflicts, and actors are analyzed in detail. Therefore, this study will shed light specifically on Qatar, and generally, on the Middle East. This study might be a good reference for those studying Qatar, foreign policy, soft power, media, and geopolitics. Finally, Turkey and Qatar have close ties with each other, but studies in the area are still insufficient. This study will be the first Ph.D. dissertation written in Turkey, as of 2020, on the subject of Qatar's foreign policy.

1.6 Methodology of Dissertation

In the present study, both quantitative and qualitative research methods were used. Literature review of books, articles, news reports, official documents, annual reports, speeches by Qatari decision-makers, and relevant governmental websites was done in efforts to test our hypotheses. Sources about soft power and Qatar were particularly analyzed so that we could reflect all discussions pertaining to our dissertation. The main topics that were researched were: power, soft power, small states, middle power, international relations theories, Qatari foreign policy, foreign aid, foreign investment, and media. Furthermore, face-to-face and remote interviews were conducted for this purpose. For qualitative research (interviews), a visit was paid to Qatar and people from Georgetown University, Qatar University, Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Al-Shark Newspaper, Qatar National Museum, and Al Jazeera were interviewed. There were also remote interviews with scholars, journalists, and analysts with expertise on Qatar. They were accessed via phone and e-mail. Questions asked were not the same since each interviewee had different areas of expertise. In addition, authors who mostly write about soft power and Qatari foreign policy were particularly chosen for the interview. Thus, their written views were also verified and recorded during the interview. Moreover, those that did not want their names to be disclosed were shown as anonymous interviewees or pseudonyms were used.

1.7 Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation consists of five chapters. The first chapter will be an introduction, focusing on the scope, purpose, methodology, structure, hypotheses and research questions of the dissertation.

In the second chapter, the study will discuss theoretical approaches to the subject. The concepts of power, hard power, smart power, soft power, small states, middle powers, geopolitics and analysis levels will be discussed broadly. In addition, the concepts will be examined according to international relations theories such as realism, neo-realism, liberalism, social constructivism, post-structuralism, and Marxism.

In the third chapter, basic information on Qatar's government, politics, and economy, alongside notable incidents, will be provided. Thereafter, the specifications of Qatar's foreign policy, Qatar's decision-makers, its relations with neighbors, mediation and

intervention efforts will be discussed. Moreover, Qatar's lobbying activities, particularly those in the US, will be examined.

The fourth chapter will focus on socio-cultural values as a source of soft power. First, Al Jazeera's coverage and ideology, how it is used as a foreign policy tool, its involvement in conflicts, biases, and objectivity will be analyzed concerning foreign policy and culture. Second, religion, education, and cultural diplomacy will be examined. Finally, the FIFA 2022 World Cup tournament will be discussed in the last section.

The fifth chapter will contain an analysis of how financial resources turn into a soft power tool. Qatar uses foreign investment, not only to make a profit, but also to form alliances. Hence, we will also look at how foreign investment and foreign aid activities –as resources of soft power– are used as supplements to Qatar's foreign policy.

The dissertation will end with a “Conclusion” section.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

This chapter analyzes power, types of power, and other related theoretical topics that will help us understand Qatar's power and its use. The chapter will analyze the following topics, respectively: power, types of power, Joseph Nye's concept of soft power, small states, middle powers, geopolitics, and level of analysis in international relations.

2.1 Power

Various scholars have provided different definitions of power in the study of politics. Historically, it goes back to Thucydides, who contended that the war between Athenians and Spartans was a result of the latter's efforts to balance the former's rising power (in Kadercan, 2017: 323). When the Spartans realized the Athenians are gaining power, which was a threat to their existence, they allied with smaller city-states to oppose the Athenians (Ibid). The decades-long war ended with the Athenians' defeat. Machiavelli and Hobbes' views of power are also worth mentioning. According to McAnulla (2011: 90), while Machiavelli opposed any normative notion in a state's administration, Hobbes argued that selfish individuals seek for power maximization on the account of others, and the only way to bring order is the transfer of individual sovereignty to a state-like structure that he called *Leviathan*. On the other hand, Karl Marx claimed that whichever individual or group has power is related to the class structure in the capitalist system. In other words, Marx is of the view that those controlling the economy (structure) will control politics/state (superstructure) as well (in Küçük, 2017: 208). Moreover, Max Weber argues that power is an advantage that provides an individual the upper hand in a social relationship to achieve his/her will despite the resistance of others (Weber, 1968: 212). Meanwhile, Robert Dahl's concept of power is more formal. According to him, "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do (Dahl, 1957: 202-203)". While Bachrach and Baratz accept Dahl's definition, they argue that "if A is able to prevent or limit B to bring new political values and practices to public consideration, then A has power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970:7)". Therefore, according to them, power is not only enforcement but also resistance, which is called non-decision-

making power. Labeling Dahl's definition of power as "one-dimensional" and Bachrach and Baratz' "two-dimensional", Lukes (2005: 28) introduces the "three-dimensional power", meaning that sometimes those holding power may not enforce or prevent a decision if it is not in their interest. For example, companies in the health industry will not meddle in decision-making unless decisions concern them.

Theoretically, positivist theories, like Realism and Liberalism, put power at the center of the debate. According to Morgenthau (1985), a country's national interest is embodied by power whose sources are military, geography, natural resources, economy, demography, and so on. The greater a country's power, the more chance it will have to survive and repel existential threats. Going further, offensive realists claim that every state's goal is to gain more power so that they can be a hegemon. While power is mainly the armed strength for realists, liberalists count on other sources, too. They claim that power is divided among various groups in the state. Thus, the state is not like a billiard ball, as realists claim, but rather a composition of various actors that have different capacities and capabilities. Critical theorists, on the other hand, base their theories on Marxist approaches and divide the world system, coined by Wallerstein, as center, semi-periphery, and periphery countries (Küçük, 2017: 215). Yet, post-structuralists focus on how power holders control knowledge and exert it via discourse. Regarding the international application of power, Nye, who classifies types of power into military, economic and soft, asserts that military power is exercised through coercion, deterrence, and protection via means such as threat and force (in Yavuzaslan and Cetin, 2016:5). Regarding hard power, governments may use coercive diplomacy, war, or alliance to attain their goals. As for economic power, while behaviors are encouragement, coercion, and admirability, the tools are money-making, investment, values, and culture. Governments may either help, bribe, or use public diplomacy for enforcement. Finally, for soft power, an agenda is created and enforced by government institutions and policies that benefit from unilateral and multilateral diplomacy.

Moreover, for Petress (2003: 1), "Power is the ability to influence others to believe, behave, or to value as those in power desire them to or to strengthen, validate, or confirm present beliefs, behaviors, or values". According to French and Raven (1959: 262-268), there are several forms of power: expert power, reward power, legitimate power, referent power, and coercive power. Information power, traditional power, and

charismatic power may be added to forms of power as well (Petress, 2003: 1). Petress (Ibid: 1-2-3) defines all his forms of power as well as those of French and Raven one by one. Expert power, as the name implies, is what one knows through their experiences, knowledge, skills, etc. Reward power is to get things done through encouragement with rewards. Legitimate power results from a person's being elected, selected, or appointed to a position of authority. For instance, the police have legitimate power granted by the state. As the state is the source of power, it is the sole authority with the capacity to delegitimize police power. Referent power, on the other hand, is power stemming from affiliation with someone or something powerful. For example, being a member of the labor union may give you power against your boss. The other form of power, coercive power, is to force others via military, economic, or political strength. As for information power, it is the unique knowledge you have but others do not have or cannot access, e.g. state secrets. Meanwhile, traditional power originates from customs, traditions, culture, religion, etc. It forces you to conform to traditional ways. Finally, charismatic power is something inherent to very few people, who influence, attract, mobilize, and draw the loyalty of others. Such power may be used both for good and bad. For instance, while Eva Peron had positive charisma, Hitler is recalled by his repulsive charisma.

On the other hand, there are three traditional approaches to the conceptualization of power: attribute power, relational power, and structural power. The first approach, attribute power, is related to the properties attributed to the state. According to this approach, "power resides" in the aggregate capabilities of the state relative to others and can be measured by some inventory of state attributes (Caporaso and Haggard, 1989: 105). This approach was further matured by realists who argued that power was not only an immediate aim but also a means to the nation's end (Morgenthau, 1985: 31). Morgenthau defined power as "Man's control over the minds and actions of other men and defined two elements/factors of power "relatively stable" and "subject to constant change (Ibid)". While relatively stable factors include geography and natural resources, those subject to constant change are industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy and the quality of government (Ibid: 127). Yet, attribute power is prone to criticism as it failed to explain why Americans in Vietnam and Soviets in Afghanistan failed despite vast resources (Ding, 2006: 35). The second approach, relational approach,

argues that power is not only limited to states but it is also embedded in relations with other states (Paruk, 2014: 44). This approach claims that power is not absolute but relative and contains resources from all kinds of exchanges between states and non-states, like NGOs and multinational corporations. Thus, the concepts of superpower, global power, regional power, and emerging power came into being by the comparison of states' relative power. Finally, the structural approach argues that power emanates from the structure of the international system (Ibid: 45). It claims that power is unequally distributed in the system. In this view, those having more power are less dependent. Structural power can be international political formations, such as the North/South and G20, or governance structures, like the IMF, World Bank, NATO, and the UN Security Council.

Moreover, contemporary debates about political power suggest that there are two types of power: hard power and soft power. However, a new type called smart power, which was coined recently, has also gained acceptance. Regarding hard power, it is defined as “the capacity to get what you want through the use of economic power or through the use of military force, by threatening others that you will use against them your economic superiority or your coercive capabilities (Pallawer, 2011: 81)”. Hard power’s resources are concrete, tangible and physical. A country’s military forces, economic strength, population, territorial size, natural resources, etc. define the magnitude of its hard power. According to Gompert and Binnendijk (2016: 5), “Coercive power may include economic sanctions, punitive political measures, cyber operations, covert intelligence operations, military aid, propaganda, the constriction or manipulation of trade, the interdiction of goods and people, and support for political opposition, among other measures”. Unlike other types of power, hard power is calculable, costly, and easily exerted. In addition, hard power is felt and the results are quick and predictable. However, when hard power exercise is over, the result may change. It also makes people suffer, deprives them of their basic rights, limits freedom, and alienates those it incurs. Theoretically, hard power is associated with realism in international relations theories. According to realists, the international system has an anarchical environment in which states struggle for power maximization to assure their security. Therefore, military capabilities are the main tools to survive under such complicated circumstances. Realists also see economic power as another type of hard power but accept it as secondary compared to military power. Then, how effective is

hard power? Some scholars think that world peace can not be upheld without hard power since it is not possible to stop conflicts and wars without military intervention. According to Spiegel (2011), who criticizes the European Union for placing greater emphasis on soft power, without hard power, no country like Japan or unions like the EU can become a superpower. However, some experts hold the opinion that the use of hard power generally results in greater turmoil rather than peace due to the consequences of military interventions and sanctions.

Since both hard and soft power have fallen short of achieving political benefits due to their limits, in her article published in *Foreign Affairs* magazine in March 2004, Suzanne Nossel coined the term “smart power”, which is a combination of hard and soft power. Although the term is associated with American foreign policy, it can be used by any country to leverage its interests. Seeing that it is a more comprehensive term to explain soft power, Joseph Nye revised his definition of soft power, acknowledging that smart power is a more enhanced term explaining what is meant by soft power. According to Nye (2011), “Smart power is the ability to combine hard and soft power into a successful strategy”. Besides, for Pallaver (2011: 20), smart power is a compilation of diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural tools, and he views the European Union as a great example of this type of power. The tendency for smart power increased after American animosity and reached its peak in the 2000s due to the failure of military power. Smart power has become a necessity as people have started to use smartphones, and armies and terrorist groups have started to use smart bombs. Not to mention, people are also smarter today than they were in the past. As people of developing countries become more educated, they are also more sensitive to hard and soft power (Wilson III, 2008: 113). Traditionally, there are institutional imbalances between hard power and soft power. Almost every politician, individual, company, or district has an interest in hard power affairs. On the other hand, soft power affairs are maintained by former diplomats or NGOs. However, failures in the use of hard power have led interest groups and voters to focus on soft power instruments (Ibid: 119). However, scholars are yet to come up with a brilliant idea about how hard power and soft power may be articulated. This might perhaps be because there are too many actors on both sides that are unable to meet in a common point.

In addition, Kamrava (2017) suggests another type of power, which he calls “subtle power”. “Subtle power is a composite form of power that combines three classical

forms of power (Ibid: 93)". In other words, it is a combination of forms of power developed by Dahl, Lukes, and Bachrach&Baratz. There are four components of subtle power: (1) safety and security; (2) the prestige deriving from brand recognition and developing a positive reputation; (3) proactive presence on the global stage; (4) wealth (Ibid: 113-117). In a face-to-face interview, Kamrava (2019) pointed out that it is power that sets the agenda behind the scenes. In his various studies, he argues that he conceptualized the term by analyzing Qatar, which, he thinks, used subtle power during Emir Hamad's era.

Finally, this study argues that there are missing points in theoretical explanations concerning power and its sources. First, when power is analyzed, scholars do it from state level, thereby ignore the influence of sub-state actors, particularly individuals. Sometimes a leader's personal efforts can make a state greater or rescue it from vanishing. What Napoleon Bonaparte, Mahatma Gandhi, and Sultan Abdulhamid II had done for their countries could have been hardly achieved by any other leader. Second, threatening other countries with military power does not always make weak countries do what the strong country wants them to do. While Americans forced the Japanese to surrender by dropping two atomic bombs during World War II, it could not defeat the relatively weak Vietnamese socialists. This was the case with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as well. What made weak countries resist superpowers was moral power, which is inherent in religion and ideology. While this research does not agree with Ferguson (2009), who claims that morale is the main source of power, it suggests that this invisible instinct/belief is one of the three sources of power together with military strength and economy. Third, the study also disagrees with scholars' claim that there is "smart power" since it is a strategy of exerting hard power and soft power together or one after another. Besides, it is incalculable and invisible. One can argue that moral power is also abstract and can never be measured but it has a triggering aspect and does not require a combination of already existing types of power.

2.2 Soft Power

Soft power, almost unanimously acknowledged by the academic world, was coined by Joseph Nye. However, despite the conceptualization of soft power by Nye, it was acknowledged to exist in history under different terms. The efforts made by countries

to affect other nations' public opinion is nothing new. According to Melissen (2005: 3), this was the case even in ancient times, as far back as the Bible. Yet, it was Guttenberg's invention of the printing press, which dramatically changed the way people communicated. Previously, Venetians were already distributing newsletters in their diplomatic network. Cardinal Richelieu and Louis XIV of France also worked hard to remould their country's image. Even fascist and communist countries were striving to win the hearts and minds of the foreign public in the 20th century. Melissen argues that contemporary soft power activities date back to World War I; Lenin and Wilson had already challenged one another at the soft power level as early as 1917-18 (Ibid: 4).

Prominent international relations theorists like Morgenthau and E.H. Carr were also aware of the significance of soft power and mentioned it under different names. Moreover, Gramsci and Foucault had already explained soft power with different terms. As per the Gramscian concept of hegemony, hegemony can be exercised through combining force and consent and balancing each other, thus the ruling class can maintain and justify its dominance (Gramsci, 1971: 80). Foucault, on the other hand, argues that governments use various techniques to subjugate bodies and control populations. When doing this, governments hide a substantial part of power so that it can be tolerable (Foucault, 1976). Furthermore, Ying Fan (2008: 3) contends that soft power was superior to hard power in Chinese history, and he tries to prove his claim by providing examples from Confucian philosophy alongside certain Chinese proverbs. Indeed, it is generally accepted that China is a reluctant user of hard power. Once, Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahatir bin Mohamed, said that although they were neighbors with China, they had never encountered a Chinese threat or invasion in the previous millennium. It can be argued that any country, depending on conditions, uses soft power over foreign countries' public in various ways. In the same vein, almost all countries have a strategy of applying soft power in their policies.

a) Joseph Nye's Concept of Soft Power

Joseph Nye's conceptualization of soft power was a reaction to declinist theories which were at the top of the agenda in the 1980s. When American power began to decline in the post-Vietnam War era, some theorists wrote pessimistic views about the future of

the American hegemony. Nye re-defined power and coined soft power by referring to traditional definitions made by classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, Klaus Knorr, and Ray S. Cline. Nye's concept of soft power can be found in various articles he wrote and the three following books: *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (1990); *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (2004); *The Future of Power* (2011). In *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, Nye argues that there was a second face of power:

A country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects. In this case, it is just as important to set the agenda and structure the situation in world politics, as it is to get others to change in particular situations. This aspect of power - getting others to want to what you want - might be called indirect or co-optive power. It is in contrast to the active command power behavior of getting others to do what you want. Co-optive power can rest on the attraction of one's idea or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences that others express.... The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions. This dimension can be thought of as soft power, in contrast to the hard command power usually associated with tangible resources like military and economic strength (Nye, 1990: 31-32).

Nye argues that "Soft power is to get others to want the outcomes that you want – it co-opts people rather than coerces them" (Nye, 2004: 5). If the aim is to control others, then, you should have certain resources like population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, political stability, etc. (Nye, 1990: 153). Soft power is less transferable, less coercive, and associated with intangible power resources, such as culture, ideology, and institutions, to which Nye refers as elements of soft power:

The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority) (Nye, 2002: 8-12).

Soft power is not less important than hard power and they are interrelated and intertwined with each other. Munk-Petersen (2013: 30) formulizes the relation between the two types of power as follows:

Hard power>Coercion< >Inducement< >Threat< >Pay< >Sanction<
>Frame< > Persuade<**Soft Power**

In addition, Nye thinks that since the world is economically and communicationally interdependent and that non-state actors are more influential than ever, soft power cannot be ignored (Ibid). Furthermore, Nye and Keohane mention “complex interdependence”, which has three main characteristics: multiple channels, the absence of hierarchy among issues, and a minor role for military force (Keohane and Nye, 1977). They contend that:

Multiple channels connect societies, including informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among nongovernmental elites.... and transnational organizations ... The agenda of interstate relationships consist of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy.... Military security does not consistently dominate the agenda.... The distinction between domestic and foreign issues became blurred... Military force is not used by government towards other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails... force is often not an appropriate way of achieving other goals (such as economic and ecological welfare) that are becoming more important (Keohane and Nye in Paruk, 2014: 52).

In such a complexly interdependent international system, some transnational corporations have more revenues than many countries. These companies may lack military power but sometimes they are more useful in terms of achieving a country's goals. Moreover, the declining costs of transportation and communication have revolutionized global markets, accelerating the development of huge corporations that transfer economic activity across border. The faster flow of goods and capital serves to boost economies. In such circumstances, multinational companies may contribute to a country's interests (Nye, 2004). On the other hand, any governmental intervention may be counter-productive in this complexity because other factors like nationalism make military intervention costly as modernization and communication have increased

the capabilities of backward states. What is more, not only weaker states are able to produce heavy weapons but even militants have access to sophisticated weapons. Nonetheless, the nature of world politics is also going through change. Certain issues, such as ecological changes, drug trafficking, epidemics, etc. require international cooperation. On the other hand, some issues are national but they have transnational effects, e.g. the Chernobyl incident. Not to mention, with new actors in the international domain, the concept of national security has also changed. Thus, military power will not be enough to protect a country as states encounter new types of vulnerability (Ibid).

Nye's point of view about soft power instruments is more or less accepted by all scholars. Indeed, culture, ideology, and other elements draw foreigners and lead a transformation of weaker culture to dominant culture through imitation and/or replacement. For instance, American culture, which Nye considers as superior to all others, has been continuing to penetrate other cultures, making others' customs and traditions undergo change to resemble those of its own. Companies like McDonald's, Levi's, Coca Cola, Microsoft, Facebook, Apple, IBM, Boeing, and Hollywood-based film producers not only earn huge amounts of money, but also help spread the American way of life across the world, while democracy and liberal economy have been accepted as the best political and economic policies.

It is important to note that while military intervention is costly, economical, institutional, and organizational skills cost less and may be more effective. There is interdependence but it often means unevenly balanced mutual dependence. In other words, a country may be more interdependent with the other. Nye also emphasizes that more powerful countries use international organizations for their interests rather than others (Nye, 1990). There are different power structures now. For instance, one country may have nuclear weapons, while the other may be economically strong. On the other hand, like states, the power of non-state actors is also important. Many NGOs, companies, and international organizations are more or less involved in the decision-making process with states.

Another noteworthy aspect of power is that it is less transferable from one sphere to another than in earlier periods. In the past, a king could buy more infantry to colonize a country and fill the treasury. But now, it is difficult and costly. For example, if Japan wants to have nuclear weapons, its political price will be higher. Besides, bigger

powers are less able to use their power resources since private actors and small states have become more powerful. Nye claims that "at least five trends have contributed to this diffusion of power: economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and changing political issues (Ibid: 160)".

b) Criticisms of Nye's Concept of Soft Power

However, Nye's concept of soft power is not immune to criticism. First of all, while Nye's three sources of soft power were initially American culture, international laws and institutions, and American multinational corporations, he later changed them to culture, political values, and foreign policy. This shows that the concept is in the making and Nye might further change it. On the other hand, according to Fan (2008: 3), only culture is a source of soft power. Yet, with countless cultures in the world, how does one decide which culture should be adhered to and used for inspiration? For example, Chinese, Egyptian, Iranian, or Indian cultures have deeper roots in history but their levels of attraction are not considerable when compared to Western cultures, particularly American culture (Ibid: 5). This study argues that contemporary or popular culture is more or equally as attractive as traditional culture. In other words, a country does not necessarily have to have historical sites to fascinate tourists. An artificial lake, a tall building, a tower like the Eiffel, an aquarium, etc. may charm more visitors than an old temple. Moreover, a cultural resource has hard power roots. As a proverb says, "the powerful are always imitated". Therefore, as long as a country is not a great power with strong hard power, the degree of its attraction is limited. For instance, New York attracts twice as many tourists as Cairo despite the fact that the latter is thousands of years old and houses historical temples like pyramids.

Another problem is who owns soft power. Individuals with reputation, knowledge, authority, etc. have soft power (Ibid: 2). Gandhi, for instance, may be a good example of individual soft power. Regardless, all theories concur that only states possess soft power. Yet, since a state has many divisions, like government, NGOs, international companies, society, and so on, they may not have equal appeal to foreigners. For example, while the United States is a hegemon in terms of military power, it is quite weak in convincing others about how good American values are. Some scholars think that America's dependence on hard power as well as its tendencies to impose values

by force may be one of the reasons behind this (Riordan, 2005: 181). As Van Ham (2005: 56) states, the September 11 attacks were a challenge to America as a superpower. Many Americans were shocked and questioned why people would hate the land that offers Harvard, Hollywood, McDonald's, Microsoft, etc.

Moreover, unlike hard power, soft power is relative, intangible and context-based (Fan, 2008: 6). While economic power may be deemed as soft power when compared to military power, it is hard power if compared to culture. Thus, soft power has levels of hardness in itself. It is also intangible as nobody can measure it. Besides, the impact of soft power depends on the context of whom, where, or when it is enforced. For example, while cultural proximity makes it easier to be accepted, religious differences resist the infiltration of the dominant culture. Unlike Nye, Fan claims that "Soft power is merely a manifestation or presentation of hard power... and... without hard power soft power cannot work properly or not work at all (Ibid: 9)". His argument is accepted by other scholars since countries with big economies, like Germany and Japan, are not as successful as the US in spreading their soft power. However, we should recall that those countries with strong military power, but weaker soft power, cannot always win the hearts of the foreign public, e.g. Russia. Yet, China, where there is strict state control, may be assumed as an exception. State-sponsored Chinese soft power has been influential not only in Southeast Asia but also in Africa. Jan Melissen (2005: 8) goes even further to claim that China is the best in public diplomacy. Another criticism is concerning Nye's perception that American culture is superior to other cultures. Indeed, the powerful is always imitated. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the culture of the strong will always be welcomed. For instance, even European states, which are America's allies, do not accept the dominance of American values, let alone the Muslim world.

Another criticism of Nye's definition of soft power (the ability to get others to do what you want) is that it is not precise. According to Vuving (2009: 6-7), "Others should *accept* what you force them to do", but he admits that this definition is just as poor. He also opposes Walter Russell Mead's views on soft and hard power that military force is "sharp" and economic strength is "sticky". Yet, Vuving claims that economic power is meaningless without military power. Even if a country has both economic and military power, this does not mean that its soft power will be adopted. For example, Nazi Germany had both types but no country welcomed its soft power. In

addition, some scholars blame Nye's concept of soft power since it falls short of explaining power in world politics. While Nye conceptualizes soft power as "the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideas and policies", he is unable to explain how American culture is attractive to the rest of the world (Bilgin and Eliş, 2008: 11). Nye is silent about why universal values are the "right" ones or how one acquires such values; he does not explain why some values are universal and why some are not. Hence, Nye is criticized for being American-centric and only advising America about how to implement its soft power (Ibid: 12), although soft power is also applied by coercion, a fact that Nye ignores (Fan, 2008: 6; Bilgin and Eliş, 2008: 12). Finally, this study argues that soft power is partly a derivative of hard power and economic power and it can not come into being without being driven by the two primary powers (military and economic power). In line with our argument, Nye's three resources of soft power (political values, culture, and foreign policy) are insufficient to make B do what A wants it to do. Moreover, what makes the US more attractive is not its 250-year-old culture but its economic power and partly military power. Furthermore, as an example of political values, India, the Netherlands, or Italy are all democratic countries, but it is still the US that has greater soft power than all of them considering that the US is militarily and economically stronger than others. In the Soft Power Index 30 discussed below, all thirty countries are strong in terms of primary powers. Therefore, it can be argued that soft power is not an alternative to military or economic power but generally an extension of them.

c) Other Studies and Conceptualizations of Soft Power

Despite the fact that the term soft power was coined by Nye, there have been numerous other academics who have studied the subject and written good articles and books about the subject. For example, Alexander Vuving tries to find answers to questions such as "How does soft power work?" and "What constitutes soft power?". According to Vuving (2009: 3-4), in a narrower sense, soft power is similar to cultural influence. In the broader sense, it is non-military power and includes both cultural power and economic strength. He claims that there is a misunderstanding of the concept of soft power due to it being "under-theorized," "lack of academic refinement," and "analytical fuzziness". For him, equating power with power resources is another reason for misunderstanding. In other words, if one country has power resources, it is supposed to be powerful. However, as power is not identical with its resources, this is

not the case. The same resource can produce both hard and soft power. To solve the dilemma, he makes a distinction between power resources and power currencies.

Vuving also develops his own concept of soft power and argues that there are three power currencies from which both power and its “softness” are derived: *beauty*, *brilliance*, and *benignity* (Ibid:8). *Benignity* refers to the positive attitudes that one expresses when one treats people, especially when treating the client. Among humans, it generates soft power through the production of gratitude and sympathy (Ibid:9). On the other hand, *Brilliance* refers to the high performance that one accomplishes when they do things. It generates soft power through the production of admiration (Ibid:10). The third currency, *Beauty*, is the tendency to seek union with like-minded people, the tendency to join forces with those who pursue the same goal, the need for moral support and guidance. It generates soft power through the production of inspiration (Ibid: 12). Vuving emphasizes that *Benignity* comes in many forms. For example, when you are nice to others; when you are generous to others; when you do good to others; when you help them, support them, protect them; when you care about others; when you pay attention or listen to others; when you respect the rights, interests, or self-esteem of others. The result of all these good behaviors is gratitude and sympathy. As for *Brilliance*, it manifests itself in many forms, such as a strong and awesome military, a wealthy and vibrant economy, a rich and radiant culture, or a peaceful and well-run society. Brilliance also comes out from a country with advanced science and technology, a military victory, or economic success. Brilliance generates admiration and respect. Regarding *Beauty*, it draws actors closer to each other through shared ideals, values, causes or visions. It gives actors a sense of warmth and security, hope and self-extension, identity and community, and vindication and praise (Ibid: 8-11).

Meanwhile, a problem that concerns soft power, in general, must be mentioned. Despite abundant studies, soft power has little significance in international relations. Scholars analyzing the international system mainly weigh on hard power. In addition, they do not define what exactly power is. Realists, in particular, offer abstract definitions of power and embody it as a military or economic power. Bilgin and Eliş (2008: 8) argue that ontologically, realists saw the state as a principal actor and ignored the power of non-state actors, whereas epistemologically, they tried to discover the “laws” that are assumed to govern social relations, and sought to base its conclusions on empirically verifiable “facts”. Conversely, soft power is intangible, incalculable,

and unmeasurable. Therefore, soft power is out of the question in the realist approach. In addition, power also means preventing something from happening. Such power can easily be enforced without coercion, but realists ignore it. On the other hand, hard power (military intervention, coercive diplomacy, economic sanctions, etc.) is emphasized by neo-realists while liberal institutionalists favor soft power (Wilson III, 2008: 114). Furthermore, Lin and Hongtao (2017: 72) argue that "The 'soft power' theory, coined by Joseph Nye, is a supplement and extension of traditional hard power ideology". On the other hand, this study opposes realist views and contends that soft power can still be as important as hard power if exerted subtly (see next chapters).

Another key issue that must be examined is which actors use soft power. As known, nation-states are the main agents/implementers of soft power through their institutions, bureaucracy, and policies. States may also hire indigenous or foreign agents to achieve their goals. For instance, prominent UK instruments like the BBC and the British Council, which are autonomous in their business, owe their success to government funding. Another example may be that of the UAE and Saudi Arabia which pour hundreds of millions of dollars into think-tanks and foreign media so as to improve their image in the Western world. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is another agent. Although states' policies are suspected by other communities, NGOs are more credible and spread through the public more than any other actor as their affairs are generally civic and address civilians. Moreover, they are deemed to be objective, transparent, non-profit, legitimate, accountable and easily managed (Raimzhanova, 2015: 10). For example, Goethe Institute, with many branches spreading all over the world, is more influential than any other German governmental institution in terms of implementing soft power. The activities of the British Council are also regarded as a success story for the United Kingdom.

A third actor is Multinational Corporations (MNCs), which have overseas investments and affect foreign people with their products and activities related to social responsibility concerning the environment, economy, social sustainability, etc., all contributing to the home country's soft power. Obviously, companies like Coca Cola, McDonald's, Microsoft, Google, Ford, and Facebook have positive yields for the US in terms of soft power. Another example is that of Nokia, a brand from a rich but little known country, Finland, and its contribution to the country's recognition.

A final agent for the implementation of soft power is media, which can access almost any person anywhere in the world. TV broadcasters, newspapers, journals, and today's social media can change perceptions in any direction they favor. The news reported by media outlets can legitimize a country's policies, discredit targeted countries or groups, disguise or reveal facts that the world audience needs to know, cause uprisings, and even get concessions. According to a survey conducted with Chinese students who were interviewed over a period of four years, from 2008 onwards, media, American movies, music, TV dramas, novels, news sports, and chat websites had a great impact on their views on the US (Yanru, 2012). Yet, media's propaganda may backlash as in the case of Qatar's Al Jazeera, which was an open advocate of the Arab Spring. When countries blockading Qatar submitted their terms for normalization, it was interesting that one of the terms was the request to close down Al Jazeera permanently.

Although Joseph Nye and many other scholars make much of soft power, a considerable number of them still favor hard power. Gray (2011: ix) argues that soft power can only be a substitute for hard power and any attempt to replace it with hard power will be very dangerous as it does not have equal weight and utility. Furthermore, since soft power is based on the acceptance of interlocutors, it is not the enforcer but the enforcee that will decide its success. Therefore, the discretion of customers is a vital factor for success. Fedirka (2017) argues that if country A lacks leverage over country B, it can not force B to behave a certain way. Therefore, without pressure, B will do whatever is in its best interest. In this sense, soft power is enforced only when hard power is not an option. For example, China is investing in the Philippines purely for persuasion as the islands that comprise it are on international trade routes. If China uses hard power, it knows it will have to encounter the US military, which is a security guarantor of the Philippines. On the other hand, coercion may be more difficult and costly but one can know what the consequence will be. Having said that, sometimes conditions force countries to use military force to achieve goals. Hence, "While military or economic coercion tends to result in an immediate but short-duration outcome, attraction and persuasion have the tendency to cause long-term change (Wagner, 2014)".

Meanwhile, Cooper (2004: 170-171) states that soft power has three weaknesses that are relative to hard power. First, cultural influence as soft power is weak and cannot be equal to political power. Second, the outcomes of soft power strategies depend on

particular circumstances, which states can not influence. Finally, he challenges the benefits of agenda-setting, the outputs of which may be seen long after originators' demises. Defending the idea that military power preserves world order, shapes its norms, upholds its institutions, and keeps the peace, Kagan (2012) goes on to say the following in his Washington Post article:

That order has rested significantly on the US ability to provide security in parts of the world, such as Europe and Asia, that had known endless cycles of warfare before the arrival of the United States. The world's free-trade, the free-market economy has depended on America's ability to keep trade routes open, even during times of conflict. And the remarkably widespread democracy around the world owes something to America's ability to provide support to democratic forces under siege and to protect peoples from dictators such as Moammar Gaddafi and Slobodan Milosevic.

If those counting on hard power have a common general point, it is that they all think countries cannot benefit from soft power unless they have big hard power capacities. For instance, referring to Soft Power Index, Fedirka (2017) asks why militarily strong countries, like the US, the UK, France, Germany, and Western countries in general are at the top of the list, and contends that soft power can only be complementary to hard power. However, she omits that there are countries with weak military power on the list.

Finally, this study contributes to literature with two new concepts. The first is “combined power”. As elucidated below, while Qatar is a strong country in terms of soft power, it does not have enough military power to defend itself. Therefore, it combines its soft power with the military power of Americans (and recently Turks) in order to protect itself from external threats. In smart power, hard and soft power are combined. Yet, both powers belong to the same country. However, in “combined power” either type of power may be provided by another country. The second concept is “hired power”, which means hiring human, military, or knowledge power from other countries. As it will be witnessed in the case of Qatar, the Sheikdom has a small population but it is still influential thanks to expatriates coming from various countries to work for the Qatari state. For example, in many institutions, including Al Jazeera, while only top executives are Qataris, others are foreigners. Therefore, Qatar wields

the experience and labor of foreign employees in order to reach its goals. Unless there were combined power and hired power, Qatar's soft power would probably be weaker.

d) Public Diplomacy

After defining soft power, its difference from hard power, its efficiency, what it is constituted from, actors, etc., we can now proceed by looking into how it is enforced. Formally, soft power is embodied as *public diplomacy*. Being a key instrument of soft power, public diplomacy means image cultivation, propaganda and other activities (Melissen, 2005: 3). Another definition deems it as diplomacy of civilians or civil groups, not governments. Public diplomacy may seem to be a new term but affiliated activities are as old as traditional diplomacy. Melissen (Ibid: 16) argues that three concepts (propaganda, nation-branding, and foreign cultural relations) are related to public diplomacy. Many scholars approve that public diplomacy is nothing more than propaganda aiming to get a place in the hearts and minds of foreigners. Yet, unlike one-way propaganda, it listens to its audience and values their requests. As for nation-branding, it is one of the main businesses of public diplomats who strive to better the image of their countries. Likewise, cultural relations are also a duty of public diplomacy even though cultural affairs have a civilian, nongovernmental aspect.

Among scholars, Brian Hocking's approach to public diplomacy is slightly different and more detailed. Hocking (2005: 29-31) offers some threads about public diplomacy. First, he argues that as the main source of peaceful initiatives are ordinary citizens and voluntary associations, there must be democratic accountability and citizens should be involved in diplomacy. The second thread is the intensification of social networks that transcend transnational borders; the expansion of social relations from those represented by financial markets to those of terrorist groups. The third thread is technological developments implicit in such terms as cyber diplomacy, linking the impact of innovations in communication and information technology (CIT) to foreign policy and diplomacy. The fourth is the media. According to Hocking, media is no longer an asset of governments in public diplomacy strategies but an actor in foreign policy. He provides the CNN-effect as an example. The last and fifth thread is nation-branding. Hocking points out that while nation-branding is traditionally a duty of governments, individuals have also been involved in re-branding their states.

Although public diplomacy was coined by Americans, the United States is seen as one of the least successful countries in this area. Some academics even prefer to use the word "failure" and hesitate to use any positive words with respect to it. Indeed, surveys have shown that America has a bad reputation in the world, including its long-lasting allies in Europe. Criticizing America's failure in the implementation of public diplomacy, Riordan (2005: 181) argues that in order to fight Islamic terrorism, a broad range of collaboration with foreign governments is necessary, particularly with the governments of Islamic countries. Besides Riordan, many other experts oppose American policies that imply America's military, socio-cultural, and economic superiority. The idea that whatever they do is right has narrowed the American viewpoint, which prevents them from seeing their mistakes. As researches have proven, people of countries invaded by the US are not against universal values like human rights, democracy, liberalism, etc. The problem lies in contradictory US policies that cause distrust among people. For example, American authorities claim that they bring democracy to countries by toppling their dictators. However, using invasion as a tool to achieve this and failing to uphold stability in the targeted country, has cast doubt on the forceful transition. Likewise, US relations with friendly undemocratic regimes is another dilemma since the US government does not question the dictatorial polities of their friends. In brief, America's reliance on military power and wrong enforcement of soft power gives rise to negative views. However, scholars mainly ignore such antipathy is limited to the US government. In other words, victims of American hard power still adhere to Hollywood films, social media programs, and Coca Cola.

Contrary to the US (government), China is praised for its success in soft power. China tries to maintain the image of a trustworthy, cooperative, peace-loving, and developing country that takes care of its enormous population (d'Hooghe, 2005: 88). In order to fulfill this goal, it promotes its culture, cuisine, alternative medicine like acupuncture, calligraphy, etc. Also, as part of its efforts towards nation-branding, it hosted the 2008 Olympics. Furthermore, while China is a peace broker between the West and North Korea, it is also an active actor in international politics thanks to its permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Moreover, having economic and socio-cultural investments worldwide, it is called a non-imperialist empire since it does not use them to dominate other countries. For example, China's presence in Africa is not

regarded as an exploitation of resources. On the contrary, the Chinese government helps African governments develop their states and lends them huge amounts of money, sometimes even in the form of grants.

Besides China, Canada and Norway are other countries appreciated for their niche diplomacy. To be a niche country in terms of its diplomacy, a country must support good works, perform good deeds and use good words, which bring international reputation, good prestige and good image (Henrikson, 2005: 68). Both Canada and Norway have similar approaches in their foreign policies, which are generally in the same direction. They aim to promote a good image in other countries. Hence, they donate huge amounts of money to poor countries, support peace processes and act together with non-state actors with respect to vital problems concerning all of humanity, such as human rights, democracy, peace-building, and the environment.

However, there are also bad examples of using soft power to the advantage of outlawed regimes. For example, Gaddafi's Libyan Jamahiriya used public diplomacy as a tool to spread Gaddafi's ideology, a combination of Islamism and Arabism, which sounded antipathic to the world audience. Gaddafi made notable donations to other countries, particularly his neighbors, with an objective to get them on his side (Sharp, 2005: 113). His visits to foreign countries were like a theatrical show as he stayed in his tribal tent, prayed in closed mosques, made provocative speeches, and so on. Gaddafi's Jamahiriya is not the last and least exploiter of public diplomacy. Bolsheviks, Nazis, Fascists, Iran, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, etc. are also regarded as bad models of soft power. All the above-mentioned actors utilized their totalitarian or authoritarian ideologies to influence their citizens and the foreign public. Thus, it was soft power that led to the exportation of destructive thoughts and nested in the minds of foreign masses.

e) Nation-Branding and Re-Branding

Another term associated with soft power (and public diplomacy) is *nation-branding*. The term “nation brand” was first used in 1996 by Simon Anholt. Companies have brands to increase their sales, e.g. Chevrolet of General Motors. They have their brands renowned via marketing, advertisements, and hiring consultancy companies. Similarly, countries and places can be branded with government sponsorship.

According to Kaneva (2011: 118), nation-branding is “A compendium of discourses and practices aimed at reconstituting nationhood through marketing and branding paradigms”. On the other hand, Ying Fan defines a nation brand as follows:

A nation brand is the total sum of all perceptions of a nation in the mind of international stakeholders which may contain some of the following elements: people, place, culture/language, history, food, fashion, famous faces (celebrities), global brands, etc. A nation's “brand” exists, with or without any conscious efforts in nation branding, as each country has a current image to its international audience, be it strong or weak, clear or vague (Fan, 2006: 12).

Seeing branding as a process, Fan describes nation-branding as the process to create, monitor, evaluate and manage a nation’s images in order to improve the country’s reputation (Ibid: 6). Zukić and Konatar’s definition is more or less the same. According to them, nation branding is a process that builds and manages a country’s identity and image to attract and satisfy internal and external visitors and investors (Zukić and Konatar, 2017: 180). As a final definition for our study, Bassey (2012: 13) argues that “Nation branding is seen as how countries can optimize their assets and gain power in international relations through the force of attraction”. Meanwhile, although the term “re-branding” is interconnected to nation-branding, they are not the same. When a country promotes what it has, it is nation-branding. Yet, if a country changes its image, social life, economy, and governmental system, it is called re-branding. For example, Saudi Crown Prince Mohamad bin Salman's westernization of his country is a process of re-branding. On the other hand, India's advertising with the slogan "Incredible India" to attract tourists is an example of nation-branding. Countries may brand, re-brand, or do both.

Countries do nation branding by hiring public relations companies (Teslik, 2007). They may also handle it on their own by organizing events, e.g. forums, granting incentives for investment, selling good products, having good education facilities, tourism, historical sites, etc. In other words, they do not require PR campaigns in every case as what they possess already attracts the foreign audience. According to Anholt, in terms of practical manifestations, nation-branding includes various activities that range from cosmetic operations like logos and slogans, and efforts to institutionalize branding within the state and quasi-state structures that undertake the process (Anholt

in Kaneva, 2011: 118). Fan (2010: 4) says countries brand themselves for various reasons, such as: (1) to remold national identities, (2) to enhance nation's competitiveness, (3) to embrace political, cultural, business and sports activities, (4) to promote economic and political interests at home and abroad, (5) to alter, improve or enhance a nation's image/reputation. What foreigners should spot on is another aspect of nation-branding. Zukić and Konatar (2017: 180) list them as follows:

- *Tourism: the country's attractiveness from a tourism point of view.*
- *Exports: their perceptions and stereotypes about the products from the specific country.*
- *Governance: their perceptions as regards the government in that country.*
- *Investment and Immigration: their personal willingness to work in that country and their perceptions about social and economic conditions in that country.*
- *People: stereotypes about the people from the respective country as employees.*
- *Culture: perceptions about the country's achievements in terms of culture, history, and sports.*

While it is at the discretion of countries to brand or not, the general understanding is that branding brings benefits. Browning and Oliviera (2017: 5) assert that the lack of nation-branding, which fosters the development, may be the primary cause of development as in the case of Africa, where states could not change the negative image of being a poor continent infested with famine and diseases. Browning and Oliviera might be right in their claim that a country's bad reputation does not quickly disappear in the course of time. For example, the number of tourists visiting Turkey took a sharp dive in 2016 due to a failed military coup and some terrorist attacks. Although Turkey became as safe as pre-coup years in 2017, there was no noteworthy increase in the number of visitors. However, thanks to the efforts of the Ministry of Tourism and campaigns held by hotel owners, figures increased by 23% in 2018 (Turob, 2019). In addition, according to Olins, good products/brands are another element that has a positive impact on nation-branding (Ibid: 173). For example, Mercedes, BMW, Audi, and Volkswagen lead people to believe that Germans produce good cars. Such that, Basse (2012: 15) complements, "Products labeled "Made in Germany" have higher sales and are more attractive to consumers as contrasted with other countries such as China, which is known for its cheaper production costs and quality".

On the other hand, re-branding may be a newly coined term, yet efforts go deep back in history. Olins (2005) argues that the French Revolution was a process of re-branding. With the French revolution, traditional nobility exiled, the royal family was executed, a republic proclaimed, religion excoriated, “Marseillaise” became the new anthem, traditional weights and measures were replaced by the metric system, a new calendar was introduced, and God was replaced by the Supreme Being, among numerous other changes. France was consciously rebranded and all Europe was heavily influenced by the change. When Napoleon Bonaparte came to power, he introduced new titles, uniforms, rituals, and decorations. His legal code is still the legal structure in Europe (Ibid: 170). A similar process was also commenced by the Republic of Turkey's founding father, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. When he declared the foundation of the Republic in 1923, he exiled the Sultan and his family, a republic was proclaimed, the state and society were secularized, religious schools were closed, the European metric system and calendar were accepted, wearing hats became compulsory, etc.

However, nation branding is not immune to criticism. “The idea that it is possible to “do branding” to a country (or to a city or region) in the same way that companies “do branding” to their products and services, is vain and foolish” (Anholt, 2008: 1). What is bizarre is not the statement *per se* but who said it. This statement belongs to Simon Anholt who first introduced the term. It seems that he reached this conclusion through his experiences and revised his opinion about the term. He thinks that “National reputation cannot be constructed; it can only be earned (Ibid: 3)”. Therefore, a nation’s image cannot be changed through marketing or propaganda if it lacks what it promotes. Compare, for example, a Chinese cell phone with an American one; consider the recruitment chances of an Iranian individual in a multinational company compared to a Canadian individual; compare London with Cairo. If, in any case, an American cell phone, a Canadian employee, and London are preferred, it is not because they made good promotion but because what is alluded is already inherent.

f) Soft Power Calculation

Although nation-branding is not a calculable phenomenon, several indexes claim to measure the branding of countries. One of them called “Nation Brands”, conducted by Brand Finance Consultancy Group, released its 2018 index in October 2018. Based on

three key pillars: Goods & Services, Investment and Society, and sub-pillars Tourism, Market, Governance and People and Skills, the index calculates the value of each country as if it is a commercial brand. According to the index, the top five countries with brand value are the USA (\$25,899 bn), China (\$12,779 bn), Germany (\$5,147 bn), United Kingdom (\$3,750 bn), and Japan (\$3,598 bn). As for Middle Eastern countries, the United Arab Emirates ranks 20th, Saudi Arabia 21st, Qatar 40th, Israel 42nd, Kuwait 47th, and Egypt 56th. Regarding Turkey, while it was 24th (\$570 bn) in 2017, it slid down to 34th (\$382 bn) due to the economic crisis and the ongoing wars in Iraq and Syria (Brand Finance, 2018).

As discussed above, all countries have public diplomacy instruments to spread their culture, brand their nations, and, in general, gain the appreciation and adherence of foreign societies. This being the case, which countries are performing well in terms of enforcing their soft powers? Unfortunately, there are not enough surveys conducted to learn about the countries' performances. However, two pieces of research conducted separately by the British and Americans provide identical data. According to a survey co-conducted in 2010 by the Institute for Government (UK) and Monocle, a monthly periodical, called soft power index, the top 26 countries are shown in the table below:

Table 2. 1: Soft Power Index 2010

Rank	Country	Score	Rank	Country	Score
1	France	1.64	14	Norway	0.99
1	UK	1.64	15	Japan	0.97
3	USA	1.57	16	Italy	0.81
4	Germany	1.44	17	China	0.80
5	Switzerland	1.39	18	Israel	0.78
6	Sweden	1.33	19	Korea	0.73
7	Denmark	1.21	20	South Africa	0.69
8	Australia	1.16	20	Brazil	0.69
9	Finland	1.13	22	Mexico	0.61
10	Netherlands	1.08	23	India	0.60
11	Spain	1.05	24	UAE	0.56
12	Canada	1.04	25	Turkey	0.50
13	Singapore	1.01	26	Russia	0.45


Source: McClory, 2010: 5

The index assesses the soft power of countries based on five categories: Business/Innovation, Culture, Government, Diplomacy, and Education (Ibid: 3). As

can be seen from the above table, France has the highest soft power index with 1.64 scores among 26 countries. McClory claims that France became No.1 due to 1,000 *Alliance Française* missions abroad, which promote French culture (Ibid: 6). The UK performed well and ranks No.2 in the index thanks to its instruments, like *BBC* and *British Council*, as well as its Commonwealth background and network. Turkey is also on the list, ranking 25th among other countries. Regarding Germany, €230 million of The German Foreign Ministry's public diplomacy budget goes to *Deutsche Welle* alone. In addition, *the Goethe Institute* has 144 missions in other countries. Another factor is that the German government has made it compulsory for foreign students to make up 10% of all university students (Ibid: 6). Switzerland is another country on the index list with a high score. One of the reasons for this success is that it is the center of more than 200 international organizations. Although China is 17th on the list, it is the most promising country in terms of soft power and it will likely have a higher rank in the near future.

Since the above survey was conducted in 2010, it may be considered to be outdated. Yet, US Center on Public Diplomacy has been carrying out almost the same index titled "The Soft Power 30- A Global Ranking of Soft Power 20XX (conducted year)" since 2015 (see Table 2.2).

Table 2. 2: The Soft Power 30 -2015-16-17-18



Source: McClory, 2018:46

US Center on Public Diplomacy used six sub-indexes, which consisted of government, digital, education, engagement, enterprise, and culture. For the Center, the Government sub-index aims to assess a state's political values, public institutions, and major public policy outcomes together with measures like individual freedom, human development, and violence in society. The Culture sub-index takes into consideration measures like the annual number of international tourists, the global success of a country's music industry, and even a nation's international sporting prowess. This sub-index aims to find out the quality of a state's culture and how much it is reached

internationally. On the other hand, the Global Engagement sub-index tries to measure states' diplomatic resources, global footprint, and overall contribution to the international community by using metrics like the number of embassies/high commissions a country has abroad, membership of multilateral organizations, and overseas development aid. The Education sub-index measures the quality of education, the country's attraction to foreign students, global scholarship and pedagogical excellence by metrics such as the number of international students in a country, the relative quality of its universities, and the academic output of higher education institutions. The Enterprise sub-index, on the other hand, measures the relative attractiveness of a country's economic model in terms of its competitiveness and capacity. The metrics used for this sub-index are ease of doing business, corruption levels, and startup costs for a new business. Finally, the Digital sub-index tries to capture how much a country embraced technology, its connection with the digital world as well as its use of digital diplomacy in social media platforms (McClory, 2018: 32-33). Looking at the results for 2018, the top 30 countries in the soft power index are as follows: 1. The United Kingdom, 2. France, 3. Germany, 4. The United States, 5. Japan, 6. Canada, 7. Switzerland, 8. Sweden, 9. Netherlands, 10. Australia, 11. Denmark, 12. Italy, 13. Norway, 14. Spain, 15. Finland, 16. Belgium, 17. Austria, 18. New Zealand, 19. Ireland, 20. South Korea, 21. Singapore, 22. Portugal, 23. Greece, 24. Poland, 25. Hungary, 26. Czech Republic, 27. China, 28. Russian Federation, 29. Brazil, 30. Argentina.

The report analyzes the results in detail and comments on what was behind the successes and failures. As for the top five countries, according to McClory (Ibid: 46-50), the United Kingdom has been maintaining its status throughout the years as the top country. *BBC World Service*, as the main factor of this success, contributes immensely to the UK's soft power. The *British Council* also scored some points for the UK with its activities aimed at spreading English culture and language. A third actor is the UK Foreign Ministry that funded and implemented soft power instruments. Moreover, UK universities still enroll thousands of foreign students, helping the UK to remain at the top. In terms of developments in 2018, the Royal Wedding of Prince Harry to Meghan Markle was watched by 2 billion people. Moreover, despite Brexit, the UK still attracts investments in technology and innovation. France, sitting in the second position, boosted its performance with the election of Emmanuel Macron, who,

according to index authors, is a global-minded and promising leader for his country. However, as the index was released before the Yellow Vest protests, which destroyed Macron's reputation, France may lose its current rank next year. Furthermore, France has a vast diplomatic network spreading all over the world. Its brands and engagement in international politics were also significant factors contributing towards its success.

Germany, which is occupying the third position, gains its soft power from luxury car brands, exhibitions, the leadership of the European Union, etc. Yet, the rise of the far-right AfD party is a challenging factor for the future. The US, situated fourth in the Soft Power Index, is home to prominent brands such as Microsoft, Coca Cola, Apple, Google, McDonald's, and Facebook, among numerous others. This comes as no surprise since Ivy League US universities like Harvard, Yale, MIT, etc. attract hundreds of thousands of international students, while culturally Hollywood movies are dominating the world film industry and transferring American culture to other countries. Yet, anti-American sentiments are still high and President Trump is threatening America's position as he turns to coercive power again. It appears that Trump's "America first" and anti-immigration policies are detrimental to the US image. And the fifth rank, which was also particularly examined, belongs to Japan, which moved upward on the list for the third consecutive year from 2015 to 2018. Turkey also has a notable soft power policy. It ranked 28th in 2015 and 30th in 2017, but could not make it in the top 30 in 2016. The failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016, and the terror attacks are the main reasons for the drop on the list. Turkey recovered and solved its political problems in 2017 but was still not able to get a place in the 2018 index.

A detailed analysis of the index reveals that while the top 23 countries were in the Western bloc during the Cold War era, number 24 (Poland), number 25 (Hungary) and number 26 (Czech Republic), all Eastern European countries, shifted from the Soviet bloc to the Western bloc in the early 1990s. China and Russia, two big powers that entered the list from 2016 onwards, became 27th and 28th, respectively. Two Latin American countries, Brazil and Argentina, each made it in the list ranking 29th and 30th. While Africa is the only continent that has no country on the list, regionally, none of the rich countries of the Middle East, including Qatar, were listed in the index.

2.3 Small States

Since Qatar is our main subject in this dissertation, the definition and specifications of small states and their role in the international system must be examined together with their foreign policies. Although the term “small state” is widely used in literature, an exact definition is yet to be formulated. According to Sheldrup (2014: 5), an objective criterion can be applied based on population, geographic area, and economic capacity. For scholars, the population of a small state varies from 1 million to 30 million. According to Pataik (2014: 9), "States with developed economies and a population not exceeding 15 million, and states having underdeveloped economies with a population of 20 million can be considered as small states". Barston has four teleological approaches that define a small power: first, the size of the population; second, the state's capabilities; third, the degree of influence; and fourth, characteristics that differentiate a state from others (in Kassimeris, 2009: 92). On the other hand, it is argued that "Great power and small power are terms reflecting political power and not size of territory and population (Mathisen, 1971: 17)". Kassimeris (2009: 93) reasons that the size in the discussion of a small power is exaggerated as it is done for the population. He gives the example of California, which is quite small but would have had the 10th biggest economy if it was an independent state (Ibid).

Moreover, Steinsson and Thorhallsson (2017: 3) contend that the foremost variables for small states are: the size of population, territory, economy, and military. Yet, for them, the population is still the most significant parameter. In one of his previous articles, Thorhallsson proposes another framework consisting of fixed size (population and territory), sovereignty size (how much control the state has over its internal affairs and borders), political size (military and administrative strength, domestic cohesion, foreign policy consensus), economic size (GNP, market size and development), perceptual size (how a state is perceived by internal or external actors) and preference size (the ideas, ambitions, and priorities of domestic elites regarding their role in the international system) (in Steinsson and Thorhallsson, 2017:4). According to J.E. Peterson (2006: 734), small geographic size is problematic since, for example, Hong Kong has a small territory but a sizeable population. On the other hand, while Namibia is 18 times bigger than Estonia in geographical size, they have the same population. In some cases, the Gross National Product (GNP) is also used as a measurement. Yet, as in the case of Qatar, while the Emirate is richer than many African countries, it is

considerably small in terms of territorial size. Theoretically, power is also taken into account but it is not so easy to measure a state's power. Furthermore, it is difficult to make a distinction between a small state and a weak state, which may be quite big in certain aspects, like territory and population. However, size is most widely measured by the population. While some experts draw the line for population at 1 million, others do so at 3 million, while some others do so at 5 million. On the other hand, the United Nations has also provided a definition stating that a state is small if it has a population of fewer than 1 million. (Ibid: 735).

It is not always the calculable and the concrete metrics that are used for the definition of small states. According to Keohane, small states are those that are unable to affect the international system (in Sheldrup, 2014: 5). For example, Mosser (2001: 54) holds that small states can be defined in two ways: absolute or relative. In terms of both characterizations, power is the key variable for a small state, but they do not agree on how to distinguish it. While absolute definitions take into account thresholds and factors such as population, GNP, or geographical area, relative definitions rely on the perception of size. For example, Poland may be bigger than Lithuania, but it is smaller than Russia. Nonetheless, Nigeria is relatively big in territorial size and population but has less influence in international affairs (Ibid: 55).

According to Keohane's (1969) fourfold classificatory framework based upon state-capability, small states are at the lowest level. The apex is occupied by "system-determining states" (superpowers) that shape the nature of international relations with their critical foreign policies. The second level belongs to "system-influencing states" (great powers and regional powers) that affect the system with their unilateral and multilateral actions. In the third category, we have the "system-affecting states" (middle powers), which are not influential on their own but can affect the international system through their collective behaviors. The last and lowest category is constituted by the "system-ineffectual states" (small states/powers), which have zero influence over the international system. Vayrynen (1991), on the other hand, has another classification with five dimensions for the definition of the small state: "(1) low rank measured either by hard data or by perceptual data; (2) high degree of external penetration; (3) specific types of behavior; (4) specific interests of small states compared with other states; and (5) specific role conceptions of the decision-makers of small states (in Pataik, 2014: 11)".

As elaborated above, analysts have different definitions of small states based on various parameters. Since each scholar uses different parameters, it is not possible to provide a common definition. For example, when the population is the only criterion, many African countries might have to be deemed as big powers, although they are economically weak, ineffectual in the international system, and weak in terms of hard power. If geographical size matters, then Mongolia, which has a surface area of 1.5 million km² should be regarded as a big power despite its 3-million population. On the other hand, although Israel has a small territory and population, in terms of power, it is stronger than all its neighbors. Among all, the definition provided by World Bank may be regarded as a criterion for our analysis although that too is unsatisfactory. According to the World Bank, small states are those that have a population of less than 1.5 million (World Bank, 2018). This definition also shows that no countries are regarded as micro-states, which are states having a population smaller than 500,000 for some scholars, 250,000 for others, and 100,000 for some others. Currently, fifty states fit into the definition by World Bank of small state, including Qatar.

The main problem for small states, as all analysts agree, is their lack of capacity to function efficiently as a normal-sized state. It may lack human resources for labor, military, and other demands, be a target for territorial expansionism like irredentist conflicts, be economically dependent on larger states or its sovereignty might be threatened by other states (Peterson, 2006: 735). Steinsson and Thorhallsson contend that:

Small states have less aggregate structural power (the total amount of resources and capabilities that can be employed) than large states. They are militarily weak, owing to the constraints of small populations and economies. They can also mobilize fewer raw numbers of forces, invest less in research and development of military technology, and sustain military campaigns for shorter periods. Military weakness, coupled with the lack of a buffer against threats, leaves small states vulnerable to external coercion (Steinsson and Thorhallsson, 2017: 5).

Moreover, as Peterson (2006: 735) argues, they are likely to cause international problems due to their weakness as was the case when Kuwait was invaded by Iraq in 1991, driving many states to intervene to get Iraq to leave. What is more, the Gulf War is still the main source of terrorism, conflicts, and wars that continue in the region.

There are a few more disadvantages that Peterson underlines. For example, he claims that small states have political deficiencies like nepotism, corruption, and favoritism as the government is involved in almost all activities. Moreover, since their societies are not universalistic, personal relationships are strong and loyalty is high, which are factors that complicate public affairs (Ibid: 738). Another disadvantage may be dependence on only one source for survival, e.g. natural gas, oil, tourism, etc. Yet, some states have subtly diversified their sources thanks to revenues earned from a single source.

Perhaps, the most important problem a small state faces is an external threat. Neutrality and bandwagoning are preferred choices for survival as they lack resources to oppose likely enemies in order to save their sovereignty and independence (Kaussler, 2015: 1). This is particularly the case for those states with hostile neighbors causing continuous threat and stress. Peterson offers small states to develop niche strategies and provide niche commodities or services. He gives some examples of states with niche strategies:

Luxembourg — the provision of air services and facilities for the EU.

Switzerland — neutrality, confidential banking, luxury consumer goods, and tourism.

Panama and Liberia — commercial ship flagging.

Monaco — gambling, a resort for the wealthy, and offshore banking.

Kuwait — formerly important activities in gold imports/re-exports, and trade.

Bahrain — regional commercial headquarters, financial services, regional service industries, and a weekend resort for neighboring states.

Dubai — gold imports/re-exports, emergence as a regional entrepôt, free trade zone, consumer bargains, and tourism (Peterson, 2006: 741).

Despite small states having deficiencies, they have some advantages as well. First of all, while hard power is an indicator of the strength that small states lack, soft power is an easily acquired and useful tool that allows any state to affect foreign public (Nye, 1990: 13). Qatar, the UAE, Maldives, Monaco, along with many other countries owe their reputation to their soft power. Second, since the population is small, economic problems are less likely to occur. Third, in cases the society is living in prosperity,

authority is rarely challenged. However, clashes among strong groups or families for ruling power is likely. Fourth, the decision-making process is quicker in small states as the ruling elite and even society generally have a homogenous structure. Rather, it is large states with big populations and with a democratic system of government that are slow to act.

However, in terms of small states' foreign policy and their position in the international system, it is commonly admitted that since these states are vulnerable to other states due to the lack of structural resources (military, population, economy, territory, etc.), they develop various reflexes to overcome dangers. Small states have fewer material capabilities to maintain their normal activities among other countries. As they are disadvantaged, their priorities are different from great powers. Many scholars would argue that a small state's foremost goal is to survive. Thus, they prefer defensive strategies over offensive ones (Habracken, 2017: 3). Similarly, Kaussler (2015: 8) states that small states are primarily concerned with withstanding the pressure of great powers and safeguarding their sovereignty and territories. As will be explained below, they wield the hard power of bigger friendly countries through bandwagoning, balancing, or joining alliances. Needless to say, economic issues are also one of their top agendas in their foreign policy as they are economically dependent on other states because of their small domestic market, which can only survive with international trade. In relation to this, Peterson (2006: 737) also argues that limited sources determine the foreign policy actions and decision-making process of small states, narrowing the focus on basic interests, independence and having good relations with great powers. According to Mohammadzadeh (2017: 22), "In a globalized economy, small states are perhaps to a greater extent susceptible to exogenous shocks from international markets and developments in the global trade regime over which they have little influence".

In addition, they may face irredentist claims and even invasion. For instance, Iraq invaded Kuwait purely because it had vast reserves of oil. On a different note, while Qatar's problems with its neighbors are political, another reason is allegedly its national cash reserves. According to Karns and Mingst (2004), small states prefer to join international organizations in order to collect and disseminate information, exchange views, participate in decision-making, define norms and rules, settle disputes, and allocate resources. Thus, Rothstein (1968: 42) advocates that small

powers are more likely to join international organizations that enable them to pursue their foreign policies, provide security, and treat members equally. However, they are not so active in the international system as they are mainly concerned with their concrete interests. As an example of small states' role in international organizations, Luxembourg's position in the European Union (EU) is notable. While at the organizational level, this country is quite active in the EU without posing any threats, at the domestic level, its small population supports the development of a national consensus on foreign policy goals (Sheldrup, 2014:9).

Mosser (2001: 53) adds that, in the security dimension, small states are mostly passive, reactive, reluctant, and, in some cases, destabilize the system. On the contrary, De Carvalho and Neumann (2015: 8) argue that "Small states try to minimize the costs of conducting foreign policy by initiating more joint actions and by targeting multiple-actor fora.... while such states tend to avoid ambiguity in their foreign policy, they engage more in conflictual non-verbal behavior than do large states". Pataik (2014: 8) points out the dependency of small states on dominant power and contends that it changes in accordance with domestic politics or the external environment. Thus, governments are constantly seeking ways to diversify dependence. For example, upon realizing that relying on neighbors would not make them safe, some small states in the Middle East resorted to the US after Iraq invaded Kuwait. According to East (in Kassimeris, 2009: 90), a small power's foreign policy has five main features: "A small power is characterized by its limited interaction with other states, becomes involved with great enthusiasm in international organizations, supports international laws, has a minimum use of force and, finally, its foreign policy is often concentrated on regional matters". Kassimeris (2009: 93) disagrees with East's and others' (in his words) "old-fashioned Cold War definitions" and suggests that the foreign policy of small states is more proactive and purposeful as witnessed among members of the EU.

According to Handel (in Kassimeris, 2009: 94), there are two types of international systems: the competitive and the hegemonic. While small powers enjoy more room to maneuver in the competitive system because of the competition among states, they are constrained by great powers in the hegemonic system. According to Vital (in Kassimeris, 2009: 95), there is a patron-client relationship between great and small states that have four characteristics:

(1) The patron will provide the client with the necessary assurances, as to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the small power, in return for other services (for example military facilities). Although the small power may prove quite demanding in negotiations with its patron, (2) the patron usually enjoys more bargaining power; however, (3) their relationship is not based on coercion. Finally, (4) the client state is expected to remain under the wing of its patron because of the “shield” it provides.

According to Kassimeris (2009: 96), from a security perspective, when small states have a security problem they have four choices: (1) they request protection from a great power, (2) become a member of an alliance of other small powers, (3) or international organization(s), and (4) don't align with other powers. He also analyzes how small members of the European Union benefit from membership and argues that EU's small states exert influence because (1) they have voting power, (2) rotating presidency enables to rule the Union for a period of time, (3) they support the European Commission that balances the power of larger countries, and (4) they are over-represented in the European Parliament (Ibid). As Steinsson and Thorhallsson (2017: 1) believe that size matters, they say small states join multilateral organizations to minimize power asymmetry and realize their foreign policies.

Meanwhile, the aforementioned Scandinavian authors point out another aspect of small states not mentioned by all experts. According to them, the location of a state is crucial as neighboring great states may create security and welfare problems. For instance, while Luxembourg enjoys a high level of security and is actively involved in the EU administration, an opportunity that contributes to its recognition, Baltic countries are not so lucky geographically as they feel the stress of being neighbors with Russia (Ibid: 2). Lebanon's ongoing civil war and external intervention are also due to being a small state with weak aggregate structural power. This country was destabilized due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Syrian civil war, and immigration. Consequently, Lebanon is supposed to be a failed state due to the overflow of external conflicts into its territory. Another problem with the foreign policy of small states is their lack of manpower for diplomacy. Since their diplomatic forces and resources are inadequate, they prefer to deal with more important issues like security, economic and political interests. For example, while Luxembourg is represented by the diplomatic missions of friendly countries in other states, Qatar,

despite having a very assertive and salient foreign policy, could not always succeed in finalizing mediatory and interventionist policies as it wished.

After discussing scholars' views on the foreign policy of small states and their position in the international system, we can now proceed to discuss approaches in international theories regarding the same subject. Almost all international relations have their own opinions about small states. For example, realism asserts that countries seek power in an anarchical system to survive. The only way to avoid being swallowed by other actors is to maximize state power. The most extreme version, which is offensive realism, goes as far as to say that power maximization must aim to be a hegemonic power so that the state will never be destroyed. Power in realism is hard power, particularly military power. Then comes a developed economy, a big population, territorial size, etc. In this sense, small powers are so weak that they cannot stand against great powers. The best explanation of the status of small states is provided by Thucydides (in Thorhallsson, 2018: 23): "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must". Therefore, according to realist theory, small states should either bandwagon behind a great power or ally with other countries to balance it (Kraussler, 2015: 1). Realists also contend that leadership does not play a huge role in a small state's foreign policy (Ibid: 3). Moreover, the realist view asserts that small states are just objects used by great powers while their sole preoccupation is to survive in an anarchical system (Habraken, 2017: 1-2). Mohammadzadeh (2017: 22) also agrees that small states have a narrow set of foreign policy choices, like balancing and bandwagoning, to ensure their survival. For realists, the units of power, unlike soft power, must be measurable in terms of weapons, planes, missiles, GDP, and so on. Such a definition of small states is synonymous with a weak state (Browning, 2006: 670). In other words, a small state is regarded as a weak state. Since small states are weak, they can only be pawns in power games and their role is highly circumscribed. Small states have little room for maneuver and they are dependent on the goodwill of great powers (Thorhallsson, 2018: 23).

On the other hand, with respect to the neo-realist view, which focuses more on structures that determine power relations and the positions of states in the international system, theorists assert that small states have nothing to do with hard power but only economic or soft power (Browning, 2006: 672). In the anarchic self-help international system, according to neo-realists, small powers must take into account changes in

power and posit themselves according to the new structure and preoccupy themselves with survival instead of great powers (Ibid: 670). Size matters for neo-realists. They argue that the international system produces functionally equivalent units called nation-states. However, these units have unequal power, meaning that some states are large and some of them are small due to the nature of the system itself (Waltz in De Carvalho and Neumann, 2015: 8). Therefore, for neo-realists, small states are prone to threats coming from large states in the system, shaped by the power of states. Also, as Steinsson and Thorhallsson (2017: 20) state, since small states have less chance to make mistakes in international relations, they tend to act in accordance with structural incentives. In other words, as foreign policy choices and outcomes of small states are bound to the international environment, they cannot afford the mistakes large states can make; hence, they must be careful when acting.

As for liberals, while they accept the anarchic structure of the international system, they differ from realists in that they refuse zero-sum game in power relations and argue that states can come together on a win-win basis. Therefore, small states are still actors in the system despite their preference to focus on specific areas, particularly in the economic domain. This means that small powers can be regarded as big powers in some areas they are strong. For example, while Israel is a small power in many aspects, it is a middle power in military terms. In addition, Singapore, with its high GDP cannot be considered a small power. On the other hand, Browning (2006: 672) argues that it is issue-specific for a country to be classified as a small state or great state. That is to say, a country might be small but great in some areas. For example, Switzerland is a great state in terms of finance while Saudi Arabia is a great state for its vast resources of oil.

Moreover, for (neo) liberals, being a member of international organizations bring benefits to small states as such organizations constraint large powers and give more room to small-sized states (Habraken, 2017: 2). The position of Cyprus in the European Union is a good example of being a member of an organization that provides a large number of advantages. This small island country not only utilizes the welfare of the Union but also tries to solve its problems with Turkey via the EU's enormous collective power. Thorhallsson (2018: 23), too, argues that European countries join the EU for practical benefits and ideological affinity, which are two liberal arguments. Many scholars also contend that the formation of the EU to prevent a new war and

control Germany together with economic integration is a success story of liberalism. Furthermore, liberals assert that economic cooperation and international organizations provide an added benefit to small states, ensuring that they are not disadvantageous against greater states as such organizations lead to a sense of collective security and peaceful solutions to disputes (Mushelenga and Van Iyk, 2017: 127). International organizations enable small states to pursue their foreign policy goals more effectively and create a more equalized field for them (Sheldrup, 2014: 7). Think of, for example, the WTO or World Bank. Since such institutions do not differentiate between small and big states, being their member is quite beneficial for a small state.

Regarding other theories, constructivists reject liberal and realist views that there is an objective social and political reality independent of us. They argue that state behaviors are not determined by the hard power of states and the structure of the international system but rather by norms, identities, values, rules, and ideas (Habraken, 2017: 6). For instance, while the United States sees Cuba as an enemy because of its socialist ruling system, it sees Iceland as a friend due to its embrace of liberal democratic values. Some scholars contend that it was when social constructivism became popular that studies of small powers increased (De Carvalho and Neumann, 2015: 9). Mohammadzadeh (2017: 26) adds another aspect and says that small states become influential by advocating norms and rules in international organizations. On the other hand, neo-institutionalists reject realists and liberals' arguments, and debate that small states' foreign policy is a result of domestic institutional make-up and "the interaction of this make-up with the international system" (Habraken, 2017: 7). Elman (1995: 10) also agrees that domestic institutions influence small states' foreign policy.

In this sense, the decisions of those holding power, be that individuals or institutions, are vital to a country's foreign policy. For example, those who hold Marxist views, advocate that the international system is hierarchical rather than anarchical. Since "World hierarchy is determined by capitalist relations of production and control of world economic surplus, they point to dependence as an impediment for substantial autonomy in weak states outside the capitalist core" (Mohammadzadeh, 2017: 23). As articulated by Immanuel Wallerstein (in Küçük, 2017:215), there are central capitalist states that have advanced technology and production system together with capital and peripheral states supplying cheap labor and goods. The power of small states will be defined on the basis of their location, whether in capitalist core or poor periphery. We

should also note that Marxism posits states in super-structure and believes that they must all be abolished regardless of being great or small. As for English School theory, writers' views are close to those of realists, arguing that small states will be affected by external circumstances and that this might restrict their actions. Thus, their only foreign policy may be to find ways to uphold their security (Ibid: 21). Finally, writers of post-structuralist views claim that the definition of small states by positivist theories are related to perceptions rather than facts. Thus, they are scholars themselves that read smallness negatively (Browning, 2006: 673).

2.4 Middle Powers

A middle power is neither a great power nor a small power, simply put, it is a state (Chapnick, 1999: 73). The term is relative as it implies a comparison between states. Middleness is in terms of international power, capacity and influence, and demonstrates a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system (Jordaan, 2003: 165). A middle power has such "military strength, resources, and strategic position that in peacetime the great powers bid for its support, and in wartime, with no hope of winning a war against a great power, it can hope to inflict costs on a great power" (Wight in Stephen, 2013: 38). For Özkan (2006: 80), to be a middle power, besides size, population, and geostrategic location, a country must have middle-rank economic and military capabilities together with the emphasis on multilateral diplomacy and involvement in international organizations.

Meanwhile, as accepting to be a middle power means admitting second-rank status in world politics, whether being a middle power pleases countries is dubious (Oosterveld and Torossian, 2018). In this sense, "middle power" may be a status that small states admire as it elevates their status. In an interview conducted for this study, Dorsey (2019) suggested quite a different view:

It is not a question of whether being middle power or not. There are many other small states like Singapore, the UAE, Oman, etc. There are various ways in which they acquire the leverage to punch out of their weight in order not to bow to bigger states. Each of them has been successful. I don't use this term. It is not about being small, big or middle. It is about using the assets you have to create leverage to great powers.

Before discussing the characteristics of middle powers, it will be worth looking at the term's historical background. Formalizing states in three status groups (small, middle, and great) goes back to the Congress of Vienna held in 1815. At that time, there were six great powers (Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy), while there were just three middle powers: Denmark, Sweden, and Turkey (De Carvalho and Neumann, 2015: 7-8). According to Yamasaki (2009: 10), the Paris Conference in 1919 was the first attempt to assess the status of states in world politics, and at the end of it, the League of Nations recognized the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan as great powers, each of which was allowed to send five delegates to the Conference. While Belgium, Brazil, and Serbia had three representatives, twelve countries (China, India, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Portugal, and Romania) had two seats each. During the San Francisco Conference, where the decision to found the United Nations was made, countries like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand claimed the status of middle powers and asked for seats near to five permanent members in the UN Security Council. However, they failed to gain recognition as middle powers (Ibid: 21).

Analysts list the general characteristics of a middle power as: interest in multilateralism, peacekeeping, moderate international influence, tendency to compromise, to embrace positions in international disputes, being part of the solution to problems at the international level, desiring to be a mediator, self-interested, activism in world politics, stabilizing internationalism, committing to orderliness and security in the world system, advocating international law, generous in aid donation, having reformist initiatives, interactional, tendency to embrace the notions of “good international citizenship”, catalysts of triggering special global issues, facilitators in building coalitions, having a moral foreign policy, leading in specific niche areas, and acting as a bridge between nations (Lee, et al., 2015; Jordaan, 2003; Chapnick 1999; Onis and Kutlay, 2016; Yamasaki, 2009). As the aforementioned characteristics show, middle powers are assumed to be sources of stability in world politics because they do not have global and ideological interests. Besides, due to being weak in contrast to great powers, they tend to pursue bridging and mediatory policies (Cooper, 2013: 26).

In addition, they have no problem of preserving their independence and they can only have the means to defend limited interests in the state system (Chia, 2000: 76). Moreover, middle powers prefer niche diplomacy as they possess enough instruments for shuttle diplomacy. Ozkan (2006: 80) claims that middle powers, as catalysts and facilitators, are effective in secondary issues like peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. Similarly, Oosterveld and Torossian (2018) contend that they are not supposed to lift hard work or take global responsibility due to not being superpowers. Instead, they promote the interests of the global community thanks to their middle-rank economic and military powers and respectability that stems from not having ideological purposes. In addition to the aforementioned aspects, it can be concluded that middle powers apply soft power in their foreign policy.

Since “middle power” is a relative term, what makes a country a middle power is controversial. Review of literature reveals that scholars suggest three types of middle power: *functional*, *behavioral*, and *hierarchical*. Functionalists think that there are great powers that can exercise international influence under any condition and small states that are incapable of exerting influence. The functional approach contends that middle powers can exert influence in specific circumstances. Hence, whether a state is a middle power depends on instances. If this is the case, then, as Chapnick (1999: 75) claims, “There is no objective way to differentiate small states that might sometimes qualify for middle power status from those that will never qualify. Thus, middle powers are actually small powers of temporarily elevated stature”. In other words, small states can become middle powers in some instances and lose this title once they no longer contribute to a certain issue. Therefore, according to the functional approach, small states can become middle powers as per their efforts and the opportunities that the international system provides. Lee et al. (2015: 4) explain that, functionally, middle power diplomacy makes states participate in multilateral forums, lead in specific niche areas, and act as a bridge between nations.

On the other hand, a middle power is not judged based on its economic and military power but instead on its position in the international system. “Positional advantage” grants middle powers a wide range of opportunities to exercise international influence regardless of material resource constraints (Ibid). To be more influential, middle powers tend to be more active in niche areas in regional and global governance (Onis and Kutlay, 2016: 9). For example, while Canada exercises its middle power status in

the human security agenda, Australia's niche diplomacy is engaged in human rights and the environment. However, the fact that niche diplomacy is not always fruitful was proven when Canada criticized human rights abuses in Saudi Arabia and detained a Chinese company's executive in late 2018. While Saudis canceled the order of the armed vehicles that were to be bought from a Canadian company, China arrested a Canadian citizen and sentenced him to death. The lessons learned from the Canadian-Chinese strife might be that middle power diplomacy may be counter-productive if the interlocutor is a furious great power.

Regarding the behavioral approach, its certain characteristics are good international citizenship, multilateralism, coalition building and mediation (Ozkan, 2006: 36). Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal (1993: 19) identify middle powers by their "desire to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, embrace compromised positions in international disputes, and notions of "good international citizenship" to guide their diplomacy". This approach also identifies the term middle power as regional leaders, status seekers, conflict managers, and multilateral moral powers. However, Hynek (2005: 36) thinks that the behavioral model is problematic as it describes that any country having middle power behaviors are assumed middle powers. In this case, behaviors, not capabilities, will be the parameter for being a middle power.

The third approach, hierarchical model, organizes states according to their international standing. While the other models argue that the middle power label boosts state power, this model affirms recognized positions in world politics (Chapnick, 1999: 74). Efforts to coin middle power and get privileges for being a middle power peaked during the establishment of the United Nations. Countries like Canada, Australia, and Belgium demanded exclusive rights such as having non-permanent seats in the Security Council that will differentiate them from small powers and grant them a higher status (Yamasaki, 2009: 15). Yet, they failed to realize this goal. In addition, some studies categorize states as great, middle, and small powers. Every study bases its classification on different indicators, but military power, GDP, and population are commonly used. Oosterveld and Torossian (2018) argue that there are three kinds of great powers. The first one is the United States, which is the sole superpower. The second kind are the remaining members of the UN Security Council: Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom. The third group consists of India, Germany, and Japan. Regarding middle powers, their indicators are the size of a

country's diplomatic network and membership in key international organizations. If these two criteria are applied, almost forty countries can be classified as middle powers (Ibid).

In addition, countries gain or lose power in the course of time. In today's world, China is economically bigger than the United States. The Soviet Union during the bipolar world no longer exists. Nobody can any longer claim India as a middle power. Briefly speaking, the ranking of states in terms of power always changes. Therefore, states may lose or raise their status. In other words, ranking is not fixed but in a continuous change. In addition, particularly in functional and behavioral models, some middle powers may be reluctant to be an active middle power and keep away from world politics. In contrast, small states may act like middle powers.

Since change is possible in middle power status, scholars have categorized middle powers as traditional and emerging middle powers. Jordaan lists the differences between traditional and emerging powers clearly as in the below table:

Table 2. 3: Traditional and Emerging Middle Powers

	Traditional middle powers	Emerging middle powers
CONSTITUTIVE DIFFERENCES		
Democratic tradition	Stable social democracies	Relatively unstable, recently democratized with some very undemocratic aspects
Time of emergence as middle powers	During the Cold War	After the Cold War
Position in the world economy	Core	Semi-periphery
Domestic distribution of wealth	Very equal	Highly unequal
Regional influence	Low	High
Origins of perceived neutrality	Regional ambivalence and relative unimportance	Regional self-association and significance

Behavioral DIFFERENCES		
Regional orientation	Fairly low	Moderately high
Attitude to regional integration and cooperation	Ambivalent	Eager (often assuming leadership role)
Nature of actions to effect deep global change	Appeasing and legitimizing	Reformist and legitimizing
Purpose of international identity construction	Distance from powerful in the region	Distance from weak in the region

Source: Jordaan, 2003:168

Oosterveld and Torossian's distinction between two middle powers is similar. According to them, while traditional (they call it "established") middle powers invest in liberal-democratic norms domestically and internationally, emerging middle powers are inclined to alternative versions of the world order like the Beijing Consensus (Oosterveld and Torossian, 2018). In addition, Onis and Kutlay explain emerging powers in detail in their co-written article and identify four critical conditions that enable emerging powers to have a fruitful role in the rapidly changing international system:

(1) the ability to serve as role models based on their soft power resources, i.e. the quality of their developmental and democratic credentials, (2) the capacity to build effective coalitions with both established and emerging powers on the basis of a consistent set of normative principles, (3) governance capacity based on a recognition of the limits of middle power influence and avoiding a mismatch of expectations and capabilities, and (4) the capacity to identify niche areas in regional and global governance where they can make a distinct and unique contribution (Onis and Kutlay, 2016: 5).

Regarding the approach of international relations theories concerning middle powers, since realists count on the physical capacity of states, they identify middle powers according to their military strength, economy, population, national resources, and so on. Realists think that physical attributes can be measured quantitatively and ranked easily. Therefore, for them, "Middle-sized countries with middle-sized populations,

middle-sized economies and middle-sized armies may be described as “middle powers” (Chia, 2000: 78)". In this hierarchical approach, while middle powers can enforce their demands over smaller states, they cannot resist the will of great powers. Yet, they can still mitigate the pressure of great powers. In addition, it is in favor of great powers to take middle powers on their side in return for some costs and allowing them to have some influence, instead of alienating them (Ibid: 79). Moreover, sometimes it is the geographical position that determines the influence of a middle power. If a middle power is neighboring a great power, it will have an ineffective role in the region. Likewise, if it is positioned among small or weaker states, it may behave like a regional great power.

On the other hand, for neo-realists that count on the structure of the international system, middle powers will either form alliances with each other or approach great powers. As seen during the explanation of functional and behavioral models, “middle power” is a relative concept that states identify on themselves. Therefore, the identity of states is significant in both models. We know that constructivists underline the importance of identities in the international system. Therefore, it can be contended that functional and behavioral approaches best matches the constructivist theory. In addition, we can share views of one of the well-known theorists of critical theory, Robert Cox, about middle powers. He argues that since middle powers have no intentions of domination and enough capacity to be functionally effective, they could be an important influencer in international relations (Cox in Chia, 2000: 81). Finally, as the (neo-) Marxist approach bases its views on economic structure, the concept of middle power does not fit into its debate. For example, Wallerstein's world system is designed according to the production of power and capital. Therefore, in this system, a middle and even a small power can be in the core while some middle powers can be positioned in the periphery.

Finally, this study argues that size matters for the status of states but not as much as power. Power has a more decisive role when states are ranked. Perhaps, that is why related concepts include the word “power”, such as “middle power”, “great power” and “superpower”. Indeed, when a small country is economically rich and has destructive weapons or a well-educated population, it can tackle vital problems, including security, and achieve greater successes despite its small size. Militarily strong Israel and Qatar with its soft power can be good examples for our argument. In

addition, as argued above, states might also hire power for the sake of their existential ends. In this sense, being strong in at least one area might fill the gap in other areas.

2.5 Geopolitics

The concept of “Geopolitics” focuses on the relationship between geography and politics. In this approach, factors like where a state is located, whether it is surrounded by land or sea, relations with neighbors, natural resources, overseas colonies or investments, etc. are all geopolitical factors that influence a country's politics. Geography does not change. That is why Ibn Khaldun said "Geography is destiny", centuries ago. Historically, the geopolitical concept has its roots in the last quarter of the 19th century. The term was first used in 1899 by Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen (Yeşiltaş, 2017). Another author who wrote about geopolitics in the same period was Alfred Mahan. In his book, *The Influence of Sea Power on History 1660-1783*, published in 1890, Mahan states that Britain's rise to world power was due to its sea power. According to Mahan, those countries having strong navies could control the world (Mahan, 1890). However, some scholars, like Mackinder (1904), objected to Mahan's views and claimed that although sea power was important for great powers since technology and industrialization made exploitation of vast lands easy, those controlling the “heartland” would control the whole world.

While such discussions were ongoing in the Anglo-Saxon world, Germans also included geopolitics to their agenda from the 1920s and onward. Karl Haushofer was the most prominent person in Germany who underlined the importance of geopolitics. Haushofer reflected his views in his journal *Geopolitik*. Since Hitler had plans to create a living space (*lebensraum*) for the German nation, Haushofer's ideas took his attention and contacted him via common friends. According to Haushofer (1928), Germany was defeated in World War I because of the lack of geographical awareness. For him, a state must have both land and sea power and should swallow surrounding small states as conquest was the only biological way for a state's growth (New World Encyclopedia, 2018). During the same period, Nicolas Spykman's views about geopolitics were dominant in American academia. According to Spykman, physical reality (geographical conditions) was decisive for a state in international relations. Thus, rulers, including dictators, may come to power and go or die but unperturbed

mountains stand (Spykman, 1942: 41). Besides, he introduced his famous “rimland theory”, which argued that coastal lines surrounding Eurasia are more important than “heartland”. When the World War II turned the world order into a bipolar order, in which old great powers were replaced by the USA and the Soviet Union, interestingly, the term geopolitics was rarely used in the new period, namely the Cold War (Gokmen, 2010: 53). It was Henry Kissinger and Brzezinski that began to use the concept again. Despite not being used much, what both polars were doing in their international politics was geopolitics. For example, the American administration developed a “containment policy” in order to stop the spread of Soviet imperialism. Therefore, Americans increased their influence in Europe and neighbors of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership tried to maintain good relations with Latin American countries. For example, when the Soviets deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba, the world came to the brink of a nuclear war.

When the American-led Western bloc defeated the Soviet Union, the Cold War ended, and a new world order, headed by the United States, began. Furthermore, globalization speeded up thanks to developments in technology, communication, and transportation. The world became more integrated and issues such as human rights, environment, immigration, etc., which were ignored during the Cold War, rose to the top of the agenda. However, parallel to globalization, nationalist conflicts increased as well. Thus, territorial integrity, secessionist and irredentist movements, terrorism, etc., which are all related to geopolitics, became top issues in world politics (Ibid: 60-68). Some examples of developments that took place in the post-Cold War era clearly show geopolitics is still key to international politics. For example, as Sempa (2002: 113) lists, the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussain’s regime, Russia’s war against the Chechens, Serbia’s attempts to control former Yugoslavia by war, North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, clashes between Pakistan and India, and the rise of China in global politics, all illustrate that geopolitics is the concept of the 21st century as well.

However, as Scholvin (2016: 6) argues, conclusions reached by scholars who wrote about geopolitics are partly correct. While geopolitics is a crucial factor that shapes international relations regardless of historical periods, it has shortcomings, too. Sometimes it is the state that makes geopolitics more significant. Think of the Americas of the 14th and 21st centuries. Moreover, other factors, e.g. ideology, may

dominate geopolitics and keep it uninfluential. As a result, it can be argued that non-geographical factors (variables/agents) are no less important than geopolitics (non-variable/structure).

Regarding the geopolitics of the Middle East, where Qatar is located, the region is the home of ancient civilizations and three monotheistic religions. Holy sites sacred to Islam, Christianity, and Judaism are located in the Middle East. Politically, Persian, Arab, and Ottoman Empires rose in this region. With the demise of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Middle Eastern geopolitics were reshaped by the British and the French via the Sykes-Picot Agreement (Amirahmadi, 2015: 88). The British Empire and France colonized almost the whole region. Meanwhile, oil was explored in colonies, heightening the influence of Western great powers in the region. Not surprisingly, oil attracted the Americans and Russians as well and, with the end of World War II, these two countries replaced the British and the French. When the colonial period ended during the Cold War, nationalistic movements climaxed to their peak due to the establishment of the Israel and American-Russian rivalry. The regime change in Iran and then the end of the Cold War increased the woes of the Middle East (Ibid: 89-91).

Sectarian conflicts, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rivalries among Arab countries, American intervention in the Gulf War, and the September 11 attacks caused continuous turmoil. Since the majority of the countries were ruled by dictators or certain families, public dissatisfaction with tyrant governments turned into unrest in some countries, which was called the Arab Spring. Although people were able to overthrow some leaders, chaos continued. The conditions of the people in the region were no better than in the pre-Arab Spring era (Khader, 2018: 3). Besides, terrorism seized almost the whole Middle East. As of 2020, it does not seem that the ethnic, sectarian, and inter-religious conflicts will be ending any time soon. What is more, inter-state rivalries based on financial and political reasons, which Qatar is also a side, serve to escalate tensions. Finally, great powers are in the region politically, economically, and militarily due to their interests, particularly those related to energy supply. This is how Khan (2015: 109) describes the situation: "Middle East; owing to its geo-strategic location and being pivot of the world energy security calculus, is the most significant region where conflict, weakened governmental structures, and instability cannot be left unattended by world community". Thus, it can be contended

that the stability of the region is not an issue that regional states will be able to solve themselves due to external intervention.

2.6 Level of Analysis in International Relations

There are many complex problems in world politics. Analysts have offered different methods to learn the roots of problems, clarifying content, context, their scale and scope, and finding good solutions. According to Tamaki (2015: 86), "We divide the complex reality of international politics into smaller levels so that studying it becomes easier, enabling us to determine what decisions are made by whom, and under what constraints". While there are various categories for it, it is generally accepted that there are three levels of analysis: individual, state, and international system (systemic). Additionally, Mabee (2007) includes sub-system (region) and bureaucracy as the fourth and the fifth categories. The global level of analysis is also a newly-emerging paradigm that resembles systemic level factors. Yet, while at the systemic level the state is the perpetrator, the global level factors are the outcomes of individuals, states, NGOs, and natural conditions. For example, global warming or the impact of the internet on international politics are assumed to be global factors. However, this study will examine the individual, state, and systemic levels since this trio is the fundamental and more common category.

The individual level of analysis emphasizes human factors in international relations. It focuses on the moral principles and behaviors individuals adopt in decision-making and explores various perspectives to understand the human role in governmental decisions. For example, this level analyzes how a leader's character affects policies and how he interacts with other decision-makers. The term "operational code" is used in this level of analysis in reference to forecasting attitudes of political leadership. This term was first used by Nathan Leites, who was hired by The Rand Corporation, during the Cold War to predict the actions and intentions of Soviet officials (Gaddis, 1992-1993: 9). The individual level of analysis is indeed a necessity to understand international politics. Napoleon Bonaparte's moral values, for instance, shaped the French society and later spread through the European continent. Hitler's ambitions for German imperialism led to World War II, which also culminated in the Cold War

(Folarin, 2015: 6). Among international theories, idealism analyzes world politics based on individual moral principles, which are regarded as those of states as well.

On the other hand, the state-level analysis explores the behaviors and characteristics of states in foreign politics. As Singer (1969) argues, state-level analysis is fruitful as it comprises richer details. In this approach, the political system, weakness or strength, historical-cultural legacy, the role of religion, traditions, economy, and even geography are factors that determine decision-making. For example, it is argued that democratic countries do not fight each other as decision-makers are under the scrutiny and control of people (Dorff, 2004: 7). On the contrary, authoritarian regimes easily declare war since decisions are taken by a few people alone. According to the realist theory, the world agenda is determined by states. The international system is built by states that are seeking power maximization. States compete to gain power and decrease the power of their enemies. Their sole goal is to survive in the anarchical system. Thus, they leave no room for individuals in the decision-making process. Similarly, Liberalism, too, counts on state-level analysis. Liberalists think that states are not only rivals but they can also cooperate for their interests. Although constructivists focus on sub-state factors that define state behaviors, they analyze international politics at the state level.

The third level of analysis is the systemic level. This approach contends that the international system is what determines the behaviors of individuals and governments. The neo-realist theory, in particular, supports the systemic level by arguing that it is the anarchical structure of the system which lacks a supra authority compelling states to act in a certain way and posit themselves in the system. According to Kenneth Waltz (1979), states have similar functions and they are unitary actors that cannot command each other as there is no legitimate coercive power. States are rational and take into account what others are doing in the international environment they live in (Fearon, 1998: 298). Thus, the system forces states to determine their foreign policies. Since the system is not a conscious actor, how it affects state politics is a matter of discussion. According to supporters of this level of analysis, the international system is like a “free market economy”. Strategies of companies (pricing, discounts, marketing, etc.) create an order and harmony among themselves without premeditation. As such, policies,

strategies, and the power of nation-states form a structure in which no state can make decisions solely on behalf of others.

Based on the above information, the three levels of analysis along with some new ones not detailed here have different approaches to world politics. Developments in the international system have shown that looking from just one perspective will be reductionism. Levels are no longer hierarchical, but intertwining, meaning that the state, sub-state actors, individuals, system levels as well as other factors may have an impact on decision-making together as a group or as a single actor. It is also important to note that the number of levels has increased in the course of time and it seems that this trend will continue in the future. For example, the newly-emerged global level may affect inter-state and intra-state politics more than expected thanks to factors like natural disasters and technology, which are not associated with any other levels.

CHAPTER 3

QATAR'S FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter analyzes Qatar's foreign policy as a form of soft power. The main topics discussed are: Qatar's country profile, the characteristics and goals of Qatar's foreign policy, decision-makers, the geopolitical context that affects Qatar's foreign policy, its relations with neighbors, mediation diplomacy, intervention to foreign conflicts, and Qatar's middle power status.

3.1 About Qatar

Qatar is a peninsula country with an area of 11,581 km², located in the Persian Gulf, with Saudi Arabia being the only land neighbor in Western Asia. According to the 2017 census, its population is 2,641,000, consisting of 313,000 Qatari citizens and 2.3 million expatriates (Priyad Souza, 2019). Some analysts, including Gray (2013: 8), classify Qatar as a microstate, meaning a country with a population less than 1 million. However, when its expatriate population is included, it can be regarded as a small state. This is because "Qatar's rapid domestic development, its ambitious program of state-branding, its position as a global gas power and its 'hyperactive diplomacy' have resulted in its transition from 'micro' to 'small' state status" (Miller and Al-Mansouri, 2016: 51). Yet, as will be explained below, the authors ignore that middle powers have the same characteristics. Being under Ottoman rule from 1871 onwards, it became a British Protectorate in 1916 when the Ottomans lost to the British Empire during the World War I. When Britain declared its disengagement with the Persian Gulf in 1968, Qatar, Bahrain, and the Trucial States (today's the United Arab Emirates) negotiated for a united country. However, Qatar (and Bahrain) decided to be an independent sovereign state and became independent on September 3, 1971. Qatar has been ruled by the Al Thani family since the mid-19th century and currently, Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani is the incumbent Emir.

Politically, the state is a constitutional monarchy ruled by Al Thani Dynasty, by a 150-article constitution, which was ratified by the Emir in 2004. According to Article 1 of the constitution, Qatar is an independent Arab state the religion of which is Islam and the legislation is based on the Sharia law (Constitution of Qatar, 2003). The first article

also states that its political system is democratic, a term that contradicts with the authoritarian systems of the region. Article 8 describes who is authorized to rule the state. As per concerning article, “The rule of the State is hereditary in the family of Al Thani and in the line of the male descendants of Hamad Bin Khalifa Bin Hamad Bin Abdullah Bin Jassim” (Ibid). The legislative authority is assumed by Al-Shoura Council, consisting of 45 members, of which 30 are elected and 15 are appointed by the Emir. Although Al-Shoura Council acts as per sharia law, the legal system includes civil law as well. Yet, elections for the council have been repeatedly delayed. On the other hand, executive authority is undertaken by the Emir and council of ministers, whose members are also appointed by the Emir. In addition, political parties or similar societies are banned (CRS, 2019: 3). Based on these facts, it can be concluded that Qatar’s limited transition to democracy is still in the making.

In terms of judicial authority, Article 129 of the Qatari constitution states that “The supremacy of law is the base of rule in the State” and claims that judges and prosecutors are independent and not subject to any power in the exercise of their judicial functions (Hukoomi, 2018). After gaining its independence, Qatar has been ruled by Sheikh Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani (1960-1972), Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani (1972-1995), Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (1995-2013) and Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani (2013-present), respectively. Regarding how they came to power, Khalifa bin Hamad overthrew Sheikh Ahmad bin Ali with a palace coup in the House of Al Thani. Hamad Bin Khalifa deposed his father, who was abroad on a vacation, in a bloodless coup. Incumbent Emir Tamim bin Hamad came to power after his father voluntarily abdicated.

Meanwhile, economically, it had been a quite poor country until the first oil well was drilled, which coincides with the time the country's rapid development began. Addressing to an audience in a Chatham House conference held in 2013, Qatar's former Foreign Minister, Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Attiyah, said that one-third of Qatari people died due to hunger when the World War II interrupted international trade and added that "When my father's generation was born, one in four women still died during childbirth. Our country's first school opened in 1947 and a full-scale hospital followed in 1959" (Al-Attiyah, 2013: 3). Qatar is now one of the richest countries in the world thanks to petroleum and natural gas, which account for more than 70% of government revenue and 85% of exports. "With proven oil reserves of 15-billion

barrels and gas fields that account for more than 5% of the global resource, it is the richest per-capita state in the world" (Reader, 2013). Qatar's proven gas reserves are the third-largest in the world.

While the Qatari government achieved 1.6% GDP growth despite the blockade imposed in 2017 by neighboring countries and Egypt, its economy grew 2.8% in 2018. Qatar's nominal GDP is \$183 billion and GDP according to PPP (purchasing power parity) is \$357 billion. On the other hand, GDP per capita (nominal) is \$108,000 (excluding expatriates). Regarding other metrics: the inflation rate is less than 0.5%; the state budget deficit is 4%; the external balance has a surplus of 9.2%; and government debt to GDP is 54% (MDPS, 2017). Moreover, Qatar's sovereign wealth fund possesses assets worth \$320 billion (Statista, 2018). The Qatari Investment Authority has invested in many multinational companies around the world, which we will discuss in Chapter 5. While the number of tourists is around 2 million, it has already invested tens of billions of USD to host the FIFA 2022 World Cup. Poverty is not a problem for the Qatari population as the unemployment rate is as low as 0.2% and citizens are considerably rich. Regarding other metrics, 70% of the Qatari population are Muslims while others are Christian (14%), Hindu (14%), or Buddhists (2%). The non-Muslims are foreigners. Other facts include: the official language is Arabic; the illiteracy rate is 3.5%, which is the lowest among the Arab-speaking world; and 88% of the population are expatriates, which is considered by some scholars as a national threat (Priyad Souza, 2018).

If we look at key events that have taken place in Qatar since its proclamation of independence, the following compiled incidents, taken mostly from two news outlets—unless otherwise specified—are worth mentioning (BBC, 2018; Khaleej Times, 2017):

- One year after Qatar became independent, Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani deposed his cousin, Emir Sheikh Ahmad Bin Ali Al Thani, while he was in Iran for hunting. He formed a new government, enacted a new constitution, and expanded the cabinet.
- In 1981, Qatar and its five neighbor Arab countries formed Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in order to promote economic development, common security, and repel threats that may come from Iranian Revolution and Iran-Iraq War (Britannica, 2018). Being a member of GCC is one of the first attempts to appear and have a say in

regional politics. Besides, it justifies the alliance theory, which argues that weak states form alliances against a common threat.

- In line with the theory, in 1991, Qatar allowed the deployment of foreign troops for the liberation of Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion and participated in the war with its army.
- Arguments over the distribution of oil revenues and an independent foreign policy ended with a bloodless palace coup via which Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani dethroned his father, Emir Sheikh Khalifa, in 1995. This coup is interesting since it broke up with regional allies despite being a weak state.
- Women were given the right to vote in 1995.
- In 1996, a counter-coup was staged by the Emir's cousin and 32 people against Emir Hamad, but it failed.
- In 1996, Al Jazeera satellite TV was launched as an independent media network supported by the Emir. Al Jazeera is now one of the three most-watched TV networks in the world thanks to its news coverage of controversial issues (Laub, 2017).
- The first democratic municipal elections since 1971 were held in 1999. Women voted and became candidates for the first time.
- Qatar solved long-running border disputes with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in 2001.
- In 2002, the US chose Al Udeid base for a likely war against Iraq. The base was renewed and expanded.
- US Central Command was deployed in Al Udeid base and was used during the Iraqi war in 2003. The base still operates and indirectly protects Qatar from external threats.
- In 2003, a new constitution allowing a 45-member parliament, whose 30 members were to be elected, was enacted. In the same year, the Emir announced his younger son, Tamim, as crown prince, replacing his other son, Jassim.
- In 2005, the constitution became effective. In addition, Qatar and the US launched the world's largest liquefied petroleum gas facility the gas of which was to be exported to the US.
- In 2007, Qatar and Dubai became the two largest shareholders of the London Stock Exchange.

- In 2008, Qatar and Saudi Arabia agreed to delineate borders and boost economic cooperation.
- In 2009, being the sole Gulf state having trade deals with Israel, Qatar cut ties with Israel over the Gaza offensive.
- In 2010, Qatar won the bid to host the FIFA 2022 World Cup, which was seen as an amazing success by the sports world.
- In 2011, Qatar joined international military operations in Libya and reportedly armed Islamist opposition groups. It also hosted some international meeting groups about Libya (Britannica, 2018).
- In 2012, the Afghan Taliban announced to open a political office in Doha to facilitate talks. Talks ended with the withdrawal of US troops in February 2020. Moreover, Emir Hamad visited Gaza and proposed to send troops to Syria to stop civilian killings.
- In 2013, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani took power after his father abdicated.
- In March 2014, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt temporarily withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar, claiming that Qatar supported the Muslim Brotherhood and other terrorist groups.
- In September 2014, Qatar and four other Arab states participated in the US-led coalition to bomb DAESH in Syria.
- In 2015, Qatar and four other Arab states bombed Houthis in Yemen.
- In 2016, the Qatari government decided to abolish the labor sponsorship system "kafala" that ordered foreign workers to get their employers' consent to change jobs or leave the country. Yet, the abolishment process continued until late 2019.
- In June 2017, Qatar faced the worst diplomatic crisis as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt implemented an air, sea, and land blockade to force Qatar to stop supporting terrorism and cut its relations with Iran. Turkey and Iran tried to lessen the impact of the blockade by providing food aid. Turkey also sent troops to Qatar to prevent a likely invasion. Qatar, regarded as a small state, as opposed to this study's claim, did not step back against the blockade, which still continues.
- In December 2018, Qatar announced that it would withdraw from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), arguing its reliance on gas

rather than oil. Yet, analysts commented that it was a symbolic decision aiming to move away from Saudi influence, another audacious move by Qatar.

3.2 Characteristics and Goals of Qatari Foreign Policy

Qatar is a small state but it has middle power ambitions as per functional and behavioral approaches about middle powers analyzed in Chapter 2. When Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani came to power in 1995, the Sheikdom became more involved in foreign affairs thanks to Emir Hamad's personality and enormous financial resources. Other strong figures like Sheikha Moza, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim and then Crown Prince Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad, incumbent Emir now, played crucial roles in crafting and enforcing the foreign policy. Before taking power, Emir Hamad considered his country as a puppet in the hands of Saudi Arabia. Thus, after becoming the Emir, he decided to pursue an independent regional and international foreign policy and modernize his country (Hassan, 2017). However, Emir Hamad's aim was not to be hostile towards the neighboring states. As Abdullah (2014) states, Qatar adopted an “open” foreign policy that relied on soft power tools like diplomacy, media, education, sports, culture, tourism, foreign aid, and so on. The objective was to maintain good relations with GCC countries, ally with super and middle powers and practice nation-branding.

The country provides such detailed account of foreign policy that Article 7 of its constitution is dedicated solely to foreign affairs. Article 7 reads as follows:

The foreign policy of the State of Qatar is based on the principle of preserving international peace and security by means of encouraging peaceful resolution of international disputes; shall support the right of people to self-determination; shall not interfere in the domestic affairs of states; and shall cooperate with peace-loving nations (Constitution of Qatar, 2003).

The article stipulates that Qatar favors preserving international peace and security and it will support peaceful solutions to international disputes, self-determination, and non-interference to other states' internal problems. It also underlines cooperation with other nations. It can be argued that mediation, one of the pillars of the Qatari foreign policy, literally conforms to Article 7. From a theoretical perspective, active involvement in international conflicts is undertaken by middle powers thanks to their sufficient

resources and eagerness to appear before the world audience. Yet, Qatar, despite being categorized as a small state, has been mediating like a middle power since the early years of the millennium. Indeed, from 1995 to 2010, Qatar played the role of a mediator in Yemen, Somalia, Palestine, Lebanon, Eritrea, and Sudan. It was the policy of impartiality and neutrality that brought recognition, respect, and credibility. Conversely, neither of the articles of the constitution refers to intervention, a policy that the Doha government pursued with the Arab Spring onwards.

Moreover, in contrast to the realist theory, which claims that small states bandwagon behind greater powers or balance against them by allying with other countries to gain power, Qatar rejected to remain under the control of its allies and followed an influential and individual foreign policy both at regional and international level. Scholars also agree that Qatar was too ambitious. They admit that despite that it acts in line with liberalism's "low politics", its ambitions are like those of middle powers (Habracken, 2017: 5; McSparren, Tok and Sanz, 2015: 38). Since it is an active participant in world affairs and uses not only economic and diplomatic instruments but also military ones, a justification of this study's hypotheses, Kausler (2015: 1-2) forwards several arguments about Qatar's foreign policy. First, Qatar has an "activist foreign policy" that lets it gain economic and political power. Thanks to this policy, it allied with the US and participated in international interventions that meant political support, legitimacy, and security. Second, through involvement in the domestic conflicts of some Arab countries during the Arab Spring, it dominated not only the democratic movements of opposition groups but also their discourse. However, this policy was countered by Hezbollah, Iran, and even GCC countries. Third, Qatari elites' ideas and preferences also have an impact on the country's foreign policy (see next section below). Finally, Qatar's activist foreign policy can enable regional states to have a mutual defense regime among states that are in contention with each other. However, given that Qatar's independent policies are opposed by regional powers like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt, its activist foreign policy does not seem to lead to the formation of a common security communion.

Another aspect of Qatar's foreign policy that punches above its weight is its reliance on economic resources derived from oil and gas revenues. Having a gas-driven "rentier" economy, Emir Hamad benefited from two tools for its ambitious and influential diplomacy (Blasi, 2015). The first is a financial tool consisting of the

Sovereign Wealth Fund and Qatar Investment Authority. These two institutions diversify the country's incomes from oil and gas to banking, media, technology, sports, industry, tourism, etc. Besides diversification, it is also used as a tool to gain new friends and make them support Qatar in its foreign policy in a soft manner. The second tool is the media. Al Jazeera TV network has been used as a diplomatic tool that supports opposition groups in Arab countries, opposes American policies, and influences pan-Arab and pan-Islamic sentiments. In terms of foreign policy-financial resources, using its economic strength in mediation and promising financial assistance is referred to as "carrot diplomacy" (Sanroma, 2015: 29). When Qatar becomes a mediator between parties or intervenes, it offers financial help or undertakes the fiscal burden of rebuilding infrastructure. In almost all mediatory instances, Qatar used its capital as a carrot to commence or finalize negotiations. For example, "Qatar pledged billions of dollars in aid to the post-revolution Tunisia in telecommunication, tourism, banking and hydrocarbons sector with a pledge to create 20,000 jobs for Tunisians in Qatar" (Mohammad, 2017). In addition, when the Emirate mediated between the Yemeni government and Houthis in 2007, it pledged to make a 300-million USD investment in Yemen (Felsch, 2016: 31). Therefore, mediating and trading were conducted by Qataris simultaneously, which culminated in political and economic gains.

Whether Qatari foreign policy caters to a particular ideology is another matter that must be discussed. Qatar, like its neighbor Saudi Arabia, embraces Wahhabism and adopts the Hanbali School of Jurisprudence since its independence (Elashmawy, 2014: 17). Qatar distinguishes between their "Wahhabism of the sea" and Saudis' "Wahhabism of the land", referring to less control and interest in clergy and a more secular-religious view of Islam, like Turkey (Dorsey, 2013: 2). It does not strive to spread Wahhabism as the Saudis do. Dorsey (2019), with whom I held an interview via Whatsapp, added that "Qataris are Wahhabis just like Saudis. Theirs is an enlightened form of Wahhabism. It shapes the culture. I don't think it is a vital factor but it is still a factor".

Conversely, it supports Sunni groups, like the Muslim Brothers (MB), whose understanding of Islam is different from Wahhabism. For example, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, a prominent Islamic scholar currently living in Qatar, is a member of the Qatar-backed Muslim Brothers. As a matter of fact, Qatari rulers have relations with a

wide range of states and groups including Hamas, Hezbollah, Israel, Iran and the US (Pulliam, 2013: 1). Therefore, the Sheikdom's foreign policy may also be called "pragmatic", Calamur (2017) says. Khatib (2014: 3) even goes on further to claim that it is both expansionist and pragmatic since Qatar relies on picking winners, rides political trends, and engages with multiple actors, including jihadist groups. This ideology-free and pragmatic foreign policy aims to cultivate a positive image of a liberal, progressive, neutral and business-friendly state (Pulliam, 2013: 1).

However, some scholars claim that it is possible to find traces of Islamic ideology in Qatari foreign policy. For example, Hammond (2014:4) does not agree that Qatar's relations with Arab Islamists are solely opportunistic and strategic, noting that Islamists are present in universities, think-tanks, and non-governmental institutions. The influence of MB members is particularly notable. The Qatar-MB alliance was witnessed clearly during the Arab Spring. Qatar uses the MB's political network to implement its policies in other Arab countries. The MB network also helped Emir Hamad to exert its independent foreign policy, which was under the shadow of Saudi Arabia. Not to mention, religion is not all that matters. Nationalism in Qatari foreign policy is also a concern for some analysts. According to Bedri (2015: 37), Al Jazeera promotes pan-Arab ideas due to its anti-American, anti-West, and anti-Israel rhetoric. Zayani (2016: 3559) even argues that "Al Jazeera helped rekindle a shared Arab identity. Al Jazeera Arabic succeeded in doing what Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser failed to achieve decades ago: to bring the Arab masses together, and to foster a sense of unity among viewers across the Arab world and in the diaspora".

On the other hand, this study argues and elucidates in the next sections that there is always an ideology in policies of countries, including Qatar. It is correct that the Qatari regime is pragmatic for its ends but supporting Islamists groups help them survive and maintain their causes. Thus, there is mutual benefit for both sides; While Qatar uses its soft power tools to increase its influence via Islamist groups in the region, its mentioned customers hold power or struggle for it. Besides, the Qatari regime might not be too Islamic but it is still Islamic and supports its allies so as to take power in Arab states.

Another term used by scholars for Qatari foreign policy is "maverick". Pointing out mass contradictions in Qatari foreign policy, Fuller (2014) contends that Qatar supports the MB as it is a non-violent and progressive group. In addition, since it wants

to differentiate itself from other Gulf monarchies through modernization and democratic process, it backs anti-governmental upheavals. In other words, Qatar complains about the current political structure of regional countries and uses its resources for change. It should be noted here that because the small Qatari population lives in comfort, they do not demand political reforms. In Qatar, while the state is ruled by the Al Thani family, people do not want democracy or demand more political participation since they have all they want. Every Qatari can earn at least 70,000 Riyals (\$20,000) per month if they decide to work for the government. Hence, being confident that it will not encounter any opposition demanding political, social, or economic reforms, the Qatari government pursues a maverick foreign policy and intervenes in the political conflicts of other countries. In other words, if the goal of a government is to increase the welfare of its people, the Qatari regime already does it. Qatar's non-democratic political system gives citizens what they want. Therefore, it is not bizarre to help other communities to overcome their woes. In addition, presuming that monarchy is an old-fashioned ruling system does not mean that a monarch will not support the democratization process in other countries. In other words, a monarch does not have to oppose a universally accepted political system. On the other hand, Qatar's hostile neighbors were also involved in the political transition of Arab countries during the Arab Spring. Hence, what Qatar did was no different from what others did. Also, since Qatar is a sovereign country, it can not be held accountable for its policies by other states except for those in the transition process. For instance, Qatar may be blamed by Libya but not by the UAE.

Another characteristic of Qatari foreign policy is that decision-making is in the hands of a few people. According to international relations theorists, foreign politics can be analyzed at the state, system, and individual levels (Waltz, 1959). Since Qatar is a hereditary monarchy, decisions are centralized by a small number of people. While decisions are taken very quickly, they do not reflect the opinions of the majority. In the case of Qatar, four people have had notable roles in foreign policy: former Emir Hamad bin Khalifa, his second wife Sheikha Moza, former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani and incumbent Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani (Al Yahya, 2017). These four rulers shaped Qatar's internal and international politics from 1995 onwards. Among all, it was Hamad bin Khalifa who launched an assertive nation-branding process and built

today's Qatar with his distinctive ruling. Qatar followed an independent foreign policy and appeared more in world politics. Policies of mediation and intervention, the establishment of Al Jazeera, locating US forces at Al-Udaid base, challenging Saudi Arabia's regional policies, improving relations with both Iran and Israel, conducting democratic elections, enacting constitution, diversifying national income, and so many other developments are all achievements of former Emir Hamad bin Khalifa.

On the other hand, it was his aide, former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani, who steered Qatari foreign policy. Hamad bin Jassim was personally involved in mediation between conflicting parties together with Qatari diplomats. His efforts made Qatar appear in international politics (Ulrichsen, 2014: 4). The third influential figure is Sheikha Moza, mother of Emir Tamim and wife of former Emir, Hamad. Besides her modern untraditional clothing, she actively maintains many of Qatar's cultural and educational projects. For example, she is the founder of the Qatar Foundation. Furthermore, she built an education city where prominent American universities have campuses (Windecker and Sendrowicz, 2014: 89). Moreover, Sheikha Moza assumes the responsibility of most of Qatar's humanitarian aid activities. The final noteworthy decision-maker is the incumbent Emir, Tamim bin Hamad. When he took power from his father with a voluntary transition, he pursued his father's salient policies. Despite being under the blockade of four countries, he did not step back and continued the same policies. It is these four influential policymakers that have changed the image and structure of the state. In Qatar, the state is not an actor but a means of a few individuals that drive it for their and country's goals.

On a side note, the implementation of soft power in foreign policy through numerous institutions, as this study will show, is another characteristic of Qatar. According to Aktaş (2019), President of Genar Survey Company based in Istanbul, Israel and Qatar are two inspiring countries for soft power. Lacking military power to defend itself, the Qatari government used soft power tools for its security, image, and development. While Qatar imitated Dubai in the diversification of the economy, which is dependent on oil and gas, it followed China's strategies in education (Sanroma, 2015: 19). Unlike other countries, the Emirate not only uses governmental institutions to enforce its soft power but also wields semi-governmental or private institutions as the state penetrated civil society, thus, making civil society ineffective for civilians but effective for state's

ends. Further to this, most NGO heads are from the Al Thani family (Ibid). For example, Qatar Foundation and affiliated foundations are directed by Sheikha Moza; Al Jazeera is headed by Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani; Qatar Museums Authority is headed by Sheikha Al Mayassa Al Thani; and Qatar Investment Authority is directed by Abdullah bin Saud Al Thani. In addition, Qatar's carrot diplomacy benefits from Qatar's vast financial resources (Antwi-Boateng, 2013: 39). Besides, Al Jazeera's impact in regional politics is so extensive that the term "Al Jazeera effect" has been coined to indicate its influence (Palloshi, 2015: 44). The TV network is seen as the main perpetrator of Arab Spring uprisings due to its coverage. Finally, Qatar's domestic investments, foreign investment, and foreign aid are all soft power tools that Qatar uses in its foreign policy.

Qatar also implements soft power for nation-branding, another aspect that should be examined. Like the UAE, as soon as Qatar admitted that natural resources would not last long, it turned to nation-branding as a stimulus of the economy (Zeineddine, 2017: 588). Their biggest achievement was winning the bid to host the FIFA 2022 World Cup. Qatar is under construction as a whole, which will cost 200 billion dollars (Lens, 2017: 5). New roads, subways, stadiums, and hotels are built for football fans. Qatar's investment in infrastructure is not only for the tournament but also to attract tourists. Doha has become an oasis in the desert thanks to renovation projects. The aim is to make the country a continuous hub of tourism and foreign investment. Obviously, the worldwide flight network of Qatar Airways will contribute to this goal as well (Leite, 2017). Additionally, buying foreign sports teams, like Paris-Saint Germain, and sponsoring football team uniforms, like Qatar Foundation's advertising on Barcelona shirts, provides visibility for the country, making it easier for foreigners to know where it is on the map.

Needless to say, Al Jazeera's contribution to nation-branding is also crucial (see next chapter). Moreover, with \$2 billion annual foreign aid, it wins the hearts of those in need and their governments (Alagos, 2017). Culturally, Qatar has become the location of museums and branches of foreign universities with the efforts of Sheikha Moza (Hertog, 2017:16). Further to the aforementioned efforts for nation-branding, political reforms and the desire of decision-makers to re-brand their country are significant factors. When Hamad bin Khalifa came to power in 1995, he tried to differentiate his country from other regional countries. He initiated a democratization, modernization,

and liberalization process to show that his state is not isolated from the world and it distances itself from extremism (Cafiero, 2012). Although a switch to democracy does not seem likely in the short term and reforms are currently paused, economic liberalization seems successful.

Another characteristic of Qatar's foreign policy is its niche diplomacy as it focuses solely on certain specific issues in world politics (Sanroma, 2015: 29). Unlike its neighbors, it engaged in Hezbollah, Iran, and Israel, and became an arbiter or linked with international powers and pariah groups that no one else wanted or dared to become involved with (Al Yahya, 2017). It has played the role of an honest broker and negotiator in many regional and international issues that enabled the Sheikhdome to gain respect and praise (Pulliam, 2013: 5). According to Antwi-Boateng (2013: 44-45), in line with niche diplomacy and by exerting soft power, Qatar devotes resources in five areas to solve vexing conflicts in the Middle East. The first strategy is to act as an unbiased interlocutor between conflicting parties, which are friends of Qatar. For example, it mediated between the Taliban, the Afghan government, and the US government. Second, it uses its offices for reconciliation meetings to mediate intra-faction conflicts, as it did between Palestine's Hamas and Fatah. Third, Qatar hosts big multilateral conferences. A couple of examples are the United Nations Convention on Climate Change in 2012 and the WTO Ministerial Conference in 2001. Fourth, Qatar has become the preferred destination for many political dissidents. For example, top executives of Hamas and the Muslim Brothers went to Qatar after being exiled or fleeing their countries. Fifth, Qatar projects its diplomatic efforts via the Al Jazeera network. In this way, it enhances its reputation in the world public opinion and gains the appreciation of conflicting parties.

As Peterson (2006: 742) correctly explains, Qatar's niche strategy is, in fact, the branding of Qatar. Indeed, Qatar's niche efforts also aim to change its Middle Eastern image to a Western-like image as a modern, peace-loving, and liberal state. However, Qatar's niche diplomacy sometimes served to provoke the ire of other regional actors, which assume this role for themselves (Kamrava, 2011: 540). For example, while Qatar's mediation in the Darfur crisis angered Egypt, similarly, its involvement in the conflict taking place between the Houthis and the Yemeni government was resented by Saudi Arabia. Yet, overall, this study argues and will elucidate below that Qatar's niche diplomacy fits middle powers rather than small states.

Finally, theoretically, Habraken (2017: 1) claims that Qatar's foreign policy contrasts with (neo)realist and (neo)liberal predictions. According to realists, there is a struggle for power in the anarchical international system and states try to survive by gaining more power. Thus, while only great powers are advantageous in this struggle, the destiny of small states is in the hands of great powers. In the case of Qatar, if it is attacked by a bigger state, it does not have the necessary power to resist. Thus, Qatar follows a bandwagoning policy to protect itself from its enemies. When Qatar understood after the Gulf War that it could not secure itself by relying on regional powers, it approached the US and eventually persuaded the US government to move its forces to Al Udeid base in 2003. Thanks to the US base, Qatar's enemies hesitate to attack the Emirate. However, it is not a silent vessel following the bigger ship. Instead of enjoying its security, it got voluntarily involved in risky conflicts, partly disappointing realists and neo-realists.

In addition, Qatar balances regional powers by remaining neutral. For example, it does not support Saudi Arabia against Iran, and vice versa (Kaussler, 2015: 2). By this strategy, Qatar posits itself according to the regional and international system, verifying the neo-realist views. Regarding the liberal approach, Qatar deliberately improves economic relations with other countries and has an active role in international organizations and institutions that constrain the role of great powers, justifying Keohane's inter-dependence theory (Habraken, 2017: 2). On the other hand, unlike the realist and liberal notion, constructivists claim that identities, ideas, self-perception, norms, and values are important in foreign policy (Browning, 2006: 673). Therefore, the way a small state perceives itself is important in international politics. Though a small state that uses its economic power, Qatar acts as a middle power as per the constructivist theory. Instead of engaging in economic and security issues, it mediates and intervenes like middle and great powers.

3.3 Decision-Makers of Qatari Foreign Policy

The state-level analysis and, partly, the system-level analysis will be misleading in terms of Qatar's foreign policy as only a few people are influential in decision-making in domestic and foreign policies. The system-level may be considered to some extent, but it is still only several people making the most important decisions. Hence, Qatar's

foreign policy should be analyzed at the individual level. In addition, individualized policymaking does not comply with most international relations theories, particularly those naming states as the main actor. Thus, it can be argued that Qatar's foreign policy disproves state-centric theories.

There is indeed a high level of personalization in the Qatari regime (D'Acunto, 2016: 24). Since Qatar is an Emirate ruled by members of "The House of Thani", most of the notorious figures carry the surname "Al Thani". According to a Qatari website, there are 16 powerful individuals behind Qatar's policies, four of whom are women and five of whom do not belong to the Al Thani family (Marhaba, 2018). However, since the beginning of Hamad bin Khalifa's reign in 1995, there have been four people who were more influential than any other: (1) former Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa, the founding father of modern Qatar, (2) his wife and incumbent Emir's mother, Sheikha Moza, (3) his cousin and former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Hamad bin Jassim, and (4) incumbent Emir, Tamim bin Hamad (Abu Sulaib, 2017). Meanwhile, Hamad bin Jassim resigned from office in 2013 but his impact on Qatar's foreign policy and implementation of soft power continues.

Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, who was born in 1952, was Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense respectively before coming to power. He became influential in Doha since appointed as Heir Apparent in 1977. Even before becoming the Emir, foreign diplomats in Qatar assumed that he was a de facto ruler running the country (Roberts, 2017: 2). Before him, Qatar had a coherent foreign policy with that of Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries. Emir Hamad was not happy with his father's policies and seeing him as a puppet in the hands of Saudi Arabia (Hassan, 2017). In 1995, to claim complete power, he deposed his father, Emir Khalifa bin Hamad, who was on vacation in Switzerland. He even froze his exiled father's assets until 2004 as a precaution for a likely counter-coup (Hall, 2013). Indeed, there were two failed coups; the one that took place in 1996 was a serious attempt (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016: 6). Emir Hamad accused Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the UAE for being behind the coups (Zafirov, 2017: 5). The coup of 1996, in particular, still shapes Qatar's relations with its neighbors. Emir Hamad's coup is also the beginning of Qatar's appearance in regional and international politics. Qatar was an ordinary small state before that coup happened. Probably, few people would know where it was on the map, had Emir Hamad not overthrown his father.

As soon as Emir Hamad took power, he launched a deep, fast, and influential reformation process by taking some bold decisions. He increased natural gas production and used its revenues for the modernization of the country and expanded the country's influence both regionally and internationally. One of his first business ventures, with respect to soft power and foreign policy, was to found Al Jazeera TV network, which is now a conglomerate with various channels broadcasting in a few languages (Hall, 2013). He also established Qatar Airways, which flies to more than 100 destinations worldwide (Pierini, 2013). In addition, Qatar won the bid to host the FIFA 2022 soccer cup in 2010 during his reign. He also founded the Qatar Investment Authority to diversify the country's incomes from gas revenues to banking, sports, technology, tourism, etc. (Blasi, 2015). Culturally, Qatar became a hub of museums, international conferences, and branches of foreign universities. Furthermore, the number of foreign aid associations with billion-dollar budgets proliferated. Politically, in 1996, he took some democratic steps, such as holding parliamentary elections, elections for the municipal council, and granting women the right to vote and be candidates in 1999 (Amiri Diwan, 2018). More importantly, Qatar's first permanent constitution was promulgated after a referendum held in 2003. The constitution was expected to provide popular participation for decision-making. For example, 30 of Al Shoura Council's (parliament) 45 members would be elected by democratic elections. Nevertheless, elections for Al Shoura members are still yet to be conducted to this day.

In terms of foreign policy, he took his country from Saudi Arabia's orbit and began to follow an independent foreign policy that is free of extremism and based on soft power (Abdullah, 2014). He adopted diplomacy of conflict resolution, mediation (and intervention during the final years of his reign). Besides punching the capacity of the small state above its weight, he also made new friends and alliances as a result of his balance and security policy. For example, an Israel Trade Representation Office was opened in Qatar in 1996, marking the commencement of official bilateral relations between the two countries (Kaussler, 2015: 39). What is more, Israeli political commentators appeared on Al Jazeera. The then Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim had “defended Qatar’s relations with Israel as necessary to counter US pressure on Qatar which he believed were the result of Saudi Arabian lobbying in Washington” (Al Yahya, 2017). Moreover, Emir Hamad began to maintain close relations with Iran as well. As the Emirate co-manages the South Pars / North Dome Gas-Condensate

Field with Iran, economic interests make both countries inter-dependent on each other (Blasi, 2015). Thus, clashing with Iran is not in Iran's interest. In addition, Qatar improves its relations with Iran to ensure balance against Saudi Arabia. However, Qatar's friendship with the United States is more noteworthy. Due to the fear of attacks by regional powers, Emir Hamad invested \$1 billion in Al Udeid base for the deployment of US forces (Windecker and Sendrowicz, 2014: 87), (CRS, 2019: 3).

Hamad bin Khalifa abdicated from the throne at his own will, a rare transition in the Arab world where rulers are replaced via bloody coups, and his son, Heir Apparent, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani came to power in 2013. His speech during the declaration of the transfer of power to his son is notable:

I declare that I will hand over the reins of power to Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and I am fully certain that he is up to the responsibility, deserving the confidence, capable of shouldering the responsibility and fulfilling the mission...I urge you (people of Qatar) to preserve our civilized traditional and cultural values, originating from our religion, Arab identity and above all our humanity; as we believe that the Arab World is one human body (Al Jazeera, 2013).

As can be understood from the above speech, he particularly underlines the unity of the people of Qatar, Arab identity, and Islamic culture.

Emir Hamad is no different than Napoleon of France or Ataturk of Turkey. If Qatar has become an influential actor and fingered out on the map, it is because of former Emir's radical policies. He achieved personally what some states could not do on themselves. The number of worldwide brands he introduced is enough to show his success. While he owes his success to the effective use of soft power, his achievements also fill an important gap, individual soft power, in the concept of soft power. While very few scholars have underlined the soft power of leaders, personal contributions to this type of power will probably be more emphasized in literature in the future.

The second influential decision-maker Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the current Emir of Qatar, was born in 1980. It is noteworthy to mention that Hamad bin Khalifa had, in fact, appointed Emir Tamim's older brother, Jassim bin Hamad, as Heir Apparent when he came to power. Yet, when Sheikh Jassim renounced his claim to the title, Sheikh Tamim replaced him as the new Heir Apparent in 2003 and became the Emir

in 2013. Both Jassim and Tamim are sons of Emir Hamad, who has three wives and twenty-five children. However, both Heir Apparents are sons of his second wife Sheikha Moza. Unlike his father, who had a military career, Sheikh Tamim worked as a top executive of the Qatari economy. He is still head of Qatar Investment Authority (Hukoomi, 2018). Also, before becoming Emir, Sheikh Tamim invested in sports and won the bid to host FIFA 2022. Moreover, foreign investments have risen during his ongoing reign. Although not being his father's first choice, thanks to his strong personality and good relations with the West, primarily with the United States and France, Sheikh Tamim was able to draw Emir Hamad's attention and eventually became Heir Apparent (Ahram, 2013).

When he came to power, the expectation was that Emir Tamim would prioritize domestic policies (Dickinson, 2014). However, as time has shown, his foreign policy has been an extension of his father's. In other words, Qatar's foreign policy motives have not changed with the transfer of power from father Emir to son Emir. In his inaugural speech upon taking office, Emir Tamim said:

With regard to international relations, the future of the region, the brotherly relations, neighborliness, and friendship, we proceed from the interests of our country and its people as part of the Arab world, as well as the Arab and Islamic nations... Qatar is committed to its obligations toward Arab solidarity and cooperation within the frameworks of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League and their institutions, and do everything possible to help the Arab brothers when necessary. It is committed to the national issues, Arab national security, and respecting the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all Arab countries. Qatar is committed to solidarity with the brotherly Palestinian people in their struggle to achieve their legitimate rights (GCO, 2013:7).

Following his speech, to improve relations with GCC countries, Emir Tamim tried to reach a common understanding with them. As a gesture, he expelled some Muslim Brothers members and asked Al Jazeera to tone down against Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi (Blasi, 2015). However, as of 2020, Qatar has been under the blockade of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt. Thus, Qatar's relations with GCC countries continue to remain complicated. Furthermore, a report of the American Congress claims that Emir Tamim continuously accuses Israel of abuses and

insincerity against Palestinians (CRS, 2019: 12). Hence, Qatar-Israel relations are not as good as expected and the US administration is not happy with this situation. Dorsey (2019) agreed in the interview that nothing has fundamentally changed in Qatari foreign policy since Emir Tamim has taken power. For example, Qatar has continued to support Ennahda Party, a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia, and gave \$500 million to the Tunisian Central Bank to bolster its currency reserves. Moreover, the Doha government has supported the central government of Libya against Gen. Khalifa Haftar, who has been supported by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Qatar is also blamed for funding the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen and Syria. Among all accusations, perhaps the most notorious one is Al Jazeera's news reports, which, according to the blockading countries, criticizes everyone except the Qatari regime (Rivlin and Friedman, 2017: 2).

On the other hand, the style of diplomacy changed right after Sheikh Tamim came to power due to various developments taking place in the region after the Arab Spring (Blasi, 2015). Emir Tamim re-conceptualized soft power and smart power tools that are used in Qatari foreign policy. While diplomatic moves were quieter when compared with Emir Hamad's era, Qatar's foreign policy became more flexible and adaptive to new circumstances (Abdullah, 2014). In addition, soft power and hard power were combined to form smart power to respond more effectively to ongoing and likely conflicts. Moreover, mediation is still one of the most important features in Qatari foreign policy and Emir Tamim plans to make Doha the "Geneva of the Mashreq" by "preventive diplomacy" instead of pre-emptive wars (Ibid). Dorsey (2019) says Emir Tamim could do more but the potential changes he would initiate were undermined by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

If Emir Hamad was a reformer, Emir Tamim is a maintainer of these reforms. The latter has not changed the direction of the country. What is more, he has acted quite bravely against the four blockading countries, which can be categorized as middle powers, except for Bahrain. The blockade continues as of 2020, but Qatar remains safe maintaining the ordinary life. Such safety also means the failure of the blockade. In other words, four countries have not been able to bring Qatar to their terms. This study argues that success emanates from the leader's character and Qatar's soft power. Qatar could have been invaded in one day but that has not happened. It is a fact that he has relied on US and Turkish military bases, but countering four Arab countries is still a

bold and risky policy. In addition, President Trump supported the blockade in the first days. Yet, Qatar's massive lobbying and arms orders to US defense companies were able to convince Trump to become neutral. Overall, Emir Tamim has succeeded in saving his country without stepping back.

The third most important individual in decision-making in Qatar is Sheikha Moza bint Nasser, who is former Emir Hamad's second wife and current Emir's mother. She is so influential that she was listed 74th in Forbes Magazine's "Power Women 2010", a list of the most powerful women in the world (Forbes, 2010). She was ranked 34th on the list of top 500 most influential Muslims in 2012 (TheMuslim500.com, 2012). Sheikha Moza, a first lady who dresses following the latest fashion trends, is very active in social and cultural programs. She is the co-founder of Qatar Foundation, the chairperson of the Silatech Foundation, Education Above All Foundation, Arab Democracy Foundation, and Sidra Medical and Research Center, to which she endowed 7.9 billion USD (Moza Bint Nasser, 2018). What is more, she has been the driving force behind Al Jazeera Children Channel and Education City. Particularly, Education City is significant since it is the location of a dozen foreign universities in Qatar. Thus, it can be argued that the former first lady is the one heading Qatar's educational, social, and humanitarian programs.

According to Anthony (2014), she "has consistently projected an image of Western-friendly modernity...Her job, it's been said, was to embody "soft power", the photogenic, charming side of a family that runs a sharia state". Indeed, Sheikha Moza has been successful in exerting soft power. One of the major quests for Qatari modernization has been transforming the pro-Wahhabi Qatari society into a knowledge-based society (El Etreby, 2014: 38). She has implemented top-down modernization, especially in education. During her position as Vice-Chair of the Supreme Education Council, while she introduced a more secular curriculum in schools, she also encouraged foreign universities to open campuses in Qatar. However, Sheikha Moza's efforts in education are not limited to Qatar alone. She has inaugurated a campaign to educate 58 million children around the world until 2021. In an interview she gave to BBC, she refused the claim that Qatar uses education to exert influence via culture and learning: "I never thought about it like that. People always think that you should link your foreign aid with your national interests. Does it need to be always

like this? I do not see it this way. I see it as a global responsibility towards others (Ibid)".

Perhaps, because of her influence, Sheikha Moza has been "the object of lurid, often misogynistic insults in Saudi, Emirati, and Egyptian media, where she is portrayed as a power-hungry manipulator of weak men (Walsh, 2018)". According to Maguid (2017) of Egypt Today newspaper, as soon as she entered the royal family, she penetrated all parts of the country at political, economic and social levels; forced her husband to depose his father Khalifa bin Hamad from the throne; persuaded her husband to back Libyan rebels against Gaddafi; drove the Qatari government to buy European fashion stores like Harrods; pressed on her husband to change Heir Apparent four times (Meshaal bin Hamad, Fahd bin Hamad, Jassim bin Hamad, and Tamim bin Hamad, respectively); convinced Emir Hamad to give up the throne for his son Tamim, etc. However, such claims have never been proven. On the other hand, after Qatar was blockaded by neighboring countries and Egypt in 2017, one of Qatar's leading opposition figures, Sheikh Saud bin Nasser Al Thani, asked the blockading countries to demand the suspension of Sheikha Moza's office in Diwan (the Executive Office that runs Qatar) as a condition to lift the blockade (The National, 2017).

Sheikha Moza can be called the image-maker of Qatari state. While her husband and son have dealt with politics and economy of the state, other areas like education, culture, and social life have been under her control. She has done revolutionary reforms in a region where even first ladies' names are not known. Thanks to her reforms, Qatar is more secular, distant from radical ideologies, and has an open society. In addition, she produces soft power rather than exerting it. Explaining with an example, since the US has Harvard University, it is easy to promote it and attract foreign students. What if there was not such a prominent university? This is what Sheikha Moza has achieved. She has established institutions to lure foreigners and it seems that she has accomplished that. It can be asserted that half of Qatar's soft power can be attributed to her (see chapter 5).

The fourth and final influential elite in Qatari foreign policy that should be mentioned is Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani. He was a Foreign Minister between 1992 and 2013 and a Prime Minister between 2007 and 2013. He resigned when Hamad bin Khalifa abdicated. He is one of the richest men in the world with his wealth recorded at \$1.2 billion (Forbes, 2018). Hamad bin Jassim has earned the nickname "peacemaker" for

his efforts to broker reconciliations between warring factions in the Middle East and Africa (Law, 2015). Besides introducing the mediation policy in foreign policy, he made the tiny state with hydrocarbon resources to punch above its weight by arming and supporting insurgencies in Syria and Libya (Ibid). His mediation efforts to settle political conflicts are well-known; in 2010, he mediated between Eritrea and Djibouti over border dispute (Ulrichsen, 2014: 6); in 2009, he led mediation efforts between Chad and Sudan (Sanroma, 2015: 33); in 2009, he brokered between the Sudanese government and the Justice and Equality Movement to end the Darfur conflict (Barakat, 2014:11); in 2007, he was the mediator between the Yemeni government and the Houthi movement (Felsch, 2016: 31); in 2007, he brokered between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah (Kinninmont, 2017: 37); he mediated between Palestine's Hamas and Fatah movements on numerous occasions (Kaussler, 2015: 39); he strived for reconciliation between Israel and Palestine (Blasi, 2015), and so on.

It is necessary to mention some of Hamad bin Jassim's views in order to understand his influence, passion, and contributions. When Western countries were taking austerity measures during the economic crisis of 2008, Qatar's economy grew 17%. The then Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim called for a reshaping of the dominant world political system, and in March 2008, said that “China is coming, India is coming, and Russia is on its way, too . . . I don’t know if America and Europe will still be leading” (Ulrichsen, 2014: 8). Regarding Qatar’s goals in foreign policy, Mr. Jassim said in an interview with Charlie Rose: “We have ambitions to have the name of Qatar in a level that everybody can see” (Habraken, 2017: 16). In reference to the principles and values of Qatar’s foreign policy, in 2010, he said: “We defined the priorities of our foreign policy based on beliefs, discretion, values and national heritage represented in the teachings of our Islamic religion and Arab civilization” (Ibid). Hamad bin Jassim is also known for supporting the will of the people. In a 2012 interview, he said: “Power has to come from the people” and “monarchies should serve their people” (Sanroma, 2015: 34). Similar to these views, he also said the following in a conference:

We, in the state of Qatar, have confirmed on many occasions that reform and popular participation represent an entitlement that stems from the original right of peoples to self-determination... we have warned that the people’s anger is ruthless, and we should not ignore the absence of the rule of law, the spread of corruption and the high cost of living. We see a political impetus for

change. We support it and in turn support the will of the people (El Etreby, 2014:33).

In general, while Sheikh Hamad was a revolutionist, Hamad bin Jassim was a practical politician, meaning that he did not only manage and rule but also got involved in the practice of foreign policy. On the other hand, Sheikha Moza has personally founded many institutions and has launched socio-cultural projects that have contributed to Qatari soft power. While the aforementioned three influential people are no longer officially occupying seats in the state administration, except Sheikha Moza, Emir Tamim and his team follow up on their steps. Thus, nothing has changed despite that there was a shift among the individuals controlling power. Individualization is apparent in both foreign policy and all state levels. Therefore, when the Qatari state is theoretically analyzed, it should be done through an individual level of analysis since state policies are the products of some rulers' ideas.

3.4 Geopolitical Context

Qatar is located in the Middle East, where nationalist, religious, ideological, sectarian, economic, political, and tribal conflicts occurred in any period in history. In addition, the Emirate is a small state with a population of 2,641,000, only 313,000 of which are citizens. Territorially, it spreads over an area of 11,581 km². Prof. Abdel-Fattah Al-Awaisi of Sabahattin Zaim University said in a lecture that the biggest threat to Qatar is the large number of expatriates that comprise 88% of its total population. These two vital compelling factors, namely, being a small state and being located in the Middle East, shape Qatar's foreign policy. However, some other factors influence Sheikhdом's foreign policy as well. While some are based on security/survival, others have a value-added effect. The value-adding factors will be discussed in the following sections.

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq proved how vulnerable small states of the Gulf are against aggressive neighbors. Particularly, Qatar understood that it could have the same end as Iraq, thereby decided to find ways to protect itself. The dispute between Kuwait and Iraq goes back to 1913 when the British split Kuwait from Iraqi territories and made it a separate Sheikhdом. Hence, the Iraqi regime always claimed that Kuwait was part of Iraq and was unjustly seceded. When Kuwait gained its independence in 1961, Iraqi forces were prohibited by the Arab League to annex Kuwait. However, in

1990, Saddam Hussein's regime accused Kuwait of stealing its oil and blamed Kuwait for overproducing oil, thus, causing a decline in oil prices. There is also the rumor that Saddam Hussein planned to pay back the country's \$80 billion debt by seizing Kuwaiti oil. Another purely geopolitical reason was Iraq's short coastline (60 km), which mostly consists of mud. Iraq claimed that when Kuwait was separated from Iraq, most of its coastline remained in Kuwait. The short coastline caused Iraq difficulties in accessing the Persian Gulf, which became apparent during the Iran-Iraq war. Thus, when Iraq decided to invade Kuwait, its aim was not only to control Kuwaiti oil but also to have more coastlines (Brown, 1994: 71).

Realizing how geopolitics can be the reason for invasion, as in the case of Kuwait, Qatar began to contemplate how it could survive among more powerful and bigger neighbors in such a dangerous region. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, with which Qatar aligned for the purpose of defense, could not defend it and even feared that it could be one of Saddam Hussein's next targets. Qatar saw Saudis' vulnerability and understood that it could not rely on a country that is not capable of protecting itself (Barakat, 2014:12). "It was clear that the Saudi umbrella was not safe anymore and there was the urge to find a new friend that could concretely assure Qatar massive military protection (D'Acunto, 2016: 23)". Furthermore, despite being a satellite state under the control of Saudi Arabia, Qatar had always felt the threat of being invaded by Saudis. In addition to this, the US-led war against Iraq gave rise to a change in the balance of power in the Gulf, weakening Iraq in favor of Saudi Arabia (Abu Sulaib, 2017: 35). Moreover, the Saudis pioneered other GCC states to liberate Kuwait from all its sources. At the end of the war, Saudi Arabia was the biggest power in the Gulf.

While Qatar tended to pursue an independent policy, Saudis wanted the Doha government to remain a client state like Bahrain (Ibid: 36). However, the then Heir Apparent, Hamad bin Khalifa, was uneasy with living under the shadow of his Saudi neighbor. When he ousted his father to become the new Emir, he tried to expand Qatar's political clout in the region to enjoy emancipation from Saudi influence. Saudi Arabia's response was the support to a counter-coup to reinstate former Emir Khalifa bin Hamad (Hroub, 2014: 35). Yet, the coup, for which Saudi Arabia and Egypt were accused of, failed and relations fell to the lowest level. After understanding that it was not easy to escape Saudi influence, Emir Hamad took his measures, among which the establishment of Al Jazeera TV is the most vivid one. Qatar used Al Jazeera not only

to challenge Saudis but also sought to bring Iraq back into the equation to balance Saudi power (Abu Sulaib, 2017: 36). From the beginning of Emir Hamad's reign to date, the Qatari-Saudi strife continues with high tensions (see next section).

As can be seen, one basic source for the Qatari-Saudi rift is the geopolitics of the region, which are hardly in favor of Qatar. Doha regime could have continued to be a vassal state of Saudi Arabia but it chose to challenge Saudis under the leadership of Emir Hamad as well as pull Iraq into the equation again. This was a risky move a small state could not dare to attempt but Emir Hamad did it. Also, challenging Saudis happened at a time when there were no US troops in Qatar. All in all, Qatar perplexed international relations theorists, who claim that small states do not pursue risky policies.

On the other hand, while Qatar feels the pressure of Saudi Arabia in the south, it has to deal with Iran in the north, too. When the Islamic revolution happened in Iran in 1979, GCC countries, including Qatar, worried that Iran's new regime would spread Shiism. Since they had Shiite minorities, a provocation by Iran would cause a civil war. Fortunately, the Iran-Iraq war started and Gulf countries relied on Saddam Hussein's Iraq. However, when the war ended, the fear of Iran surfaced again. Particularly, Saudi Arabia, which disseminated Wahhabism as a state policy, was anxious about Iran's sectarian regional policies. Yet, Qatar saw the end of the Iran-Iraq war as an opportunity to extract its natural gas in the North Field (South Pars) together with Iran (Barakat, 2014: 6). It is estimated that 13% of world gas reserves are in the North Field. Discovered in 1971, the gas field started to be exploited by the two neighbors, making Qatar dependent on Iran and forcing it to have cordial relations with its partner (El Etreby, 2014: 62). While Qatar balanced Saudi Arabia with Iran, with which it had good ties, it did not entirely oppose the former as the latter had ideological goals in the region. Therefore, it had to balance Shiite Iran with the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood or Saudis (Windecker and Sendrowicz, 2014: 93). For instance, despite good relations with Iran, Qatar supported Sunni families against the Shiite majority in Bahrain in 2011.

According to Emir Tamim, Qatar's relations with Iran are pragmatic and bandwagoning because if relations are deteriorated, Qatar would be the loser, not Iran (El Etreby, 2014: 63). Indeed, while Iran supported Shiite uprisings in other Gulf countries, it did not intervene in Qatar's domestic affairs thanks to shared wealth along

with Qatari-Iranian maritime borders. However, Qatar still has hesitation about Iran's nuclear ambitions. It does not want a nuclear Iran nor does it want an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities as its gas fields are within the range of Iranian missiles (Perspectives, 2012: 20). Thus, Qatar voluntarily became a mediator in multilateral negotiations on Iran's nuclear program (Kaussler, 2015: 38). Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdulrahman Al Thani once said:

Qatar and Iran are neighboring states, linked by geographic air and sea borders as well as a shared gas field...The State of Qatar refuses to look at Iran through the sectarian lens or to frame the region's conflicts in the Sunni vs Shia paradigm. The nuclear deal (JCPOA) provided an opportunity to reintegrate Iran into the international community, and we believe that if differences remain they may yet be resolved through dialogue (Kinninmont, 2017: 38).

Qatar's pragmatic relations with Iran fit exactly to liberal understanding of interdependence. Despite being on opposite sides ideologically, both countries prefer to improve their relations for the sake of revenues they extract from the co-operated gas field. Nonetheless, the peace with Iran also means deteriorating relations with Saudi Arabia but it has intelligently managed the situation so far.

However, this does not mean that Qatar's policy was ensuring its security. Therefore, sandwiched between Iran and Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War, Qatar sought new ways to maintain its existence. Eventually, it found how to secure itself: not to incur an invasion as Kuwait did. In other words, it learned from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Kuwait is also a small state in terms of demographics and area. Abu Sulaib (2017: 37) argues that "Before it was invaded by Iraq in August 1990, in many ways, the Kuwaiti foreign policy resembled Qatar's after 1995. Kuwait's attitudes were to a large degree independent of regional and international powers". Kuwait's foreign policy ran counter to Saudi Arabia and the United States on many occasions. Like Qatar, Kuwait was a mediator and neutral country for regional crises. Another similarity was its donation of generous financial resources as foreign aid and foreign investments (Ibid). According to a report, Kuwait, by donating 12% of its GDP, was by far the biggest donor among small GCC countries, donating more than Qatar and UAE combined in 1981 (CIA, 1984: 1). However, Kuwait's policies were not enough to protect itself from Saddam Hussein's Iraq as it did not allow the US or any other great country to

have a base on its territory. Briefly, Kuwait paid the price of not bandwagoning to a greater power very heavily.

Taking a lesson out of Kuwait's invasion, Qatar did not make the same mistake. Instead, like when Qatar allied with Great Britain in 1916 to protect itself from Saudi ambitions to annex the Emirate, it requested the United States to deploy its forces on a base located in Qatar so that it could concentrate on its foreign policy without the fear of external threats (Perspectives, 2012: 19). When Emir Hamad bin Khalifa came to power, one of his goals was to improve relations with the United States. Qatar, in fact, had looked to the United States to guarantee its security from external threats since the 1980s. The formal cooperation began with "Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addressed a US troop presence in Qatar, consideration of US arms sales to Qatar, US training, and other defense cooperation" (CRA, 2018: 1). Sheikh Hamad built Al Udeid high-tech airbase for \$1 billion so as to invite the American army in 1996. He once said, "If we build it, they will come" (Windecker and Sendrowicz, 2014: 87). The September 11 attack became the determinant for the arrival of US troops as the attack changed US policy, leading to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Since most of the attackers were from Saudi Arabia, tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia reached a peak. Saudis were not seen as a solution but rather a part of the problem (Abu Sulaib, 2017: 37).

Eventually, when Saudis refused to cooperate with the Bush administration concerning the invasion of Iraq, the US administration withdrew its troops from Saudi Arabia and moved them to Al Udeid base, which is 30 km away from Doha. The base hosts 11,000 American troops of the Central Command (CENTCOM). Meanwhile, there is another US base in Qatar called Sayliyah (Ibid). Being aware of the importance of the deployment of US forces, the UAE offered Americans to build the same facility on its soil but the US administration did not change its decision (Speckhard and Shajkovci, 2018:5). According to Partrick (2017), "Qatar needs the US base as a continued hedge against Saudi dominance; the United States wants to keep it for fear that, without it, Qatar will become the very thing its neighbors already accuse it of being: a 'door' for Iran". In addition, the US base is the leverage for Americans to force Qataris to change their foreign policy as it is the only facility that stops Saudis from intervening in Qatar's domestic and international politics. This means that the base can be used as a means to blackmail Qatar.

Perhaps, this is why Qatar invited Turkish troops and provided them with a base as well. Turkey's military base was established in 2016, following a defense agreement signed between the two countries in 2014. The base has a 3,000-troop capacity, consisting of air, naval, and land forces. When Saudi-led countries blockaded Qatar, the Turkish government immediately got a bill from the parliament approving the deployment of Turkish forces in Qatar. The analysts we interviewed argued that the Saudi-led bloc could have invaded the Emirate, had Turkish forces not been deployed. In contrast, Dorsey (2019) argued in the interview that “The Turkish military base is more symbolic than anything else. They also have the largest US military base. That was not a result of soft power but regional realities, which led to US presence”. He also claimed that if Saudi tanks would roll into Qatar, there would not be much it could do. Yet, Dorsey admits that Qatari soft power creates a major obstacle for Saudis to attack and says Qatar is capable of protecting itself and doing very well against the Saudi-UAE-led boycott (Ibid).

One of the reasons behind this success is good ties with Israel and lobbying in the US. Unlike the other Arab States, Qatar has official relations with Israel. According to Qatari officials, they must have diplomatic relations with Israel to improve their relations with Americans. It has become an interesting situation in which those who were once condemning Qatar for its relations with the Israeli state have improved relations with Israel themselves in recent years. Today, not only Qatar, but also Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Oman, and Chad are good friends of Israel. Tactically, it is a good strategy but since its adversaries have stolen the Sheikdom's role, it will face more problems in its relations with the US and Israel.

On the other hand, having good ties with Iran, Hezbollah, Israel, and other regional actors lead to both peace and threat at the same time. It is peaceful since it is certain about having no danger from friendly relations. But, in the meantime, it is creating a rift between itself and the neighboring countries. For example, while Iran is happy to be Qatar's friend, it opposes the Emirate's relations with Israel. In addition, while Saudis no longer blame Qatar for its relations with Israel, they are angered about Qatar's relations with Iran. Therefore, Qatar is not able to appease all actors at the same; conversely, it creates new enmities. On the other hand, as Ibn Khaldun says, “Geography is destiny”. Qatar's suffering stems mostly from its location, which Qataris want everyone to find on the map. Perhaps, it would not have so many woes if

it was located in another region, like Europe. How can the presence of foreign troops in Qatar be evaluated then? This study argues that the Qatari regime acted in line with the realist theory by positioning itself behind the wings of the US. Turkish army's presence is also deterrent but not as much as US troops. Conceptually, "combined power" fits well with Qatar's strategy. While Qatar is a conspicuous soft power, it lacks military power. Yet, Qatar has cleverly combined its soft power with the US military power to protect itself and has succeeded. However, Dorsey (2019) claims that if Saudis or any other country decides to invade Qatar, they will probably do it. One can ask: why haven't they invaded it then? It is probably because Qatar's good ties with great powers could persuade them to oppose a likely invasion of Qatar during the blockade as well as because of the presence of US troops in the Emirate. In other words, Qatar secured itself with combined power. The Emirate is now safe and sovereign despite having a small army.

Finally, in line with developing good ties with the United States, another regional country with which Qatar has improved its relations is Israel. Qatar is the first Arab state that established diplomatic ties with Israel by allowing Israel to open a Trade Representation Office in 1996 (Abdullah, 2014). Yet, upon the Israel-Hamas conflict, the office was ordered to be closed in 2009. Despite several incidents that have occurred between the two countries, their relations have not been strained. For example, Qatar has repeatedly invited Israelis to events conducted in Doha, causing anger among neighbors (Pulliam, 2013: 6). Moreover, then Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni attended a forum in Doha in 2008. In addition, Al Jazeera held interviews with Israeli experts to look at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the other side as well (Pourhamzavi and Pherguson, 2015: 12). Furthermore, Qatar is still the sole mediator between Israel and Palestinian groups. According to Windecker and Sendrowicz (2014: 91), Qatar maintains a pragmatic relationship with Israel. However, the main reason behind Qatari-Israeli relations is, as then Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim said, to counter US pressure on Qatar, which he believed was due to Saudi lobbying in Washington (Al Yahya, 2017).

Pragmatic relations with Israel can be also regarded as a subtle policy of Qatar. The Sheikdom does not approve Israel's occupation and always criticizes it but acts realistically by maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel. It uses Israeli support as venom to malicious Saudi lobbying in the US. Besides Israel, Qataris deliberately hire

Americans with Jewish background to break Saudi propaganda, e.g. Alan Dershowitz. Overall, Qatar smartly balances and challenges the middle powers of the region both for survival, like small states do, and to increase its influence in the region, like middle powers do. It can be said that it turns geopolitical disadvantages into advantages, though sometimes its policies cause more turmoil.

3.5 Qatar's Relations with its Neighbors

Qatar is a peninsula located west of the Persian Gulf. While Qatar has land borders only with Saudi Arabia, it has maritime borders with Bahrain, the UAE, and Iran. When Qatar became an independent country in 1971, border disputes with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain continued until they were settled in 2001 (Peterson, 2006: 742). Qatar became a member of the Arab League after the independence and established The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) together with other Gulf countries in 1981. Qatar had smooth relations with GCC countries until Sheikh Hamad came to power. Except in few areas, its foreign policy was in accordance with that of Saudi Arabia. In 1988, despite Saudi Arabia's rejection, Doha established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China, claiming that such steps would strike a balance between major players in the international arena (Zafirov, 2017: 5). Nonetheless, when Iraq was out of the game after the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia's rising influence was deemed as a threat to Qatar.

While then Emir Khalifa was indifferent to Saudi policies, Prince Hamad was quite nervous and eventually overthrew his father in 1995, opening a new page in Qatari-neighbor relations. As soon as Qatar's new Emir came to power, neighboring countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain did not recognize him. Soon after, a counter-coup was foiled by the new Emir in 1996 (Perspectives, 2012: 7). Emir Hamad accused Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt of being behind the coup (Peterson, 2006: 742). According to the former Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ahmad Aboul Gheit, Qatar's hostile policy toward the Hosni Mubarak regime was because Sheikh Hamad believed that Egypt had supported the failed coup to restore his father to power in 1996 (Abu Sulaib, 2017: 41). Hence, he diversified relations in the region, allowed Israel to open a trade office in Doha, and hosted then Prime Minister Shimon Peres, who inaugurated the first diplomatic relations (CRS, 2019: 12). Needless to say,

as a small state, Qatar tried to balance his regional enemies by inclining to Israel. As expected, ties with Israel caused fury among Arab countries.

However, what angered the regional countries more, particularly the neighboring countries, was the opening of Al Jazeera. Emir Hamad initially granted 137 million USD to Al Jazeera and continued to support it in the following years (CRS, 2003: 1). Al Jazeera became one of the most influential tools of Qatari diplomacy and Qatari soft power. Al Jazeera's coverage did not comply with other Arab countries' state-owned TVs. According to Seib (2008), unlike the controlled broadcasts of other Arab TVs, it reflected aspirations, hopes, and problems of people in the region. It opposed current values and practices and ignited desires for change (Bedri, 2015: 40). According to Palloshi (2015: 57):

It is the first Arab news network that challenged the Arab and Middle Eastern tradition of non-criticism towards the dictatorial regimes of the region. It has also taken the monopoly of information from the hands of the regimes and has made it harder for them to rule over a more informed public. It has demonstrated a strong agenda-setting effect with Arab governments by bringing more freedom of thought and speech. This is an indicator that the network has the potential to bring democracy to the Middle East. Al Jazeera has empowered the Arab people and allowed them to make their voices heard and for the world to see their perspective of international events.

According to leaked US diplomatic cables, Qatar has used Al Jazeera's coverage as a bargaining tool to repair relations with other countries. For example, Al Jazeera toned down its criticism about Saudi rulers in some periods. In addition, then Qatari Prime Minister, Hamad bin Jassim, proposed Hosni Mubarak to change his position on the Palestinians in order to avoid criticism from Al Jazeera for one year (Ulrichsen, 2012: 14). It can be inferred from the literature that Al Jazeera has been used as a tool for blackmailing. However, this study argues that the TV network is the best soft power tool Qatar possesses and provides reasons in Chapter 4.

What is more, Qatar's mediation and intervention policies have also been disturbing the neighboring countries. For instance, Saudi Arabia and the UAE refused Qatar's mediation between the Houthis and the Yemeni government, by additionally accusing Qatar of supporting the Houthis (Hroub, 2014: 36). In mediation efforts taking place

in Sudan, Egypt criticized Qatar for intervening in matters that directly concern Egypt (Ibid). In Lebanon, brokering between Hezbollah and other parties was again unwelcomed by the Saudi-led bloc (Elashmawy, 2014: 15). Regarding intervention, while Saudis and its friend countries supported popular movements in Libya and Syria, the rebel groups they supported were different. As for Egypt during the Arab Spring, contrary to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, Qatar sided with people against Mubarak (Baabood, 2014: 43). Qatar's only apparent alliance with them was during the Shia uprising in Bahrain in 2011. Qatar (and Al Jazeera) supported the Bahraini ruling family against protestors. In almost all cases, a basic accusation extended to Qatar was its utilization of the Muslim Brothers (MB) network (Ulrichsen, 2014: 9). Both the MB and Hamas are designated as terrorist groups by all four countries, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt. Meanwhile, other GCC countries (Kuwait and Oman) have chosen not to take sides in the strife and have remained neutral.

It should be stated here that Qatar has started assuming the role of a regional power, as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in regional conflicts. Qataris jumped over both countries and began mediation in their backyards, namely in Yemen and Sudan. As expected, Saudis and Egyptians misunderstood Qatari diplomacy and saw it as a threat to their interests. They were not wrong since the Sudanese and Yemenites preferred Qatar to the other two, which were interfering with their internal affairs. Moreover, using the network of the MB was also disturbing for other regional actors since Ikhwan had been hostile to them. Overall, Qatar was in contention with the middle powers of the Middle East and doing well against them.

On the other hand, the responses of hostile countries were beyond criticism. As stated above, Emir Hamad incurred two failed coups happening in 1996 and 2002. Disturbed by Israeli presence in Doha and the appearance of Saudi dissidents on Al Jazeera, Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador to Qatar in 2002 and did not send him back until 2008 in order to force the Doha government to change its ways (Roberts, 2017: 2; Dorsey, 2013: 13). When El-Sisi replaced Morsi in 2013, pressure on Qatar mounted. Already complaining about the Qatari government and Al Jazeera's support of Islamic groups, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors. Riyadh offered an agreement that will defuse the conflict. According to the terms, Qatar was expected to close hostile media outlets inside and outside Doha; expel MB members; stop naturalizing Gulf activists; halt supporting groups like Hamas and

Houthis (Hassan, 2017). While Qatar denied the accusations, it signed the agreement and the new Emir, Tamim bin Hamad, promised to take steps to end the conflict. In fact, signing the agreement meant accepting the accusations. When we look at accusations, we see that Qatar acted too excessively for a small country. It seems that Qatar bravely did whatever the other four saw as threats to themselves.

However, tensions escalated to a record high in 2017 since Qatar insisted on its policies. On May 23, 2017, two days before US President Trump visited Saudi Arabia, Qatar News Agency's website was hacked and fake remarks were published on the website attributed to Sheikh Tamim. The content of the news story consisted of the Emir's speech supporting Hamas, Iran, Israel, and Hezbollah (Al Jazeera, 2017a). Afterwards, the foreign ministries of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt issued statements that announced to sever diplomatic ties with Qatar on June 5, 2017. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain closed their borders and launched the air, sea and land blockade (Roberts, 2017: 7). This was followed by the closing down of Al Jazeera's offices. According to Al Jazeera (2017b), the Trump administration had encouraged the Saudi-led coalition to impose a blockade, referring to former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates' speech one day before Trump's visit. Gates had said, "Tell Qatar to choose sides or we will change the nature of the relationship, to include downscaling the base (Ibid)". In addition, Trump also blamed Qatar for financing terrorism on June 6, 2017. Thus, the US administration sided with blockaders, meaning that there were no great powers behind Qatar. When the reasons for the blockade were asked, the quadruple claimed that Qatar was supporting terrorism, continuing cordial relations with Iran, and meddling in their internal affairs. As a response to allegations, Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated the blockade was unjustified as it was relied on baseless claims and was premediated (MOFA, 2017).

On June 22, 2017, the blockading countries sent 13 demands to Qatar via Kuwait, acting as a mediator, and gave 10 days to respond. The demands are as follows (Wintour, 2017):

- 1. Curb diplomatic ties with Iran and close its diplomatic missions there. Expel members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards and cut off any joint military cooperation with Iran. Only trade and commerce with Iran that comply with US and international sanctions will be permitted.*

2. *Sever all ties to “terrorist organizations”, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic State, al-Qaida, and Lebanon's Hezbollah. Formally declare those entities as terrorist groups.*
3. *Shut down Al-Jazeera and its affiliate stations.*
4. *Shut down news outlets that Qatar funds, directly and indirectly, including Arabi21, Rassd, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, and Middle East Eye.*
5. *Immediately terminate the Turkish military presence in Qatar and end any joint military cooperation with Turkey inside Qatar.*
6. *Stop all means of funding for individuals, groups or organizations that have been designated as terrorists by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Bahrain, the US, and other countries.*
7. *Hand over “terrorist figures” and wanted individuals from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain to their countries of origin. Freeze their assets, and provide any desired information about their residency, movements, and finances.*
8. *End interference in sovereign countries’ internal affairs. Stop granting citizenship to wanted nationals from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain. Revoke Qatari citizenship for existing nationals where such citizenship violates those countries’ laws.*
9. *Stop all contacts with the political opposition in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain. Hand over all files detailing Qatar’s prior contacts with and support for those opposition groups.*
10. *Pay reparations and compensation for loss of life and other, financial losses caused by Qatar’s policies in recent years. The sum will be determined in coordination with Qatar.*
11. *Consent to monthly audits for the first year after agreeing to the demands, then once per quarter during the second year. For the following 10 years, Qatar would be monitored annually for compliance.*
12. *Align itself with the other Gulf and Arab countries militarily, politically, socially and economically, as well as on economic matters, in line with an agreement reached with Saudi Arabia in 2014.*

13. *Agree to all the demands within 10 days of it being submitted to Qatar, or the list becomes invalid.*

As can be seen, the demands are mainly related to Qatar's soft power, which is the main topic of this study. The Sheikdom saw the demands as unacceptable and rejected them. Rejection also meant a brave challenge to four blockaders and the US administration, the world's only superpower. At that time, 17 days after the beginning of the blockade, Qatar was partly relieved thanks to Turkey and Iran's aerial food and basic needs support. Besides these two countries, Qatar's extensive diplomatic efforts with the United States broke the US support to blockading countries and managed to persuade Americans to remain neutral. Although the blockade is ongoing as of 2020, Qatar is still resisting the terms of Saudi-led countries. The resistance is also the reason why this study argues that Qatar is a middle power.

Meanwhile, while the blockading countries accuse Qatar of causing instability in the region, they are not innocent either. For example, Riyadh had failed to cover its ties with armed groups linked to Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Syria when launching the blockade (Zafirov, 2017: 7). Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also directly involved in the ongoing civil war in Libya by backing General Haftar. In addition, the blockading countries are combatting in Yemen with their armies. Moreover, while Saudis and its Arab friends condemned Qatar for its relations with Israel, former Saudi intelligence chief, Turki Al-Faisal, confessed that a number of the Gulf countries had secret relations with Israel dating back as far as 25 years (Middle East Monitor, 2019a). Regarding the charges that Qatar supports terrorism, CNN (2019) revealed that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their coalition partners fighting in Yemen had transferred American-made weapons to Al-Qaeda-linked groups and hardline Salafi militias. CNN's claims were also confirmed by American authorities. Furthermore, the European Union blacklisted Saudi Arabia to fight money laundering and terror financing on February 13, 2019 (Bodoni, 2019). Unlike Saudi Arabia, Qatar has never been on the EU's terror financing list.

The rivalry between the blockading countries and the tiny state of Qatar can also be witnessed in the United States in terms of lobbying activities. Both sides have hired and poured millions into numerous PR firms to both whitewash themselves and discredit their rivals. According to Allen-Ebrahimian and Dubin (2018), many American-based think-tanks are funded by Gulf countries. Besides, some countries get

their institutes funded. For instance, the Gulf International Forum is close to Qatar, The Arabia Foundation is close to Saudi Arabia, while The Arab Gulf States Institute is close to the UAE (Ibid). According to the American Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), as of 2019, Qatar worked with 32 American PR firms, Saudi Arabia with 31 firms, and the UAE with 19 firms (FARA, 2019). Thus, Qatar works with more PR firms than its adversaries. In addition, the amount each country pays ranges from 15 million to 20 million USD. According to Al-Monitor (2018), Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have spent more than 50 million USD in a battle of perception to influence American policymakers.

We should also note that Gulf countries' lobbying activities are not limited to the United States. According to an investigation published by an Arab newspaper, the UAE has hired journalists, diplomats, and consulting firms to smear its rivals in the United Kingdom (Al Araby, 2018). In addition, a Saudi prince, Sultan Mahammad Abduljadayel, has bought a stake of between 25% and 50% in prominent British Newspaper *The Independent* (Ruddick and Sweney, 2017). Qatar is also active in lobbying in the UK. For instance, among the terms that blockading countries wanted Qatar to fulfill was to cease funding news outlets like Middle East Eye, a UK-based news portal. Apart from the given examples, it is believed that rival Gulf countries hire influential individuals, newspapers, and companies to subtly influence the Western audience. According to some interviewees, and based on the findings of this study, Qatar has won the war of perception in the West, particularly in the US. Talking to Allen-Ebrahimian and Dubin (2018), Jean-François Seznec, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, said:

From a purely PR standpoint, [the Qataris] are cleverer than the Saudis. They are presenting a more open image, an image of cultural openness, which the Saudis until lately did not have. The Qataris have a better part argument over the past seven to eight months, but that is because the Saudis and the Emiratis have not been very effective at making their case. Initially, they were unable to even articulate what it was that they were even demanding.

Furthermore, regarding the developments since the beginning of the blockade on Qatar, a Saudi official hinted in August 2018 that his government would dig a canal called the Salwa Canal on the Saudi-Qatari border that would turn the Qatari peninsula into an island, isolating Qatar from the Saudi mainland (Guardian, 2018). The canal

would be 60 km long and 200 m wide, and a nuclear waste facility and a military base would be built close to it (Crisp, 2018). Yet, Saudis could not fulfill this punitive project. On the other hand, when prominent Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was assassinated and his body was dismembered at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul in October 2018, the image of Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman was destroyed. Although many countries asked the Saudi regime to punish the perpetrators, it did not take action, cementing the accusations that the Crown Prince ordered Khashoggi's death. Taking Khashoggi's murder as an opportunity to attack Saudis, Al Jazeera utilized it very well to demonize Saudi Crown Prince. The TV network made anti-Saudi news for months to squeeze the Saudi regime into the corner.

In addition to the journalist's murder, human rights abuses committed by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen led to the implementation of the arms embargo on Saudi Arabia by some countries. Hence, given the terrifying developments, the blockading countries partly lost international support, the leverage they used against Qatar. The UAE even eased the ban of shipping goods from/to Qatar on February 20, 2019 (Reuters, 2019b). In addition, immediately after the lift of the ban on shipping between Qatar and the UAE, a contingent of the Qatari military arrived in Saudi Arabia to participate in a military drill called 'Peninsula Shield' (Middle East Monitor, 2019b). In November 2019, while the Qatari Foreign Minister paid a visit to Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian, UAE, and Bahraini football teams joined the Gulf Cup held in Qatar. It seems that the blocking countries have no plan to abandon the blockade and it may continue until an indefinite time.

Finally, complex (inter)dependence between Qatar and its neighbors is another issue that must be clarified to understand their relations with each other. As discussed in Chapter 2, if countries are inter-dependent, they prefer to have good relations and do not go to war since their losses may result to be greater than their gains. In Qatar's case, the Sheikdom imports most of the goods it needs through the Saudi border. If Saudis close their borders, Qatar will not be able to receive people's basic needs, as this is the case for the moment. Turkey and Iran's air and sea shipping helped Qatar to survive but it needs the Saudi border open in the long-term. In addition to the closure of land borders, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE closed their air spaces to Qatari aircraft. This was another means of punishing Qatar via dependence. Whereas Qatar, as a gesture of good intention, did not cut the natural gas flow to the UAE, which

imports 40% of its gas from the Sheikdom. We can argue that what happened during the blockade was the Saudi regime's exploitation of Qatar's dependence on Saudi Arabia. Yet, we also saw that Qatar did not bow down to Saudi Arabia despite the fact that it was more dependent on its neighbors than they were on Qatar.

If Qatar's relations with its neighbors are generally evaluated, it can be said that the country is unfortunate in terms of maintaining good relations due to its neighbors' ideologically aggressive and expansionist agendas. In fact, Qatar wants good ties with all Gulf States and it has no other choice. It cannot, for example, counter Iran due to co-extraction in North Field gas reserves. Any clash may culminate in losing vast gas resources. On the other hand, it wishes for good relations with Saudi Arabia on the condition that it pursues an independent foreign policy free of Saudi influence. Yet, since Emir Hamad took power in 1995, Qatari-Saudi relations never meliorated. Tensions have always been high between the two countries due to Qatari foreign policy and Al Jazeera's coverage. On the other hand, while Bahrain looks like a Saudi satellite state that follows every step of Saudis, the UAE has a more assertive agenda than even Saudis. The latest developments have shown that the UAE is trying to be the main actor in the Middle East. Its ambitious clout may cause conflict even with Saudi Arabia. Yet, for now (2020), it is obvious that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and, a little far out, Egypt, have hostile policies against Qatar. In June 2017, these four countries blockaded Qatar and the blockade continues. While it may be thought as a Saudi-led blockade, this study argues that the real initiator is the UAE. According to the Anonymous Qatari Official (2019):

The blockade was pre-determined by the UAE. The UAE bought Egyptian media and Saudi liberals. They want to break Qatar's influence. Before Qatar News Agency's (QNA) was hacked, Qatari Emir met with other leaders and there was no problem. On that day there was a military school graduation ceremony. Normally, Emir does not speak in such events. But the speech leaked is allegedly the one that Emir would address during the ceremony. It was intentionally prepared and leaked. Qatar's soft power annoyed their street since Qatar sided with the people.

In addition, the accusations of the blocking countries are not assumed realistic by many analysts. Taguia (2019) says "Saudis may blame Qatar for supporting political Islam but everybody knows that Saudis have been spreading Wahhabism for decades". While

Qatar does not deny that it supports the MB, Qatari officials also argue that they support people, and that the MB is a part of people. Besides, Qatar does not help opposition groups unless they ask for it. In addition, Qatar does not see the MB, Hezbollah, and Hamas as terrorist groups. Therefore, the claim of the blocking countries that the Sheikdom supports terrorism is self-declared and Qatar does not have to accept it. According to Qaradaghi (2019), "Hamas defends its territories against occupiers. It is legitimate according to international laws. The matter is not Hamas. They just want to support Israel. Not Qatar but Saudis use religion politically". As the majority of analysts agree, the problem between Qatar and hostile states is the influence. Saudis want to control the whole region and do not want any antithetical policies. For them, Hamas's fight against Israel is causing trouble as Saudi and Arab people expect the Saudi regime to take action. However, the regime does not want to confront Israel. Therefore, Saudis (and the UAE) do not want any groups or countries that will force them to encounter Israel. In other words, they do not want any headaches. However, Qataris think the opposite and support those groups that fight against Israel or dictatorial regimes. Hence, for them, Qatar is distorting their serenity and stealing their regional role. As Taguia (2019) points out:

Saudi Arabia does not want any country to have independent diplomacy. It is a principle for them. Don't do anything before asking me. Second, Saudi Arabia recognizes the Palestinian Authority but not Hamas. They do not want any conflict with Israel. When Hamas continues fighting, Saudis know that they will be under the pressure of their people.

Moreover, some demands for lifting the blockade have no rationale. For example, they want Qatar to curb diplomatic ties with Iran, although Qatar has no problem with Iran. Such a demand is interference in Qatar's sovereignty. Moreover, the UAE itself still has good ties with Iran. Furthermore, while they want Al Jazeera to be shut down, their TV channels, like Al Arabiya, continue to broadcast and they are extremely biased. Third, they want the termination of Turkish military presence. Nonetheless, there is no mention of American troops that are deployed in Qatar. It is the CENTCOM forces that protect Qatar from external threats. Fourth, they also want to audit Qatar every month whether Qatar fulfills demands or not, which means the end of Qatari independence. While all demands show how the blocking countries are confident about their power, there is also some sort of arrogance. In addition to combining their

powers, the perception of seeing Qatar as a small state that can easily be defeated further encouraged the blockade of the Sheikdom. However, Dorsey (2019) says that Qatar has successfully repelled the threat with its soft power. In addition, Gharib (2019) argues the blockade strengthened Qatar by forcing it to find new ways for survival. Since the blocking countries and Qatar are contending for power and influence, the strife between them will likely continue in the future. Finally, as Allen-Ebrahimian and Dubin (2018) quoted from various analysts, Qatar manages the crisis more intelligently than others.

3.6 Qatar's Mediation Diplomacy

As stated in the middle power section in the previous chapter, the theory states that small states can functionally be middle powers by participating in international politics and bridging between states. In addition, the behavioral approach argues that middle powers try to find solutions to international problems; they are multilateral moral powers; they are conflict managers and regional leaders. Particularly, mediation is a characteristic of middle powers. On the other hand, small states rarely mediate since they have more severe problems like security and their capabilities are limited.

Regarding Qatar, its adoption of the mediation diplomacy, by which Qatar expected recognition and credibility in international politics, began with Emir Hamad bin Khalifa. Mediation diplomacy also officially entered the Qatari constitution in 2003. Associated with the desire to be the “Geneva of the Middle East”, Qataris introduced the term “preventive diplomacy”, aiming to replace it with the term “preventive war”, coined by Americans (Abdullah, 2014). One specification with Qatar's mediation diplomacy is its lack of secrecy. All efforts could be learned through news reports by regional and international media outlets, which are filled with Qatari diplomats' interviews and breaking reports about the case (Kaussler, 2015: 19). Kamrava (2019) also commented about Qatari diplomacy in an interview as follows:

Qatari foreign policy parallels that of Oman. But Omanis do it silently, without attention, etc. which is more effective. But Qataris do mediation as a show. They do it in Sheraton, call Al Jazeera, and turns it into a show. While Omanis

are interested in the result, Qataris are interested in the process itself or let's say reputation.

In addition, as will be discussed below, its broker diplomacy was empowered with generous financial incentives.

On the other hand, according to Kamrava (2011: 540), Qatar's aim in mediation diplomacy is not only international prestige, nation-branding, and enhancing Qatar's soft power but also to maintain its survival since it is a small state. Located in a region with continuous religious and military conflicts, Qatar takes advantage of mediation to prevent them from reaching its borders and neutralize its enemies regionally and internationally (Abu Sulaib, 2017: 31). Qataris also see mediation as a moral duty. According to Barakat (2014: 11), Qatari officials stress mediation as a moral, cultural, and religious duty, emphasizing that the Qur'an orders parties to use *wasata* (intermediation), *sulh* (traditional reconciliation), or *musalaha* (conflict mediation) to resolve disputes. Underlining the importance of conflict resolution, former Qatari Foreign Minister said in a conference:

This dedication to resolve conflict stems from the longstanding Qatar tradition of mediation. Our cultural norms also emphasize tolerance and openness, especially towards those in difficulty. In the words of our founder, Sheikh Jassim: [in Arabic], "Qatar is the destination of the oppressed" (Al Attiyah, 2013:5).

We should note that conflict resolution as a religious norm is rarely mentioned in international theories. Rather, they look at the subject from a materialistic perspective that does not include moral beliefs. While moral duty is common in Muslim and Eastern countries, like China, it is not a matter of discussion in the Western literature.

Concerning Qatar's eagerness to be a mediator, Barakat (2014: 12) ascribes five factors that led the Emirate to become a mediator in regional conflicts: (1) financial and domestic stability; (2) a foreign policy with pragmatic nature; (3) Al Jazeera's broadcasts that cast Qatar as a relatively free and open debate country in the Arab world; (4) No historical baggage (conflicts, wars, enmities, etc.); (5) former Emir's personal interest in conflict mediation. There are also some significant motivations that force Qatar to mediate. First, it wants to maintain its security and survival through containing conflicts and lowering threats of terrorism. Second, Qatar wants to impede

Iran's rising influence. Since it shares the North Field natural gas field with Iran, it can not afford to jeopardize its relations with Iran. Third, Qatar desires to expand its influence in the region vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. Fourth, Qatar wants to improve its international profile by creating an honest broker and a diplomatic powerhouse image (Habraken, 2017: 10-11). On the other hand, El Etreby suggests three different reasons for mediation. According to him, Qatar mediates because (1) it has abundant resources in the hands of the Emir; (2) it has financial and commercial benefits; (3) it serves state branding (El Etreby, 2014: 51). A report prepared by Heinrich Böll Stiftung also underlines the impact of Qatar's ability to create ties with regional and international actors. While Qatar had good relations with the West, it also preserved good ties with Iran, the Syrian regime, the Taliban, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Moreover, Qatar's mediation diplomacy was vital for America and other Western countries as it opened a window for them to access uneasy political groups (Perspectives, 2012: 21).

When the above scholars' views are examined, it can be seen that Qatar possesses all factors for mediation, such as domestic stability and financial resources. While mediating, it is aware that it has limited capacity to ensure its security but continues to mediate anyway. It is because it sees mediation as both a solution to its security and a means for boosting its influence in the region, a behavior distinctive to Qatar. In other words, it behaves like a small state and a middle power at the same time.

Among cases of mediation, Qatar's brokerage in Yemen, Lebanon, Darfur, Palestine, and Afghanistan is salient in the context of its influence. In Yemen, a civil war broke out between the Yemeni government headed by Ali Abdullah Saleh and Zayidi Shiites called Houthis in Saada province in 2003. Having credibility with both sides, Qatar began the mediation process with Emir Hamad's visit to Yemen in 2007. When the Emir arrived in Yemen, the fourth war between parties was already ongoing (Kaussler, 2015: 24). The Qatari Foreign Ministry, together with some hired Yemenis, began talks between the two sides, and eventually, they agreed on a ceasefire agreement and signed it in Doha in February 2008. The agreement stipulated the Yemeni government to release the prisoners, grant amnesty, and re-construct war-torn areas. On the other hand, Houthis were demanded to disarm. As a tool of its carrot diplomacy, Qatar pledged to invest more than \$300 million in Saada province (Felsch, 2016: 31). However, both sides blamed each other soon after the agreement and the fighting

resumed. In return, Qatar declared that it would not fulfill its pledge of financial assistance.

Qatar appeared on the scene for negotiations in 2010 again but failed once more. Jansen (2013: 26) blames Saudi Arabia for the failure of the process. Saudis, who were backing Ali Abdullah Saleh, got disturbed by Qatar's involvement and its payment to some Houthi leaders. In addition, Saleh was unwilling to abide by the Doha Treaty due to Saudi support. Eventually, Qatar's efforts to resolve the conflict in Yemen failed due to several reasons. First, there was a lack of effective follow-up mechanisms and established channels to regulate and monitor disputes during implementation. Second, Qatar's mediation diplomacy did not use traditional ways. For example, while the Doha Treaty asked Houthis to disarm, it did not include comparable provisions for the Yemeni government (Barakat, 2014: 17). Third, "The top-level Qatari players had left the more low-level embassy in charge of aiding the agreement (Jansen, 2013: 25)". Fourth, Saudi Arabia's support of the Yemeni government and, sometimes, direct involvement were reasons for the process to fail. Saudi Arabia had a geopolitical interest in Yemen and saw Qatar's efforts as a challenge to its power (Ulrichsen, 2014: 16). When Qatar re-engaged in Yemen in 2010, Saudi Arabia poured \$1 billion into Yemen (Kamrava, 2011: 551). However, Qatar's engagement resumed during the Arab Spring. "When the revolutions began in Yemen in 2011, Qatar conspicuously sided with the opposition and publicly called on President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down. It even funded the Yemen Youth Channel, a TV channel launched by the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen" (Akpınar, 2015: 7). In Yemen, Qatar could be successful but due to amateur mistakes and Saudi intervention, its efforts did not bring peace. It is not Qatar to be blamed but Saudis and their man, President Salih. Perhaps, Qatar failed but other actors could not solve the conflict as well.

A second notable mediation case in Qatar's foreign policy is its endeavor to end the strife among leading parties in Lebanon in 2008. After the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war, Lebanon was plunged into a political conflict. Protestors took to the streets and sat down in Beirut streets. In 2008, when then Prime Minister Fouad Siniora dismantled Hezbollah's communication structure, Western Beirut was seized and roads were blocked by the Shiite group and its political extension, the Amal Party. Lebanon was again on the brink of a new civil war. Siding with Lebanon against Israel and actively criticizing it during the war, Qatar diplomatically stepped up again before any mediator

in 2008 and brought conflicting parties to Doha for negotiation. The Qatari Foreign Minister, Sheikh Mohammad bin Abdulrahman, called Qatar's mediation in Lebanon "preventive diplomacy" (Kinninmont, 2017: 37). The Doha Agreement was signed on May 21, 2008. Among the provisions, two are important. First, the head of the Lebanese army, Michel Suleiman, was appointed as President. Second, a national unity government was formed on the conditional balance among parties that Hezbollah had a de facto vote (Barakat, 2014: 18). Besides achieving conflict resolution, Qatar provided financial aid to Lebanon for post-war reconstruction, including the predominantly-Shiite towns (Jansen, 2013: 45). An interesting point about Qatar's involvement as a mediator in the Lebanese case was that Saudi Arabia supported the step rather than opposing it due to the rapprochement between the two countries at the time. Thus, since Saudis did not intervene as they did in Yemen, Qataris succeeded in diplomacy.

Qatar's mediation in Lebanon is generally regarded as a success. As both parties had trust in Qatar, they gave room to the Emirate to act freely in solving the problem. Moreover, Qatari mediators' engagement and insistence were influential as Lebanese actors were unable to solve their problems when left to themselves (Barakat, 2014: 18). A further factor was Qatar's promise of additional investment, which was necessary for a war-torn country. Qatar had promised an additional \$300 million investment that encouraged parties to deliver an agreement. After the agreement was signed, advertisement banners proclaiming the slogan "Thank you, Qatar" were visible throughout Lebanon (Sanroma, 2015: 31). Reflecting Qatar's success in the Lebanon initiative, a leaked 2009 US embassy wire described the Emirate's standoff as "having a policy of doors across the ideological spectrum in the region" as "important to promoting stability in the region." (Kaussler, 2015: 23). Nevertheless, this was a short-term success as Lebanon's political turmoil has deep roots that cannot be solved so easily (Felsch, 2016: 31). Thus, the tension between Lebanese parties escalated again in 2011 and continues. Therefore, even if the mediator is successful, it is not always possible to uphold a permanent solution due to the deep roots of the conflict.

Another salient mediation led by Qatar was in Darfur in 2008. In 2003, rebel groups attacked Sudanese troops, claiming that the Darfur region was economically and politically discriminated by the government. The army's counter-attacks caused the death of 35,000 people at the beginning. UNICEF stated in 2009 that 200,000-300,000

people were killed during clashes, resulting in the United States Congress to call it genocide. Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir was indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court in 2009. Qatar, already being in Sudan for relief activities through its Red Crescent, was named as the representative of the Arab League to mediate between Sudan and various rebel groups. There were also envoys from the African Union and the United Nations. After several failed attempts, the Sudanese government made a ceasefire agreement with the biggest rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and other rebel groups separately in 2010. The final agreement between the government and the rebel groups was signed in 2011 (Sanroma, 2015: 32). Qatar, again, as a pivotal tool, utilized its financial resources and pledged to establish a development bank, to invest \$500 million in Darfur, and buy Sudanese state bonds (CRS, 2012: 8). In addition, it signed an agreement with Sudan to invest \$4 billion in the Red Sea Port at Sudan's Suakin coast (CRS, 2019: 13).

Qatar's mediation in Darfur is assumed to be an achievement but the praise is shared with other actors, such as the African Union, United Nations, and the Arab League (Barakat, 2014: 20). Yet, it was Qatar's financial support that played a crucial role in the resolution. While Qatar promised to invest \$2 billion for Darfur's infrastructure, its investment in Sudan's other sectors totaled \$3 billion. Meanwhile, Egypt, viewing itself as the primary patron in Sudan, was infuriated by Qatar's mediation as it considered Sudan its backyard (Kamrava, 2011: 541). Two results can be inferred from Qatar's mediation in Sudan. First, while mediating, Qatar also conducted commerce, thereby turned the conflict into an economic advantage for itself. Second, Qatar became successful despite Egypt's opposition. Yet, since there were more and greater actors alongside Qatar, Egypt's opposition was not expected to change the result.

The fourth and final major mediation effort that should be discussed is the one between Palestinian groups and, in association with it, between Israel and Palestine. Qatar is biased against Palestine. Former Qatari Foreign Minister, Khalid Mohammed Al-Attiyah (2013: 7), said in a conference: "We emphasize that the Palestinian cause is our cause and the first cause of the Arab people. We reject all forms of Israeli settlement". In addition, the Doha government has been funding both Hamas and Fatah (Palestinian Authority) for a long time. In addition, Al Jazeera has provided favorable coverage to the Palestinian conflict and has harshly criticized Israel (Jansen, 2013: 32). For example, it provided live broadcasting during the second intifada, winning the

hearts of Palestinians. When Hamas, designated as a terrorist group by the United States, won the Palestinian elections in 2006, the group was isolated by Western powers. Thus, Qatar decided to get more involved in the Palestinian cause. Interestingly, Sheikha Moza made one of the first attempts from the Qatari side. She tried to persuade the United States to support the Arc Project, a railroad between West Bank and Gaza in 2006, but failed (Ibid: 33). From 2006 onwards, Qataris has been trying to broker peace between Hamas and Fatah factions.

In fact, Egypt had acted earlier than Qatar, but since Hamas had seen Egyptians as pro-Fatah, negotiations had failed. There were also some attempts made by Saudi Arabia and Yemen that ended with no solution. On the other hand, as Qatar is considered to be a more reliable partner, it was allowed to mediate. Qatar, as always, used its most effective tool, financial aid, to facilitate the mediation process. However, no agreements were signed between Hamas and Fatah until 2012. The Palestinian Authority leader, Mahmud Abbas, and Hamas's exiled leader, Khalid Mishal, both of whom once lived in Qatar, signed the Doha Agreement in February 2012. Nevertheless, Hamas leaders based in Gaza deemed the agreement illegitimate as they were not invited to the negotiation process (Felsch, 2016: 31). Therefore, the implementation of the agreement failed. In connection with mediation between Palestinian factions, Qatar also joined efforts for a permanent solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is no secret that Qatar is pro-Palestinian. However, unlike other Arab countries, it has had diplomatic relations with Israel since 1996. It used to have numerous meetings with Israeli high officials until Israel's destructive war on Gaza in 2008. In 2011, Qatar played an important role in the release of the Israeli soldier, Gilat Shalit (Blasi, 2015). Moreover, it supported Obama's two-state solution (CRS, 2012: 5).

Regarding Qatar's success in the Palestinian cause, it failed to bring Hamas and Fatah together because of deep differences in the two factions' ideologies. Yet, it continues to send aid to both groups and staunchly defends the Palestine cause. Unfortunately, its pro-Palestine policies have put it under the US and Israeli criticism, thus, leading it to be accused of financing terrorism, particularly due to Qatar's good relations with Hamas. Therefore, Qatar's diplomatic activities in Palestine cause trouble for the Doha government. On the other hand, the brokerage for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is less likely to find a permanent solution to the problem, especially since

Israel is more powerful and does not intend to make peace with Palestine. Moreover, US support to Israel reduces the likelihood of peace between the parties. Interestingly, many Arab countries are not as sensitive as Qatar concerning Palestine. Instead of working towards a solution to the problem, they prefer to maintain good ties with Israel. Further, they even blame Qatar for supporting terrorism (Hamas). Thus, the Palestine case is too big and complicated for a small state like Qatar to solve through mediation.

There were also some other instances of mediation worth pointing out. For example, Qatar allowed the Taliban to open an office in Doha. It also brokered between the Taliban and the Afghan government but as the then Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, accused Qatar of allowing the Taliban to use their Doha office like an embassy of an exiled government, negotiations failed (Windecker and Sendrowicz, 2014: 98). However, the Taliban and the US agreed to the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in Doha in February 2020. In 2008, Qatar successfully mediated between Eritrea and Djibouti, preventing new military confrontations. What is more, Qatar was involved in disputes among countries located in the Horn of Africa, namely Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan (Jansen, 2013: 60). However, since Ethiopia blamed Qatar as the source of instability due to, allegedly, its support of Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, and armed groups, diplomatic relations between the two countries ceased. Relations were eventually normalized in 2012. Besides Ethiopia, Egypt was also disturbed by Qatar's pro-Sudan policies. Another angry state in the Horn of Africa was Kenya, which was uncomfortable with Qatar's activities in Somalia. According to Mesfin (2016: 11), Qatar lost its credibility because it did not remain impartial in Horn of Africa disputes. Finally, Qatar was also involved in the release of numerous hostages abducted by armed groups in various countries.

In terms of achievements and failures in mediation diplomacy, the Qatari Foreign Minister, Sheikh Mohammad bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, contended in an interview conducted by Gulf Affairs that Qatar had mediated nearly 10 conflicts since being elected as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2007. Qatar had mediated upon the request of concerning parties and had not interfered with their internal affairs. He claimed that mediation efforts had resulted in many successes that had brought about international peace and security (Kinninmont, 2017: 37). However, there are scholars claiming that Qatar has some structural weaknesses that

prevent it from using its diplomatic capacity in full. As Qatar's diplomatic team is too small to follow up on the post-agreement process and monitor the implementation of terms, according to Ulrichsen (2014: 6), "The country lacks a large professional diplomatic corps to translate initial engagement into the sustainable implementation of agreements". For example, during the Darfur and Lebanon cases, Qatari diplomats built bridges between parties and solved superficial problems but deeper problems remained untouched because of the inadequate capacity of Qatari diplomacy. Moreover, Qatar's decision-making is centralized as only high-level individuals are involved in mediation. Thus, Qatari diplomats and NGOs are only reactive to what top executives decide. In other words, their role in decision-making is minimal and does not have much effect on the result (Leira, 2016: 16).

Therefore, analysts argue that the Emirate's mediation brings forth short-term solutions alone while basic problems continue to remain unsolved. For example, Felsch (2016: 32) argues that besides the lack of diplomatic corps, Qatar's small military power is not capable of enforcing agreements. Thus, the assertion that soft power cannot be effective without military power is correct as in the case of Qatar. This being the fact, what Qatar does is alleviate tensions and enable conflicting parties to negotiate and a permanent solution to the conflict is beyond the capacity of Qatar's foreign policy (Leira, 2013: 16). Kamrava (2011: 552-553) points out that if Qatar aims to mediate conflicts, it is successful. However, if it aims conflict resolution, the number of cases it has failed is greater than those it has resolved successfully. With mediation, you can stop violence, initiate negotiations, and solve small problems. However, in order to find solutions to core problems, a mediator should have a full commitment, contextual knowledge and resources, which Qatari diplomacy lacks.

However, such views are not satisfactory to explain Qatar's brokerage efforts. First of all, the roots of problems should not be a parameter for a mediator. Some cases can not be solved even by superpowers through mediation. For example, no great powers or international organizations could solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since both sides' reasons for the conflict were also *raison d'être* for them. Second, Qatar is successful because it gained the confidence of conflicting parties, which is a crucial factor in mediation diplomacy. For instance, none would see Egypt as a mediator in Sudan, Saudis in Yemen, or Iranians in Afghanistan. Yet, Qatar mediated in all these countries. Third, Qatar's brokerage is not just to gather parties in Doha. It also makes

donations and helps parties cover the costs of reconstruction. This strategy is well welcomed by parties. Fourth, Qatar's diplomacy could be more fruitful, had regional powers not distorted it. If there is an intervention to a peace process, the result will hardly be successful. As explained above, the failure was not due to Qatar but external intervention in some cases, e.g. Saudis in the Yemeni peace process. Fifth, Qatar turns its soft power into commercial gains through diplomacy. Since it is the mediator, parties open their markets to Qatari companies, most of which are affiliated to the Qatari regime, as a gesture. Finally, Al Jazeera's continuous coverage of Qatar's efforts has changed Qatar's image positively. Hence, it has cultivated an image of a peaceful mediator through its media. Overall, Qatar has benefited from mediation diplomacy both politically and economically.

3.7 Qatar's Intervention in Foreign Conflicts

Theoretically, particularly realists claim that states are in continuous war for survival and they accumulate power to secure themselves from external threats. What makes a state strong or weak is its hard power, literally military power. The quality and number of weapons and the number of soldiers are basic parameters for a country to be powerful. Those having more power than all others are called superpowers. On the other hand, those in-between small states and superpowers are called middle powers. Only superpowers are expected to intervene in world conflicts since they have the capacity to do so. While middle powers may not be present everywhere in the world, their presence in their region is common. Middle powers may also intervene but the issue must affect their interests directly. They mainly join international coalitions when it comes to global conflicts. Regarding small states, they prefer not to fight unless their sovereignty is under threat. On the other hand, fighting with soft power is out of the question since it is technically impossible.

Regarding Qatar, up until the time the Arab Spring broke out in December 2010 with the uprising in Tunisia, it had a foreign policy based on soft power. The most important feature of its foreign policy to that time was diplomatic mediation. With the uprisings called the Arab Spring, it abandoned mediation and adopted an interventionist foreign policy. Therefore, the conciliating mediator turned into an active supporter of the uprisings. According to Habraken (2017: 14), Qatar's interventionist policies would

not have been possible without extreme wealth as it was the case for mediation and state-branding, two other pillars of Qatar's foreign policy. When unrest began in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria, Qatar saw the developments as an opportunity rather than a challenge (Ulrichsen, 2012: 1). This was because the uprisings toppled some strong dictators of the Arab world and allowed Qatar to be more influential and reinforce its regional position (Abu Sulaib, 2017: 38). Previously, Qatar had not been able to intervene due to the regimes' authoritarian policies. This is one of the reasons it had preferred mediation over intervention before the Arab Spring. When conditions became in favor of Qatar, it decided to fill the power vacuum in the region. Therefore, Qatar was opportunistic during the Arab Spring. Qatar also wanted to show Western states that it could be a good partner if it wanted (Pulliam, 2013: 8). Besides, it would enable Qatar to play on the world stage. In his article in *The Times*, Hugh Tomlinson (in Abu Sulaib, 2017:38) wrote:

The Obama administration has recognized the value in Qatar's relationship with rogue states and terrorist groups. As the United States tries to ensure regional stability while extricating itself from two foreign wars, Doha's willingness to engage America's enemies on its behalf is invaluable.

Another reason for the change in Qatar's foreign policy was its domestic stability. The Emirate has the highest GDP per capita in the world. As Elashmawy (2014: 14) points out, Qataris are too rich to protest. While people are demanding freedom, jobs, non-corruption and so on in many other Arab states, Qatari people are living in welfare. Unemployment in Qatar is below 1% and Qatari citizens occupy top posts in the government and business. Even the Shiite minority (approximately 10% of the population) is well integrated into the society and there has been no discrimination against them. In addition, Qatar's leader, Emir Hamad, has already launched a democratization process in his country. Thus, he made reforms before his people would request them. An anonymous Qatari official (2019) said in an interview: "Our Emir is inside his people. We have no problem with our people. We do not oppress them. We also made trial of democracy. For example, we conducted local democratic elections. Our people are globalizing. It is not possible to shape their lives".

Moreover, Qatar has been hosting Muslim Brotherhood members and their leaders since the 1950s. When MB members escaped from the Gamal Abdul Nasser regime in 1950, they resided in Gulf countries. Despite embracing the Wahhabi creed, Qatari

rulers welcomed MB ideology and even allowed them to shape their school curriculum. The Sheikhdome saw the MB as a democratic, progressive, and non-violent group that could change the political order of the Middle East (Fuller, 2017). Hence, to reach Islamist groups during the Arab Spring (and even before), it utilized the MB network in the region (Ulrichsen, 2014: 9). For example, it was in contact with the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, Islah in Yemen, the PJD Party in Morocco, Hamas in Palestine, and the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and Syria (Hammond, 2014: 8).

This study spots on Qatar's cooperation with the MB. The group is both a political Islamic group and a religious congregation. Since a small state with big passions like Qatar can not realize its goals via its weak power, it needs to hire power to use for its ends. On the other hand, the MB has huge human power and network but lacks financial resources. Therefore, the co-operation of Qatar and the MB would bring mutual benefits. While Qatar would be one of the most influential Arab states in the region despite its small size, the MB would take power in countries it was operating. This was a well-planned strategy of Qatar, which would multiply its strength through “hired power”.

To understand Qatar's foreign policy, which relied solely on soft power until the Arab Spring, and its collaboration with the MB, it is worth examining the Emirate's activities in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain alongside Al Jazeera's coverage during the Arab Spring. The first upheaval of the Arab Spring happened in Tunisia in December 2010. When people took to the streets, Qatar indicated its side via Al Jazeera TV. Although Al Jazeera correspondents were banned from entering Tunisia, they were still able to cover the conflict secretly. The Islamic scholar, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, said in his sermon, which was broadcasted by Al Jazeera, that the Tunisian revolt was a reaction to injustice and there were more Arab countries whose leaders had stolen public wealth (Sanroma, 2015: 46). According to Abdelmoula (2012: 240):

The most important thing, regardless of the nature and quality of its coverage, is that Al Jazeera, from the first moments of the Arab revolutions, especially in Tunisia, was able to capture that symbolic moment of Bouazizi setting himself on fire and opened up the skies on it. If that story died, I believe the Arab revolutions would have died consequently.

Thanks to Al Jazeera's live broadcasting of the Tunisian protests the then leader of Tunisia, Zine El Abidine bin Ali, understanding his inability to resist the protests, decided to flee to Saudi Arabia, and thus the revolution was accomplished. This is an example of how Qatar played a great part in igniting the Arab Spring via its media. Qatar also became involved in the post-uprising by supporting the Ennahda Party, the Muslim Brothers' branch in Tunisia. The Doha government not only supplied financial aid but also pledged to invest in Tunisia, which will be elaborated in upcoming chapters. Nevertheless, while Ennahda garnered 37% of votes in the first post-revolution elections held on October 23, 2011, and came to power, it lost to the secular Nidaa Tounes Party in the October 2014 elections (Deeter, 2012). However, Tunisia is considered a good friend of Qatar now.

On the other hand, when Tunisia managed to oust Bin Ali, Egyptians began to revolt against President Mubarak, hoping that they can get rid of their dictator as well. Protests began on January 25, 2011, and forced Mubarak to cede his presidential power to then-Vice President, Omar Suleiman. However, protests continued and Suleiman transferred power to the Egyptian Armed Forces. When the first democratic elections were held in June 2012, the MB candidate, Mohamed Morsi, won the elections (CNN, 2012). Yet, new protests erupted in November 2012. The Defense Minister, Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, finally toppled Morsi on July 3, 2013, and became the President (Chulov and Kingsley, 2013). El-Sisi is still Egypt's president to date. While he came to power with elections, there are accusations of fraud in the elections.

Meanwhile, Qatari former Emir Hamid bin Khalifa's enmity goes back to 1996, when he was about to be overthrown by a failed coup. The Emir blamed Hosni Mubarak for instigating the coup together with other Arab leaders hostile toward him. As soon as Al Jazeera was established, in line with the Emir's attitude towards Egypt, it provided negative coverage against the Mubarak regime. In addition, Egypt saw Qatar's active diplomacy as a threat to its regional role (Elashmawy, 2014: 15). Although both countries were on the same side at times, they were usually cold toward each other. Therefore, when Tahrir Square was flooded by pro-democracy protestors, Qatar saw it as an opportunity to take revenge. Having perfect relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting their prominent members, like Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, were additional opportunities for Qatar.

Back to the short-ended Egyptian revolution, as soon as protestors gathered at Tahrir Square, Al Jazeera began covering the events live, which eventually culminated in the closure of its offices. Nonetheless, “Aljazeera evaded the blockage by providing viewers with alternative frequencies to watch its coverage of the unfolding news” (El Etreby, 2014: 90). Al Jazeera's discourse during the Egyptian revolution was also different. While it did not label the protests in Tunisia as a revolution, it referred to the anti-Mubarak protests as a revolution (Elashmawy, 2014: 16). Over and above, Al Jazeera founded a new channel called Al Jazeera Al Mubashir Misr that was devoted to covering the protests in Egypt. Moreover, there were dozens of Al Jazeera correspondents, some of whom were sentenced to prison by El-Sisi's regime. Indeed, their journalism changed the course of events. For example, while the Egyptian state TV was showing happy shoppers, featuring previously taken footages, Al Jazeera was zooming on thousands of people chanting for regime change (Miles, 2011). As a result, more people took to the streets and led to regime change. In the aftermath, the Qatari government opened the doors of their treasury and provided financial aid to the Morsi government. It is estimated that Qatar pledged to grant and lend an amount of about \$18 billion.

What if there was an MB-controlled government in Egypt? Qatar would certainly get the biggest Arab country's support and would have more say in regional politics. At least, it would resolve the problem of survival thanks to its cooperation with the MB. Therefore, allying with the MB is more than opportunism and should never be underestimated.

Regarding Qatar's intervention in the Libyan civil war, it is distinctive, as boots of Qatari soldiers were on the ground. In fact, the Qatari administration had good relations with Muammar Gaddafi. Both countries were against Saudi domination in the Arab world. Before Gaddafi's ouster, Doha had a \$10 billion investment in Libya (Blasi, 2015). However, when the civil war erupted in Libya, Qatar sided with Islamic groups, probably because it understood that its ally Gaddafi would be overthrown. Hence, it became the most active Gulf state during the conflict. When fighting among Libyan parties broke out, Qatar called for an Arab League meeting and suspended Libya's membership. In addition, it was the first Arab country that recognized the Libyan Transnational Council (TNC) as a legitimate power in Libya (Kaussler, 2015:

17). After getting the support of the Arab League, it backed NATO's military operation and asked the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya.

Further to political actions, Qatar sent six Mirage jets to join NATO forces and supplied weapons to rebels. During the final battle at the Bab Al Aziziya base, Qatari special forces were seen on the front together with the rebel groups they trained (Ibid). Al Jazeera further supported the rebel groups with its coverage. It even began to use the tricolor rebel flag instead of the Libyan flag when the civil war erupted. Moreover, Al-Qaradawi appeared on Al Jazeera's scene and gave supportive speeches. In one of his speeches, Al-Qaradawi said:

To the officers and the soldiers who can kill Muammar Gaddafi, to whoever among them can shoot him with a bullet and to free the country and [God's] servants from him, I issue this fatwa: Do it! That man wants to exterminate the people. As for me, I protect the people and I issue this fatwa: Whoever among them can shoot him with a bullet and to free us from his evil, to free Libya and its great people from the evil of this man and the danger of him, let him do so! It is not permissible to any officer, be he an officer pilot, or a ground forces officer, or an air forces officer, or any other, it is not permissible to obey this man [Gaddafi] within disobedience [to God], in evil, in injustice, in the oppression of [His] servants (Sanroma, 2015:50).

There was also a satellite TV channel (Libya TV) based in Doha, being the voice of rebels (Ulrichsen, 2014: 11). According to Elashmawy (2014: 20), Libyan rebels that Qatar supported were affiliated to Muslim Brothers. Nevertheless, the post-Gaddafi era was not fruitful for Qatar since it could not turn short-term gains into long-term ones due to its lack of diplomatic capabilities and failure to institutionalize the outcomes (Ibid: 12). For example, the Doha-backed Libyan Al-Watan Party, whose logo resembles the Qatari flag, won only one seat in the 2012 assembly elections. However, the civil war in Libya continues and there is no winner. The distinctiveness of Qatar's intervention is that it sent troops to Libya, an unexpected action from a small state. It indeed sent troops via international coalition but its move is still unusual.

In addition, when public protests erupted in Syria, Emir Hamad tried to persuade Bashar al-Assad to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. The Emir's daughter, Sheikha Al Mayassa Al Thani, sent emails to Asma Assad, Bashar Assad's wife, to

convince his husband to voluntarily withdraw from power (Sanroma, 2015: 52). However, when mediation failed, Qatar was again first to step forward. Qatar's first action was to ask the Arab League to send Arab troops to stop the bloodshed (Abdullah, 2014). In the case of Syria, Qatar worked alongside Saudi Arabia and the UAE to arm rebel groups, a move that angered Iran. This collaboration was praised by US Senator John McCain in February 2014 (Kaussler, 2015: 27). Yet, rivalry prevailed ultimately due to Qataris and Saudis' support of different factions in the Syrian National Council (SNC). Qatar chose to support the Muslim Brotherhood branch in SNC, a decision that disturbed Saudi Arabia. Also, both countries had different clients in the Free Syrian Army (FSA). While Saudis supported Jays Al Islam, Qatar backed Al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Nusra (Barakat, 2014: 910). Due to the Qatari-Saudi rivalry, particularly Saudi Arabia's desire to control the Syrian opposition, both the SNC and FSA suffered from the competition and divided into further groups. In the end, more fundamental movements like ISIS and Al-Qaeda pacified other rebel groups and gained greater influence in the Syrian turmoil (Fuller, 2017).

As for Qatar's policies in Syria, like it did in Libya, Qatar armed rebel groups and became the biggest Arab donor to Syrian dissidents, as a result of which the Syrian government launched cyberattacks on Qatar. Doha additionally backed Syrian rebels with humanitarian aid, diplomacy, and media. The Former Qatari Foreign Minister, Al Attiyah (2013: 6), said in a conference about their goals in Syria:

Our foreign policy in Syria remains to protect human life in any way possible, to ensure a safe corridor for humanitarian aid, to promote a political solution to end the violence, to support the coalition in their aspiration for a transitional government, and to collaborate through the Friends of Syria group and other multilateral channels.

Regarding media support, Al Jazeera remained silent until Qatar stopped supporting Assad, once a good friend of Emir Hamad. In the aftermath, it featured pro-SNC reports and allowed Al-Qaradawi to comment on the Syrian revolution. Qaradawi said on his TV program that "Today the train of revolution has reached a station that it had to reach: The Syria station... Every Muslim who knows how to, and can fight, must volunteer" (Sanroma, 2015: 52). Nonetheless, neither Qatar nor other GCC countries were successful in Syria as the groups they supported united with ISIS or Al-Qaeda. While ISIS was defeated by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a group

that grew to be the biggest rebel group in Syria, partly due to the rivalry among Arab countries, Al-Nusra renamed itself as Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), which is no longer supported by Qatar. The bizarre aspect of the HTS is that its new supporters were Saudi Arabia and the UAE after Doha cut relations with the group. It can be argued that Qatar failed in the Syrian civil war because almost all the actors lost there. In addition, it was the pioneer of the Arab World concerning supporting the revolution like it was in Libya.

Qatar took part in the Yemeni unrest as well. However, the information concerning its involvement are mostly allegations. Qatar certainly keeps good ties with the Islah Movement, a Muslim Brotherhood branch in Yemen. According to Baabood (2014: 46), the Sheikdom reportedly donated \$80 million to the Islah Movement during the unrest that led to the end of Ali Abdullah Saleh's reign. It also established the Yemeni TV channel called Yemen Youth Channel. However, Qatar was also accused of supporting Iran-linked Houthi rebels against the Saudi-backed Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi regime. Thus, it was expelled from the Saudi-led coalition fighting against Houthis when the Qatar diplomatic crisis began in 2017 and culminated in the ongoing blockade. It seems that Qatar's hyperactive policies disturbed the Saudi-led coalition quite much.

Among all countries that incurred revolts during the Arab Spring, only Bahrain saw Qatar's support the only exception for the Emirate. The Qatari government remained silent during Bahrain's unrest and joined the GCC for intervention later on. Whether Qatar sent troops to Bahrain to demonstrate its support is not clear. While Pulliam (2013) and Blanchard (2012: 3) claim it did, Windecker and Sendrowicz (2014) hold the opposite. Also, Al Jazeera was blind to the Bahraini uprising as well, which was considered as double standard (Pourhamzavi and Pherguson, 2015: 13). There are some reasons why Qatar stood next to the Bahraini government. One reason may be that it might have decided not to cross the line (Pulliam, 2013: 8). In other words, it did not want to worsen its relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain. However, Qatar was always indifferent to the Saudi threat. Thus, this reason does not seem realistic. Furthermore, since those that revolted were Bahrain's Shiite majority, it probably allied with other neighbors to form a Sunni counter-pole against Iran's infiltration attempts (Windecker and Sendrowicz, 2014: 93). This reason looks more acceptable since Qatar would not want to see Iran next to its borders. In addition,

Zweihr (2019) said in an interview that the "Bahraini situation is about regional security. Qatar is also a GCC state and has commitments. They supported the stability of Bahrain but also listened to the demands of people". Consequently, thanks to the help of GCC countries, including Qatar, Bahrain was able to suppress the revolt.

However, it should be admitted that Qatar exceeded its lines during the Arab Spring. Allying with the MB was a good idea but Saudi Arabia and the UAE were hostile to the MB since they saw political Islam as a threat to their regimes. In addition, the Arab Spring proved how the MB was powerful and strong, causing fear in Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Yusuf, 2019). Therefore, Qatar's Arab neighbors were frustrated by the Qatar-MB alliance and accused Qatar of attempting to destroy their regimes. Thus, their enmity turned into hostility. It can be concluded that Qatar should have remained as a mediator instead of being an interventionist country since mediation diplomacy culminates in a good image, trust, respect, new friends, and even new business opportunities. Meanwhile, Qatar has lost some of its credibility since the beginning of the Arab Spring due to interventionist policies. On the other hand, Qatar's capacity is short of managing intervention due to its diplomatic and military power. It is now apparent that the Arab Spring did not bring new opportunities but rather new threats. However, it is not fair to blame Qatar for supporting democratic transitions in other countries. The moral policy for a country is to support such political changes as they will result in more freedom, political participation, and the diversification of power in a country. As Taguia (2019) explained in the interview, Qatar's policy is "inclusive", meaning that it wants people to participate in the political system. If people are excluded, they will be more radical and there will always be a state of chaos. Moreover, those countries condemning Qatar were not innocent in their policies since they worked to maintain dictatorships.

Furthermore, Qataris are also in favor of a return to the mediation policy. In a face-to-face interview, an Anonymous Qatari Official (2019) said that "We already think of it. We are reorganizing our diplomacy. But Saudis and Egyptians try to prevent even mediation diplomacy. For example, Saudis and UAE paid \$3 billion to Sudan. They also helped El-Sisi. They put heavy conditions in return. Theirs is money diplomacy". Kamrava (2019) also commented about Qatari diplomacy in an interview:

Qatar got a little too confident during the Arab Spring. They got involved in Libya. When they overran Gaddafi's compound, the first flag that was raised was Qatar's

flag, not rebels'. Then Qataris thought they could do in Syria what they did in Libya. But when more powers involved in Syria, they realized this is too much. So, they pulled back. My sense is that they are a little reluctant now.

3.8 Qatar's Middle Power Status

Based on the above information, it is worth discussing Qatar's power range now. Qatar is a country the size of which matters. Although it has a population of 2.6 million, the number of its citizens is slightly over 300,000. In addition, its surface area is slightly larger than Lebanon. Thus, one cannot travel from one side of the country to the farthest side with a plane as the distance is less than 250 km. If only citizenship is considered for the calculation of population, then, Qatar is a microstate. However, with the inclusion of expatriates, Qatar should be regarded as a small state. Among scholars examined for this study, Windecker and Sendrowicz (2014), and Miller and Al-Mansouri (2016: 51) are the only ones arguing that Qatar is a microstate. On the other hand, Ulrichsen (2012) thinks the country's high level of immigration makes Qatar a small state. Kamrava (2013) contends that Qatar is a middle power due to its hyperactive diplomacy. Generally, while the majority of analysts accept Qatar as a small state, only few of them insist being a microstate. Also, some scholars see Qatar as a middle power. While metrics for microstate and small state are physical and calculable, abstract parameters, like functionality and behaviors, as discussed in the previous chapter, are determinants for middle power. This study claims that Qatar is a small state in terms of size, but a middle power in terms of politics and economics.

According to realists, microstates and small states act under the shadow of great powers. Yet, Qatar, by following an individual and distinctive foreign policy, challenges such assumptions (Kaussler, 2015: 1). It is different from other small states as it engages in 29 diplomatic activities through the United Nations (Sanroma, 2015: 28). Qatar's activist foreign policy enables it to get political and economic gains as well as ensuring its security. Its use of soft power provides it a secure place and legitimacy in the international community. While mediation is not typical to small states, one of the main pillars of Qatari diplomacy is mediation. Normally, it is Saudi Arabia or Egypt and, as an external force, the United States, that mediate in the region (Habracken, 2017: 5). However, Qatar is so active in this domain that it even mediated between the United States and the Taliban. Unlike other small states, it even intervened

in conflicts during the Arab Spring like middle and great powers. For example, Qatar acted together with NATO during Libya Spring and headed other Arab states, a move that an ordinary small state would not dare attempt. In addition, Qatar was again the Arab country that led the Arab League to take action against Bashar Assad of Syria. According to Ulrichsen (2014: 7), globalization made small states punch above their weight and project new soft power forms. In the case of Qatar, the middle powers of the Middle East like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran were declining in the 2010s, allowing Qatar to appear on the scene. The increase in Qatar's hydrocarbon revenues, in particular, allowed the Doha government to act freely in the region. It was still a small state but double-digit growth in GDP made Qatar a middle economic power in the 2000s. Therefore, external factors helped Qatar to pursue an oversized foreign policy. In addition, internally, during our visit to Qatar, we witnessed that Qataris had gathered quite influential and intelligent brains in its universities. There is a knowledge (or scientific) power serving the Qatari state for the country's foreign policy ends. Therefore, Qatar seems to reinforce the country's brainpower deficiency with foreigners, enlarging its scientific power.

Taking into consideration the above facts, this study agrees Habraken (2017: 5) that Qatar acts and sees itself as a middle power rather than a small state and argues that the conceptualization of a small state is not accurate. While it is the size of the population of a state that defines whether it is small or not, some other factors define power. For example, a country may have a small population but its GDP might be high. For instance, while Nigeria's population is 633 times bigger than the Qatari population, its GDP is just double of Qatar. A comparison between the UAE and Nigeria is even more interesting. While the UAE has a population of 1.4 million (excluding expatriates) with \$432 billion GDP, Nigeria has a population of 191 million with \$375 billion GDP. In this case, Nigeria is sizably bigger than the UAE but economically, it is smaller than the Arab Emirates. In addition, the UAE is more influential and active in international affairs. The situation is similar to the difference between quantity and quality. As quality is more significant than quantity, just looking at the demographic or land size of countries to make power classification will be misleading. Israel might also be a good example of explaining how the conceptualization of small states and middle powers is wrong. While Israel's GDP is \$390 billion, its neighbor Egypt has a GDP of \$300 billion and a population tenfold

that of Israel. Moreover, Israel defeated all its Arab neighbors in three wars since 1948 thanks to its military power and its alliance with the United States. Additionally, Israel allegedly has nuclear weapons, a claim which it has neither denied nor admitted. Hence, having destructive weapons can make a small state, and even a microstate, act as a middle power.

However, unless there is a greater power that will protect the small state, size still matters. In Qatar's case, the Emirate is quite small but ensures its security thanks to the US troops in Al Udeid airbase. What is more, it balances the region's middle powers against each other and bandwagons the US, justifying the realist theory. However, when security is no longer an issue, a small state ascends to the middle power level. Since Qatar thinks it is safe, it supposes itself as a member of the middle power league (Habraken, 2017: 5). Nevertheless, it should be accepted that the middle power status of small states is contextual. When conditions change against small states in the course of time, they may lose their position. For example, if Qatar, one day, loses its hydrocarbon originated revenues, its foreign policy may drop to idle level since it is mostly based on financial resources. If it fails to maintain the balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran or loses Turkey's support, it will have to concentrate on its survival once again and forget about getting involved in ongoing conflicts in countries like Sudan, Lebanon, or Yemen. Also, if US forces leave Qatar, it will become vulnerable to external threats. Thus, while size matters for small states, it is time that matters for those states behaving like middle powers. In other words, small states may be middle powers if the conditions permit. To sum up, it can be concluded that as regional and international conjunctures are in favor of Qatar, it can be called a middle power. Whether it will have the same status in the future or not will become clear in the course of time.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIO-CULTURAL VALUES AS QATAR'S SOFT POWER

This chapter analyzes socio-cultural values as a form of Qatari soft power. Al Jazeera Media Network will be given broad space with a few sub-titles, which will be followed by sections of religion, education, cultural diplomacy, the FIFA 2022 World Cup, and tourism. Yet, before all, *Qatar National Vision 2030* will be analyzed as it is the theoretical framework for Qatar's socio-cultural and economic development, which are elaborated in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively.

4.1 Qatar National Vision 2030

Some countries prepare development plans for their future and make it a state policy that has to be fulfilled. Generally, such plans are assigned names and the years by which they are supposed to be implemented, such as Turkey 2023 Vision, Laos Vision 2030, Saudi Vision 2030, etc. Qatar also has a development plan called Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV2030). It is not only a roadmap for sustainable development and advanced society but also a theoretical framework for the country's national strategies and implementation plans that need to be fulfilled by 2030.

QNV2030 was launched by Emir Hamad in 2008 as a beacon to guide the social, economic, human, and environmental development of the country (MDPS, 2019). It aims to address five major challenges of Qatar: “1) Balancing modernization and preserving traditions, 2) Meeting the needs of today without compromising future needs, 3) Managing growth, 4) Maintaining equilibrium between Qataris and expatriates, 5) Engaging in good environmental stewardship” (Hukoomi, 2019). On the other hand, The National Vision has four pillars: (1) Human development, (2) Social development, (3) Economic development, and (4) Environmental development.

Regarding the human development pillar, Qatar is aware that hydrocarbon resources will eventually run out. Thus, Qatar plans to have knowledge-based people via advanced education and health systems. Moreover, it wants the effective participation of Qatari people in the labor force. In the same vein, it plans to attract qualified

expatriate workers in all fields. In other words, while Qatar will increase the quality of its human resources through education, it will also be selective in recruiting expatriate workforce (QNV2030, 2008: 13-18). The second pillar, social development, aims to advance the social dimensions of its society by strengthening coherence in family, providing social protection, preserving Qatar's Arab and Islamic identity, enhance women's participation in social and political life, be open to and in dialogue with other nations, and ensure security, stability, and equality for its citizens. In addition, it reveals the country's future vision about foreign policy. The Vision states that it will enhance its regional and international role via organizations like the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Organization of Islamic Conference. Moreover, it pledges to fulfill its international commitments, sponsor and support dialogue among civilizations, and contribute to international security and peace (QNV2030, 2008: 20-23). The third pillar, economic development, explains how sustainable growth will be ensured; how the economy will be diversified and how current oil revenues will be converted to non-oil investments; how hydrocarbon reserves and incomes will be boosted; and provides the roadmap for the state's economic development. In addition, Qatar plans to find a solution to expatriate labor as it sees dependence on non-nationals as an obstacle to economic development (QNV2030, 2008: 24-29). The fourth and final pillar, environmental development, aims to protect Qatar's nature as well as oil and water resources. The Sheikhdome does not want to sacrifice its nature for urban development nor does it want to pollute its environment as a result of the rising population and oil resources. The environment is so important for Qatar that Article 33 of the constitution states: "The State shall preserve the environment and its natural balance to achieve comprehensive and sustainable development for all generations (Constitution of Qatar, 2003). Thus, the environment has become a national issue for the Sheikhdome. As will be discussed below, the Qatari government uses the national vision as a theoretical guide to its domestic and foreign policies.

This study contends that Qatar National Vision 2030 is an awareness of the shortages of Qatari state. Qatari officials know well that they have economic power but not well qualified human power. Therefore, they want to adapt their employment strategies of expatriates to their new status. In addition, they reiterate that they will not step back from their current foreign policy. Besides, they want to be self-sufficient in economic terms since they know that hydrocarbon resources might run out sooner or later.

Overall, the draft is a guide to how Qatar can preserve its current position and grow more if possible.

4.2 Al Jazeera

Media is an asset of soft power used to boost public diplomacy. Scholars like Hocking (2005) argue that it is no longer a tool of government but a separate actor in foreign policy. However, this might be the case in Western democracies but not in the Middle East, where media is either under the control of governments or partly independent. Regarding Al Jazeera, it is owned by Qatari state and its strongest tool of soft power, which it wields in foreign policy and nation-branding. As Dorsey (2019) said in the interview, Al Jazeera is a success story for Qatar. Al Jazeera's story must be discussed because it is one of the three influential networks together with BBC and CNN despite being a new TV network, non-Western, and belonging to a small state located in the Middle East. For Al Jazeera, being owned by Qatar is important since the biggest media companies are generally owned by great powers. Thus, the small Sheikdom is like a superpower in the context of media. Moreover, another Qatar's tool is its economic power but it does not contribute to the Emirate's soft power as much as Al Jazeera does. What is more, Al Jazeera is used as a hard power tool as will be explained below. In addition, theoretically, it fits the constructivist theory due to its ID-based coverage. Conversely, its general stance contradicts with other international theories. The following sections cover details about Al Jazeera.

a) The Establishment of Al Jazeera

Before discussing the aspects of soft power of Al Jazeera Media Network, which are a *sine qua non* for this dissertation, it is worth explaining the TV network's profile, the status of regional media in the 1990s, and how and why it was established. Al Jazeera was established by the Qatari government in Doha on November 1, 1996. Broadcasting via satellite, it began with six-hour programming until 1999, when it started around-the-clock broadcasting. Despite being funded by the Qatari government, the media network calls itself a private company established for public utility. It has more than 10 channels, including Al Jazeera Arabic, Al Jazeera English, Al Jazeera Balkans, Al

Jazeera Children, Al Jazeera Documentary, BeIn Sports, etc. The company employs more than 3,000 staff from more than 70 countries. This is also an example of what this study calls “hired power”. Its channels are watched in 310 million households in more than 100 countries (Al Jazeera, 2019). According to Hashmi (2012: 3), it is the third most-watched media group worldwide, ranking after BBC and CNN, respectively. This also means that it is the only global TV that broadcasts from the Middle East (or non-Western world).

Media in the Middle East region is state-controlled. Even if there are privately-owned print media and TV networks, if they are not loyal to the regime, they have no chance of survival. According to Bedri (2015: 32), the Middle East is the region where media is under regime control and information is censored. The only exception might be Lebanon (Ibid). The reason is obvious: most countries of the region have a one-man rule and the regimes do not want free media as they see them as a threat to their power. This is why they have the Ministry of Information that controls the flow and filtering of information. On the other hand, when satellite channels started to be available in the 1990s, TV channels got the chance to broadcast not only in other countries but also other continents. The first two prominent satellite channels were the Saudi-owned Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC), established in 1991, and Arab Radio and Television (ART), established in 1993. However, both channels were broadcasting entertainment only (Cherkaoui, 2014: 19). Soon after, the Saudi government founded the Orbit Satellite Network Company to establish a news channel. Then, Orbit proposed BBC to establish an Arabic news channel emulating the CNN model, which drew attention during the Gulf War. Eventually, the BBC established the channel in 1994. Nonetheless, when it aired programs criticizing the Saudi royal family, Orbit tried to censor the channel but the pressure backfired, and the Orbit-BBC partnership was terminated in 1996. The closure of the channel made 150 staff redundant and equipment useless. However, the establishment of Al Jazeera on November 1, 1996, changed the destiny of former BBC staff (see details below).

Emir Hamad bin Khalifa launched an extensive program to modernize his country after coming to power in 1995. Among the reforms was the abolition of the Ministry of Information. It was the first time ever that an Arab country had taken such action. To justify the abolition of the ministry, Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani, Chairman of the Board of Al Jazeera, once said: “The Ministry of Information controls the news

media, be it television, radio or newspaper ... We don't see that a Ministry of Information has any positive role to play in future media projects" (Zayani, 2005: 2). On the other hand, when the Emir had just begun to transform his country, he incurred a failed counter-coup in 1996. Seeing that external threat may overthrow himself, Emir Hamad took his precautions, among which was the establishment of Al Jazeera. The channel was established by the Qatari government with an initial grant of \$137 million. Having no expertise in broadcasting a professional channel, Al Jazeera's executives hired 150 staff of the defunct BBC Arabic, who were mainly Egyptian and Lebanese journalists with Western education (CRS, 2003: 1). Further to its staff, Al Jazeera bought BBC's advanced equipment, enabling the newly-established TV to emulate the British channel. Since then, Al Jazeera has been experiencing dramatic growth with annual revenue of \$700 million (Owler, 2019). However, the Doha government still supports the TV network financially.

It can be contended that the foundation of Al Jazeera was like buying a new gun, the ammunitions of which were not bullets, but controversial news. This gun was purchased by Qatari Emir to defend his regime as well as attack his foes. It can hardly be argued that Emir Hamad established it not for his personal use but for Arab people. However, none will probably object that the TV became the voice of the Arab population and even the third world countries over time.

b) Al Jazeera vs Qatar

The reasons underlying the Qatari regime's establishment of Al Jazeera have been a matter of discussion among analysts. According to Eliades (2006: 4), it was a political instrument for self-defense against Saudis that own Orbit, Al Sharq Al Awsat, and MBC. For the Qatari government, Al Jazeera would become a tool to oppose Saudi influence and get out of its shadow. It would target the Arab-audience with investigative and critical journalism and present the Qatari point of view without the hindrance of governments (Laub, 2017). As Cherkaoui (2014: 19) argues, Al Jazeera would give more leverage against rival neighbors, particularly Saudi Arabia. However, Emir Hamad himself thought that a satellite channel is necessary if the country is to adopt free parliamentary elections as democracy necessitates free media (Zayani, 2005: 12). Abu Sulaib (2017: 30) thinks that Qatar uses the media network as a soft

power weapon to achieve its foreign policy goals. Indeed, it is one of the most influential instruments for Qatari diplomacy. In addition, Ulrichsen (2012: 17) gives several examples that show Al Jazeera is used as a negotiation tool against other countries. For example, when Qatari-Saudi relations deteriorate, the TV group becomes negative in tone toward the Saudi royal family. On the contrary, when relations are good, it criticizes Saudi Arabia less. This is the case for other countries as well. Moreover, it is a media platform that enables Qatar to show international public opinion that the Sheikdom is a state of free and open debate in the Arab world (Habracken, 2017: 10). Furthermore, it boosted Qatar's international profile as it can reach hundreds of millions of households. Sultan claims (2013: 246):

Al Jazeera was never really a media project. It was, and is, a political project. It is about being an extension of the state of Qatar. The Qataris wanted something that could both enhance their prestige and give them power and influence. This gave rise to Al-Jazeera and it has been enormously successful at achieving it.

In fact, the abovementioned views about Al Jazeera and its affiliation with Qatar are correct to some extent. Indeed, as a media giant, Al Jazeera is an extremely effective instrument in the hands of a small state like Qatar. Al Sadi (2012), after analyzing several Al Jazeera shows, concludes that the TV network does have a pro-Qatari discourse rather than an anti-establishment one, and works in favor of Qatari interests. It spreads Qatar's newly embraced liberal and democratic values to other Arab regimes ruled by dictators. The aim is not to overthrow authoritarian regimes but to force them to reform themselves. As seen during the Arab Spring, Al Jazeera supported groups that wanted more democracy in their countries. What is more, its discourse was in line with that of Qatari politicians. Mostefa Souag, then managing director of Al Jazeera Arabic, said in an interview to BBC that Al Jazeera has been a force for good and a strong advertisement for Qatari influence, and added that "The media is all about soft power...If you are a small country and you want to be successful, you don't need warships or airplanes; you need soft power...Soft power is media, science, and culture... I believe that the Emir was aware of this and I believe that's a great vision" (Connolly, 2012). In addition, El Etreby (2014: 43) contends that Al Jazeera is not objective in its coverage as while it exposes the crimes of certain regimes like Saudi

Arabia, it prefers to keep silent when Qatari officials are accused of any fraudulent transaction like bribery.

Furthermore, being sandwiched by Iran and Saudi Arabia, Al Jazeera, despite being a soft power tool, helped Qatar deter its powerful neighbors and promote Qatar's regional and international interests. Al Jazeera was not established to produce and broadcast news only. It was all about the power that the Emir required for his small state (Bedri, 2015: 80). Al Jazeera's service to the Qatari government can also be grasped from other countries' reactions. When a country is disturbed with its coverage, it condemns the Emirate more than the TV network itself. Tensions have risen many times between Qatar and Middle Eastern countries and even the United States as a consequence of Al Jazeera's oppositional coverage. It is not the media network but the Qatari regime that has been blamed since Al Jazeera has been state-owned and state-funded. Hence, the Doha government has been expected to curb the channel. However, Qatar has always insisted that it cannot interfere due to editorial independence (Zayani, 2005: 49).

State-sponsored public diplomacy via international broadcast goes back to World War I. Since then, countries have been using radios to make their propaganda and demonize their foes. From the 1980s onwards, privately-owned news networks, e.g. CNN, have replaced government-funded media and have gained credibility due to being private. According to Samuel-Azran (2013: 1294), while Al Jazeera is owned by the Qatari government, it acts independently in routine affairs, which gives it credibility. Calling Qatar-Al Jazeera relations a hybrid model, he asserts that the channel reverts to the state-sponsored model when there is a conflict that involves the state, too. He goes on to say that "The station's global and/or regional credibility gained during peacetime makes it a highly potent public diplomacy tool, which allows the state to influence public opinion and in turn impose pressure on elite groups in a foreign state to modify the target state's policies to the state's advantage" (Ibid). In addition, Da Lage (2005: 55) claims that while Al Jazeera has unlimited independence to criticize any country, the host country, Qatar, is immune to criticism.

Besides, it is a tool for Qatar to market itself and a source of fame. What Al Jazeera signifies for Qatar is the same as what casinos signify for Monaco. Without question, the TV network is a success story for this little renowned state. Thanks to the

worldwide renown channel, Qatar has become one of the central states in the region. As El Oifi (2005: 76) suggests:

Al Jazeera has become a weapon to contend with and a source of influence at the disposal of a tiny country that does not possess any of the classical elements of power—it has no large population, no sizeable army, and no big industry. The soft power Al Jazeera puts in the hands of Qatar inescapably makes the latter part of the Arab political game. Ignoring Qatar has a cost that Arab leaders can make as insignificant as possible, but cannot escape altogether.

While many scholars agree that the Al Jazeera media network serves Qatar to pursue its maverick foreign policy, William Lafi Youmans' thoughts on this allegation are slightly different. It is true that Al Jazeera is financially supported by the Emirate and its coverage is in line with Qatari foreign policy. However, despite being the public diplomacy tool of the small state, where and whom Al Jazeera covers are not of specific interest to Qatar (Youmans, 2012: 72). In other words, when regimes changed during the Arab Spring, Qatar did not benefit from the results of the events. Taguia (2019) also says that Al Jazeera is independent in its broadcast as it criticizes those regimes with which Qatar has good relations. For example, Qatar maintains good ties with Algeria but the Algerian government does not allow Al Jazeera to have an office there. Both authors agree that what Al Jazeera did was to enhance Qatar's reputation just as BBC did for Great Britain. However, what BBC signifies for a big state like Great Britain is not the same as what Al Jazeera signifies for a small state like Qatar. On the other hand, regardless of discussions, there is nothing wrong with Al Jazeera being an influential soft power tool in Qatar's foreign policy. As BBC is a tool in British foreign policy or Al Arabiya is a tool in Saudi diplomacy, Al Jazeera may be a tool in Qatari foreign policy as well. Pulliam (2013: 7) is another in the camp that assumes the TV channel is free, quoting some Al Jazeera staff who claim they do not get any instructions from the state in terms of coverage and content. However, there are also rumors to the contrary, asserting that employees think the channel is under the control of the Qatari government. Samuel-Azran (2013: 1297), quoting from surveys conducted to gain insight into the views of Al Jazeera staff, claims that all employees know well who their boss and sponsor is, meaning the Qatari state.

In fact, the connection between the Emirate and the TV network is so obvious that it requires no further discussion. Yet, such a connection is not strange since Al Jazeera

is financed by the Qatari state. However, probably since Qatari elites and Al Jazeera administration do not want to erode the credibility and reliability of the media network, they prefer not to disclose their relations with each other because Al Jazeera is not only a soft power tool but also a means for nation-branding. Thus, the Qatari government has to give the network its independence –even if not full independence– to maintain its independent foreign policy. Otherwise, Al Jazeera will be considered a mouthpiece of the Emirate instead of being known as a world brand media group.

Overall, as this study infers, Al Jazeera has a great influence, which can hardly be obtained even by military strength. Qatar is a small country and its calculable strength never ensures to have a say in regional politics. Yet, possessing Al Jazeera has made it an actor that cannot be ignored regarding regional and sometimes world politics. Joseph Nye (2018) admitted this fact in an interview made for this study. Besides, the Al Jazeera effect is like hard power for Qatar. It may sound strange but think of the Arab Spring, for example. Thanks to its coverage functioning like a match/lighter, the order of the whole Arab World was about to change. Nothing will be like pre-Arab Spring any longer due to revolutions. In addition, Al Jazeera is on the lurk, waiting for new upheavals. From another perspective, would the region have change so much, had there not been Al Jazeera? Indeed, the oppressed people would have revolted anyway, but it was Al Jazeera that ignited the fire of rebellions. Thus, all in all, the fact is that a small power owns a soft power tool of a super power and uses it for its ends.

c) Al Jazeera's Ideology

Al Jazeera is regarded as a media organization that reflects hopes, aspirations, problems, and thoughts of people living in Arab countries. It has broken not only the taboos of Arab regimes but also the monopoly of Western media in terms of the flow of information. The Arab world is ruled mainly by authoritarian regimes. While there are no free elections in some countries, those allowing elections have always been accused of fraud. For instance, Egypt's El-Sisi had prevented his potential five rivals to compete with him in the 2018 elections. In addition, many leaders have been elected several times by getting more than 90% of the votes. It was the anti-establishment coverage of Al Jazeera that caused discomfort among the Arab leaders. Additionally, Al Jazeera was one of the main actors siding with rebel groups during the Arab Spring.

This thus led scholars to think about whether Al Jazeera has an ideology to which it adheres. Three models are suggested by scholars (Bedri, 2015: 37). First, because of its anti-establishment rhetoric, it is claimed that Al Jazeera has anti-American, anti-Israel, anti-Western, pan-Arab, and pan-political Islamic sentiments and ideas. The second model asserts that the media network advocates press freedom, democracy, human rights, and objective journalism. Finally, supporters of the third model argue that it is just a tool of the Qatari state. Since we discussed the third model in the previous section, this section will focus on the first and the second model.

Regarding the first model, its proponents see Al Jazeera as an anti-West, anti-Israel, and anti-establishment media company. At the same time, they think that it advances Arab nationalism and political Islam. In the context of anti-Americanism, some American politicians argue that it ignites Muslim outrage against America. According to Lynch (2005: 38), the first signs of Al Jazeera's anti-American sentiment became apparent during Operation Desert Fox in 1998, when American and British air forces bombed Iraqi troops. Al Jazeera was the only television on the ground taking footage of the strikes. Supported by graphics, Al Jazeera's footage caused the outbreak of anti-American protests across the region. Former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, once said in a conference that if people watch Al Jazeera every day, even if they are American, they will hate America (Lynch, 2005: 36). Moreover, since Al Jazeera broadcasted interviews with anti-Western individuals, like Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, its coverage is regarded as hostile to American policies. Ajami (2001) even claims that the station is administrated by Islamic fundamentalists who are staunch haters of America and define themselves as anti-Imperialists. He further adds:

No matter how many Americans show up on Al-Jazeera, the station will pursue its oppositional agenda. Al-Jazeera's reporters see themselves as anti-imperialists. These men and women are convinced that the rulers of the Arab world have given into American might; these are broadcasters who play to an Arab gallery whose political bitterness they share — and feed (Ibid).

This study also argues that Al Jazeera has an anti-American rhetoric. However, unlike other scholars who blame the TV network, it argues that US policies in the Middle East have not been innocent and justifiable. For example, the US administration itself confessed that the Saddam Hussain regime did not have chemical weapons, which was

the main reason for invading Iraq. Therefore, whether Al Jazeera's anti-Americanism is to blame is questionable.

In addition, the allegations that Al Jazeera led the masses and increased anti-West and anti-Israel sentiments were once supported by Jamal Khashoggi, who was dismembered to death in Saudi Arabia's Istanbul consulate in October 2018. He argued that the station, which knows the anti-Western Arab street well, was led by the masses instead of leading masses (Bedri, 2015: 39). However, Khashoggi's views changed after having a fallout with the Saudi regime. On the other hand, when America invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, all media outlets that challenged the invasion were labeled as anti-American. Hence, what Al Jazeera did was not different than many other media outlets. However, it should be reminded here that despite discontent with Al Jazeera's coverage, the United States has the biggest overseas base, Al Udeid, in Qatar, and relations between two countries are at alliance level.

In terms of encouraging anti-Israel sentiments, Qatar does not deny that it supports the Palestinian cause. Al Jazeera has always looked at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the Palestinian perspective (Felsch, 2016: 31). For example, it was Al Jazeera that made live broadcast during the second Intifada. Thanks to its coverage, the world audience had the chance to view the incident not only from the American and Israeli perspective but also from the Palestinian perspective. Its performance led to the emergence of a positive image of Al Jazeera in the Arab world (Palloshi, 2015: 56). In fact, Al Jazeera's coverage of the Israel-Lebanon war in 2006 was praised by the Qatari Emir himself. He claimed that the TV network played a major role in showing Israel's massacre of innocent Lebanese people (Kamrava, 2011: 549). In addition, both Martin Indyk, a former US ambassador, and Fareed Zakaria, a prominent columnist for Newsweek magazine, blame Al Jazeera for the rise of extreme anti-Semitic ideas and sentiments (Bedri, 2015: 46-47). Yet, their American perspective ignores that Israel's actions cause the rise of anti-Semitism. This fact is even admitted by some Israeli media and Jewish scholars.

Meanwhile, Israeli officials are also unhappy with the media network's coverage. According to Al-Khater (2017), when chaos was at the peak during the Arab Spring, some Jewish leaders met at Tel Aviv University in 2011 and spoke of the influence and power of Al Jazeera on the protests and its central role in distorting the US and Israeli policies in the region. At the end of the meeting, they called to establish a

'Jewish Al Jazeera'. However, despite Al Jazeera's negative coverage, Qatar is the only Arab country that maintains unique ties with Israel. As underlined in the previous chapter, Qatar has official relations with Israel and hosted top Israeli officials including Israeli Prime Minister in Doha. Further to political relations, when Al Jazeera was first launched, it opened its airwaves to Israeli guests, causing fury among Arabs. The Arab audience was angered seeing a guest on an Al Jazeera program from Tel Aviv. The station had to wait for the second intifada to take place in the year 2000 to convince the Arab people that it is a pan-Arab TV channel.

In general, from a soft power perspective, Al Jazeera has really disturbed Americans and Israelis in the Middle East. Yet, the US and Israel might be unhappy with Al Jazeera but the world generally, particularly the South, appreciated the TV network. This was because Al Jazeera disclosed what was hidden from people and became the voice of the adversaries of these two countries. Scholars wrongly or deliberately questioned which side Al Jazeera took but they never discussed which side was right. In addition, no media outlets can change facts. If Al Jazeera's coverage is disturbing, then facts are disturbing as well. In this sense, accusations about anti-Americanism or pro-Americanism are meaningless.

Regarding Al Jazeera's pan-Arab and pan-Islamist ideology, some scholars argue that it promotes pan-Arab and pan-political Islamic ideas. According to Bedri (2015: 48), Emir Hamad has chose a pan-political Islamic agenda because of his struggle with Saudi Arabia. While both countries adhere to Wahhabism, Emir Hamad shifted to the Muslim Brotherhood version of Islam. That is why Yusuf Al-Qaradawi was let to have his show, "Al-Sharia and Life", on Al Jazeera, Bedri argues. Besides Qaradawi's program, the station devotes considerable time to Islamic programs and most of its employees have strong beliefs of Arabism or political Islam (Ibid: 49). In addition, some critics in the Arab world asserted that Sheikh Hamad wanted to be the new Gamal Abdel Nasser, the famous pan-Arabist leader who ruled Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s. Depicting the station as "the most potent weapon in the Islamic arsenal", Chafets (2001: 1-4) calls it "An Islamist's propaganda machine that aims to spread hate against the US, Israel, and the West in general by steering Arab feelings and amplifying them...An Arab propaganda outfit controlled by the medieval government of Qatar". Meanwhile, Al-Sadi (2012) thinks that the media network's pro-Arab and political Islam agenda is just a deception to hide its real motive, which is to serve Qatar's

interests in regional and international politics. Thus, Al Jazeera wants to promote Qatar as a self-reforming state that embraces democratic values, which Arab masses could embrace if they get rid of their authoritarian regimes. Therefore, Al Jazeera is not about challenging Arab autocracy but re-inventing it (Ibid).

On the other hand, Zayani (2005: 2) argues that “In the absence of political will and political pluralism in the Arab world, Al Jazeera serves as a de facto pan-Arab opposition and a forum for resistance. It provides a voice for opposing Arab views and a high-profile platform for political dissidents many of whom live abroad”. Arabness is paramount in Al Jazeera’s coverage. It has a discourse of Arab nationalism and deliberately creates pan-Arab consciousness (Ibid: 7). Moreover, its Western-style format is regarded by some Western analysts as merely a cover that veils pan-Arab/Islamist viewpoints (CRS, 2003: 3). Cherkaoui (2014: 20), too, focuses on when pan-Arabist ideas became predominant in Al Jazeera’s coverage and concludes that the station’s coverage during the second intifada is the starting point for the promotion of Arab nationalism. Perhaps, one of the most interesting views about this subject is shared by Mohamed Zayani, who argues that Al Jazeera has been broadcasting in standard Arabic, helping to rekindle a common Arab identity. What has Al Jazeera accomplished is in fact Gamal Abdel Nasser’s dream decades ago: bringing Arabic-origin masses together and boosting a sense of unity among them through its coverage (Zayani, 2016: 3559).

Among the literature reviewed for this study, quite a few scholars assert that since Al Jazeera is owned by Qatar, an Arab and Muslim country, it is natural for the TV network to be pro-Arab and pro-Islam since media corporations can also have an ideology like human beings. Nobody questions BBC's pan-British sentiments or CNN's Pan-American sentiments. Hence, Al Jazeera's Arabness or Islamism is in line with the nature of media business. However, it is not possible to calculate the ideology of people and institutions. Thus, all claims about Al Jazeera's biases or that of other media outlets might stem from their own biases. In addition, while cited scholars above use an incriminatory language, their views are supported by this study, too. Al Jazeera is indeed pan-Arab and pan-Islamic. But we must clarify that it differentiates between rulers and Arab people. It supports Arab people against both one-man and oligarchic regimes and non-Arabs. Particularly, Al Jazeera Arabic has pro-Arab rhetoric that defends Arab values and nationalism. Theoretically, this strategy fits well with

constructivist theory but it has more; it is in the making of an identity generated from Arabism and Islam(ism). While doing this, it does not utilize from Wahhabism but orthodox Sunni theology. Yet, it cannot be concluded that Al Jazeera does it consciously. Sometimes, social structures come into being without awareness. Probably, Al Jazeera's massive pan-Arab and pro-Islamic broadcast unconsciously creates an identity. However, our argument is based only on Al Jazeera's Arabic language channel(s) since other channels broadcasting in other languages are not so biased. Finally, in short, it is the strength of the soft power of Qatar exerted via Al Jazeera that boosts pan-Arabism and Islamism.

In addition to anti-American and anti-Israel/Semitic rhetoric, Al Jazeera is also accused of being anti-establishment, which allegedly feeds and causes radicalism among the Arab population. From its establishment to date, the media network has always been accused of challenging Arab regimes and their social, economic, and political norms, rules, and concepts. It broke taboos and artificial traditions of hegemonic powers in the region. Thus, its coverage is regarded as revolutionary and anti-dictatorship (Bedri, 2015: 39). According to Abdelmoula (2012), it was Al Jazeera that commenced the democratization process in the Arab world. Particularly during the Arab Spring, the media conglomerate did not need to disguise which side it supports. Thanks to its support of opposition groups, the leaders of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen changed while Syria's Assad is still striving to stay in power since 2011. Yet, Al Sadi (2012) claims that Al Jazeera and the Qatari regime do not aim to overthrow Arab regimes but force them to reform themselves.

Regarding the second model, some scholars claim that it is advocating democracy, press freedom, human rights, among other cherished values. Indeed, people of the Middle East saw the criticism of anti-democratic regimes together with the foundation of Al Jazeera. Before the TV station, nobody had dared to challenge the region's dictators. In fact, since the media had been state-owned, there had been no single outlet that could be critical of governments. With Al Jazeera on the stage, an awakening began among the Arab population as Al Jazeera's coverage was independent, allowing the free flow of information. Thanks to the media organization, various topics could be discussed including political corruption. Due to its pro-democracy stance, Hafez (2004) even argued that Al Jazeera was one of the most influential de facto political parties in the Arab world. When he made this comment, the Arab Spring had not

erupted yet. In addition, Samir Khader, one of Al Jazeera's senior producers, claims that the station teaches Arab people democracy and helps them shake up their stagnant societies (Bedri, 2015: 60). We should recall that Emir Hamad launched a (limited) democratic reformation when he came to power. Therefore, Al Jazeera is both a fruit of his political change, namely, democratization of the system, and a proponent of it. However, there are also analysts claiming that while the media network let people have their say and has supported democratic demands, it has never questioned the undemocratic regime of the host country (Eliades, 2012: 6). According to an index prepared by Freedom House in 2013, Qatar is not a free country, having 5.5 on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1=free. In the same vein, Qatar is 138th among 167 countries as per the Democratic Index of The Economist, meaning that it is an authoritarian country (Sanroma, 2015: 35). Furthermore, Al Jazeera turned a blind eye on Bahrain's protestors who asked for more freedom and democracy (Abdulnabi, 2017: 2). On the other hand, Lynch (2005:44) says that an enthusiast called "the Democratic Republic of Al Jazeera" does not exist since TV programs do not change regimes or compel them to change their ways. However, six years after Lynch wrote his cited article, the Arab world encountered a fierce transition from dictatorship thanks to Al Jazeera's broadcast.

Since views about Al Jazeera's ideology or cause vary and are contrasting, it would be most appropriate to find out what Al Jazeera thinks about itself. The media conglomerate's "About Us" section on its website, Aljazeera.com, gives some clues about Al Jazeera's goals and motivations (Al Jazeera, 2019). In the aforementioned section, it says, "In Al Jazeera's work you can find it all, from the heights of the indomitability of the human spirit to the lows of dictatorship, repression and the abuse of power." The keywords in this sentence are "dictatorship", "repression" and "the abuse of power", which give clues about Al Jazeera's intentions. As can be seen, the company clearly opposes dictatorships that are common in the Middle East. In the same vein, since only dictators repress their people and abuse state power, it can be contended from Al Jazeera's own words that it is an anti-establishment media company. The sentence following the above sentence states: "For decades Al Jazeera has been pushing the boundaries of free access to information, free thought and free expression in one of the most uncompromising parts of the world". Free access to information, free thought,

and free expression are all necessities of democracy. If people can not access information other than that which is supplied by state-owned media, they cannot break the official discourse and will not be eager to participate in decision-making and oppose the establishment. Whereas, in many aspects, freedom enables people to question ruling elites and their regimes, which will finally culminate in requesting democratic participation, a real threat to authoritarian regimes.

In addition, Al Jazeera defines the Middle East as one of the most uncompromising parts of the world, revealing that it is not happy with developments and the political structure of the region. By saying “pushing boundaries”, it admits that it is involved in the democratization process of the Middle East. In another sentence concerning the coverage of the Palestinian conflict, it says that “The Palestinian conflict cannot exclusively be covered from an Arab-Muslim perspective only; the Israeli, American and European views should also be highlighted, regardless how contradictory to the Palestinian views they may be”. Thus, it claims to be neutral even in cases where it is supposed to be siding with Arabs and/or Muslims.

Overall, Al Jazeera is really anti-establishment and it does not deny its role in anti-regime protests. Besides, it supports democracy but whether this affection stems from its belief in the democratic system or its hatred of dictatorial regimes is not clear. However, since the Qatari state has launched a democratic process, despite being limited, its pro-democracy discourse is hardly deceptive. On the other hand, being anti-establishment and supporting democratic transition is regarded as a true action by the majority of the world. Therefore, Al Jazeera's posture might be blamed by authoritarian regimes, but others, particularly scholars writing about it, should not criticize it as they would contradict themselves. Sometimes, authoritarian Arab regimes are favored to the democratic system, which likely brings Islamic groups to power. However, since such favors are against the realization of the will of people, regardless of who comes to power, opposing popular protests and condemning media sponsors like Al Jazeera can not be justified. One can argue that the media company remains silent about the undemocratic system of Qatar. Yet, wrong attitudes of a TV network do not make the right ones wrong. From a soft power perspective, Al

Jazeera's anti-establishment stance could help people to oust dictators, had there not been a foreign intervention. However, at least it has led to a revival among people and has given them hope for the future.

d) Al Jazeera's Coverage

Al Jazeera's coverage has been under scrutiny and criticism since its foundation. Before Al Jazeera, there had been almost no private media outlets based in the Middle East. The flow of information had been filtered and censored by countries' Ministries of Information. Hence, news covering anti-governmental incidents had been either biased or not published. When the Qatari regime founded Al Jazeera, it allowed the TV station to act independently. Indeed, Al Jazeera's exemption from government censorship was so effective that it became not only one of the instigators of events in the region but also an alternative voice to West-dominated international media. With the Qatar-based TV network, people of the region gained access to non-filtered information. While the Arab population became more aware of their countries' politics, regimes became worried by the station's coverage and saw it as a threat to their ruling because it did not "Shy away from covering political and social issues over which Arab governments prefer to keep quiet" (Zayani, 2005: 3). As Seib (2008) summarizes in one sentence:

For the first time in the modern history of many independent Arab countries, there is a media organization that reflects the aspirations, hopes, and problems of many in the region. It is seen as a station that has managed not only to break regional taboos but also to break the West's hold on the flow of information.

It was this effectiveness that led to the emergence of the term "The Al Jazeera Effect", drawing inspiration from "The CNN Effect", after it covered the post-September 11 developments, mainly the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States. Besides technical similarities like satellite broadcasting, digital programming, and a modern format, like the CNN effect, it sets the agenda, influences foreign policy decisions and forces decision-makers to act. The difference of The Al Jazeera Effect is that it creates a balance in international media while offering a different perspective and disrupting the monopoly of mainstream media on information (Palloshi, 2015: 58). Palloshi also argues that The Al Jazeera Effect educates people about democracy and

their basic rights. After helping them become conscious of their rights, it begins to help them have their voices heard. Furthermore, before Al Jazeera came to the scene, it was not possible to learn about a coup, a massacre or protests, which were embarrassing friendly countries (Ibid: 60). With Al Jazeera, transparent information could be accessible, which culminated in the break of information control and the emergence of opposing ideas. Yet, Palloshi ignores that Al Jazeera's transparency does not include Qatar. In addition, such pro-democratic coverage was absent during Bahraini uprisings in 2011.

Regarding Al Jazeera's discourse and rhetoric, as discussed above, various scholars with various views stress that the TV station is pro-Qatari, pro-Arab, pro-political Islam, anti-American, anti-Israeli, anti-Semitic, anti-Western and anti-establishment. This study also agrees with scholars but only for Al Jazeera Arabic, since its English channel is quite internationalist. Al Jazeera has covered many important conflicts and wars taking place in the Middle East since its foundation. Analysts have examined its programs and news reports to learn to what extent it is biased and objective. For example, Eliades (2006: 15) reminds that while Western media reports about the Arab-Israeli conflict, they use words like "terrorists" and "targeted killings". On the contrary, Al Jazeera (Arabic) preferred words like "martyrs" and "assassinations". Moreover, it employed a language describing suicide bombings as "martyrdom operations", and the Israeli army as an "occupation force". Furthermore, it called America's "Operation Iraqi Freedom" as "The War Against Iraq" and made live coverage of Iraqi civilian casualties, dramatizing the events to appeal emotionally to viewers (CRS, 2003: 2). Ibrahim Helal, once editor in chief of Al Jazeera, admits that emotions are the most important facts and parts of Al Jazeera's news stories (Carney, 2006: 9). During Operation Iraqi Freedom, while CNN preferred to present the developments using terms like "Coalition Forces", "terrorist(s)", "war of liberation", on the contrary, Al Jazeera's choice of words was "invading Americans/forces", "freedom fighter", "ugly face of war", etc. (Ibid: 10-11). In addition, when Saddam Hussein's statue was toppled on April 9, 2003, unlike Western media that covered cheering Iraqis, Al Jazeera was broadcasting images of people looting and the wounded Iraqis in Basra. Such rhetoric led the TV network to win the hearts of the Arab population although Arab regimes and American administration were not happy. Americans even established the Al-Hurra TV channel to compete with Al Jazeera. Yet,

it failed due to American traces in its rhetoric. For example, during the 2009 Gaza War, Al Hurra looked from the Israeli perspective and invited more Israeli commentators to its news programs than Arab guests. While Al-Hurra claimed Israeli forces were targeting Hamas, Al Jazeera was reporting that Israelis were attacking everyone in Gaza. In addition, Al Hurra used words like “killed”, “Israeli forces”, “operation”, etc. in comparison to Al Jazeera's discourse consisting of words such as “martyr”, “Gaza Under Fire”, “occupation forces”, etc. (Samei, 2016: 63-65). Al-Hurra was so alien to the Arab World that, unlike Al Jazeera and other Arab media that greeted the audience with "Al-Sallamu Alaykum", its presenter preferred to say "Welcome Back" instead (Ibid: 59). Perhaps, this is the reason why, according to a survey, only 2% of Arab viewers preferred to watch Al Hurra in 2008.

Excluding the coverage of American invasions, Al Jazeera pursued a broadcast stance in alignment with Qatari foreign policy. When Qataris were active in mediation in the early 2000s, Al Jazeera supported the Qatari clout with pro-mediation programs. Qatari diplomats were on the scene almost every day during their brokerage. The aim, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was to contribute to Qatar's credibility and reputation with its coverage. On the other hand, when the first popular protests of the Arab Spring started in Tunisia, Al Jazeera's coverage suddenly changed. It openly began to support opposition groups and discredit the regimes of the countries where unrest erupted. The TV network sent dozens of journalists to Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria. While the deaths of regime forces were ignored, those rebels killed were called martyrs (Cherkaoui, 2014: 25). Al Jazeera was such a staunch supporter of revolutions that while Yusuf Al-Qaradawi called people to resist and fight via its scene, the TV network continued broadcasting live 24/7. It even opened Al Jazeera Mubasher Misr solely to cover the events happening in Egypt. However, it was not always pro-protestors. For example, it ignored revolts in Bahrain since the Qatari regime sided with Bahraini rulers. The Bahraini case is indeed a black stain in Al Jazeera's support of the democratization process in the Arab World. Abdulnabi (2017: 10-15), to prove the TV network's subjectivity, gives some examples of statements by former Al Jazeera journalists. For example, Salih Al-Saqqaf, an Al Jazeera reporter in Sydney, wanted to cover pro-Assad protests in Australia. Yet, Al Jazeera's headquarters asked him not to do so by saying “Please understand our situation”. In another case, in September 2015, Kelly Jarrett, an executive at Al Jazeera, told staff

not to present Al-Nusra Front as affiliated with Al-Qaeda since Qatar (and the other Gulf States) supplied weapons to the rebel group. Karem Mahmoud, a former anchor at the TV station, once said that the administration had instructed staff to favor the Muslim Brotherhood.

Besides rhetoric, programs aired on Al Jazeera give an idea about its coverage. Among its programs, "The Opposite Direction," "More Than One Opinion," "Century Witness", "Without Bounds" and "Al-Sharia and Life" are the most vivid ones. These and many other programs have invited not only ordinary commentators but also those called "terrorists" by Arab and Western governments. In addition, Al Jazeera was the first Arab TV to feature Israeli officials. Thus, from Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein to Israeli analysts, many people with different ideologies and nationalities appeared on Al Jazeera's programs. However, despite this diversity, and its motto being "The opinion and the other opinion", the media company could not clear itself from accusations that it politicizes Arab viewers and supports political Islam.

Indeed, although Al Jazeera's programs has welcomed everyone holding different views, it has still been more pro-Arab/political Islam/Qatar. Perhaps, the most influential program was Yusuf Al-Qaradawi's "Al-Sharia and Life". A detailed investigation of it may give a better idea about the media company's goals hidden in its coverage. "Al-Sharia and Life" was produced solely to broadcast Qaradawi's views. The program had a weekly audience of 35 million. Seeing the success and influence of the program, Sheikh Hamad founded The International Union of Muslim Scholars, whose President was Qaradawi (Warren, 2017: 4). Qaradawi discussed not only religious issues but also social and political ones. During the Arab Spring protests, he used his program to encourage opposition groups to revolt against their governments. In his speeches, he called for jihad against Bin Ali of Tunisia, Mubarak of Egypt, Gaddafi of Libya and Assad of Syria. On the other hand, when Mohamed Morsi of Egypt was overthrown by Sisi in 2013, he did not support the military government and said that "Islam orders us to obey President Morsi" (Pulliam, 2015: 48). However, it was Qaradawi who fiercely criticized Al-Qaeda's understanding of Islam, a strong evidence on Al Jazeera's hand against those calling the TV network "the terrorist news network", "Jihad TV" or "Bin Laden's Private TV Channel" (Carney, 2006: 9).

To sum up, Al Jazeera's coverage is indeed controversial. First of all, Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Jazeera English channels have different, sometimes clashing coverages. While

you can not find news about issues like feminism in the Arabic channel, the TV network does not hesitate to stream such news in the English channel. In addition, the discourse of the English channel is more international while the Arabic one is pro-Islamic and pan-Arab. Therefore, its coverage changes according to the audience it addresses. Probably, it seeks legitimacy in the world audience by trying to be a bit more neutral in the English channel. Further to this hypocrisy, there is also inconsistency in its coverage since it broadcasts in line with Qatar's foreign policy. For example, when Qatar was neutral until 2010, so was Al Jazeera. Yet, when Qatar intervened in conflicts, its coverage changed as per Qatar's policy. In general, it is an effective tool in the hands of Qatar and its coverage has hurt many states.

e) Repercussions to Al Jazeera

The establishment and ongoing coverage of Al Jazeera are regarded as a game-changer in terms of state-dominated Middle Eastern media and West-dominated international media, which had a monopoly on the flow of information. As Bedri (2015: 60) contends, Al Jazeera is the first channel that transmits information from the south to the north and from the East to the West. And, this transmission is done and sponsored by a small country despite the opposition of great powers. Earlier, the global south had no chance to have its voice heard due to the dominance of news titans like CNN and BBC (Youmans, 2012: 34). Besides being the loudest "voice of the south", what made Al Jazeera so prominent and influential was being the dominant news network of the Middle East, where states controlled and censored information to manage their societies (Pulliam, 2013: 6). Therefore, voicing from the Middle East is another success. In point of fact, the news network belongs to the Qatari state and was founded to broadcast in the interest of Qatar, which was under the target of several Arab countries since Emir Hamad overthrew his father and made his way independent of Saudi Arabia. However, it became a media giant in the region first, and went worldwide later. Nevertheless, being so influential in a region of conflicts and states with authoritarian regimes had a price. While Al Jazeera has encountered many obstacles and attacks perpetrated by regional countries and Americans, the Qatari state has gone through dangerous crises with its neighbors and other Arab countries. Therefore, Al Jazeera's coverage has become a headache for Qatar as well.

How Al Jazeera and Qatar have been affected by its broadcast line can be examined through the events it covered. For example, when Al Jazeera began broadcasting in 1996, opening its airwaves to Israelis to depict the other side of the conflict caused fury among Arab rulers and populations. For a long time, it was seen as a mouthpiece of the US. However, during Operation Desert Fox, when the US-led coalition bombarded Baghdad in 1998, Al Jazeera remained the only network covering the operation. Due to its report from Iraq, many international news outlets borrowed Al Jazeera's footage. The Arab audience also began to pay attention to the TV network. A month after the aforementioned operation, Al Jazeera transmitted Saddam Hussein's call for a general revolt against Arab monarchies, causing controversy in countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan (Bedri 2015: 5). It was a bold and risky action that enraged not only the region but also world powers. This was because a small state was daring to support the 'evil' regime of Saddam Hussain against the world's biggest powers.

Moreover, when Al-Aqsa Intifada erupted in 2000, it was again Al Jazeera that covered the whole event from an Arab perspective. The other TV network that was in Jerusalem at that time was CNN but it did little coverage and was biased in favor of Israel (Palloshi, 2015: 56). The second intifada was the moment when it convinced Arabs that it is a pan-Arab TV station, while Arab governments, on the other hand, were grumbling due to its coverage. Between 1999 and 2001, Al Jazeera's offices based in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Ramallah were temporarily closed while Mauritania asked Qatar to stop Al Jazeera broadcasting to its citizens (Al Jazeera, 2019). Such decisions are weird taking into consideration that these countries are Arab and Muslim. It means that Al Jazeera pressed on their tails, too.

On the other hand, while covering relatively small incidents, the September 11, 2001 attacks took place. Al-Qaeda hit the US in its territory, which Americans deemed a great humiliation on their behalf. The Bush administration accused Afghanistan's Taliban and Iraq's Saddam Hussein, and thus started preparations to invade both countries. Days after the September 11 attacks, the Pentagon signed a \$16.7-million contract with The Rendon Group to have Al Jazeera's bureaus and correspondents monitored (Ibid). In 2001, the US military entered Afghanistan to find Osama Bin Laden and punish the Taliban. Again, Al Jazeera was on the scene to report the American invasion. It could access Kandahar and Kabul and took footage of people injured and killed in the American bombardment (Samuel-Azran, 2017: 3). Yet,

besides the heart-breaking videos of civilians, the TV channel took one more step forward and aired Osama Bin Laden's videos. It also made exclusive interviews with Bin Laden; thus, some media outlets called it the mouthpiece of Al-Qaeda. On the other hand, US officials were displeased with the airing of Bin Laden's interviews. Colin Powell, then-Secretary of State, criticized the station for airing fierce statements of Al-Qaeda (CRS, 2003: 8). Further to American criticism, Saudis were also furious since Bin Laden was a Saudi citizen and critical of the Saudi family (Abdulnabi, 2017: 3). Meanwhile, in November 2011, American missiles “accidentally” hit Al Jazeera's Kabul office. In the aftermath, while Al Jazeera's Kabul correspondent Tayseer Allouni was arrested during a visit to Spain, cameraman Sami Al-Hajj, a Sudanese citizen, was arrested in Pakistan and sent to Guantanamo in 2001 (Al Jazeera, 2019). Al-Hajj was released in 2008.

Al Jazeera's success was assumed as the defeat of CNN. More broadly, America was defeated by a small country's global TV channel, a situation that international relations theories hardly explain. Besides, regional powers just watched Al Jazeera's coverage like a paralyzed person. However, they tried to punish the Qatari regime afterwards.

When the invasion of Afghanistan was completed, the Bush administration turned to Iraq and invaded it in 2003. Al Jazeera journalists were in Iraq during the occupation and informing the world from the Iraqi perspective. The station was broadcasting Iraqi civilians, American casualties and prisoners, a move that angered the US. As a result, the Al Jazeera crew was again bombed by American jets, killing its correspondent, Tareq Ayyoub. Despite seeming accidental, many believe that coalition forces deliberately attacked Al Jazeera's journalists. Several Al Jazeera correspondents were sent to Abu Ghraib prison and tortured. On the other hand, Rashid Hamid Wali, another correspondent, was killed by a US sniper fire in Iraq in 2004 (Al Jazeera, 2019). According to Palloshi (2015: 58), “Al Jazeera's being attacked by coalition forces proves that Al Jazeera is influential and can impact US politics and policies. Al Jazeera can affect US foreign policy by providing the different perspectives it aims to”. The TV network indeed disrupted US policies in the region and ruined its image at that time. Al Jazeera was also starting to get on American officials' nerves. Calling it a mouthpiece of terrorists, Donald Rumsfeld, then-Secretary of Defense, said after the Iraqi invasion:

We know that Al Jazeera has a pattern of playing propaganda, over and over and over again. What they do is, when a bomb goes down they grab some children and women and pretend that the bomb hit the women and the children. And it seems to me that it's up to all of us to try to tell the truth, to say what we know, to say what we don't know and recognize that we are dealing with people that are perfectly willing to lie to the world to attempt to further their case, until ultimately they are caught lying and they lose their credibility and one would think it wouldn't take very long for that to happen, dealing with people like this (Eliades, 2006: 11).

These words can also be regarded as American fury and despair against Al Jazeera.

Meanwhile, Western media cautioned their audience not to trust Al Jazeera's coverage. Being frustrated by anti-propaganda, Al Jazeera launched a website, AlJazeeraEnglish.net, in February 2003, to reach the international audience (Samul-Azran, 2017: 4). The war continued over the news with Sunday Times' claim that Iraqi intelligence had penetrated Al Jazeera, resulting in the resignation of Al Jazeera's CEO (CRS, 2003: 4). Seeing that Al Jazeera won the media wars, Saudi Arabia launched Al Arabiya in 2003 to fight against Al Jazeera, while the American administration launched Al-Hurra TV after Al Jazeera covered the Iraqi invasion (Hashmi, 2012: 4). Moreover, France 24 Arabic was also launched by France, while Venezuela founded "Telesur" in Latin America, which is regarded as a copy of Al Jazeera. Furthermore, Jordan, Algeria, and Morocco either canceled the accreditation of Al Jazeera correspondents or closed its offices due to programs or commentators that were critical of these countries. Briefly, Al Jazeera simply changed the structure of media with its coverage and forced great powers to take precautions by imitating the TV network.

The year 2006 witnessed some major developments regarding Al Jazeera as well. In March 2006, NSA fugitive, Edward Snowden, leaked that NSA hacked Al Jazeera and accessed the communication of its correspondents and managers. In the same year, in November, Al Jazeera English was launched. In that time, the most important event was the Israel-Lebanon war. The channel showed Israel's attacks as a massacre of the innocent Lebanese, gaining the praise of the Arab and Muslim world while irritating Israelis and Americans. Thus, while challenging Israel this time, it also consolidated Arab and Muslim solidarity. When the 2009 Gaza War erupted, Qatar and Al Jazeera openly supported Hamas. Al Jazeera did blanket cover during the 22-day war. Qatari-

Israeli relations were frozen and Doha expelled Israeli representatives. When the Arab Spring began in 2011, Al Jazeera became one of the main actors of rebellions, and revolutions were called "Al Jazeera revolutions". Thanks to its coverage, protests spread to the whole region. Al Jazeera's journalists were among the protestors to transmit events instantaneously. Governments that incurred unrest expelled, jailed, or tortured Al Jazeera's correspondents. In addition, satellites did not provide signals to the TV network to broadcast. However, governments' precautions were not enough to stop Al Jazeera. It founded new TV stations like Al Jazeera Mubasher Misr. It also used SMS messages for communication.

Further to its support to revolutions, the news network supported the newly formed governments replacing Bin Ali, Saleh, Gaddafi, and Mubarak. However, revolutionary governments were short-lived and replaced by new authoritarian ones. For example, when El-Sisi took power in Egypt, it did not only stop it from broadcasting from Egypt but also reimbursed Qatar's financial aid to the Egyptian Central Bank (Hammond, 2014: 6). In March 2014, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE recalled their ambassadors from Doha to protest Qatar's policies, which they deemed a threat to regional security. They were particularly furious about Al Jazeera's coverage. Qatar agreed to a deal with neighbors to ease relations with its neighbors. Among the three countries' demands was the request to prevent Al Jazeera from calling Morsi's ouster a coup (Hassan, 2014). In a final rift beginning on June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt jointly blockaded Qatar by closing air, sea and land borders, alleging that the Sheikhdome supports terrorism and disrupts regional peace. Al Jazeera was again the main target of the blockading countries. All Al Jazeera offices in the blockading countries and Jordan were closed. When the four countries announced their conditions for lifting the blockade, the permanent closure of Al Jazeera Media Company was on the list. As expected, Qatar refused to close Al Jazeera. It had to do so since Qatar's influence would diminish dramatically as more than half the Sheikhdome's soft power in foreign policy originates from Al Jazeera.

On the other hand, when looking at who oppose Al Jazeera, we see two actors: the authoritarian regimes of the Arab World and the United States. Middle Eastern countries were established as mandates by the British and the French mainly after World War I. While some of them gained their independence before World War II, the majority of them became independent after European powers ended the colonialization

era. While some of them were ruled by big families, others were ruled by the military junta. Whether monarchical or dictatorial, there has been a one-man rule in almost all countries. Authoritarian rulers and a small number of their aides have never thought of sharing power with their people. Further to absolute power, they have tortured individuals and groups that asked for a democratic and transparent political system. Since Qatar was a small state when Emir Hamad took power, he applied soft power against his adversaries and Al Jazeera was the first instrument of soft power, which is still effective.

The TV network disturbed Arab regimes at any moment. Since regimes were corrupt and intolerant, the station could find many faults that it could use against them. Therefore, anyone who dared to target Arab regimes would be successful at that time and even now. In other words, for example, if not Qatar but Oman had owned an Al Jazeera-like TV, it would find enough material to take attention. Yet, only Qatar attempted to punish its adversaries via media, which is the distinction for the Sheikdom. In addition, Qatar supported opposition groups threatening the power of authoritarian leaders via opening Al Jazeera's airwaves to dissidents. That is to say, Al Jazeera was not only airing news but also trying to change the region's political system. Thus, establishments of the Arab World began to defend themselves and punish Qatar and Al Jazeera. For example, Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador in 2002 and let him return in 2008. In 2014, all neighbors recalled their ambassadors. In one of his visits to Doha, Hosni Mubarak wanted to visit Al Jazeera headquarters. He was wondering how a small state had drawn his country's audience. After completing his tour, he said, "This matchbox! All this noise is coming out of this matchbox!" (Eliades, 2006: 9). Mubarak's statement shows that he was aware of the power of Al Jazeera.

The second party that Al Jazeera irritates is the United States. As a matter of fact, the US and Qatar have good relations. Even when US jets bombed Al Jazeera office in Baghdad, US forces based in Saudi Arabia were moving to Qatar. Thus, despite its disturbance with Al Jazeera, unlike Arab countries, the US continued to maintain good ties with Qatar. The reason for US hatred of the station was its coverage during the Afghan and Iraqi wars that smeared the American administration. Because of Al Jazeera, Americans could not convince anyone that it was fighting terrorism. In addition, Al Jazeera was doing interviews with whoever the US army targeted, e.g.

Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden. Moreover, Al Jazeera always supported Palestinians against Israel, America's best ally in the region. Thus, Americans could not bear Al Jazeera's coverage that was threatening its interests in the Middle East.

According to a report prepared for American congress in 2003, the following policy options were advised to the congress:

- *Create an alternative Arabic Language Television Network.*
- *Tie foreign aid to media reform.*
- *Buy commercial air time on Arab networks*
- *Have US officials engage the Arab media more actively*
- *Favor the more moderate Arab satellite networks*
- *Encourage more privatization of media (CRS, 2003: 13-14).*

Americans implemented all the advice listed above. For example, Americans wanted to get rid of Al Jazeera by lobbying for the privatization of the media network (Youmans, 2012: 70). However, although the Qatari government was initially warm to this proposal, it later renounced. As another precaution to stop the Qatari media giant, Americans launched Al-Hurra TV against the Qatar-based TV station, which was a total failure. It also forced the closure of Al Jazeera America, which was launched in 2013 and closed in 2016 due to continuous obstructions, leading to a loss of more than \$1 billion (Samuel-Azran, 2017). It seems that America's measures against Al Jazeera did not work and probably will fail in every attempt since pro-establishment media has the same and censored content as opposed to Al Jazeera, which discloses what is trying to be hidden. In other words, the problem is not Al Jazeera but critical issues it covers. As long as people are deprived of political participation and there is no transparency in the system and censorship, Al Jazeera or any other media group will attract the audience.

4.3 Religion

Qatar is a Muslim country ruled by Sharia law. Article 1 of the Qatari Constitution states that "...Its religion is Islam, and the Islamic Law is the main source of its legislations... (Constitution of Qatar, 2003). However, Sharia is not the sole source of legislation. Civil law is also effective. People are generally pious and religion has great importance in their lives. Like its neighbor Saudi Arabia, the Sheikdom adheres to

the Wahhabi creed and the Hanbali school except for its 10% Shiite minority. Yet, the role of Wahhabism, or generally religion, at the political and state level is minor. According to Baskan and Wright (2011), unlike Saudi Arabia, Qatar has a secular character resembling that of Turkey. The reason for this is the lack of the Ulama class in Qatar that advises society and the state how and why the teaching and promotion of religion are important. On the contrary, this is exactly the case in Saudi Arabia. Since the Muhammad Abdul Wahhab era in the 18th century, there have been Wahhabi Ulama that dictate, guide and shape the state and society in Saudi Arabia. Such is why “Qataris privately distinguish between their ‘Wahhabism of the sea’ as opposed to Saudi Arabia’s ‘Wahhabism of the land’, a reference to the fact that the Saudi government has less control of an empowered clergy compared to Qatar that has no indigenous clergy with a social base to speak of” (Dorsey, 2013: 2). Moreover, there is no religious force that monitors morality, and religion is taught in schools of the Ministry of Education, instead of scholars. Due to less conservative religious interpretation, there is permission for non-Muslims to consume pork or alcohol, non-Islamic events are hosted, there is more women participation in social and business life, etc. In other words, Qatar has a more liberal, secular, and open society, i.e. different from its neighbors. The majority of the liberalization and modernization of the society are the results of efforts by former Emir Hamad and his wife Sheikha Moza. After coming to power, while Sheikh Hamad reformed political life, Sheikha Moza dealt with social life. Being a woman without a full veil and who dresses according to the latest fashion trends, the then-first lady contributed to the changing image of the country via the Qatari Foundation, which she heads. Besides bringing foreign educational institutions to Qatar, she also Westernized state education and liberalized socio-cultural life (El Etreby, 2014: 38). Such a move perpetrated by the House of Al Thani also broke the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had actually lessened by their own will.

Although Qatar is following moderate Islam, allegations that it uses religion as a soft power instrument has always been on the agenda. Exporting sectarianism and various interpretations of Islam are common in the Middle East. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has been relentlessly promoting Shiism among Muslim communities. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has propagated Wahhabism against Shiism and other Sunni interpretations throughout its history, but particularly from the 1980s onwards.

In an interview with Washington Post, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince, Mohammed Bin Salman, was asked about the Saudi-funded spread of Wahhabism, which is accused of being one of the sources of global terrorism. He responded that their Western allies wanted them to spread Wahhabism to prevent inroads in Muslim countries to the Soviet Union (DeYoung, 2018). Saudis have invested billions of USD for propagating the Wahhabi creed since then. On the contrary, the Qatari state always kept away from sectarian imperialism and did not join Saudi Arabia for its dissemination.

Nevertheless, Qatar is still blamed for supporting political Islam due to its collaboration with the Muslim Brotherhood, primarily during the Arab Spring. Ikhwan members immigrated to Qatar in the 1950s and found jobs in bureaucracy, particularly in education. Since Qatar had a shortage of teachers, more members came from Cairo. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, the most vivid individual among them, moved to Qatar in 1961. He headed a religious institute until he established and became the dean of the College of Sharia at Qatar University (Roberts, 2017: 54). Ikhwan institutionalized itself in 1974 by establishing The Qatari Brotherhood (Freer, 2015: 9). By the end of the 1980s, the group split between younger members, who asked for more political activities, and older members who were more cautious. Moreover, Ikhwan members understood that the Muslim Brotherhood would not fit Qatar, which is rich, has no social problems, and has a conservative Wahhabi society (Ibid: 10). In other words, Ikhwan had not much to offer to Qataris as they already had more. Seeing no interest from the people and no elite patronage, the Qatari branch eventually decided to disband itself in 1999 and completed the process in 2003. As Jassim Sultan, one of the prominent MB members, stated, "Nobody will listen to any radical ideas when their needs are fulfilled" (Leber, 2018).

However, the status of Qatari-Ikhwan relations in other countries is quite different. They have acted like blood brothers in many countries of the region. Qatar's utilization of the Ikhwan branches was especially salient during the Arab Spring, which is still the main source of hostility towards the Sheikdom. When unrest erupted during the Arab Spring, beginning from Tunisia, Al Jazeera staunchly supported opposition groups, including Islamic rebels. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, called for people's participation in the revolts and gave fatwas about the legitimacy of the overthrow of authoritarian regimes (Trager, 2017). Simultaneously, Qatari government officials collaborated mainly with MB-affiliated

groups and benefited from their network. In almost all uprisings, Qatar was the foreign pioneer as a state. It was so active that it financed not only protests and gave media support but also armed rebel groups. With Qatari support, MB governments came to power in Tunisia and Egypt after the revolutions, although they lost power via either democratic elections (Tunisia) or a military coup (Egypt). At the time Ennahda of Tunisia and Morsi of Egypt, as Ikhwan members, were in power, the Qatari government aided billions of dollars to help them stay in power. On the other hand, in other countries where the Emirate acted together with its neighbors at first but later parted, Qatar failed to reach its goals.

There are several reasons why the Qataris supported the Muslim Brotherhood. According to Roberts (2017: 84-92), Ikhwan's influence in education allowed its ideology to spread among the Qatari people and, eventually, Qatari politics. However, since Ikhwan is no longer active in Qatar and the educational system has changed, this argument is debatable. According to Fuller (2014):

(Qatar) appears to believe that Islamism of some sort will continue to be the guiding moral/ideological principle in Middle East governance for a long time to come. For this reason, it prefers a more modern variant of Islamism, namely the Muslim Brotherhood which is largely non-violent...the Brotherhood also generally accepts the principle of the democratic process in ways that so many other Islamists do not (and is therefore generally viewed as blasphemous and dangerous by Riyadh.) Qatar sees the Brotherhood in its various forms across the Muslim world as relatively progressive and representative of the wave of the future far more than the Saudi or other Gulf states.

In line with Fuller's arguments, it can be contended that the MB is a good tool for Qatar's maverick independent foreign policy. Qatar's diplomatic network is small and has a shortage of qualified diplomats. Thus, hiring a region-wide network to reach its goals might be more efficient. In the same vein, Qatar would escape Saudi Arabia's diplomatic orbit through links with Muslim Brotherhood branches located in other countries. Furthermore, due to severed relations with Saudis and pro-Saudi governments, Qatar needs countries and groups with the support of which can resist hostile countries. For example, it is well known that the Qatari regime was on bad terms with Hosni Mubarak. Hence, when MB members revolted against him, Qatar saw it as a chance to punish the Mubarak regime. Thus, according to many scholars

(Calamur, 2017; Khatib, 2014; Ulrichsen, 2014), Qatar's support for Ikhwan is pragmatic. It deliberately allies with those that it believes will be the winner at the end of the conflict. To some extent, such claims are correct as it has good relations with Iran as well. However, it should be noted that Qatar, being a Muslim country ruled by Islamic Law, must be regarded as an instigating factor for supporting Islamic groups. Having a pious population and considering Islamic orders at the state level show that Qatari regime is pro-Islam. It can be concluded that a pro-Islamic country may support political Islam provided that it is not detrimental to it. Moreover, Qatar is mostly active in Muslim countries, indicating that Islamic creed is a factor that shapes Qatar's foreign policy. Another aspect concerning this issue is that the Emirate's support of Islamic groups does not affect its domestic policies because the Qatari regime feels certain that its people will not revolt against it as they live in prosperity. Further to the comfort of Qataris, since Sharia is already implemented in Qatar at the social and state levels, nobody needs to ask an Islamic system. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood was unable to root its ideology in Qatar. Thus, an uprising by Ikhwan or any other group is not likely. As a result, it feels free and safe when getting involved in conflicts happening in the region. However, religion may not be a vital tool in Qatar's foreign policy but its customer is a religious group. Therefore, religion is an indirect tool for Qatar. In addition, the result of collaboration includes a more religious system where revolution is successful. Hence, religion is a soft power instrument for Qatar, though indirectly.

In addition, the Sheikdom's engagement with Islamic groups is not limited to the MB. As stated above, it also supports Hamas and Hezbollah; it allowed the Taliban to open an office in Doha; and made interviews with Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. Moreover, it allowed many Algerian, Libyan, Mauritanian, Palestinian, and Chechen Islamic opposition leaders to live in Doha. Besides, Yusuf (2019) said in the interview that Qatar supports even seculars provided that they clash with the establishment. Perhaps, secular groups, rather than Islamic ones, can be regarded as an absolute pragmatism as well as consistency in foreign policy, whose policymakers claim to support popular movements.

Furthermore, this study argues that *ulama* residing in Qatar and united under the umbrella of The Union of World Islamic Scholars, established by Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, affect Qatari state policies. Former and current Emirs respect *ulama* and take their

advice into account. When General Secretary of the Union, Ali Qaradaghi, was visited for this study, he agreed that they work closely with Qatari rulers. This study asserts that the advice of *ulama* have a positive impact on Qatari foreign policy. On the other hand, despite that they are members of the clergy, *ulama* do not force Qatar to politicize Islam, nor do they give *fatwas* as per rulers' requests. In addition, they supported Qatar's involvement in the democratization process in the other Arab countries. Without *ulama*, the Qatari regime might have been no different from other authoritarian regimes.

4.4 Education

Qatar has experienced a fast transition in the education system. In the 1950s, there were only *kuttab* classes that were teaching Qur'an (Karkouti, 2016: 183). The first secular school teaching science and religious lessons opened in 1956. Qatar University, the first university in the country's history, was founded in 1973 (Ibid). Upon the rise of income from hydrocarbon resources, Qatar invested more in the education system and made it free to its citizens. However, the quality of education was still low (Nasser, 2017: 2). In 2001, the Qatari government hired The Rand Corporation to reform its Kindergarten (K) to the Grade 12 education system. After the consultancy of the American firm, independent schools were launched and a Western curriculum was accepted (Said, 2016: 2254). The new education system seems to be beneficial as Qatar became fourth among 142 countries in terms of the quality of the education system in 2012, according to a report prepared by the World Economic Forum (Edarabia, 2012). In addition, the literacy rate is almost 98%, men and women having almost the same rate. This is the highest rate in the Arab World.

While advancing its education system, Qatar also used education as a soft power tool when Emir Hamad came to power. According to Sanroma (2015: 18), Qatar followed the Chinese model, which is inspired by Confucius' famous words: "If you think in terms of a year, plant a seed; if in terms of ten years, plant trees; if in terms of 100 years, teach the people". To reach their goals in the education system, Sheikh Hamad and his wife, Sheikha Moza, founded the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development, or short Qatar Foundation, in 1995. Still being chaired by Sheikha Moza, Qatar Foundation (QF) defines itself as a leader in education, cultural development, and science on a local and global scale. The aim is, as stated on the

foundation's website, to turn Qatar from a carbon economy to a knowledge economy by educating its citizens (QF, 2019). What is more, Qatar has a society that adheres to the Wahhabi creed, which embraces Arab and Islamic traditions. Another objective of the QF was to modernize this society via a new model of education with a top-down strategy (El Etreby, 2014: 38). In other words, Qatar was re-branding itself and the QF assumed the duty. It was Sheikha Moza, in particular, who pioneered the modernization process through the QF. With a budget of more than \$1 billion and more than 50 entities engaging in education, science, youth, environment, etc., the QF has not only become the dominant institute in Qatar in various areas but also a soft power instrument abroad. It should be noted here that improvements in domestic education do not generate soft power. Yet, some other projects launched by QF are indeed soft power tools.

One of the most important initiatives of the Qatar Foundation is the Education City, which was launched in 1997. It is 14-square-kilometer campus housing universities and research centers. What makes it different is that the universities with campuses in the Education City are prominent American and European universities (six American, one British, and one French). Their names, establishment dates, and programs offered are provided in the table below:

Table 4. 1: Universities at Education City

Universities	Est. Date	Programs Offered
Virginia Commonwealth University	1998	art and design
Weill Cornell Medical College	2002	pre-medical and medical programs
Texas A&M University	2003	chemical, electrical, petroleum, mechanical engineering, and science
Carnegie Mellon University	2004	computer science, business, and information systems programs

Georgetown University	2005	international affairs programs, school of foreign service
Northwestern University	2008	journalism and communications programs
HEC Paris	2011	business programs
University College London	2011	museum studies, conservation, and archaeology programs

Source: Koç and Fadlelmula, 2016:9

In addition to the foreign universities, there is also the indigenous Hamad bin Khalifa University. Moreover, for basic education, there are: Qatar Academy, Academic Bridge Program, Awsaj Academy, Renad Academy, Qatar Leadership Academy, whereas for research, there are Qatar Science & Technology Park, Qatar National Research Fund, Sidra Medical, and Research Center.

Zweihl (2019) said in the interview that 40% of students of universities are foreigners. He added that parents who want their children to be educated in a foreign university based in a Muslim country prefer Qatar (Ibid). During our visit to the Education City, what took our attention was not the number of foreign students but the number and the quality of scholars that teach at the universities. Besides teaching, renowned academics generate brainstorming ideas that push Qatar forward. If there is a type of power called “brainpower”, it can be found in Qatar. Supposing that prominent academicians help the Qatari government to determine correct strategies for the state, education indirectly boosts Qatar's soft power then. However, generally speaking, education is not as good as other soft power tools when compared.

4.5 Cultural Diplomacy

While Qatar Foundation uses the Education City to attract foreign universities and students (as well as Qatari students) with the objective of making Qatar a hub for education, science, and R&D, it also conducts cultural diplomacy activities abroad. A few initiatives of Qatar Foundation are worth mentioning. The first one is Qatar Foundation International (QFI), which was founded in Washington in 2009. The sole

aim of the QFI is to teach and promote Arabic language and culture in the US, Canada, Brazil, and Great Britain via Arabic Schools and Arabic Language and Culture programs (Eggeling, 2017: 15). It also runs Arabic classes for primary and secondary school students in American schools. With its motto “Connected Communities”, “QFI supports 20 schools in 10 American states, reaching over 2400 students (Ibid)”. According to the institution's website, “Arabic language education is key, when you learn the language, you learn about the culture. We are happy to support language education. Anything we can do to add and help American people who want to learn Arabic we are happy to help” (QFI, 2019). In fact, the QFI’s goal and strategy in spreading Arabic resemble that of the British Council, Goethe Institute, or Turkey’s Yunus Emre Institute. Arabic schools and classes teaching the Arabic language and introducing Arabic culture seem to be inspired by the aforementioned institutions. However, whether this assertive initiative will be successful or not is not clear yet. Qatar's smallness is felt quite much in such projects since this kind of cultural diplomacy needs continuous care and human power, which Qatar lacks. Therefore, among so many projects, some of them might be shortlived or not grow to the desired level.

The second initiative, which is also global, is the World Innovation Summit for Education (WISE) that was inaugurated in 2009. According to its website, “WISE is an international, multi-sectoral platform for creative thinking, debate and purposeful action... Through both the biennial Summit and a range of ongoing programs, WISE is promoting innovation and building the future of education through collaboration” (Wise-Qatar, 2019). Wise Summit unites thousands of experts, innovators, and researchers in Doha biannually to discuss innovation in education. There are also high-profile guests attending the summit, e.g. Michelle Obama. In addition, Wise Prize for Education rewards those who make outstanding contributions to education. The award is \$500,000. Like the QFI, Wise is also headed by Sheikha Moza. Indeed, Sheikha Moza’s impact on Qatar’s educational and cultural transformation can be traced in almost every project.

Another asset of Qatar’s cultural diplomacy (or soft power) is the museums established in the Sheikhdome. Namely, Qatar Museums (QM) aim to spread Qatar’s cultural heritage to the world and bring world culture to the Emirate. The other mission is to protect Qatar’s identity. The Qatar Museums Authority (QMA) was established in

2005 and is chaired by Sheikha Al Mayassa Al Thani, a sister of the incumbent Emir. According to the QM's website, its purpose is "to be a cultural instigator for the creation of generation... fulfill the cultural goals of the 2030 Qatar National Vision... helping Qatar originate art, culture and heritage experiences from within... generate a national spirit of participation" (QM, 2019). In Sheikha Al Mayassa's words: "We are changing our culture from within, but at the same time we are reconnecting with our traditions. It is important for us to grow organically" (Ibid). According to Windecker and Sendrowicz (2014: 90), both the Emir and Sheikha Al Mayassa try to make Qatar a figurehead for Arab and Islamic culture and an international hub for modern art. The QMA has built big museums around the country such as Mathaf, Arab Museum of Modern Art, Museum of Islamic Art (MIA), MIA Park, Alriwaq Doha Exhibition Center, Qatar Museum Gallery at Kabara, World Heritage Site Visitor Centre, and – soon– the National Museum of Qatar. The QMA has purchased very valuable works of art worth more than \$1 billion, including sculptures, paintings among other pieces of art (Sanroma, 2015: 21). However, so many museums do not attract foreigners, at least currently. In an interview, Faraj (2019) said that museums are built just to save Qatar's culture. He added that "Qatar has a deep Bedouin and seaside culture but no work has been done till now. With these museums, we protect our culture and let other people see them. We have no concern about the numbers of tourists."

Besides, QM additionally inaugurated the "Years of Culture" initiative in 2012, a program that aims to bring international artists together and host cultural organizations with various countries. Until now, it organized the "Years of Culture" events with Japan (2012), the United Kingdom (2013), Brazil (2014), Turkey (2015), China (2016), Germany (2017), Russia (2018), India (2019), and soon France (2020) and the United States (2021). According to Eggeling (2017: 19), the aforementioned countries are chosen deliberately for various reasons. For example, Brazil and Russia were chosen for having previously hosted the FIFA World Cup. As it will host the tournament in 2022, it overlapped the dates of the events with those of tournament. As for the other countries, they have good economic and political relations with Qatar. Hence, it can be argued that it benefits from cultural soft power to advance its relations with other countries. However, there is also a debate about QM's activities. Certain local newspapers have conducted some surveys and concluded that such liberal projects are a threat to national and cultural identity. In fact, people also demanded

that more Qataris be employed in the museums (Hertog, 2017: 6). Furthermore, it is argued that the artworks exhibited reflect international rather than local tastes. Therefore, there are limited crowds, mostly expatriates, in museums (Ibid: 15).

In line with cultural diplomacy, Qatar also hosts major international conferences and meetings. Besides being an effort for nation-branding, these events help Qatar to show that it is distinct from the other Gulf States, which are traditionally more closed countries. Forums and conferences are organized by the Permanent Committee for Organizing Conferences, and the Qatar MICE Development Institute (meetings, incentives, conference, and exhibitions), an affiliate of Qatar Foundation to promote meetings, conferences, the conference sector, and exhibitions in Qatar (Sanroma, 2015: 25). According to the committee's website, five to seven conferences are organized in Qatar every year. Among the conferences, the Doha Forum, which is held annually, is the most salient one, in which many countries participate at the ministerial or presidential level. Established in 2000, the forum is a platform for global dialogue on critical challenges facing our world. The Doha Forum, as per its website, "promotes the interchange of ideas, discourse, policy-making, and action-oriented recommendations. In a world where borders are porous, our challenges and solutions are also interlinked" (Doha Forum, 2018). There are also ad hoc events held in Qatar, among which the Doha Round (2001), the WTO Conference (2003), OIC Summit (2003), and the UN Climate Change Conference (2012) are the most vivid. Doha also hosts conferences for conflict resolution. It had an active mediation diplomacy during the Arab Spring and, currently, it still invites parties of the conflict to Doha to negotiate and solve their problems. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Qatari government hosts conflicting parties in line with their pre-emptive diplomacy and the goal of turning Doha into the Geneva of the Middle East. However, it should be noted that forums and conferences address to elite groups since ordinary people are not interested in them. Yet, they are top-level activities as they gather decision-makers from other countries.

In the same vein, Qatar is also home of think-tanks that develop policies about the region. While the Doha Institute, The Arab Center for Research and Policy, and The Arabs for Democracy Website are indigenous, there are also international think-tanks with offices in Qatar such as The Brookings (Institute) Doha Center, The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Qatar, a prominent British institution, The Center for

International and Regional Studies (CIRS), a part of Georgetown University in Qatar, and The RAND-Qatar Policy Institute (RQPI), a part of The Rand Corporation. These institutes hold seminars, organize workshops, and prepare reports about Qatar and the region in efforts to tackle national and regional problems. What is more, as discussed in chapter 3, Qatar funds and collaborates with foreign-based think-tanks openly or secretly for reasons like promoting Qatar's foreign policy, countering black propaganda and lobbying. Hosting think tanks is also a good strategy since Qatar is under the attack of think tanks sponsored by the UAE and Saudi Arabia. It can be said that the mentioned think tanks have balanced smear campaigns against the Emirate (see the previous chapter).

A final component of cultural diplomacy that should be discussed is the hosting of sports events, which this study differentiates from sports investments, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Qatar has long been trying to be a sports hub. As a matter of fact, "Through sports, Qatar initially intended to expand its visibility and to strengthen a positive image in the world. This is a clear example of the use of soft power in international relations" (Sendrowicz, 2014: 91). Qatar relies on sports events to beat regional rivals in the race of attracting tourists and culminate in international persuasion and promoting a new state image. Qatar hosted the Gulf Cup in 1976, The Asian Football Cup in 1988, the Asian Games in 2006, and the Men's Handball World Championships in 2015. It also regularly hosts the Qatar Open Golf Masters, the ATP and WTA Tennis Championships, the Doha stage of the MotoGP World Championships, and the IAAF World Championships in Athletics. It hosted 57 international sports tournaments in 2014 alone (Reiche, 2014: 4). The biggest sports event it will host is set to be the FIFA 2022 World Football Cup, first for the Arab World and the Middle East (see next section).

On the other hand, Qatar's sports authorities naturalize foreign sportsmen like athletes and football players. Almost the whole national sports teams of Qatar are foreign-born. Qatar transfers and gives them limited citizenship and an average of \$1.000 (Ibid: 6). Naturalization seems to be a successful strategy. In 2019, the Qatar national football team won the Asian Cup by beating Japan in the final match in the UAE, which hosted the tournament. It was a surprise not only for Qatar but also for the whole region. While Qatari fans could not support their team due to the blockade, Emir Tamim lavished gifts to team players. Thus, Qatar could be on top news with its naturalized players. In

addition, the Qatari Football League has become vivid by transferring famous football players from European and Latin American leagues with monumental salaries, and thus, drawing the attention of football fans and sports media.

Another initiative in sports as a humanitarian venture is Aspire Academy, founded in 2004. Though it is not very visible and little known to people in general, the sports world knows it quite well. Aspire Academy aims to find young talents for football, athleticism, squash, table tennis, and fencing. It was initially thought that the academy was founded to train solely Qatari youth for sports. However, it was soon understood that the initiative was an international training program to discover and support talented children in Africa, Asia, and Latin America as a social responsibility. In the first year alone it reached 430,000 African boys in 595 locations in seven African countries (Eder, et al., 2014). By 2014, this number jumped to 3.5 million boys in 17 countries. The best of them were separated and sent to either Senegal or Doha, where the two main centers of the academy are located, for advanced training. They get free accommodation, scholarships, free education, a monthly spending allowance, among other benefits. (Manfred, 2014). In aims to find the players of the future, Aspire Academy hired prominent directors and headhunters, like Andreas Bleicher and Josep Colomer, who discovered Lionel Messi, perhaps the best soccer player in the world (Eder, et al., 2014). Qatari officials further work with prominent football players and invite many of them to attend the academy's events. For example, the academy chose Xavi Hernandez (former FC Barcelona player), Raul Gonzalez (former Real Madrid player), Lionel Messi (Barcelona player), Pele (Brazilian football legend), and many others as its global ambassadors (Aspire Academy, 2019). In addition to hiring former players, dozens of famous athletes have visited the academy.

Beginning with headhunting in sports, Aspire has also invested in football teams in recent years. Currently, while it owns to the Belgian team K.A.S. Eupen and the Spanish team Cultural Leonesa, it also collaborates with the Spanish team Atletico Astorga FC and the British team Leeds United. However, Aspire Academy is criticized based on allegations that Qatar used it to win the bid for the World Cup. According to Eder et al. (2014), "Of the 24 nations with delegates on the FIFA executive committee, five were countries in which Aspire Football Dreams was operating". Qatar is accused of influencing committee members by making sports investments in their countries. Yet, this claim has remained an allegation only. However, even if it is true, it is a subtle

tactic to get votes of delegates. Furthermore, since Qatar is known for the naturalization of foreign athletes for its teams, there have been accusations that Qatari sports officials use Aspire Academy to find the best players among young foreigners. According to BBC correspondent Djazmi (2019), two-thirds of Qatar's national football team that won the Asian Football Cup in 2019, and the high jump world champion, Mutaz Essa Barshim, were trained at Aspire Academy. In addition, Al-Shafee (2019) reported that Almoez Ali, who won the Asian Cup tournament's scorer title by netting record-breaking nine goals, was a graduate of Aspire Academy.

All in all, Aspire Academy is an undiscovered success story in terms of soft power. While few people know it, those visiting Qatar will certainly come across youth trained in the academy at Hamad International Airport. Thanks to Aspire Academy, Qatar did not only win the bid for FIFA 2020 World Cup as per allegations but also found sportsmen for its teams. Moreover, it can be a good revenue maker if it sells the best sportsmen to foreign countries. Leaving aside economic benefits, accessing millions of youth is an amazing activity for image-making.

4.6 FIFA 2022 World Cup

Before proceeding to the details of the topic, we should state that since this study supposes the FIFA 2022 World Cup a socio-cultural tool of soft power, the topic is discussed in this chapter rather than in the next where sports investments will be elaborated as an economic soft power tool. Furthermore, due to its significance, it was not discussed in the previous section, where hosting sports events were discussed.

Hosting the FIFA World Cup is an extraordinary success and prestige for any country in terms of soft power. It provides greater recognition for the country, attracts tourists, and allows some hosting countries to re-brand themselves, meaning that it is integrated with the modern world and popular culture. Thus, countries race to host the tournament even though it is an expensive event that generally does not pay off the costs. Like other countries, Qatar was very eager to win the bid for the FIFA World Cup in order to give a positive image to the world audience. The small state is located in a region of conflicts with orthodox lifestyles that do not resemble other parts of the world. What is more, the Middle East is isolated from the world because of authoritarian regimes. Very few locations attract foreigners to visit, build a business, or live there. The only exception

until now has been Dubai. With Emir Hamad's reign, like in other areas, Qatar invested in sports and began to host more international tournaments in the Emirate as a policy of modernization and foreign policy strategy (Sendrowicz, 2014: 91). Thanks to hydrocarbon revenues, the oil and gas-rich country played high in the sports business as well. Although it has hosted many international sports events, that Qatar was aspiring to host the FIFA World Cup, the world's biggest sports event conducted every four years, had not been predicted. Yet, Qatar went for it and won the bid.

There are numerous reasons why Qatar initiated this venture. According to Brannagan and Grix (2014), the following two reasons can be listed as Qatar's motives for hosting the tournament. First, the Sheikdom wants to distance itself from the region's socio-political issues. As discussed above, attracting tourists is a problem for the whole region, including Qatar. Many travel agents and tourists think that Qatar is no different from Kabul or Baghdad. Qatar believes that the FIFA World Cup tournament can help foreigners change perceptions. Second, Qatari officials believe that mega sports events, particularly football, due to its popularity, allow showcasing Qatar to billions of people. No other event will attract the attention of more people than football tournaments. Since Qatar is aware of this, it generously spends money to win bids. Winning the bid for the FIFA 2022 World Cup alone will catapult the state 100 years in terms of people showing where Qatar is on the map. According to Sendrowicz (2014: 93), in order to envisage itself as a more liberal, business-savvy, and advanced country than its neighbors, Qatar uses football to fulfill its political goals as this sports branch belongs to popular culture and addresses the masses rather than elites.

Another rationale argued by Amara (2013: 2) is that "Qatar wants to have a share of the international sports market, to play an active role in the bidding and staging of international sports events, and to dominate sports performance, at least in the Arabian Peninsula, and to improve its ranking in the Arab World and internationally". Moreover, sports is also a post-oil investment that will create jobs and revenue. Therefore, it creates socio-economic benefits for Qatar and led to cohesion among Qatari people together with health and their well-being (Chaddick and Widdop, 2017). Reiche (2014: 7) clarifies domestic motives better and compiles that Qatar's motives for success in sports are: (1) developing the health of the nation, (2) improving relations with other countries, and (3) to become a global hub for sports events. He also argues that sports might help recruit foreign white-collar workers who may be

attracted by international sporting and other cultural events. While Qatar is full of blue-collar workers coming from Asia, fewer European professionals work in Qatar. Thus, sports might have a positive effect on brain drain. This last goal might be fulfilled but it will hardly develop the health of the nation, which is not related to tournaments. Finally, thanks to the FIFA 2022 World Cup, Qatar is renewing its infrastructure by building new subways, roads, hotels, stadiums, and other facilities. It is estimated that the Doha government will invest 100 billion USD for the tournament (Al-Naimi, et al., 2018: 2). Some analysts claim that total expenses may exceed 150 billion USD, even reaching 200 billion USD (Lens, 2017: 5). It is a certainty that this amount will not be paid off in terms of capital but it will certainly increase the awareness about Qatar. In addition, the amount is quite high but since the country is rich, it will not hurt its budget and it can not be assumed as a dead investment.

Regarding how it won the bid, on December 2, 2010, 22 members of the FIFA Executive Committee convened and voted for the bidder for the 2022 World Cup. Qatar won the bid by getting 14 votes against the United States that got eight votes. It was a great success since it won against the US. That fact that this will be the first World Cup to be held in an Arab and Muslim country is the second success. In addition, for the first time, the tournament will be held in November and December instead of May, June, or July. Thus, persuading delegates to change the season for the tournament is the third success. Qatar is expected to build 12 new stadiums although there are rumors that the number will drop to nine due to high costs. On the other hand, the Emirate is planning to dismantle the majority of stadiums after the tournament and donate them to poor countries (Reiche, 2014: 9). If it does, it will be admired by the world audience. As the tournament date approaches, new developments related to the organization have happened recently. In February 2019, FIFA announced that it set up a joint venture with Qatar to streamline the organization. In the new venture, FIFA will hold a 51 percent share while Qatar's share will be 49 percent (Reuters, 2019a). In fact, FIFA President, Gianni Infantino, had already hinted at the establishment of this initiative. He had claimed that the decision was driven not because Qatari authorities had a lack of trust but rather to increase efficiency. Furthermore, FIFA, headed by Infantino, who is eager to expand the World Cup to 48 teams, considered the inclusion of Oman and Kuwait alongside Qatar as host countries. However, this move was rejected by the FIFA board in June 2019.

Whether Qatar can manage the organization of such a major football event successfully will be clear only after the tournament. Yet, the Sheikhdome has incurred many accusations, among which corruption is the most important one. According to allegations, while it was almost clear that the United States would win the bid for the 2022 cup, delegates suddenly changed their mind and chose Qatar. Former FIFA president, Sepp Blatter, said in an interview that Qatari officials paid more than \$5 million to FIFA officials to secure the bid (Adams, 2017: 198). After so many accusations, FIFA conducted an international investigation and found no wrongdoings on behalf of Qatar. Moreover, Swiss prosecutors launched an additional investigation but Qatar was cleared again. Yet, news about corruption continued to appear in media. For example, The Sunday Times (2019) claimed that Qatar offered \$880 million to FIFA to gain the right to host the tournament. According to the report, \$400 million was paid before FIFA's announcement confirming that Qatar was the winner. The remaining amount, \$480 million, was paid three years after the announcement. This allegation is absurd because delegates of countries, not FIFA, choose the winner. Furthermore, FIFA would hardly accept bribe, and even if it does, the amount is too large to hide.

In addition, both The New York Times and The Guardian revealed that allegations concerning Qatar bribing FIFA officials were simply smear campaigns financed by the UAE and Saudi Arabia. According to The New York Times correspondents Montague and Panja (2019), Cornerstone Global Associates, a London-based consulting firm, prepared reports that blame Qatar of corruption and had them published in British media, including BBC. The New York Times revealed that all concerning news were referring to the same report entitled "Qatar in Focus: Is the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Danger?", which was prepared by Cornerstone Global Associates. It is evident that news calumniating the 2022 World Cup tournament heightened after Qatar was blockaded by its neighbors and Egypt. New York Times correspondents conclude that "The goal appears to be to scuttle the tournament or, failing that, to humble Qatar by forcing it to share the event with its political enemies" (Ibid). On the other hand, while The New York Times blamed Ghanem Nuseibeh, the president of Cornerstone Global Associates, with links to the UAE, for launching smear campaigns against the tournament, it also published Nuseibeh's articles written with the same objective. For instance, in an article published in The New York Times on March 7, 2019, Nuseibeh

(2019) called on FIFA not to let Qatar host the FIFA World Cup, claiming that the Sheikdom supports extremist/terrorist groups and is an anti-Semitic country. Besides The New York Times, The Guardian also revealed similar anti-World Cup campaigns. According to Guardian correspondent Jim Waterson (2019), Sir Lynton Crosby, owner of the lobbying firm CTF Partners, “offered to work on a campaign to cancel the 2022 Qatar World Cup and get it awarded to another country in return for £5.5m”. Crosby demanded this amount; to delegitimize the Qatari government; to put pressure on FIFA so that it would renew the bidding process to give the right to host to another country; to have negative news about Qatar published in mainstream media, and lobby friendly journalists and politicians, etc. (Ibid).

Since Qatar won the bid, the small state has been under scrutiny in terms of human rights, support of extremist groups, religious life, climate, etc. Thus, a few problems related to the World Cup have caused headaches for the Qatari government. One of them is organizing the tournament in a hot weather. In fact, the timing was changed from June-July to November-December, but still, many football analysts call granting the bid to Qatar a “FIFA’s folly”, a “farce” and a “disaster” (Bayoumy, 2016: 2). This is because the European leagues will be in the middle of their timeslot and also fans will be most likely on their annual leave in the middle of winter. In addition, Qatar is criticized for allegedly supporting extremists and terrorist groups like Hamas. Thus, some writers oppose Qatar being the host country for the tournament. Yet, the Qatari government denies allegations and acclaims that such is Western propaganda against itself and the Middle East (Adams, 2017: 193). There are also suspicions about Qatar's (in)tolerance towards other cultures. Since Sharia law is effective in the Emirate, drinking alcohol in public is forbidden and LGBT/homosexuality rights are refused. Hence, how it will attract foreign football fans is a matter of question. However, an Anonymous Qatari Official (2019) said in the interview that they will allow football fans to drink alcohol as per the agreement signed with FIFA.

Yet, the most attentive accusation is the working conditions of migrant workers. Besides media, NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have been criticizing Qatar for poor working conditions. An article written by Pete Pattison in The Guardian in 2013 is still used as a reference to Qatar's labor conditions. According to Pattison (2013), almost every day one Nepalese worker died in the summer of 2013. The main problems for workers include forced labor in World Cup infrastructure

projects, the non-payment of salaries for months, the confiscation of passports by employers, bad treatment, extended working hours, filthy accommodation, etc. On the other hand, Amnesty International (2016) underlines how the Kafala System, common in the other Gulf States as well, abuses workers' rights. The Kafala System requires employers to sponsor their employees. In return for sponsorship, the employer makes contracts with workers, which dictates them not to leave their job until the contract date expires. If the contract does not state any end dates, the employee cannot leave the country within five years. Employers generally confiscate employees' passports throughout the contract, which is much criticized by international NGOs. When we met some migrant workers in Qatar for this study, we were able to get some information about their working conditions. Kamunya (2019), a Kenyan worker, said he earned 2,000 Riyals (550 USD) per month plus free accommodation, food, and transportation. Fuwad (2019), a Sri Lankan taxi driver, said he had worked for a car distributor for ten years and was happy with the salary and free accommodation and food. However, he had become a taxi driver so as to earn more money but was disappointed. He was planning to wait for the end of the one-year contract and find a job with a regular salary. Yet, thanks to the pressure from the international public opinion and the FIFA 2022 World Cup tournament, Qatar abolished the Kafala System, though some related problems continue to persist.

In association with the above FIFA 2022 World Cup issues, Brannagan and Guilianotti (2018: 1140) caution about unintended and weakening consequences, which they call “soft disempowerment”. The concept refers to “actions, inactions and/or policies of states that ultimately upset, offend or alienate others, leading to a loss of credibility and attractiveness” (Ibid: 1152). A broader explanation is that:

Soft disempowerment occurs when diverse state and non-state actors—intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), the media, the corporate sector and civil society groups (trade unions, non-governmental/non-profit organizations, online activists and so on)—disseminate information which challenges or discredits the state’s soft power strategies and messages (Ibid).

Based on Brannagan and Guilianotti’s definition, if Qatar cannot steer accusations and finalize the tournament with minor problems, the outcome may be the reverse of what it aspired to achieve. Thus, soft power may turn into soft disempowerment, which has a disappointing taste. However, Dorsey (2019) says the FIFA 2022 World Cup has

already contributed to Qatar's re-branding even though there are still two years remaining until the tournament.

Overall, the FIFA 2022 World Cup will indeed boost Qatar's image and awareness. Qatar has long been trying to re-brand itself via such events. With this tournament, people will find where Qatar is on the map, a dream constantly mentioned by Qatari officials. In addition, it will provide Qatar the opportunity to separate itself from authoritarian regimes and give the image that it has an open-society integrated into world culture. Tactically, hosting an event that is typically watched by 3 billion people will be a showcase for Qatar and make it the top trending country in the world during the tournament. It can be argued that the FIFA 2022 World Cup alone will contribute to Qatari's image more than all of what Qatar has done so far. Further to the mentioned benefits, the FIFA 2022 World Cup may boost Qatar's tourism. Qatar is not a tourist destination (see the next section). The number of foreign visitors never exceeded 3 million. Whereas the Dubai Emirate of the UAE alone receives 15 million tourists. Tourism numbers will likely rise in 2022 when the biggest football event will be held.

4.7 Tourism Performance

Qatar is investing billions of USD to attract foreigners either to visit or invest in the country. From museums to the hosting of global-scale sports events, all investments are made with the motive of making Qatar an attractive destination to non-Qataris. The Sheikdom is striving for its reliance on hydrocarbon revenues by diversifying its economy. One of the sectors that the Qatari regime wants to base its economy on is tourism. While the contribution of tourism to the country's GDP is 5.2% as of 2019, the Qatar Tourism Authority (QTA) projects it to rise to 9.7% by 2030 (Visit Qatar, 2018). The QTA even inaugurated the Qatar National Tourism Sector Strategy (QNTSS) 2030 to reach its goals. The QNTSS focuses on key areas such as cultural and sports tourism, urban and family entertainment, and business (Ibid). Currently, the number of tourist arrivals is not promising. As can be seen in the table below, while the number of tourist peaked in 2015, it has been declining since. The number of tourists visiting the country in 2017 and 2018 is directly related to the Qatari blockade since almost half of the total number of tourists come from GCC countries (National Tourism Council of Qatar, 2018). Furthermore, the number of Western tourists, the

main target group Qatar wants to attract, comprises less than a third of the total number (Ibid).

Table 4. 2: Numbers of Tourists Visiting Qatar

Year	Tourists (mln)
2009	1.48
2010	1.7
2011	2.06
2012	2.32
2013	2.61
2014	2.84
2015	2.94
2016	2.93
2017	2.26
2018	1.8

Source: Trading Economics, 2019

As Table 4.2 shows, the number of tourists visiting Qatar is dramatically low. Whereas according to the UAE Government (2018), the UAE, Qatar's neighbor, and rival country, has very high number of foreign visitors. For example, the Dubai Emirate of the UAE attracted 14.20 million visitors in 2016, 14.90 million visitors in 2017, and 15.92 visitors in 2018. Dubai is also the 6th most visited city in the world. On the other hand, the Emirate of Abu Dhabi received 4.44 million visitors in 2016. In total, more than 22 million foreigners visited the UAE in 2016, almost eightfold that of Qatar. However, the share of tourism revenues in GDP is 5.2%, the same as Qatar. While including Saudi Arabia in the comparison may be misleading due to its religious (hajj and umrah) tourism, Bahrain might be compared to Qatar as well. According to Gulf News (2017), 5 million tourists visited Bahrain in 2016, 70% more than that of Qatar. The contribution of tourism to Bahraini GDP is 4.2%. However, one-day visits, mainly from Saudi Arabia, constitute 68% of total visits. This is because Bahrain has a more liberal lifestyle than Saudi Arabia, thus, attracting a great number of Saudis. In general,

all Gulf countries fail to reach average tourism contribution to GDP, which is globally 10.4% (WTTC, 2018). Meanwhile, the comparison was made based on 2016 statistics as there was no blockade on Qatar in that year yet.

Two factors seem to be obstacles to boost tourism. One is that Qatari Sharia law dominates peoples' lifestyle which does not comply with that of tourists. For example, all beverages containing alcohol are allowed in licensed areas only. In addition, there are strict rules on intersex relations. Thus, tourists may not feel comfortable in Qatar. The second reason is related to business and tourism relations. The UAE, especially Dubai, began nation-branding by attracting investors first. It abandoned income taxes to achieve this goal. Whereas, if an investor wants to do business in Qatar, he or she should initially establish a company, whose 51% stake is owned by a Qatari national. Furthermore, profit is subjected to a 10% income tax (Visit Qatar, 2018). On the other hand, when Dubai became a business hub, it started to build distinctive shopping and entertainment centers for tourists. Hence, it became a trade region first, and then a tourist center. Moreover, Dubai allows tourists to maintain the lifestyle they have in their home countries. In sum, tourism is yet to be a source of soft power for Qatar. Perhaps, FIFA 2022 World Cup tournament will enhance it, but to what extent is hardly predictable.

CHAPTER 5

ECONOMIC TOOLS OF SOFT POWER

Qatar's economy is based on hydrocarbon revenues mainly generated from natural gas. The Sheikhdome is aware that gas revenues will not last forever. Thus, it is in a course of diversifying its revenues by investing in sectors like banking, tourism, technology, real estate, industry, culture, and so on. To achieve this goal, the Qatari regime has made investments in the United States and Europe. In recent years, it also decided to diversify regions and countries in which it invests. Hence, it included Asian countries in its investment portfolio. Qatari Foreign Minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani, commented on the country's diversification policy: "Qatar is committed to the diversification of its economy and expanding its economic partnerships around the world—whether through investments or trade based on common goals of economic development and prosperity for all (Kinninmont, 2017: 38)". Sanroma (2015: 18) contends that Emir Hamad followed the UAE, particularly Dubai, to diversify the economy that was dependent on gas and oil, which count for more than 50% of the country's GDP. Like the UAE, it uses state-owned enterprises to fulfill this goal in the country and abroad (Sons and Wiese, 2015: 15). The biggest enterprise established for diversification is the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), which will be elaborated below. The QIA owns big companies with enormous budgets which purchase shares of foreign companies. In addition, the Qatar Sovereign Wealth Fund is also ruled by the QIA. It can be argued that most of Qatar's foreign direct investment (FDI) is made directly or indirectly by the QIA. Thanks to the diversification policy initiated by the QIA, Qatar relies less on hydrocarbon incomes and its share in GDP decreases every year.

The diversification of the economy also serves Qatari foreign policy since it uses it as an instrument of soft power. Qatari companies invest overseas not only for profit but also to increase interdependency for its security. As discussed in chapter 2, in a complexly interdependent international system, liberals say, the spread of economic activity across borders reduces the possibility of clashes as it is in the interest of warring countries because foreign direct investment boosts the home country's economy by creating new jobs, tax revenues, transfer of technology, etc. The host

country knows that problems with the investor country may culminate in the termination and withdrawal of investments. Hence, investor countries use their FDIs as leverage against the countries in which they make investments. In addition, such investments enable countries to obtain the support of other countries and make new friends or allies, as realists claim. In this sense, the client country becomes a political proponent of the investor. In particular, if a small state is investing in a great power or purchasing goods from it, it is highly likely that the former will be defended by the latter in regional and international politics. US behavior during the blockade of Qatar by its neighbors and some other countries may be a good example of this. When the American President, Donald Trump, visited Saudi Arabia a few days before the blockade, he blamed Qatar for supporting terrorism and this was done for the sake of the arms deal between US and Saudi Arabia worth more than \$100 billion. Assuming it as a green light from Trump, the blockading countries began to bloc Qatar. Yet, when Qatar gave orders to American defense companies, Trump turned to be a mediator rather than being a supporter of the blockade. On the other hand, European countries did not support the blockade thanks to Qatari investments. Thus, Qatar's financial power became effective like hard power. Overall, theoretically, Qatar's strategy of investment fits mainly to liberal theory and partly to realism.

5.1. Economic Resources for Security and Foreign Policies

Qatar had been a poor state until it explored vast natural gas reserves and began to extract it in the 1990s. Before the exploration of natural gas (currently accounting for 13% of world reserves) it had quite a small reserve of oil, which was not enough to balance even the state budget. As stated in previous chapters, Qataris starved to death in the 1950s due to poverty. The population relied on foreign aid supplied by neighboring countries to survive. With the discovery of oil in 1939 and the increase in its production in the 1970s, Qatar managed to get itself off the list of the world's poorest countries. It was the production of natural gas and its conversion to LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) that boosted the Qatari economy. Thanks to hydrocarbon revenues, Qatar has become one of the richest countries in the world. This study argues that the Qatari regime headed by former Emir Hamad tried to wield the state wealth at the highest level. Thus, the Sheikdom has benefited from financial resources as a soft

power and has used it to secure state sovereignty, pursue an active foreign policy, and make a profit through economic investments. Yet, these goals were not achieved separately since they were intertwining.

Before proceeding to investments as an economic tool of soft power, it is necessary to explain how Qatar used financial strength as a means of hard power that has enabled its survival and a tool in foreign policy to gain friends, respect, and legitimacy in world politics. Regarding the military deterrence against its enemies, Qatar voluntarily called on the American government to deploy CENTCOM forces at Al Udeid base. To convince Americans that Qatar is the best place for their Middle Eastern forces, the Qatari government spent \$1 billion to build the base and never charged the US government for the costs. The total cost of the base was \$8 billion as of 2019 (Qatar Embassy USA, 2019). Al Udeid base did indeed attract the American army, and thus they moved the Central Command to Qatar in 2003. Thanks to the investment in the military base, Qatar became safer than ever. Yet, when Qatar's neighbors cut diplomatic relations with the Sheikdom, it invited Turkish forces to deploy their troops in another 3,000-soldier capacity base in 2015. In return, Qatar increased its investment in Turkey. For example, while bilateral trade was \$38 million in 2000, it exceeded \$1.5 billion in 2018 (Mohammad, 2017). Moreover, the US and Turkey are two major arms suppliers of Qatar. While the Qatari military buys miscellaneous weapons from the USA, including advanced jets, it buys armed drones, armored vehicles, and electronic warfare from Turkey. For example, Qatar Air forces signed a \$6,2-billion contract with Boeing to buy 36 F-15 fighter jets right after the onset of Qatar's blockade by its neighbors and Egypt (Browne, 2017). In addition, Qatar has a 49% share in BMC, one of Turkey's biggest armored vehicle manufacturing companies. Moreover, Qatar ordered 36 Rafale jets from France, and 24 Eurofighter Typhoon jets and six Hawks from the United Kingdom, another strategy to keep European states close (Defense News, 2017). It is not surprising that Qatar placed the biggest military orders after the blockade. Yusuf (2019) said in the interview that the blockade made Qatar understand that it was vulnerable to external attacks, and thus, it bought new weapons. Another motive behind its weapons purchase is to have the supplier countries stand by its side. It seems to be the right move as President Trump softened its discourse against Qatar and offered mediation between Gulf countries (Browne, 2017). The other reason, as Ali Bakeer (2018) said in a WhatsApp interview,

is that it had almost nothing in terms of weapons. For instance, it used to have less than 30 combat jets until 2018 (Combat Aircraft, 2016). With new orders, the number of combat aircraft will reach more than 130. In addition, even though weapons will not be enough to protect the small state from invasion, they may help resist enemy armies until its friends come and rescue the country, or great powers mediate for a likely ceasefire.

On the other hand, Qatar's utilization of financial resources in its foreign policy has various and distinctive goals. Since the Emirate has followed carrot diplomacy, it has generously spent hundreds of billions of dollars in aid or investment. A detailed review of Qatar's mediation diplomacy will reveal that this policy has been maintained through generous financial help provided to conflicting parties. Nonetheless, the aim has not only been to solve problems between parties but also to secure economic benefits. For example, in Yemen, Qatar invested about \$800 million through the Yemeni-Qatari Real Estate Investment and Development Company (D'Acunto, 2016: 37). Gulbrandsen (2010: 40-41) details Qatar's investment during the mediation process and lists that Qatari Diar and Shibam Holding jointly developed a \$600-million construction project in Sana'a. The project was launched and announced when Emir Hamad was in Yemen for mediation in 2007, a sign that underscores the link between diplomacy and business. The Doha government also funded the construction of Al-Saleh Medical City, valued at \$280 million. Furthermore, Doha Insurance and the Yemeni government founded a joint insurance company, 40% of whose capital was provided by the Qatari insurance company. Moreover, several Qatari banks partly owned by the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), such as Qatar Islamic Bank (operating through Thadamon Islamic Bank), Doha Bank (operating through The Cooperative and Agricultural Bank) and Qatar National Bank, were active during and after the mediation process in Yemen. Furthermore, Qatar offered Yemen economic aid worth between \$300 and \$500 million for reconstruction (Sanroma, 2015: 31). As can be seen, mediation diplomacy opened all business sectors of Yemen to Qatari state and private companies. They could have generated enormous profits but the ongoing civil war did not permit them.

In Sudan, Qatar brokered between the Sudanese government and some rebel factions over Darfur and enabled them to sign some agreements called Doha Agreements. To cement the post-agreement peace process, besides aid, Doha also promised to invest

in Darfur and Sudan. Hence, Qatar signed an agreement with Sudan to make a joint \$4-billion investment in Suakin city located along the Red Sea coast (CRS, 2019: 13). In addition, as Gulbrandsen (2010: 64) elaborates, Qatari Diar built a \$400-million hotel and residential project in Khartoum. Also, Qatar National Bank Al-Islami, owned by Qatar National Bank (QNB), opened branches in Sudan at the time Qatar was mediating in Darfur. Moreover, Qatar Islamic Bank entered the Sudanese banking market simultaneously. Furthermore, Qatar bought farmland from Sudan for its food security (Pulliam, 2013: 5). It also pledged \$500 million to rebuild the destroyed places in Darfur (Abdullah, 2015). According to Mesfin (2016: 8), from 2011 onwards, Qatar has invested in banking, mining, agriculture, real estate, and many other sectors. While investments exceeded \$1,5 billion by the end of 2012, they did not stop. Qatar deposited \$1 billion in the Sudanese central bank in 2014 and provided natural gas to Sudan. At those times, Qatar was also mediating between Sudan and Eritrea. “The reason why Qatar took the initiative in bringing both [Eritrea and Sudan] to a settlement was because Qatar has a wide range of oil exploration interest in Sudan” (Ibid). Hence, Qatar was in Sudan not only to resolve the conflict but also to enter the Sudanese market and get diplomatic support from the Sudanese regime. This strategy worked well since Qatari companies operate there and make profits.

Qatar used its investment tool in Lebanon as well. Before the political crisis erupted in Lebanon in 2007, Qatar was the fourth-largest foreign investor in the country (Gulbrandsen, 2010: 51). When Lebanon was on the brink of a civil war in 2008, Qatar pledged to invest \$300 million in the country to assure the success of negotiations (Felsch, 2016: 31). In addition, Qatar Islamic Bank was active in Lebanon. As for trade between the two countries, bilateral trade volume reached \$1 billion (D’Acunto, 2016: 38). Finally, in January 2019, Qatar purchased Lebanese government bonds worth \$500 million (The Peninsula Qatar, 2019). Meanwhile, in Africa, Qatar’s relief activities in Somalia and Mali caused fury in the region. In Somalia, Qatar Charity, a non-profit organization, was maintaining relief programs during the famine, parallel to Qatar’s mediation efforts. On the other hand, in the Northern Mali region, Qatar Red Crescent was the only humanitarian organization that helped locals (Abdullah, 2015). As for Somalia, the Kenyan government blamed Qatar for supporting Somali armed groups that conducted numerous attacks on its territories (O’Bright, 2016: 24). Algeria was another country that blamed Qatar, accusing it of using humanitarian

missions to transfer weapons to the guerilla groups located in Northern Mali (Sanroma, 2015: 35). There were further allegations during the implementation of the mediation diplomacy that Qatar helped either Muslim countries or those states in which it had economic interests only. Assuming that allegations are true, this means that Qatar utilizes humanitarian foundations for its ends. Besides, it sides with Muslim countries and armed groups. All these activities could be seen as normal if a middle power had got involved in such secret operations. Yet, it was Qatar, known as a small state, that became an influential actor in Africa via its diplomatic and humanitarian missions.

As much as during mediation efforts, Qatar made investments during and in the aftermath of the Arab Spring as well, allegedly converting political crises into economic opportunities. Regarding Tunisia, the Emirate pledged to invest in banking, telecommunication, tourism, etc. to create 20,000 jobs after the revolution (Mohammad, 2017). Ennahda Party and its President, Rachid Ghannouchi, whose son-in-law, Rafik Absesselam, was formerly an Al Jazeera staff and later became Foreign Minister of Tunisia after the revolution, helped Qatar to infiltrate into the Tunisian market. In 2012, Qataris disclosed plans of constructing a refinery in Gabes Gulf of Tunisia to produce 120,000 barrels of oil per day through a project valued at \$2 billion. Qatar also helped the Tunisian central bank to balance payments in 2012 (Ulrichsen, 2014: 14). According to Sanroma (2015: 40), the amount was \$500 million and it was to be paid back within five years with an interest rate of between 2.5% and 3%. Qatar also "bought 75% (some reports say 90%) of the Tunisian telephone operator for \$1.2 billion during the transition. In addition, Qatari mobile GSM company Ooredoo is operating there. Qatar also acquired 49.96% of Tunisian Qatari Bank, thus obtaining 99.96% of the company, and financed development and infrastructure projects" (Ibid). Qatar also invested €29 million in housing and promised to employ 20,000 Tunisians in Qatar (Antwi-Boateng, 2013: 46).

In terms of Egypt, Qatar was the biggest supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood movement and President Mohamed Morsi. Hence, it poured billions of USD to Egypt during the revolution. According to Blasi (2015), Qatar gave the Morsi government \$8 billion in loans and aid. Mohammad (2017) contends that Qatar immediately released \$2 billion as soon as Morsi became the president, while it also pledged to invest \$10 billion in infrastructure projects. When then Qatari Prime Minister, Hamad bin Jassim, visited Cairo in 2012, said that his country would invest \$18 billion in Egypt within

five years (Ulrichsen, 2014: 15). Sanroma (2015: 40) says Qatar gave Egypt \$500 million as soon as Mubarak left power. In addition, it promised to transfer \$2 billion to the Egyptian central bank and offered \$3 billion in loans with low-rate interest rates and supplied natural gas to Egypt. However, when El-Sisi toppled Morsi in a military coup, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait pledged to give \$12 billion in loans. Consequently, the Egyptian central bank returned the \$2 billion given by Qatar during the Morsi government. If Morsi had not been overthrown, Qatar's investment in Egypt would have been very fruitful. Besides economic gains, keeping the MB in power would have ensured Qatar's security and increase its influence in the region. Perhaps, that is why it poured more money to Egypt than other Arab states. Nonetheless, its plans for Egypt did not come true since other countries did not allow Morsi to remain in power.

Another country that Qatar intervened and used its financial muscles was Libya. The Doha government both funded armed groups and sent its jets to fight against the Gaddafi regime. Blasi (2015) says that while Gaddafi was still in power, Qatar had a \$10 billion investment in Libya, particularly in construction projects. As soon as the civil war erupted, the Qatari regime began to support rebel groups against Gaddafi's forces. Besides military assistance, Qatar supplied \$400 million as financial aid, essential goods, heating gas, etc. (Ulrichsen, 2014: 11). It also helped rebel groups to market the oil they extracted from wells in Eastern Libya in exchange for medicine, food, gasoline, diesel, etc. According to another claim by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, head of the Libyan National Transitional Council, Qatar spent more than \$2 billion during the Libyan revolution (Sanroma, 2015: 51). However, Qatar's active involvement in the Libyan civil war led Gaddafi to threaten to kill Emir Hamad and his family. On the other hand, when the revolution succeeded, Qatar was blamed by many Libyans for implementing its agenda (Ibid). Among them was General Khalifa Haftar, who now controls most of Libya with the help of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. He once said that "If aid comes through the front door, we like Qatar, but if it comes through the window to certain people [and] bypassing official channels, we don't want Qatar" (Cafiero, 2012).

Syria was another country that Qatar intervened by supporting rebel groups with financial assistance and supply of weapons. In fact, Syria had been the biggest recipient of Qatari investment before the civil war broke out. Qatari Diar company's

Syrian subsidiary, Qatari Diar Syria, had a total investment of \$12 billion (D'Acunto, 2016: 37). The two countries also established Qatari-Syrian Holding Company with a capital of \$5 billion to make joint investments in real estate, tourism and industrial projects (Gulbrandsen, 2010: 51). In the meantime, several Qatari banks and insurance companies were operating in Syria. During the Syrian civil war, it is estimated that Qatar spent 3\$ billion for the Syrian opposition between 2011 and 2013 (Financial Times, 2013). Most of the aid was allegedly given to the Islamic Front, which is affiliated with Al Nusra front, considered the Syrian wing of Al-Qaeda (Weinberg, 2017: 11).

In total, Qatar provided opposition groups billions of USD during the Arab Spring (5 \$billion to Egyptian opposition, \$400 million to Tunisian opposition and \$3 billion to Syrian opposition) (Akpinar, 2015: 8). Qatar's politically-motivated aid to these countries, except for Egypt, continued in the following years as well. According to the UN-OCHA report that tracks humanitarian aid, in 2016, 41% of Qatar's aid went to Syria, while 21% went to Libya (Kinninmont, 2017: 2). However, Qatar's way of buying influence via financial aid backlashed in some countries, partly or as a whole. While aid recipients were happy with the aid, other groups saw Qatar's policies as an intervention in their countries. Therefore, instead of attracting and persuading, it risked losing the favor of locals. As Antwi-Boateng (2013: 48) exemplifies:

After initially hailing Qatar for its role in toppling Arab Dictators, protestors in Libya burnt the Qatari flag for funding the Muslim Brotherhood there. After giving Egypt \$3 billion, some Egyptians burned the Qatari flag and accused their government of selling the country to Qatar. Meanwhile, rumors continue to swirl among Egyptians that Qatar might purchase the Suez Canal despite numerous denials from both governments. Furthermore, anti-Qatar demonstrations flared up after Qatar promised a \$1 billion loan prompting an embarrassed Tunisian government to rebuke its citizens for insulting a country that is helping them.

Since investments and aids are used as tools in Qatari foreign policy, Qatar's diplomatic efforts have been described as "Naked commercial opportunism" (El Etreby, 2014: 51). On the other hand, Gulbrandsen (2010: 40) calls it "Business diplomacy". On the other hand, this study calls it "buying power". For sure, Qatar did not spend such big amounts of money just to help Arab populations to overthrow

authoritarian regimes. As a country, it also has interests in democratic transition. By fiscally supporting opposition groups, it aimed to control “to-be formed” governments with its capital so that it can enrich its economy and make them good allies to the Sheikdom. In this way, neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE would challenge this small country. It would also be impossible to call it a small country, had all revolutions been accomplished. Particularly, a permanent administration headed by the MB in Egypt would boost the influence of Qatar.

5.2. Qatar’s Foreign Investment

This section analyzes Qatar’s foreign investment in other countries and their implementation as soft power. Sports investments will be examined in a separate section due to its importance.

Qatar's venture of foreign investment goes back to the early years of Emir Hamad's reign. When Emir Hamad came to power, he liberalized and diversified the economy. One leg of diversification was to purchase shares in foreign companies. As a result of this policy, the Qatari government now has shares in many prominent international companies. According to Beaumont (2012), what Qatar does is "the emergence on to the world stage as a considerable diplomatic, cultural and even military player of a tiny state whose huge ambitions to spread influence around the globe are fueled by enormous wealth and devotion to a strict interpretation of the Qur'an". As he clearly defines, it is not only about economics, but also about foreign policy. The aim is to increase the influence and win new friends. For McSparren et al. (2017: 1-6), Qatar wants to promote its nation brand and establish interdependencies with other countries to ensure its security because it is a small state in the Middle East region, where it is quite difficult to protect its security and interests. Therefore, it benefits from money as soft power to balance regional and international actors for survival.

The main enterprise that steers Qatar’s domestic and foreign investment is the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA). Controlling also the sovereign wealth fund (SWF) of the country, it is the source of almost all procurements. Established in 2005 by the State of Qatar and headed by Sheikh Abdullah bin Mohammed bin Saud Al Thani, the QIA manages assets totaling \$1 trillion, \$335 billion of which is the SWF (Sergie, 2017). Its goal is to manage oil and gas surpluses by investment so that incomes will be

diversified. The QIA defines its mission as: “To invest, manage and grow Qatar's reserves to create long-term value for the State and future generations... To support the development of a competitive Qatari economy, facilitating economic diversification and developing local talent (QIA, 2019)”. It also denies any political motives behind its investment policies. According to the QIA's 2016 annual report, the enterprise has four asset class ranges: (1) Listed Equities/Private Equity, (2) Credit/Fixed Income, (3) Real Estate, and (4) Multi-Strategy Investments (QIA 2016 Annual Report, 2017). Since the QIA does not disclose all of its investments and the companies it owns, it is very difficult to compile what it possesses. According to McSparren et al. (2017: 5), the QIA owns five subsidiaries: "Qatar Holding LLC, the prime vehicle for strategic and direct investments by the state; Delta Two LTD, the secondary investment vehicle of QIA; Qatari Diar, real estate and development company; Hassad Food, an agricultural investment company; and Qatar Sports Investments". On the other hand, the QIA 2016 Annual Report (2017) lists the following companies: Qatar National Bank (QNB), Ooredoo (Qatar Telecom), Qatar Airways, Qatari Diar, Qatar Stock Exchange, Katara Hospitality, Mowasalat, Al Rayyan Hospitality, and Hassad Food. If the QIA is assumed as the body of a tree, these companies are branches that own many companies all over the world. Those that have investments abroad need to be examined to understand how the Qatari state has become a global trader.

Beginning with Qatar National Bank (QNB), half of it is owned by the QIA. The QNB owns 99.81% of Turkey's Finansbank, 20% of Ecobank Transnational Incorporated (Ecobank) in Africa, 97.12% of Alahli Bank in Egypt, 35% of Jordan-based Housing Bank for Trade and Finance (HBTF), 40% of the UAE's Commercial Bank International (CBI), 99.96% of QNB Tunisia, 51% of Al-Mansour Investment Bank in Iraq, 49% of Libyan Bank Commerce & Development, 20% of Doha-based Al Jazeera Finance Company, 51% stake of QNB-Syria, 100% of QNB Suisse, 100 of QNB Financial Services in Qatar, 100% QNB Capital LLC in Qatar, and 82.59% of QNB Indonesia. From another aspect, QNB operates in more than 30 countries with almost 30,000 employees in approximately 5,600 locations. According to the QNB 2018 Annual Report (2019), the Qatar-based bank has \$236.8 billion in assets and its profits in 2018 reached \$3.8 billion. On the other hand, Ooredoo (Qatar Telecom) serves 164 million customers in Qatar, Oman, Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, Palestine, Myanmar, Kuwait, the Maldives, and Indonesia as of 2017. While it employed 17,000 people, its

revenue was \$9.6 billion, \$540 million of which was net profit in 2017 (Ooredoo 2017 Annual Report, 2018).

Perhaps, the QIA's most salient company is Qatar Airways, hence the most influential advertisement tool for the Sheikhdum. While it is the official sponsor of FIFA, it also sponsors the t-shirts of football teams. Among them, there were/are prominent teams like FC Barcelona, AS Roma, Boca Juniors, and Sydney Swans. Anyone interested in football will likely notice the name of Qatar Airways every week. As for the strength of the airline, it has a fleet of 250 aircraft carrying 30 million passengers to more than 150 destinations and employs 46,000 people. In addition, almost 300 aircraft worth \$90 billion are on order (Qatar Airways, 2019). It is the third-largest air cargo carrier carrying 1.5 million tons. According to its annual report for 2018, its revenue is \$11.6 billion. Yet, it had a loss of 70 million USD due to the air blockade of the neighboring countries (Qatar Airways 2018 Annual Report, 2018). On the other hand, Qatar Airways diversifies its income by investing in foreign aviation companies. Currently, it has a 20.01% stake of IAG (umbrella company for British Airways and Iberia), a 10.03% stake of Latam Airlines (Chile), a 9.94% stake of Cathay Pacific, and 49% of AQA Holding (parent company of Air Italy) (Ibid). Further to the mentioned investments, the Qatari flag carrier also entered the Chinese market by buying a 5% shareholding of China Southern Airlines (Flightglobal, 2019). Besides international investment, Qatar Airways possesses more than ten aviation companies as a way of increasing revenues from its main business.

As for real estate, the QIA's Qatari Diar company builds and purchases not only in Qatar but also in more than 30 countries on six continents. As per our research, the value of each project ranges from a few hundred million USD to \$8 billion. The value of existing and developing projects is not exactly known but as a prediction, it may be close to \$50 billion. As of 2019, it has a capital of \$8 billion and more than 60 projects that are still under development (Gulf Times, 2019). We could list all its properties here, but it would take up a few pages. However, a quick online search will reveal what it has.


While Qatari Diar buys, sells, or develops real estate projects, another company, Katara Hospitality, owns and operates hotels globally. Founded in 1970, the hotel operator has more than 40 luxury hotels in four continents with more than 7,000 rooms (Katara Hospitality, 2019). Similar to Katara Hospitality, the QIA also owns Al

Rayyan Hospitality. It operates hotels in Qatar and abroad, although it is not as big as Katara. Currently, Al Rayyan is developing joint ventures with the Hilton Hotels Group.

The last QIA company worth mentioning is Hassad Food, which is involved in agricultural investment. It was founded in 2008 to supply Qatar's food needs and trade in agricultural products. It has investments in Australia, Spain, Oman, Sudan, Kenya, Latin America, and so on (McSparren, et al., 2017: 14). According to the details given by Ulrichsen (2012: 7), the Qatari government founded Hassad Food with a \$1-billion budget for the National Food Security Program. Regarding the company's investments, it made a \$500-million agreement with Sudan in 2009 to grow rice and wheat in 250,000 acres. The agricultural company also bought 40,000 acres from Kenya and additionally negotiated with Brazilians to buy a sugar plant in 2012 (McSparren, et al., 2017: 14). Its subsidiary in Australia was founded in 2009 and built up a 250,000-acre portfolio and launched a sheep growing business (Ibid). Moreover, Hassad Food invested in Spain, where it bought 30,000 acres of cultivated land. It also has lands in India and continues to operate there.

As stated above, the QIA invests surpluses of Qatar's gas and oil that is extracted and marketed by Qatar Petroleum (QP). The QP alone produces 60% of Qatar's revenues and it is the third-largest oil company in the world. Yet, the QP itself has investments in its business, too. The QP and its subsidiaries have so much investment in Qatar and abroad that it is difficult to list here. However, the chart below, which contains approximately 140 companies, is an illustration of investments as of December 2016.

Table 5. 1: Qatar Petroleum's Investments



Source: QP, 2019

Needless to say, so many connections among dots (companies) are also indicators of complex interdependence since the dots are based in dozens of countries. Besides, almost all QIA-owned companies have similar networks all over the world, too. Based on these facts, it can be argued that thanks to investments, Qatar should be considered not a small state but a middle power. Mehran Kamrava said in the interview that he developed the term “subtle power” when people came to him and asked how they can get Qatari investment during a conference held in Spain. Needless to say, those countries that want to attract Qatar for investment will defend it in regional and world politics, and indeed they do. As Kamrava (2019) argues, Qatar sets the agenda thanks to its foreign policy, based on the soft power of economic tools. We can conclude that Qatar's foreign investments bring economic and political gains.

a) Sports Investments

Qatar’s sports investments in foreign countries deserve a special section since they serve to contribute to the Sheikdom's image as well as generating revenues. Besides health, sports is a type of leisure that everyone engages indirectly or as audience. Almost everyone is a fan of a sports club, be that a football club, basketball club, rugby club etc. Thus, owning a famous club, advertising on uniforms, and broadcasting

matches increase the awareness about the country that makes the investments. For instance, football tournaments are watched by as many as 3 billion people. Any advertisement or engagement with football means addressing this enormous audience. Since Qatari elites are aware of this fact, they invest billions of USD for state-branding via sports investments. As Gibson (2015) states, "Sport presses emotional buttons that other investments cannot reach and the strategy is far from haphazard as far as QSI is concerned". Regarding Qatar's sports investments, he says, "Sport is also seen as a means of bringing together a fast-changing nation that is virtually unrecognizable from a generation ago and where the indigenous population enjoys the highest per capita income in the world" (Ibid). In addition, Amara (2013:2) argues that Qatar wants to have an active role in international sports bidding and staging of sports events, have a share in the international sports market and dominate the sports market in its region. Overall, it wants to use sports investments as soft power.

Qatar has an institution that invests in sports abroad: Qatar Sports Authority (QSI), a subsidiary of the QIA. Founded in 2004, the QSI re-invests its revenues to improve Qatar's sport, entertainment business, and leisure. In addition, it underlines investing in profit-bearing related projects within Qatar and internationally (QSI, 2019). Therefore, the QSI acts with the motive of profiting as well. The authority owns the French football club, Paris Saint-Germain (PSG), Burrda, a company producing sports clothing, and NextStep, a marketing company engaged mainly in sports. It is estimated that the QSI has forked out \$1.6 billion since 2012 for mega investments such as France's PSG and Spain's Barcelona (Flacks, 2018).

The QSI's biggest and the most salient investment is France's Paris Saint-Germain football club. In May 2011, the QSI bought a 70% stake for about €50 million and then bought the rest within the following year. The total cost of purchasing is estimated to be €100 million. The purchase was decided in Elysee Palace during a lunch attended by French President, Nicholas Sarkozy, former FIFA President, Michel Platini, PSG's owner, Sebastien Bazin, and the then heir apparent, Tamim bin Hamad (Conn, 2013). Platini acknowledged later that Sarkozy asked Qataris to buy PSG and Platini to vote for Qatar to help it win the bid for hosting the FIFA 2022 World Cup. Therefore, Qatar got France's vote in winning the bid for the tournament in return for purchasing PSG. This means that even if Qatar does not make any profit from PSG, it is already the winner thanks to France's vote that helped Qatar to host the FIFA 2022 World Cup. In


addition, right after the purchase of PSG, Platini's son, Laurent, was offered to be the CEO of Burrda, a subsidiary of the QSI (Ibid). If Conn's argument is correct, then, the procurement is an absolute political decision. On the other hand, Liew (2013) lists reasons underlying the Qatarization of PSG quite accurately: for Sarkozy, it was a good opportunity to attract Qataris to invest in France's shuttering economy; for Bazin, it was a chance to sell a club that was continuously making a loss; for Qataris, who see commerce as peace, the procurement would enable it to secure its economy with new resources and build new alliances. In addition, as Qatar considers investment as a form of soft power, buying PSG would open new markets, attract tourists and investors, and help Qatar to gain prestige.

The Club's President, Al-Khelaifi, invested more than €1 billion since PSG was acquired by the QSI. With this investment, PSG bought two of the world's most expensive players: Mbappe (€135 million) from Monaco and Neymar (€222 million) from Barcelona. According to a survey conducted by Forbes (2019), PSG is the 11th most valuable football team with a value of \$971 million. PSG created a revenue of \$529 million and a profit of \$38 million in 2018. This means that PSG's value grew eightfold within a period of eight years. However, while it has dominated the French league by winning the last six championship titles, it has had no vivid continental success, playing only the semi-final in the UEFA Champions League since its buyout by Qatar. Meanwhile, besides state corporations, Qatari businessmen have also shown an interest in football clubs. Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser Al Thani, a member of the royal family, bought the Spanish football club, Malaga CF, in 2010, for €36 million. While the team drew attention with its achievements between 2010 and 2014, later, things went bad. Malaga CF dropped to Spain's secondary league. In addition, Turkish media claimed that Qatar would buy Turkish football clubs Başakşehir in 2017 and Trabzonspor in 2018. However, claims were denied by both clubs.

Moreover, Qatar also sponsors sports clubs as a form of nation-branding. In 2011, Qatar Foundation (QF) became the first historical commercial sponsor of Barcelona FC t-shirts for five years, for €170 million (Hertog, 2017: 16). The QF was later replaced by Qatar Airways, the name of which was branded across players' chests and on the facade of Camp Nou stadium next to the Nike logo. Barcelona FC, being the most successful team back then, helped Qatar advertise its name and institutions to gain worldwide recognition. Barcelona and Qatar's joint promotional clip released in

2013 is a good indicator of how Qatar turned commercial advertisements into soft power. What is more, Qatar Airways became a sponsor of Bayern Munich in a deal for €10 million per year to have its logo on shirt sleeves (New Indian Express, 2018). In fact, it replaced Doha’s Hamad International Airport sponsorship, which was already sponsoring the German club with the same conditions. On the other hand, Qatar Tourism Authority signed a sponsorship deal with PSG, amounting to €200 million. Moreover, Ooredoo, the Qatari telecom company, sponsors Real Madrid, Arsenal FC, Tunisian and Myanmar Football Federations, and Inter Milan directly or via its subsidiaries. More examples can be given but the below chart by Chadwick and Widdop (2017) reveals Qatar’s sponsorship venture quite well.

Table 5. 2: Qatar’s Sports Sponsorships



Source: Chadwick and Widdop, 2017

Chadwick and Widdop (2017) call sports sponsorship “soft power sponsorships”, which they define as:

An outward contractual relationship between a state-owned entity and a property aimed at promoting the attractiveness of a country, its culture and its policies, to alter the attitudes and behaviors of key target audiences about the entity and/or the country with which it is associated.

The third instrument Qatar uses as soft power is sports broadcasting, which is undertaken by Al Jazeera Media Network. Until 2011, Al Jazeera had no ambitions of

broadcasting important sports events. When it bought a package of live France football league, Ligue 1, broadcast rights for the period from 2012 to 2016 for €90 million, the venture began. As a tool for re-branding Qatar, Al Jazeera began re-branding through renaming its sports channel as BeIN Sports in 2012. It should not be a coincidence that Qataris bought Paris Saint-Germain in the same year when Al Jazeera purchased broadcast rights of Ligue 1. Meanwhile, PSG President, Nasser Al-Khelaifi, is also the director of BeIN Media Group. In the course of time, BeIN got the rights to broadcast the live matches of the most-watched football leagues, i.e. Spanish, German, British, French, and Italian, among many others. Besides football leagues, it broadcasts international tournaments such as the FIFA World Cup, UEFA Champions League, and the Europa League. It also holds the rights to the Australian Rugby League, tennis tournaments, like Wimbledon Championships and ATP World Tours, European Handball League, and NBA. BeIN Sports has 60 channels broadcasting in 43 countries. If a channel network were to be drawn, it would resemble a spider network covering all continents. Moreover, it employs more than 3,700 personnel in seven affiliated companies (BeIN Media Group, 2019). Besides sports, BeIN is also involved in the film industry and TV platforms. For instance, it bought the Turkey's TV platform, Digiturk, in 2015 for \$1,5 billion and the American film producer and distributor, Miramax studios, in 2016. We should note that Miramax was purchased from American Colony Capital and Qatar Investment Authority. It seems to be a custom for Qatari companies to replace each other in ownership of foreign companies because while conducting research for this study, we faced many cases of such substitutes. Finally, BeIN Media Group's revenue exceeds \$8 billion annually (Crunchbase, 2019).

In general, sports investments are a good tool for promoting a country. Qatar has particularly chosen football to increase awareness among the foreign audience. This tactic seems to be successful since Qatar's name and its company names are known more than ever thanks to commercial ads on shirts of famous football clubs. Besides nation-branding, it has also used sports investments to get the support of countries in international bids, e.g. France's support for FIFA World Cup 2022. Thus, it uses its soft power to harvest more fruits.

5.3 Investment Strategy

Qatar invests billions of USD in valuable assets all over the world for political and economic gains. When the countries it made investments in are marked on a map, an irregularly woven spider web comes into being. However, the densely marked places on the map are quite clear as it follows a sophisticated strategy when investing. An examination of Qatar's investment patterns across the world reveals that Qatar heavily invests in Northern America, Europe, and recently, in the Far East, while investments in Africa are far less. There are several reasons for this strategy. First, Western countries are worth investing in due to their economic and political stability. Investors are confident that their investments are safe in countries where economic crises are rare occurrences. Second, the commercial laws in the West protect investors in the case of any disputes. Therefore, law secures investments against any unfair action, such as deception. Third, it is easy to start businesses in North America and Europe as regulations facilitate doing business. This is unlike Qatar which is a considerably difficult country for foreigners in terms of starting a business because they are bound by Qatari law to find a Qatari partner who will hold 51% of the shares of the new company. Fourth, many luxury and prominent brands with great sales and revenues belong to Western countries. Instead of creating a new brand and promoting it, purchasing an already renowned brand is more reasonable and profitable. Fifth, as for emerging markets, like China and Turkey, these countries promise growth for investors. Any investment made today is expected to grow faster. For example, in countries like China and India, which add 6-8% to their GDP yearly, the return of investment is shorter due to high populations that are getting richer day by day. Sixth, as discussed above, economic interdependence led to political interdependence, which is crucial for the security of a relatively small state like Qatar, located in the world's most problematic region. Seventh, Qatar seems to get pleasure from acting as a middle power. Its foreign investments provide the small state the opportunity to appear more on the international stage while becoming more involved in world politics. Eighth, in regions like Africa, there are not so many assets that Qatar may invest, except for some state-owned banks, telecom companies, and lands for agriculture. Political turmoil, failed states, instability, coups, poor business culture, etc. are all factors compelling Qatar and other investors not to invest in Africa.

Based on the above reasons, we can now examine how Qatar is selective in its purchases. One of the biggest markets that the Qatar Investment Authority invests in

is the United States. The authority's President, Mansour Ibrahim al-Mahmoud, told reporters in January 2019 that the QIA has about \$30 billion investment in the US and it plans to raise it further to \$45 billion (Knecht, 2019). In the US, Qatari companies: bought Miramax Studios; have a 10% stake in the Empire State Realty Trust, which is the owner of the Empire State Building; bought Gigamon Inc., the US networking software company; invested in Uber, and so on. (CNBC, 2017). As for Europe, it has investments in great countries of the continent. In Germany, it has already invested €35 billion and plans to add another €10 billion (Gulf Times, 2019b). Qatar's investments in France are worth approximately €20 billion. In terms of the investment portfolio in the UK, Germany, and France, although the following list does not show all investments as it was prepared in 2017, it includes most of them.

Major Investments: EADS (6%), owner of Airbus, Total (4%), Air Liquide (5%), Technip (5%), GDF Suez (5%), Vince SA (4%), LVMH (1%), Véolia Environnement (5%), Partner of Caisse des Dépôts Investment Fund, France Telecom (1%), J. Sainsbury (22%), IAG (20%), owner of British Airways and Spanish Iberia Airways, London Heathrow Airport (20%), Barclay's (12.7%), Fisker Automotive (small stake), Credit Suisse (6%), BHP Billiton (1.6%), Volkswagen (17% voting stake), Royal Shell Dutch (0.9 %), London Stock Exchange (10.3%), Volkswagen (Preferred Shares) (11.26%), Porsche SE (10%), Deutsche Bank (a small stake), Hapag-Lloyd (14.4%), Hochtief, and Siemens (Minority Stake) (Aalep, 2017).

Hotels: Peninsula, InterContinental Paris Le Grand, Concorde Lafayette, Deuxième, Accor Hotels (10.5%), Raffles, Hotel Lambert, Martinez, Hotel du Louvre, Hotel Evreux, Carlton (Cannes), Palais de la Méditerranée (Nice), Shangri-La Hotel, Société fermière du Casino municipal de Cannes, Savoy, Claridge, Connaught, Berkeley, and Conversion of US Embassy on Grosvenor Square into a luxury hotel.

Real Estate: Harrods Group (including Knightsbridge), Le Printemps, Le Tanneur, Shell Center (that houses Royal Dutch Shell), Credit Suisse London Headquarters, Thousands of square meters on Avenue des Champs Elysées, Department Stores, Battersea Power Station (mixed-use redevelopment), Olympic Village, HSBC Tower, Chelsea Barracks, Appeldoorn majority owner of Canary Warf Group (shares), Shard Skyscraper.

Media; Lagardère (13.3%).

In addition, it bought Asia Square Towers for \$2.5 billion in Singapore (CNBC, 2017). In Russia, it purchased more than 10% stake in Rosneft, 24.9 percent of St. Petersburg Airport, and invested \$2 billion in the Russian Investment Fund (Arabian Business, 2017).

In Turkey, according to news reports published in 2017, Qatar had \$18 billion worth investments, making it the second-largest investor in Turkey (Hürriyet, 2017). In addition, Qatari Emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, announced in 2018 that they would invest an additional \$15 billion in Turkey. Qatar currently has stakes in some prominent Turkish companies, like QNB Finansbank, Abank, Digitürk (renamed as BeIN Sports), BMC (49%, defense company), Boyner (31%, fashion stores), Mado (49%, food), Banvit (40%, poultry), Sea Pearl Residences, and tens of thousands of acres of land for agriculture. Until 2014, Qatar's Lusail Media also had a 25% stake in the Sabah-Atv media group, which is a staunch supporter of Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Regarding how Qatar turns the above investments into soft power, each asset strengthens ties between the Emirate and the investee country. Countries that host Qatar's investments know that any amount of Qatari foreign direct investment contributes to their welfare. Hence, they keep their relations with the Sheikdom closer and support it in regional and international disputes. For example, when the blockade of Qatar began in June 2017, all the abovementioned European countries called for the resolution of the crisis through dialogue and opposed the blockade. When French President Macron met Emir Tamim, he said: "Qatar suffers daily from the measures that have been taken, families have been separated because of the crisis. We talked about the crisis and we agree that it must be solved through dialogue" (Al JazeeraB, 2017). On the other hand, German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, called to solve the crisis swiftly and asked regional countries, like Turkey and Iran, to help solve the dispute. Further to Merkel's comments, German Foreign Minister, Sigmar Gabriel, pursued active diplomacy in favor of Qatar (Ulrichsen and Karasik, 2018). Germany received billions of Euros in investment from Qatar and was helped by the Emirate during the 2008 world economic crisis. Hence, Germans had sympathized with the Qatari regime. For the UK, besides the historical roots of bilateral relations, Qatar has enormous investments in the Kingdom, which the British government cannot ignore. What is more, the UK procures a huge quantity of its LNG need from Qatar. Thus, it opposed

the blockade like other European countries. The European Union also backed Qatar by easing some of its regulations for Qatar. For example, the EU Commission granted Qatar Airways unlimited access to any EU destination, making the airline advantageous against other Gulf airlines (Saeed, 2019). As Asian countries are dependent on Qatar for natural gas, countries like China, Japan, and South Korea saw the blockade as a threat to their interests since any chaos in Qatar would negatively affect the supply of energy. As for China, Qatar is the second-biggest provider of LNG to the energy-thirsty country. In addition, Qatar is a good buyer of Chinese weapons. Regarding Japan, it is heavily dependent on Qatari LNG. In addition, Qatar sent \$100 million in cash as an aid to Japan after the Fukushima disaster. The two countries' political and cultural relations are also at peak level. On the other hand, India is a hub of agricultural products for Qatar, which had investments even before the blockade. Thus, Qatar's security was important for India, too. Moreover, the biggest expatriate community in Qatar is Indian, numbering 700,000 Indian expatriates who send \$3 billion to their home every year (Ibid).

However, no country supported Qatar during the blockade as much as Iran and Turkey. There were rumors that the blockading countries would do more to Qatar than regime change. Despite the lack of proof, there was a claim that Qatar would be invaded by the blockading countries and annexed to the UAE. Regardless whether the aim was to overthrow Emir Tamim or invade the Emirate, Iran and Turkey sided with Qatar. Iran was willing to support Qatar because it was blockaded by Saudi Arabia, a country that Iran had been in continuous contention. Thus, it supplied food to Qatar when the Saudi border was closed. In addition, Iran and Qatar co-manage the North Dome gas field. A regime change or invasion could have culminated in losing the revenue generated from the field, which would be a disaster for the Iranian economy. Meanwhile, Turkey was Qatar's top supporter during the blockade. Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan had good relations with both incumbent and former Emirs of Qatar since his party came to power in 2002. Inter-country trade volume increased 30 times during the Erdogan era and Turkey received enormous investment or aid from Qatar. In 2015, a defense agreement was signed between the two countries, allowing the Turkish military to have a military base in Qatar. When the diplomatic crisis with neighbors erupted, the Turkish government supplied food with air freighters to lessen the impact of the blockade. In addition, Turkish troops were deployed to Doha to deter blockaders.

Many analysts argue that it was Turkey's firm stance that rescued Qatar from being swallowed by the blockading countries.

Besides political influence, Qatari investments also return as high profits to Qatar. While there is no data for the profits the QIA has generated from the subsidiaries and companies in which it has a stake, many of the abovementioned companies finished the previous years with high profits. For example, Volkswagen Group had €17 billion net profit in 2019; Airbus had a net income of €3.05 billion in 2018; Rosneft had a net income of \$5.09 billion in 2017; IAG Airlines Group had a net profit of €2.9 billion in 2018. Other companies also generally finished their fiscal years with high profits. Therefore, it can be contended that despite fluctuations in companies' incomes, Qatar makes vast amounts of profits from its investments.

In addition, it should be noticed that interdependency between Qatar and investees is in favor of Qatar. In other words, despite being a small state, Qatar is not dependent on the greater powers it invests in. Therefore, the theory that small states are dependent on strong states does not entirely fit to Qatar. In addition, Qatar proves that soft power may also be a determinant in inter-state relations provided that it is exerted smartly. Therefore, theories of international relations do not entirely explain how Qatar converts its investments into soft power and makes customer countries dependent on it.

5.4 Foreign Aid

Foreign aid is the money one country gives to another country that is in need due to reasons like poverty, natural disaster, war, etc. The rationale might be humanitarian, political, or even economic. For example, a donation may serve to persuade and attract receiving nations, which may culminate in the political alliance as well as positive discrimination in accessing economic resources, tenders, and investment. In other words, it turns into soft power for the donor country. However, while foreign aid complies with Nye's concept of soft power, the resources of which are cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions, various authors claim that foreign aid is a type of economic coercion, and thus, it is hard power. Giving it almost the same weight as military power seems unrealistic but some scholars like Antwi-Boateng (2013) claim that small states, e.g. Qatar, use it like hard power. No matter

which power type it suits, governments utilize foreign aid as a means to achieve their strategic goals (Young, 2015: 52). Indeed, this is a fact for all countries.

Generally, the Gulf States are known for their generous donations. Until it was invaded by Iraq, Kuwait was the champion of foreign aid in the region. Thanks to the surge in their revenues due to the 1973 oil crisis, these countries gave 10% of their GDPs, or \$6.1 billion, as foreign aid in 1981. There are various reasons of giving aid but a report prepared by the CIA in 1984 reveals why Arab states donated so much. According to the report, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE used foreign assistance mainly to bolster their security (CIA, 1984: iii). Other reasons were: (1) integrating themselves with countries that are a threat to them, e.g. Syria and Iraq; (2) funding Iraq's war against Iran, which wants to spread Islamic revolution to their shores; (3) strengthening pro-Western Arab states like Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, and Oman; (4) to support the Palestinian cause and bolster their legitimacy at home; (5) to get the support of poor countries and enhance their international prestige. As can be seen, all reasons are related to foreign policy goals. On the other hand, while threatening countries have changed except for Iran, the aforementioned states are still small and they appease greater powers with various money-based ways to secure themselves. For instance, Qatar's hosting of American troops to deter Saudis and Iranians can be seen as foreign aid.

Nevertheless, as the CIA correctly estimated in its report, foreign aid could not protect Kuwait against the Iraqi invasion despite having poured billions of USD to the Saddam Hussein regime. Moreover, when the small Gulf States reduced the amount of aid, they were threatened by aid receivers. On the other hand, according to Young (2015: 28), Gulf States donate aid to create alliances and uphold friendly regimes. For example, between 2011 and 2015, the UAE gave \$15 billion foreign aid to Egypt, while Saudi Arabia granted \$14 billion and Bahrain \$7 billion, respectively (Ibid: 47). On the other hand, Qatar aided \$7.5 billion to Egypt between 2011 and 2012 but ceased it upon Morsi's ouster. What is more, when Qatar was blockaded by the neighboring countries, more than ten Muslim countries sided with the blockading countries purely because they did not want an aid coming from them to stop. The support of these poor countries for the blockading countries is indeed a good example of how foreign aid determines which side countries take.

Regarding Qatar, it subtly utilizes foreign aid in every aspect. In the 1970s, the Sheikdom donated as much as 16% of its GDP (CIA, 1984: 7). Today, its foreign

assistance (both governmental and nongovernmental) stands at \$2 billion, or 1.1% of its current GDP. However, the 1980s were tough times when Qatar and other Gulf countries feared not only from Iran but also their ally, Iraq. Thus, most of the aid was allocated to funding Iraq's war against Iran. With the reign of Emir Hamad that began in 1995, foreign aid meant a tool to bolster its foreign policy rather than a bribe given to the threatening countries. Several reasons motivate Qatar to donate foreign aid. First, like other Gulf countries, Qatar donates to ensure its security by means of forming new alliances and gaining the support of countries it provides aid. Second, besides (political) friendship, it also helps friendly regimes in other countries to come to power or support them. The Muslim Brotherhood's taking power is a good example of this policy. Qatar spent billions of USD just to support the Morsi government against opposition groups. Third, humanitarian aid is a religious responsibility according to the Islamic faith. Ruled by Sharia law, the Qatari state and its people are aware that they have to give 2.5% of their wealth as zakat (alms-giving) every year. Fourth, according to Manjang (2015: 59), Qatar depends on foreign aid to create favorable environments for its investments. For example, to ensure its food supply, security, and political weight, it bought lands in African countries, to which it donated hundreds of millions of USD. According to Antwi-Boateng (2013: 46), the beneficiary of today is the ally of the future. Foreign aid and investment, hence serve donor countries to buy influence in the receiving country.

This is the exact policy Qatar is pursuing and its politicians acknowledge it. For instance, former Foreign Minister Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Attiyah (2013: 8) argues that foreign aid is central to their foreign policy. Social inclusion and economic development are the most reliable and safest paths to peace and stability. On the other hand, Ali Shareef Al Emadi, Qatari Minister of Finance, says that Qatar provides aid because it believes in the importance of the South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation (The Peninsula Qatar, 2019). He adds that:

The provision of such assistance is positively reflected on the achievement of international peace and security, human rights and development for all, to achieve peaceful, integrated and non-marginalized societies, based on strong institutions that are more accountable and efficient and more resilient to addressing the scourge of extremism and the threat of terrorism (Ibid).

The Finance Minister's emphasis on extremism and terrorism is important because incumbent Foreign Minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, uses almost the same words, stating:

The peoples of the region and the world cannot achieve security, stability, peace, and justice without sustainable development...(Qatar) is investing in education, health, and economic empowerment. We believe that such empowerment is a critical strategy in the global campaign to combat terrorism and violent extremism (Qatar Fund, 2018).

It is important to add that, unlike other Qatari elites, Sheikha Moza does not just support humanitarian aid but also gets involved in humanitarian efforts and leads projects. Bringing a new and modern understanding to aid, which is quite different from traditional one, she campaigns together with the United Nations for the education of 58 million children around the world who do not have access to schools. She denies that Qatar's activities for education are a form of soft power and advocates that it is a global responsibility for everyone (Coughlan, 2014).

The establishment of private and state- or royal family-owned foundations goes back to the 1970s. According to official statistics, 70% of foreign aid is supplied by the government while the rest is of nongovernmental organizations (The Peninsula Qatar, 2017). Lestra (2017: 71) argues that there are two generations in Qatar's aid organizations. The first generation adopted an Islamic concept of aid called *waqf*. They were distributing sacralized aid to the needy as per the Islamic faith. For instance, *zakat* was one of the main resources of its revenues. Qatar Charity, Qatar Red Crescent, and foundations belonging to royal family members were all in this category. From the 2000s onward, the second generation of aid organizations appeared in Qatar. Pioneered by Qatar Foundation, founded and headed by Sheikha Moza, these organizations worked parallel to other Islamic aid organizations. They are more ambitious, reformist, performance-based, working like corporations, hiring professional administrators, and engaging in various social issues that are out of religious scope. Since the second-generation organizations were launched by Sheikha Moza, they could bypass bureaucracy and got exemptions not available to others (Ibid: 82).

Like other countries, Qatar's foreign aid is not all granted. As we saw in the previous sections, it sometimes lends money as aid to force conflicting parties to solve their

problems, while it also grants money for reconstruction and other purposes. It can be contended that all aid given during political disputes have political goals such as helping a friendly government, getting concessions in disputing countries' markets, gaining new friends, etc. In such cases, fiscal aid appears like hard power rather than soft power because it compels the beneficiary to accept the terms of the donor as it needs urgent help. There are so many examples of how Qatar used its financial ‘muscles’ during its mediation diplomacy in the Arab Spring. Since most of them have already been stated in detail, there is no need to reiterate them here. On the other hand, Qatar is also a generous donor of humanitarian aid, which is not reimbursed. Qatar Fund, the top official regulator for Qatari aid, prepares annual reports for Qatar's aid activities. According to the institution, Qatar spent \$574 million in 78 countries in support of education, health, economic empowerment, and humanitarian activities (Qatar Fund 2017 Annual Report, 2018: 9). While \$617 million (92%) was spent as development aid, the amount for humanitarian aid was \$56.5 million (8%) (see funding by sector below). Since interlocutors for development aid are governments, a political motive behind Qatar’s aid is likely though it cannot be proven. Yet, Dorsey (2019) argues that there is always a goal behind every country’s foreign aid.

Table 5. 3: Qatari Foreign Aid by Sector

SECTOR	AMOUNT (USD)	PERCENTAGE
Infrastructure	275,780,231	41%
Health Care	167,420,736	25%
Education	105,913,594	16%
Economic Development	54,919,313	8%
Budget Support	41,200,000	6%
Humanitarian Support	28,630,278	4%

Source: Qatar Fund 2017 Annual Report, 2018:18-19

As for beneficiaries, there is indeed a diversification since Qatar distributed aid to more than 70 countries. However, during the Arab Spring, Arab countries going through

political transition took more than 60% of government assistance, with Egypt taking 77%, Libya 16%, Jordan 6%, and Yemen 2% (Rouis, 2013: 3).

The activities of Qatar's aid/relief foundations and associations are worth analyzing from a soft power perspective. Qatar Charity is the first major foundation involved in charitable activities. It was founded as a nongovernmental aid organization. According to its website, it spent more than \$1.3 billion between 2013 and 2017 for humanitarian and development aid. The donations it received in 2017 amounted to \$335 million. It has reached 178 million people in more than 50 countries via 27 field offices (Qatar Charity, 2019). Being a conservative Islamic foundation has put it under scrutiny and has led it to face allegations. Gartenstein-Ross and Zelin (2013) blamed Qatar Charity in their article published in *Foreign Policy* for (1) funding Islamist groups in Mali, (2) supporting assassins who attempted to kill Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, in 1995, and (3) sponsoring Syrian rebels. They also quoted from a defunct website that had claimed Osama Bin Laden once had said that "Qatar Charity is one of the several charities that funded Al-Qaeda's overseas operations" (Ibid). In addition, WikiLeaks (2009) disclosed some documents of the US embassy in Doha, in which American diplomats claimed that they were suspicious of Qatar Charity making donations to extremist groups. Moreover, Darfur rebel groups accused the organization of supporting the Sudanese army that kills and is responsible for the displacement of people (Sudan Tribune, 2015). Furthermore, countries that blockaded Qatar in 2017 included Qatar Charity on their terrorist list together with the Sheikh Eid Al Thani Charitable Foundation and the Sheikh Thani bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services (Al Jazeera, 2017c). However, all allegations about Qatar Charity were cleared by the United Nations. In addition, Al Mugaiseb (2019) said in the interview that Qatar Charity is on the list of Thomson Reuters, which prepare lists of reliable aid organizations. Further, he said that the United Nations' office is in their headquarters, meaning the UN can audit them whenever it wants. On the other hand, the organization partners with the UNCHR, OXFAM, USAID, UNICEF, the World Food Program along with numerous other charity organizations (Qatar Charity, 2019). Finally, those disseminating anti-charity allegations come either from the blockading countries or from American far-right groups, who are generally biased against Qatar.

Another charitable organization is Qatar Red Crescent, which was founded in 1978. Since it is an official relief organization, it is directly affiliated with the Qatari

government. With 18 offices worldwide, it distributes almost \$100 million in aid to the needy (Qatar Red Crescent, 2019). Interestingly, the 2015 annual report states that the restricted donations (given for a specific purpose) are all donated to Muslim countries like Palestine, Syria, Sudan, Turkey, Somalia, etc. (Ibid). It shows that Qatari and non-Qatari donors prefer their money to be sent to Muslim beneficiaries. On the other hand, like Qatar Charity, Qatar Red Crescent is also accused of funding extremism. It was the only humanitarian organization that was allowed to access Northern Mali after the region was taken by Islamist groups in 2012. The French alleged that Qatari Special Forces trained Ansar Dine, an Islamist group in Mali (Ulrichsen, 2014: 18). Thus, it was blamed for funding extremists (Right News, 2014). It should be noted that the source of this allegation (Right News) is affiliated with the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA), a think-tank based in Israel. However, the above allegations were rejected by the UN (Al Jazeera, 2017c). Besides Qatar Charity and Qatar Red Crescent, there are many other humanitarian associations and foundations located in Qatar that distribute aid all over the world. Since their activities are more or less the same, there is no need to go over them separately. What is clear is that they more or less contribute to Qatar's soft power.

Perhaps, the most salient, influential, unique, modern, and professional institution is the Qatar Foundation (QF). It is so distinctive that there may be no similar foundations in any other country. When Hamad bin Khalifa came to power in 1995, he made radical reforms to re-brand his country. The democratization of the political system, an independent foreign policy, and a diversified economy were his major achievements during his reign. However, it was his wife, Sheikha Moza, who undertook the Sheikdom's socio-cultural revolution. Founding the QF together with her husband, Sheikha Moza chaired it and transformed Qatar. With an independent legal status and a budget of billions of USD, the QF has been shaping the country since its establishment. It works in four different areas via 98 entities: pre-university education, higher education, research-development-innovation, and community development (QF, 2019). Regarding education, while it has schools for K-12 education, the prominent Education City hosts eight foreign universities. As for research purposes, the QF owns Qatar National Research Fund, Qatar Science & Technology Park (costing \$800 million), and Qatar Computing Research Institute. Regarding medicine, it established the Qatar Biomedical Research Institute. The QF also established the

Sidra Medical and Research Center with an endowment of \$7.9 billion. In addition, the QF additionally has initiatives in the field of art and culture. Al Shaqab (an education resource center), Al Jazeera Children's Channel (owns 90%), Qatar National Library, Qatar Philharmonic Orchestra, Mathaf: Arab Museum of Modern Art and Msheireb Downtown Doha (\$5.5-billion property development project) are all owned and operated by the QF. Besides social projects, the QF is also involved in commerce through joint ventures: it owns 50% of Vodafone Qatar, has a stake in Qatar Solar Technologies, and MEEZA, a joint venture providing IT services. In addition, it partners with Fitch London for Fitch Qatar, a design company, and Sintex Global for Qatar MICE Development Institute (QMDI), an initiative that manages conferences and similar events (Altenergymag, 2009). On the other hand, in 2011, it placed its name on the front of FC Barcelona's shirts with a five-year contract costing €170 million.

The particularity of the above entities and their businesses is that they make the Qatari state more attractive. In other words, such investments aim to allure foreign students, scholars, researchers, artists, and scientists to come to Qatar. Moreover, such initiatives integrate Qatar with the contemporary world as facilities are at the highest level of quality. Thanks to QF's efforts, Qatar ranks 6th in education quality in the world (World Economic Forum, 2018). Therefore, it can be concluded that soft power stemming from the QF's activities has reshaped the lives of conservative Qatari people. However, this does not mean that QF is not active abroad. On the contrary, it is one of the most influential Arab foundations spreading Arab and Muslim culture and funds social projects. Yet, it does these activities via its subsidiaries that work in different sectors.

One of them is Qatar Foundation International (QFI), the headquarters of which are in Washington. The QFI either prepares the curriculum for Arabic teaching or sponsors Arabic courses in American, German, British, Canadian, and Brazilian schools. According to an article by Hobbs published in Wall Street Journal (2017), the QFI gave \$30.6 million to some American schools within eight years in aims to create a positive image of the Arab and Muslim world (QFI, 2019). It defines its mission as “connecting cultures and advancing global citizenship through education... engage a global community of diverse learners and educators, fostering global competency and 21st-century skills through the exploration of the Arabic language and the Arab world's societies and cultures (Ibid)”. According to the QFI's website, the organization

operates in 27 locations in the US, reaching more than 100 schools, while in the UK, it is active in eight locations. Meanwhile, in Germany, it has connections with one school in Mannheim only (Ibid). What the QFI is doing is it resembles the British Council that teaches English and spreads British culture all over the world. In other words, it is inspired by state-sponsored cultural centers like the British Council (UK), Goethe Institute (Germany), Yunus Emre Institute (Turkey), Confucius Institute (China), Cervantes Institute (Spain), Alliance Française (France), etc. Not surprisingly, those opposing the QFI's activities in Western countries are far-right groups and their media. For instance, Litwin (2019) insults the QFI for teaching Muslim culture on the Middle East Forum's website, which is owned by Daniel Pipes, a member of the Jewish lobby in the US. Other opposing articles are also written by similar people with rightist sentiments. QFI is an assertive initiative but only time will show whether it will fulfill Qatar's overseas cultural ends.

Another NGO that is a strong tool of Qatari soft power is Silatech. While it is not a subsidiary of the Qatar Foundation, its founder is the same: Sheikha Moza. Silatech's main focus area is the employment of Arab youth. It provides resources for developing new jobs, employing youth and training them. From its establishment (i.e. in 2008) to 2017, Silatech was donated \$100 million by Sheikha Moza, \$77 million by the Qatari government and \$33 million by private donors. In addition, it was able to collect \$377 million by means of co-financing by the end of 2017 (Silatech, 2018). It found jobs for 200,000 Arab youth aged between 18-30 years until 2017. Besides, it provides funds for microfinance projects in Arab countries. Silatech's annual reports show that its activities are limited to Arab countries. In addition, in terms of public diplomacy, it addresses poor people of other countries. Like other Qatari institutions, Silatech has not been immune to criticism either. According to Stephens (2013), Qatar, with wealthy arms of soft power, tries to channel money into populist causes by using NGOs like Silatech, Qatar Charity, etc. That Silatech is not a private NGO, but a part of the Qatari government is another aspect that is criticized. Indeed, some members of the board, including Sheikha Moza, have governmental posts as well. Besides, the Qatari state grants generous donations to Silatech.

Another influential NGO that operates as a tool of Qatar's soft power abroad is the Education Above All Foundation (EAA). Sheikha Moza again appears as the founder and chairperson. Its mission is to create opportunities for poor and marginalized

children, youth, and women worldwide. According to their website, they are active in more than 55 countries (EAA, 2019). The EAA maintains its activities through four programs: Educate A Child (EAC), Protecting Education in Insecurity and Conflict (PEIC), Al Fakhoora, and Reach Out to Asia (ROTA) (Ibid). The EAC has implemented more than 70 projects in more than 50 countries and helped 7.5 million children to enroll in schools. The EAC's projects are supported by famous politicians, businessmen, activists, and celebrities, gaining it wider public recognition and visibility. The EAA spent more than \$500 million on the EAC program between 2012 and 2017. On the other hand, the PEIC addresses children in war-torn areas and helps them continue their education. It is active in countries like South Sudan and Syria together with international organizations. Al Fakhoora was a program dedicated to taking care of the education of children in Gaza but later became active in the West Bank and other countries as well. Thanks to the program, 102 educational facilities were reconstructed and refurbished in Gaza. In addition, thousands of students received scholarships from Al Fakhoora in the Middle East. Finally, ROTA is a special program for Asian children who have less or no chance to study. The program reached 385,000 children for education, trained 53,000 youth for better employment, trained 7,600 teachers, and constructed/rehabilitated 336 schools. With all its programs, the QFI spent \$1.7 billion (including \$1 billion co-funding) for 11.7 million beneficiaries in 55 countries.

The chart below illustrates how much the EAA has spent in each country through its programs. As can be seen, the Qatari NGO works like a UN program. In this way, Qatar invests in today's children for the future. While being applauded by beneficiaries, it also seems to plan to change children's attitudes towards the Sheikhdom when they grow up. When they become adults and gain higher posts in government, they will likely feel they owe to Qatar and thus support friendly relations with the country. Hence, what Qatar does via the EAA foundation can be defined as "advance purchasing of attraction and persuasion of future generations". Surely, this achievement mostly (maybe entirely) belongs to Sheikha Moza. She acts like the Culture Minister of not only Qatar but the whole world. While great powers can reach many disadvantaged people, unfortunately, they do not engage in their problems. Conversely, Qatar is a small state with rich resources and accesses millions of people through Sheikha Moza's projects.

Finally, Qatar implements its foreign aid as a form of soft power against great powers, especially when they experience natural disasters. When Hurricane Katrina destroyed some locations in the US, the Doha government launched Qatar Katrina Fund to help victims with healthcare, housing, and education, spending \$34.4 million for housing, \$27.4 million for healthcare, and \$38.2 million for education, totaling \$100 million (Qatar Katrina, 2015). Reactions to the Qatari fund were varying. Mohammad Jaham Al Kuwari, Qatari Ambassador to the US, said that “Foreign aid is like a bridge- a cultural bridge that helps to build better relations between nations” (Ibid). While Qatar got quite many appreciations from beneficiaries and the American government, some analysts questioned the intention behind the fund. Referring to a ceremony held by Qatar in New Orleans to commemorate Hurricane Katrina in its 10th year, Ahmed (2015) claims Qatar continuously reminds Americans of its aid. He further claims that these donations are “a desire to show the US that its relationships with the Arab world are not simply about security or US support for trusted partners... The hope is that those themes will undercut skepticism about largely undemocratic Muslim countries”. Meanwhile, the UAE also granted \$100 million for Hurricane Katrina but transferred the amount to the federal government instead of distributing it to the victims as Qatar did. Qatar wants its soft power felt by beneficiaries.

Another beneficiary of Qatar's lucrative aid is Japan. Qatar Friendship Fund (Japan) was founded in 2012 after the Great East Japan Earthquake happened in 2011. Qatari Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa, announced a \$100 million donation to help those inflicted by the disaster (Qatar Friendship Fund, 2016). Yusuf Bilal, Qatari Ambassador to Japan, said: “We started the fund to show our loyalty to our friends and as a sign of the strong friendship with the people of Japan (Japan Times, 2016)”. Since Qatar and Japan already had already had strong ties, the fund had a strengthening effect on relations. Moreover, Japan is a good customer of Qatar's natural gas. When neighboring countries blockaded Qatar, Japan sided with the Emirate.

Furthermore, Qatar sends aid to other countries that are victims of various disasters. For example, it sent 80 tons of immediate relief to the Philippines when it was hit by Typhoon Haiyan. It was a meaningful aid since a great number of Filipinos work in Qatar (Naar, 2013). Moreover, after the Haitian earthquake, the Doha government launched the Qatar Haiti Fund and pledged to donate \$20 million. It also collaborated with the UASID to construct new homes for victims (Reliefweb, 2013). When the

Qatari relief to the Philippines and Haiti are compared, it can be contended that the Sheikdom sent less aid to the Philippines despite that it is home to tens of thousands of Filipinos. Qatar also helped so many other countries but we assume that the above examples are enough for the purpose of this study.

Regarding repercussions, foreign investment and aid are two influential tools that every country, including Qatar, uses as soft power instruments. Many alliances and friendships are built via such tools. They are also useful in helping countries when it comes to winning the hearts of foreigners and for re-branding. However, this is not always the case. As Brannagan and Guilianotti (2015) argue, soft power may turn into soft disempowerment, meaning that it may have opposite outcomes. In other words, states may draw hatred instead of attraction. In addition, there must be compliance between states' actions in their policies. Sometimes, an incident might wipe out all of a state's good deeds. For example, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman introduced himself as a reformist to the world audience and gained a lot of appreciation. However, when Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, was killed in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, the whole world forgot his reforms and saw him as an evil and dangerous man. Thus, all his current and future good deeds will no longer be appreciated. After this incident, he may never be able to change people's perceptions.

Concerning Qatar's abundant use of its soft power, it sometimes leads to negative repercussions. As the small size state does not have strong military power, it has to replace hard power with soft power because its independent and aggressive foreign policy provokes its neighbors. Thus, it has not been able to avoid diplomatic tensions with its neighbors on numerous occasions. Even currently, it is under blockade because of its soft power. There is almost no trade with its neighbors and people do not visit each other. Furthermore, all Qatari companies are banned from doing business in the neighboring countries. Hence, Qatari investment in these countries was affected negatively. Also, during its mediation diplomacy, it was not always possible to appease both sides.

Complaints about Qatar's soft power have mainly come from regimes, GCC countries or their PR companies. Since Gulf countries are hostile to each other, it has become a routine for them to blame each other through media and consulting companies. Thus, the accusations must be examined carefully and double-checked if those making the accusations are employees of think-tanks. For example, when Emir Tamim visited

London in 2018, the casting agency Extra People advertised to find 500 protesters to join anti-Emir demonstrations. It later explained that a company called Neptune PR Ltd., set up three months prior to the protests, requested 500 protesters from them (Middle East Monitor, 2018). In addition, in February 2018, the four blockading countries conducted a conference about sanctioning Qatar in Munich. When participation was noticed to be less than expected, organizers hired a PR company and the room was filled with young women from Eastern Europe. One of the participants, for instance, confessed that he was paid to attend (Al Jazeera, 2018).


On the other hand, we have mentioned how Sarkozy pressed Qataris to invest in his country during the economic crisis in 2011. Yet, when Qatar invested €50 million in the outskirts of Paris, it gave rise to a suspicion of a religious hidden agenda as the districts it invested in were mainly Muslim-populated. Similar accusations that Qatar prefers Muslims to non-Muslims in its relief distribution have been also made by some other actors. When the countries it aided are analyzed, indeed, many of them are Muslim countries. Yet, whether relief distribution is made for religious agendas is not something provable unless acknowledged. On the other hand, it is no secret that there is always a rationale behind every aid, whether economic, political, or spiritual.

All in all, if a brief conclusion is made about this section, it can be contended that Qatar's foreign aid is a strong instrument of its soft power. Perhaps, few countries have reached so many people in the world. At least, while analyzing other countries, we did not find such humanitarian activities penetrating the farthest areas of poor countries. While Antwi-Boateng sees Qatari foreign aid as hard power, this study hardly agrees with this claim. It is not like hard power but results it generates are similar to those of hard power. Qatar is not coercing anyone to receive its aid and no country has to show its loyalty to the Sheikdom just because it has received Qatari aid. Yet, foreign aid makes Qatar have more friends and it will certainly benefit from their support when facing external threats that may use hard power. From a theoretical perspective, almost no theories count on foreign aid except for poor consideration of liberalism. Whereas, Qatar has shown that the world is not so anarchical as theories have claimed and there are other ways of concentrating power and survival. Finally, it is actually Sheikha Moza accessing millions of people. Probably, no person in the world has been so active in social activities, thus, she deserves much appreciation. In addition, she proves that individuals also have soft power like states.

5.6 Qatar vs. Other Gulf Countries in Terms of Foreign Investment and Aid

GCC countries (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) are in a relentless rivalry with each other for inward/outward investments and aid. A comparison is necessary to understand the degree of their accomplishments. In terms of tourism, while Qatar won the bid for the FIFA 2022 World Cup, the UAE won the right to host Dubai World Expo 2020. While the UAE hosted the Asian Football Championship in 2019, it was Qatar that won the tournament. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia hosts 2.4 million hajj and 6.5 million Umrah pilgrims every year (Arab News, 2018). According to the chart below, which shows the number of projected tourist arrivals to GCC countries in 2020, while Saudi Arabia tops others, Oman has the lowest numbers. Moreover, Bahrain, with its relatively liberal understanding of tourism, receives more than 8 million tourists – mostly from regional countries– every year. Finally, Kuwait has a moderate number of 5 million. If pilgrimages are omitted from the count, the UAE becomes the country to receive the highest number of tourists. On the other hand, Qatar ranks 5th with 1,591,000 tourists, proving that it is yet to be an appealing destination for tourists. If the chart has a recommendation, it is that Qatar should do more than what it has done so far. For example, for starters, drawing inspiration from the UAE may be a good idea. In addition, revising inward investment culture may also be a solution as the country is not attractive to foreign direct intervention.

Table 5. 5: Projected Tourist Arrivals in GCC Countries in 2020



Source: Statista, 2019

The UAE deserves praise for attracting tourists. Dubai, in particular, has notable success in tourism despite being located in the desert. It is home to the world's tallest building, the world's tallest hotel, luxury hotels, huge malls, aquariums, beaches, museums, opera halls, and so on. What makes Dubai and partly Abu Dhabi distinctive is that all attractive venues are artificial. Only a few places are natural or historical. Yet, when tourists visit UAE cities, they are satisfied with their visits. Moreover, the country's touristic investments mostly address rich tourists. Therefore, the revenue generated from tourism is quite high. While other Gulf countries, including Qatar, are similar in terms of geography and climate, it is only the UAE that has been able to become a touristic location. Concerning Qatar, perhaps, preferring cultural and sports tourism to leisure tourism is one of the reasons for small numbers of tourists.

Regarding foreign direct investment (FDI), all countries receive a considerable amount of investment from foreign investors. When FDI inflow from 2011 to 2016 is analyzed, it can be seen that Saudi Arabia is the leader. However, as the chart below illustrates, while Saudi Arabia's FDI is in a decreasing trend, the UAE has a rising curve. As for Qatar, it is the last among six countries and there is a more than \$50 billion difference between the UAE and the Sheikdom.

Table 5. 6: FDI inflows in GCC Countries, 2011-2016 (bn USD)

COUNTRY	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	TOTAL
Saudi Arabia	16308	12182	8865	8012	8141	7453	60961
UAE	7152	8828	9491	10823	8795	8986	54075
Qatar	939	396	-840	1040	1071	774	3380
Kuwait	3259	2873	1434	953	293	275	9087
Bahrain	98	1545	3729	1519	-797	282	6376
Oman	1628	1365	1612	1506	-2692	142	3561

Source: EU GCC Investment Report, 2017: 10

The chart clearly shows that Qatar is not attracting much foreign investment. Conversely, Qatar has invested hundreds of billions USD in foreign countries. If this discrepancy is not a strategy, it should be worrying. Regarding FDI outflow, while the UAE invested \$15.7 billion abroad in 2016, the amount for Qatar was \$7.9 billion. However, we should note that the UAE's GDP is \$382 billion while Qatar's is \$183 billion. On the other hand, Kuwait invested \$6.4 billion, Saudi Arabia \$8.6 billion, Oman \$356 million and Bahrain \$170 million to foreign assets in the same year. The UAE will likely be the champion of FDI soon as it offers greater opportunities to foreign investors. As of date, many foreign companies prefer to have their regional offices in Dubai instead of other countries. One reason for this might be the UAE's free corporate income tax, which is, for example, 10% in Qatar. Thus, investors save 10% if they invest in the UAE instead of Qatar. Meanwhile, the UAE has allowed 100% foreign ownership in 2018, with the exception of certain specific sectors, while Kuwait did it in 2014 (PWC, 2018). On the other hand, Qatar and Saudi Arabia still require a local partner for foreign investors, having a share of up to 51% as per sector. Yet, Qatar allows 100% ownership in free zones and a few specific businesses.

Table 5. 7: GCC Countries FDI Outflow, 2016

COUNTRY	FDI Outflow (bn USD)
Saudi Arabia	8.6
UAE	15.6
Qatar	7.9
Kuwait	6.4
Bahrain	0.17
Oman	0.37

Source: Index Mundi, 2016

Finally, when GCC countries' humanitarian aid is compared, Qatar donated \$2 billion (2017), the UAE \$5.25 billion (2017), Saudi Arabia \$3 billion (average), and Kuwait \$580 million (average) (The National, 2018; Arab Times Online, 2019). On the other hand, Oman and Bahrain have no remarkable aid amounts. Hence, the UAE is the leader in humanitarian foreign assistance as well.



CONCLUSION

In this dissertation various aspects of types of power have been analyzed, particularly soft power, and the role of soft power on Qatar's foreign policy by elucidating policy-makers, policies and instruments. First of all, conceptually, the study has come to the conclusion that there are three primary types of power: military power, economic power, and moral power. Military power, also known as hard power, refers mainly to the number of soldiers and weapons. Yet, in today's world, advanced weapons are more influential than large armies due to their enormous and growing destructiveness. For instance, an atomic bomb is capable of killing more than tens of thousands of people at once, which an army relying on its power can never achieve. On the other hand, economic power is the income you obtain from various sources such as natural resources, industry, trading, and service. The third major power type is moral power, which refers to the belief in a religion or a thought (ideology). Since it is unseen and incalculable, one can become aware of this particular power from the results of a conflict.

This study argued that all other types of power are derivatives of these three basic types, and they are secondary to the three. If a country has the first two primary powers, it can be regarded as a great power. However, if a country wants to be a superpower, the amount of both powers must be the highest compared to other countries. Regarding moral power, it is related to faith (and ideology) and does not surface unless there is a grave danger to a state or nation. Besides, moral power can be either benign or malign. On the other hand, being a strong country via primary powers may sometimes inflame antipathy for the state unless it is supported by soft power. For instance, Nazi Germany was economically and militarily strong enough but other countries did not favor it. Further, it was even seen as a threat to world peace since the driving force for Nazi Germany was the fascist ideology (malicious moral power), which was about to destroy the world order during World War II.

Regarding soft power, this study concludes that it derives mostly from economic power and partly hard power. Sometimes moral power is also a source of soft power. For instance, Saudi Arabia is adhered to by Muslims since the holy cities Mecca and Medinah are located there. While Nye's three resources of soft power (political values,

culture, and foreign policy) are not underestimated, these resources are not sufficient to make B do what A wants it to do. In addition, for example, countries with deep culture do not have as much soft power as superpowers, such as the United States. A comparison between the US and Egypt is a good example that shows the impact of culture as soft power. What makes the US more attractive is not its 250-year-old culture but its economic power and partly military power. Moreover, as an example of political values, India, the Netherlands, or Italy are all democratic countries but it is still the US that has greater soft power since the US is militarily and economically stronger than others. In the Soft Power Index 30 discussed above, all thirty countries are strong in terms of primary two powers. Therefore, soft power is not an alternative to military or economic power but generally an extension of them. Yet, it does not mean that soft power has less function than primary powers. This is not the case, as we examined in this study. On the other hand, this study argues that “smart power” does not exist since it is not calculable. Instead, it should be regarded as a strategy of using hard power and soft power together or one after another. In fact, moral power is also non-calculable but at least it has a source, like religion. On the other hand, smart power has no source that generates this type of power.

This study also argues that there are some other types of power, which have not been coined before. One is “combined power”. As discussed in previous chapters, while Qatar is a strong country in terms of soft power, it does not have enough military power to defend itself. Therefore, it combines its soft power with the military power of the US (and recently Turkey) to protect itself from external threats. In “combined power”, either type of power may belong to another country. Another type of power might be “hired power”, which means hiring human, military, or knowledge power of other countries. As witnessed in the case of Qatar, the Sheikdom has a small population but it is still influential thanks to expatriates coming from various countries to work for the Qatari state. For example, in many institutions, including Al Jazeera, while only top executives are Qataris, others are foreigners. Therefore, Qatar wields expertise and knowledge of foreign employees to reach its goals. If it weren't for combined and hired power, Qatar's soft power would probably be weaker. This study offers the aforementioned two concepts to the literature of power.

Regarding sources of Qatari soft power, they are: (1) economic/financial resources, (2) individuals, (3) media, and (4) socio-cultural resources. First, Qatar subtly uses its

financial resources in its foreign policy. When Qatari diplomats are involved in a conflict, there are lucrative financial resources behind them. From the beginning of Emir Hamad's era to date, Qatar has chosen to be an independent regional actor instead of living a luxury life with its wealth. It has tried to be an actor mediating or intervening in conflicts. In almost all of its policies, its hand has been strong thanks to its fiscal strength. Qatar has wielded its wealth not only to solve conflicts but also to penetrate markets of conflicting parties. While using fiscal resources as soft power, it has also turned soft power into economic gains. Thanks to mediation diplomacy, Qatari companies have increased the number of their customers and made profits. One can easily find a Qatari bank, hotel chain, construction company etc. in every country where it has mediated between the conflicting parties.

Furthermore, Qatar uses its oil and gas income for the diversification of revenues, which seems to work well. The Sheikhdом now owns many commercial holdings with billions of USD incomes. Besides buying global brands, Qatar has also created its global brands like Al Jazeera, Qatar Airways, Ooredoo, and QNB. As a comparison, Saudis do not have so many global brands. In the case that Qatar's natural resources are depleted today, it can still survive on the amount it earns from companies.

Regarding investments vs. foreign policy connection, Qatar seems to have understood liberals' complex interdependency and utilizes it quite much as such that Qatar intentionally invests in countries that bring more profit or support its foreign policy. Qatari state-owned and private companies have bought 100% or a share of some prominent companies in Europe and the US. From Volkswagen of Germany to Miramax of Hollywood, many world brands are partly or wholly owned by Qataris. In recent years, football teams in Europe have become a new area of investment. Beginning with purchasing Paris Saint Germain in France, Qatar Sports Investment pursues new opportunities to buy new teams.

Thanks to foreign investment in developed countries, Qatar gains both economically and in terms of soft power. As a result, the invested countries support Qatar for its regional policies in order not to lose Qatar's capital. Moreover, besides investments, Qatar gives foreign aid to friendly countries in the form of lending money and delivers humanitarian aid to poor countries. While it tries to win the hearts of governments through foreign investments, it addresses the foreign public with humanitarian aid. Foreign aid is also used as a tool in foreign policy to enhance friendship with other

countries and to ensure the success of its mediation policy. The distinction of Qatar is that it is being regarded as a small state. Liberal theory accepts that some countries might be more interdependent but it does not mention the dependence of great powers on a small state, which was achieved by Qatar.

The second source is individuals like Emir Hamad, Sheikha Moza, Jassim bin Hamad Al Thani, and Emir Tamim. Except for Jassim bin Hamad, all the other three are father, mother, and son in the same family. Their personalities have been shaping Qatar's domestic and foreign policies since 1995. Unlike previous rulers who ruled the country under the shadow of Saudi Arabia, the above people have made Qatar a rival of Saudis and other regional countries. Without their volition, Qatar would have remained a passive and unknown country. The above analysis shows that Emir Hamad alone meant the state. While all political reforms were perpetrated by him, he is also the founder of Al Jazeera TV network, which is perhaps the biggest tool of Qatar's soft power. In addition, bringing the US and Turkish troops to Qatar respectively was his idea. If we are talking about Qatar of today, it is because of the former Emir's policies.

In addition, his wife Sheikha Moza has changed the social life, culture, and education of Qatari state. Besides, she is the founder of a few biggest foundations associations in the world, which have reached more than one hundred countries and boosting Qatar's soft power. In addition, while Jassim bin Hamad Al Thani contributed Qatar's soft power by working together with Emir Hamad, his foreign policy is still maintained by the incumbent Emir Tamim Bin Hamad. Emir Tamim has not changed his father's policies, and as a result, Qatar's domestic and foreign policy have not changed as well.

The ruling of strong individuals in Qatar also shows that individual-level analysis fits the Qatari case more than any other level of analysis since individuals, not the state, are actors. This fact clashes with arguments of rational theories of international relations, which see the state as the only actor. Thus, theories fail to explain Qatar in the context of foreign policy. In addition, individualism in Qatari politics shows that most scholars studying soft power, including Joseph Nye, have been neglecting the soft power of individuals. Whereas, Qatar would have had a weak soft power, had there not been Emir Hamad's personal politics and his wife Sheikha Moza's efforts in the transformation of domestic culture and cultural diplomacy.

The third factor is the media. This study argues that Al Jazeera's role as an instrument of soft power is too big for a small country like Qatar. The Sheikhdome has the same media influence as that of a great power thanks to Al Jazeera media conglomerate, the channels of which are watched in more than 100 million households. Regionally, Qatar has a bigger voice than any other country thanks to Al Jazeera. This is because Al Jazeera is the first TV network that disclosed wrongdoings of authoritarian regimes. In fact, other regimes have had more fiscal power to have more influential media outlets but haven't achieved that due to censorship, whereas those media outlets that had the opportunity to broadcast freely, like Al Jazeera, took the attention of the people and got prominence. Perhaps, Al Jazeera would not have been so famous, had there not been state control on the other media in the Middle East.

Therefore, the argument that half of Qatar's soft power and half of the effectiveness of Qatar's foreign policy stem from Al Jazeera is no exaggeration. Qatar has always had an upper hand against its rivals thanks to Al Jazeera. In addition, the Arab Spring would not have spread throughout the region, had Al Jazeera not existed. The term 'Al Jazeera revolution' might not be exactly true but it is not wrong at all. It can be argued that Al Jazeera is both a game-changer and an agenda-setter. Further to the support of political transition, Al Jazeera spreads a pan-Arab, pan-Islamic, and anti-establishment ideology. It claims to defend the Arab and Islamic creed against external attacks, which reversely results in popular support and trust to the TV network. What the TV network does can be called the revival and reinforcement of Arab and Islamic identity, which mostly fits the constructivist theory of international relations.

Fourth, Qatar's other socio-cultural resources also contribute to its soft power. For example, Education City, launched by Sheikha Moza, produces science and strategies for Qatar. This compound hosts nine foreign and one local university as well as think tanks. Qatar benefits from the brainpower of foreigners working in these institutions and uses it for its foreign policy. Qaradahgi (2019) says "Size no longer matters for Qatar. What is important is the quality of people". Indeed, there are highly qualified expatriates working for the Qatari state in media, education, and commercial sectors. On the other hand, in terms of religion, it supports moderate religious groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood, to break the power of authoritarian regimes and bring democracy.

Yet, while supporting opposition groups, Qatar is concerned for its interests as well. This study argues that supporting the MB was a smart strategy since the group had a network spreading across the region. Qatari regime infiltrated into the conflicts during the Arab Spring via MB's branches. Almost all groups it supported in Yemen, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Egypt had an affiliation with the MB. Had MB's factions come to power in their countries, Qatar would have had an upper hand on them and it would have ensured its security via their support. For example, the ongoing Qatari blockade would have probably never happened. Besides, it would rule the region via the MB. Thus, a small state like Qatar would have probably had the loudest voice in the region. Conversely, other powers, such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, would have hesitated to clash with Qatar.

On the other hand, hosting the FIFA 2022 World Cup will boost Qatar's image. If the event is held without a problem, it will be a success story for Qatar. In fact, as Dorsey (2019) said in the interview, Qatar already got what it wanted since it won the bid against a strong rival candidate, the US. The tournament will be held in a desert climate and in winter. Besides such achievements, Qatar is also expected to be a very well-known country when the final match is over in Doha in 2022. Many countries have hosted the FIFA world cup but the distinctiveness for Qatar is that it is known as a small country. Based on this fact, this is why this study argues that smallness or middleness is not always related to size. In addition, the humanitarian organizations of Aspire Academy and Qatar Foundation are not at sight but they do enormous things in terms of soft power. Since they mainly address foreign youth, it can be argued that it is sowing seeds of the future in the hearts of millions of young people, who will feel owed to Qatar in the future.

In addition, this study argues that when all resources of Qatar are entirely and subtly exerted, Qatar punches above its weight and obtains middle power status. In the same vein, the study does not accept traditional definitions of small states, which are based on the size of population, territory, and so on. The criterion should be power rather than size. For instance, Qatar, thanks to its soft power, could secure itself in a region where there are hostile countries. To give some examples, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt have been adversaries of the Sheikdom for a long time. However, they haven't been able to bring it to their terms. Even their ongoing air, sea, and land blockade did not make Doha step back. In fact, they could have invaded this militarily

weak country but they did not. Leaving aside the US base, the other basic reason is the international support to the Emirate, which Qatari government had accumulated through lobbying, foreign support, and investment abroad. In this way, Qataris made other countries support the country against hostile countries and eventually they achieved to maintain their security by this support. In addition, Qatar challenged the US and Israel and disrupted their plans for the region. Particularly, Al Jazeera's anti-American and anti-Israeli coverage was salient.

Qatar have overcome all these challenges via its soft power, which is not in line with international relations theories. For example, individuals, not the state, are actors in Qatar as opposed to realist theory. Moreover, Qatar bandwagons with the US for its security, complying with realist theory. However, instead of enjoying its security, it has got involved in regional conflicts through mediation and intervention. This behavior is hardly explained by theories. On the other hand, it has propagated Arab nationalism and political Islam. In other words, it self-constructed, or more literally, revived an identity. While constructivist theory argues that states with similar ideologies and norms come together, it does not mention about a state's constructivist efforts. Whereas, Qatar is trying to cement an Arab nation with Islamic faith and democratic system. Thus, the Sheikdom has also surprised constructivists. However, the contradiction is that Qatar itself is not a democratic state. On the other hand, while Qatar's policies were complying with complex interdependency of liberalism, its actions for utilizing from interdependency and using the dependency like hard power does not exactly match the theory.

However, despite ensuring its security, being a regional actor, and gaining reputation thanks to soft power, Qatar's utilization from its soft power is not immune to criticism. First of all, there are moments when no country defends the other if the protector has internal problems. For instance, Qatar could persuade US President Trump not to go too far during the early days of the blockade. However, it may not always be so lucky. Moreover, Turkey will probably support Qatar as long as Recep Tayyip Erdogan or any other pious leader holds power. Yet, if a secular party rules Turkey, certainly it will not support Qatar and withdraw its troops. Therefore, since friendship is based on conditions such as who the leader of the protector country is and the protector's interests, it may not be possible to uphold sovereignty by relying on other countries.

Moreover, soft power might turn into soft disempowerment if not exerted subtly. For example, having an assertive diplomacy is good for Qatar but it also causes new enmities. As witnessed since 1995, the more Qatar got involved in regional politics, the more its rivals like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt opposed the Sheikhdom. For example, the blockade is a result of such enmity. Perhaps, pursuing a silent diplomacy and avoiding interventionist policies as it did during the Arab Spring will be better for the Qatari regime. Besides what has happened until now, how Qatar will manage FIFA 2022 World Cup organization will be a test for soft power or soft disempowerment. If it succeeds, its international image will boost. If not, its image will be damaged dramatically since all eyes will be on Qatar.

If a SWOT analysis was to be made, it would be as follows:

STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES	OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
1) Financial Resources	1) Small Population	1) US and Turkish Military Bases	1) Hostile Neighbors
2) Ambitious Rulers	2) Expats Comprising 88% of Population	2) Economic Weaknesses of the Countries Where it can Invest	2) US and Israel's Unexpected Con Policies
3) Al Jazeera	3) Laws Against Foreigners	3) Regional Conflicts	3) Aggressive Foreign Policy
4) Mostly Completed Diversification of Revenues	4) Inadequate FDI	4) Lessons Learned From Past Experiences	4) Being a Rich Small State
5) A Rich Population that will not Revolt	5) Weak Tourism	5) Global Brands	5) Black Propaganda of Hostile Countries
	6) Military Power		
	7) Lack of Qualified Citizens		

Finally, this study suggests the following proposals for Qatar's foreign policy:

- Qatar must return to mediation diplomacy and avoid solo intervention in the political transition of other countries. It should re-gain respect, trust, and be known as a neutral country. On the other hand, it should not break with popular groups that distance themselves from violence, e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood. In case of incurring accusations, it should point out its support of the will of people in a stronger manner as it seems to have not offered adequate explanations about its exact policies.
- The Qatari Foreign Ministry should not try to turn its policies into a showcase. A more silent diplomacy should be preferable. Such a shift will lessen negative reactions.
- The rift with Saudi Arabia hurts Qatar extensively. In case bilateral relations are recovered, it should work harder to maintain good relations. However, it should not side with Saudis for their political interests. For instance, it should not sacrifice its relations with Iran or Hamas, which is a partisan group, for the sake of good relations with Saudi Arabia. Both countries should be deaf and blind to each other's clouts unless their interests clash.
- Elections for Al Shoura should be held, which is a sign of progress in democratic transition.
- The quality and quantity of weapons it possesses should be increased. It should also implement compulsory military service to its citizens.
- Qatar's birth rate is quite low (1.91 births per woman). Hence, the state should encourage its citizens to have more children. Moreover, highly qualified foreigners who have been living in Qatar for certain years should be granted citizenship.
- Al Jazeera should not be privatized. Its current coverage should continue as it is.
- Qatar is not an attractive destination for tourists. Currently, there are no adequate places to visit. It should build new sights that will lure tourists. For example, a canal dividing Qatar into two parts with residences and shopping centers on the banks is advised.
- The Sheikdom is not attractive for foreign direct investment, either. While Qatar invests in foreign countries, foreigners do not invest much in Qatar. It can begin by lifting corporate taxes.

- Qatar should not keep its cash and investment in certain countries. Instead, it should reserve it in more countries and diversify its investments.
- It should not exaggerate sports investments in Europe. Instead of purchasing football teams, placing ads on their shirts will be more influential. In addition, sports events conducted every year should be preferred over ad hoc events.
- Kafala (Sponsorship) System for foreign workers must entirely be abolished.

Overall, this study concludes that Qatar is a middle power as power matters rather than size. Qatari state has strong economic power, which it turns into soft power. In addition, it uses it to protect itself, to be an international actor, and to increase its influence. Particularly, the last two policies are of middle powers rather than small states. On the other hand, it enhances its soft power in order to defend itself, thereby justifying that countries can protect themselves with soft power, which is the case for Qatar now. Moreover, having networks of humanitarian aid, investments, media, and diplomatic missions are indicators of being a middle power. Qatar owes all this success to its soft power. Yet, this study also argues that excessive use of soft power is risky and might provoke backlash. Therefore, the Sheikdom must switch from an uncontrolled to an intelligent use of soft power..

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ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: INTERVIEW WITH ANONYMOUS QATARI OFFICIAL, 23 APRIL 2019

What do blockaders want from Qatar?

Even we are trying to find an answer to this question. Blockaders also don't know the answer. Because their claims are baseless. The blockade was pre-determined by the UAE. The UAE bought Egyptian media and Saudi liberals. They want to break Qatar's influence. Before Qatar News Agency's (QNA) was hacked, Qatari Emir met with other leaders and there was no problem. On that day there was a military school graduation ceremony. Normally, Emir does not speak in such events. But the speech leaked is allegedly the one that Emir would address during the ceremony. It was intentionally prepared and leaked. Qatar's soft power annoyed their street since Qatar sided with the people.

Why are blockaders blaming Qatar for supporting terrorism?

Let's leave aside S. Arabia and talk about the UAE. It has MB-phobia. They finished MB-affiliated Islah Movement in their country. The UAE is against free speech. It is the country that banned entrance of more people to their territories than any other country. It is a police state. It injected the same habit to Saudis. Seyyid Kutub and Ali Tantavi, etc. were all at Saudi TVs in the past. They did not have a problem with MB. S. Arabia thinks it needs the UAE. So, they act together. This strife is an American project. Trump played with all sides. Saudis try to appease Americans by secularization. A crazy man (MBS) wants to come to power. He killed Khashoggi even before becoming the King. He went to America and promised Aramco to US businessmen. US supported him. But he was wrong when he thought Americans will ignore Khashoggi murder. US has many trump cards against Saudis. They can use them whenever they want. Regarding the murder of Khashoggi, it had two reasons. One was to stop the emergence of a new opposition leader. Second, to harm Turkey.

Where is this situation (blockade) going?

No change for the moment. It will continue. We don't fear Saudis politically. S. Arabia's woman ambassador to USA called a woman journalist to the embassy. They still do the same mistake. They call her to kill. But the journalist refused the call. How they think that they can kill a journalist in Washington where world politics are decided? See their logic.

Soft power is influential against them. But it is not enough to struggle with hostile countries.

We made many military agreements after the blockade. Another issue, while they founded entertainment channel (MBC), we founded a news channel (Al Jazeera).

Why does Qatar invest abroad but not in its country like Dubai?

Dubai's economy is getting worse. They just do money laundering.

Won't it be good to return back to mediation diplomacy?

We already think of it. We are reorganizing our diplomacy. But Saudis and Egyptian try to prevent even mediation diplomacy. For example, Saudis and UAE paid 3 billion USD to Sudan. They also helped Sisi. They put heavy conditions in return. Theirs is money diplomacy.

What is the role of religion in Qatari foreign policy?

Ideologically, we don't use religion. Not us but Islamic groups ask our help diplomatically.

Qatar is a monarchy but supports democracy in other countries. Isn't it contradictory?

Our Emir is inside his people. We have no problem with our people. We do not oppress them. We also made trial of democracy. For example, we conducted local democratic elections. Our people are globalizing. It is not possible to shape their lives.

If someone wants to drink alcohol during Fifa 2022, will you allow that?

There is no other choice. They will drink.

ANNEX 2: INTERVIEW WITH AHMED YUSUF (EGYPTIAN JOURNALIST BASED IN QATAR), 23 APRIL 2019

Can Qatar defend itself militarily?

Qatar relied on GCC states in the past. With blockade it understood its vulnerability and purchased weapons from different countries. It also conducted military drills. Besides, it sent military attachés to different countries. In addition, it established Barzan Holding that produces or buys military equipment.

Can Qatar be invaded by blockaders?

I don't think so. Because USA and EU will not allow it due to Qatari investments there. There is also US base, Al-Udeid. Also, the Pentagon defends a free Qatar.

What do you think about Al Jazeera as soft power?

It is a smart move to found Al Jazeera. With it, Qatar has its voice everywhere.

What about Qatari-MB relations?

Gulf countries actually have no problem with MB. During the Nasser era, MB members came to the Gulf and became influential in education. During the Arab Spring, GCC states saw how MB was powerful and feared. S. Arabia is hostile to

MB mainly due to the UAE. In UAE, it is the only alternative to the status quo. But many of their leaders are in prison.

Qatar supports people. Since MB is people, they support it.

Do Qatari-MB relations cause fury? Isn't it risky?

Qatar's foreign policy is different. They claim people must not be ruled by dictators. They advise dialogue.

Shouldn't Qatar return to mediation diplomacy?

The Arab Spring affected all countries. Not only Qatar but also for example Turkey sided with people. If dictators had not fought against their people, everything would be ok.


May MB come to power one day in the future?

Change in Egypt is very difficult. Any attempt may cause more chaos. Ihvan does not know politics. They relied on the army. This was wrong. On the other hand, Qatar follows constructive policies. When Sisi came to power, Qatar sent an envoy to Egypt. But Sisi refused.

What about individuals as soft power? Who are the most influential ones?

Former Primer Minister Jassim Al Thani was very influential. Also, Sheikha Moza, who founded the Qatar Foundation, is very influential. She prefers to be active instead of sitting.

ANNEX 3: INTERVIEW WITH ALI BAKEER (Ph.D., ANALYST), 28 DECEMBER 2018



ANNEX 4: INTERVIEW WITH ALI QARADAGHI (GENERAL SECRETARY OF UNION OF WORLD ISLAMIC SCHOLARS), 24 APRIL 2019

How do you see Qatari foreign policy?

The foreign policy of Qatar was shaped by Sheikh Qasim Al Thani in the 19th century. He did not fight Ottomans and followed a wise foreign policy. Qatar has

always opened its doors to the tortured. Those ulama coming from outside advised Al Thani rulers to love other people and behave with them well. The rulers deny apartheid. Sheikh Tamim follows the same paths of his ancestors, which is appreciable.

Qatar has a small population. Is it a problem in foreign policy?

Size no longer matters. The important thing is the quality of people.

What do Saudis and UAE ask from MB?

Their problem is not with Ikhwan. They are against any movement mentioning about jihad and politics. They are even against moderate Salafis. Those they jailed in S.Arabia are all Salafis.

What about Kuwait?

I like Kuwait's attitudes.

Why do Saudis and the UAE speak with Israel's mouth?

Hamas defends its own territories against occupiers. It is legitimate according to international laws. The matter is not Hamas. They just want to support Israel. Not Qatar but Saudis use religion politically.

What is the role of the ulama in Qatari foreign policy? Do you agree that they keep Qatar on current line?

Yes. They count on the ulama's advice. That is why they think differently from Saudis and the UAE.

ANNEX 5: INTERVIEW WITH SILAS KAMUNYA (KENYAN WORKER), 22 APRIL 2019

Tell us something about your working conditions.

I earn 2000 riyals (550 USD) per month. My company also supplies free accommodation, transportation, and food. I can not change my job as long as the 2-year contract is finished. I am happy to work in Qatar.

ANNEX 6: INTERVIEW WITH ABDULLA FUWAD (SRI LANKAN WORKER), 24 APRIL 2019

What are the working conditions here?

Before being a taxi driver, I worked for a Toyota distributor for 10 years. It was a good company. There was free accommodation and a higher salary. Now I earn only 40-50 (10-15 USD) riyals per day and pay my accommodation by myself. Life is more difficult now. I can not leave my job for one year. I expected to earn more money from taxi business but I was disappointed. I can leave my job but have to go back to Sri Lanka and start procedures for working from the beginning. It costs

almost 15,000 riyals, which I can not afford. I will have to wait for one year to change my job.

ANNEX 7: INTERVIEW WITH HAOUES TAGUIA (AL JAZEERA CENTER FOR STUDIES), 22 APRIL 2019

In respect to the last blockade on Qatar, tell us what is the problem between the blockaders and Qatar?

It is a problem of power between a small state and a bigger state (Saudi Arabia). Saudi Arabia considers itself as a hegemon in the region. Saudis rely on their hard power and try to control other states in the region. It is a matter of politics. Saudi Arabia considers itself as the leader and the hegemon of the region. It thinks it has the right of overseeing the behaviors of other countries. On the other hand, Qatar wants its autonomy (independence). But the hegemon (Saudis) does not want that. In the Arab Spring, they had different views. Qatar says to resolve the problems of the region, we should apply an inclusive approach. That means opposition groups should have a role in the system. This will prevent radicalization. They, including Islamic groups, should play a role in the political system so that there will be no justification of violence. If we prevent moderate movements, we let only radical movements. But for Saudis, they say if we accept elections, for example, the Saudi family will lose their power. Monarch will no longer nominate. Sometimes S. Arabia allies with MB. For example, they work with Islah in Yemen. Also, in Bahrain, they allied with MB. But sometimes they see MB as a threat.

Let's look from the Saudi perspective. They say Qatar supports political Islam, which is a threat to our throne. What do you think about that?

Political Islam is only a detail in Qatari foreign policy. It aims to reach political stability by an inclusive approach. It also mediated between Houthis and Hezbollah as well. So, it is not all about MB. Why is Qatari advocating them? Because they are big groups. Maybe they will support even seculars for stability. You can not exclude such groups.

Qatar could remain neutral. Why is it involved in conflicts?

Others are proactive, too. Look at Saudis. They are not neutral. They spread Wahhabism. Every country has its own securities. If stability is necessary for Qatar, it will of course support opposition groups. It will not just stay neutral to make someone happy.

MB was not all time considered as an enemy by S. Arabia. During the Nasser era, Saudis supported them. During the 1990s, MB supported Iraqis. S. Arabia then saw it as an enemy. Their attitudes change from time to time. It is all about politics and power.

How much is the power of MB in Saudi Arabia?

Sahwa (MB) is a large movement. They just want more rights and more transparency. In the long term, you can not sustain the situation. S. Arabia should help them to participate in decision-making. According to the Qatari perspective, if there is no inclusion, there will be a revolution. Qatar says inclusion is necessary for the stability of the region. Otherwise, there will be violence.

Why do Saudis and others accuse Qatar of supporting terrorism?

S. Arabia does not want any country to have independent diplomacy. It is a principle for them. Don't do anything before asking me. Second, S. Arabia recognizes the Palestinian Authority but not Hamas. They don't want any conflict with Israel. When Hamas continues fighting, Saudis know that they will be under the pressure of their people.

If Saudi Arabia decides to invade Qatar, who will stop them?

There are three obstacles to invasion. First, the army of Qatar. They can not stop but they can gain time. Second, there is a US base. US gives Qatar a guarantee for its protection. Third, Turkish base with 3000 soldiers. In addition, giving all power to Saudi Arabia will change the balance of power in the region. The US will not allow it. In the US, not the State Department but Pentagon decides about Qatar as the relation between two countries is military rather than diplomatic.

Is Al Jazeera free in its coverage?

Yes. For example, Qatar has good relations with Algeria, but Al Jazeera has no offices there. Because the Algerian government does not allow.

ANNEX 8: INTERVIEW WITH İHSAN AKTAŞ (PRESIDENT OF GENAR SURVEY COMPANY), 23 APRIL 2019

How do you see Qatar's Soft Power?

Qatar and Israel are two amazing countries because of their soft power and lobbying activities. They are the best in the world. I had advised the Turkish government in a report to learn lobbying from Qatar.

ANNEX 9: INTERVIEW WITH JAMES DORSEY (SENIOR FELLOW AT THE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AT SINGAPORE'S NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY), 3 APRIL 2019

- 1. Qatar seems to exchange its soft power with other countries' hard power, e.g. Turkey and USA. How sustainable is this policy? Can we coin it as combined power?**

Qatar is like Kuwait of 25 years ago. Conservative Kuwait was a satellite of Saudi Arabia while the less conservative Kuwait was a satellite of Cairo. While the rest of the world liberated the country. That was a soft power

paradox. That is the model Qataris adopted. With 300K population, it really does not matter how much hardware you have. You are not gonna win a war. The fact that Qatar has Turkish military base is more symbolic than anything else. They have also the largest US military base. That was not a result of soft power but regional realities which forced US presence. Soft power is not enough to protect Qatar with a small population. That is not where the world is going.

2. While Qatar is a small state (someone even calls it a microstate), it acts as a middle power. Can we put it into the group of middle powers?

It is not a question of whether being middle power or not. There many other states like Singapore, UAE, Oman, etc. There are various ways in which they acquire the leverage punch out of their weight not bow to bigger states. Each of them has been successful. I don't use this term. It is not about being small, big or middle. It is about using assets you have to create leverage to great powers.

3. Do you think that Qatar hardens its soft power through excessive use of it?

I don't think it acts like it has hard power. What it is doing is it is using its soft power to further its interest. That is every state, irrespective of their size, does.

4. Can a country like Qatar, which has a weak hard power, secure itself with soft power?

We should clarify what you are protecting yourself against. In case of Saudi-UAE led boycott, it is capable of protecting itself and doing very well. But if Saudi tanks would roll into Qatar, there is not much it can do. The fact that its soft power creates a major obstacle for Saudis to attack.

5. Do you agree that Qatar would not be negatively reacted so much if it was located in another region?

Probably not. It might not have that kind of foreign policy if it was in a different region. Because it would have addressed a different environment. Not geopolitics but environment defines foreign policy.

6. Is Al Jazeera a success story for Qatar?

A (bad planned) success story. Qatar is not a country that has freedom of press. But Al Jazeera is still a formidable competitor to institutions like CNN and BBC. In such a region, Qatar attracts attention with Al Jazeera. That is exactly the way they wished to position themselves.

7. What might be the motives that couraged Qatar, a monarchical state, to support the democratization process in other Arab countries?

Working for liberalization in other countries is naive. Unlike Saudis and UAE that try to stop development, they support development. They also use it for their advantage.

8. What is the role of religion in Qatar's foreign policy?

They are Wahhabis just like Saudis. It an enlightened form of Wahhabism. It shapes the culture. I don't think it is a vital factor but it is still a factor.

9. Why does Qatar support Muslim Brothers (MB) despite that it adheres Wahhabism?

MB has been in Qatar from day one. Qatar is between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It did not copy the Saudi model. It doesn't have influential clergy except for Qaradavi. MB fills the vacuum.

10. Qatar uses the MB network in foreign policy. Can we call it hired power rather than soft power?

It is not a question of hiring power. That is not what they are doing. Saudis and UAE see political Islam a danger but Qatar does not.

11. How much do ad hoc sports tournaments like Fifa 2022 World Cup or cultural activities like intl forums contribute to Qatar's nation-branding?

I think it already has contributed.

12. Do you see a difference between Emir Hamad's and Emir Tamim's reign in terms of foreign policy in respect to soft power?

Nothing fundamental really. Potential change was undermined by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

13. Do you think Sheikha Muzah, former first lady, plays a great role in Qatar's decision-making?

She was major in extending the education sector. Major in projecting a role for Arab women. She was a very influential

14. How is foreign investment and aid used as soft power? Is Qatar distributing aid just for humanitarian reasons? Any political goals behind?

There are always other goals behind. All the Gulf States for the last half century has used foreign aid as a form of soft power. All countries do this.

15. In general, do you think Qatar benefits from soft power successfully?

By and large, it has been successful except labor issues. For several years labor force is worked against them but now it is in their favor. Intl trade unions praise Qatar(?). Great powers do not agree with each other but they all agreed to find a solution to Qatari boycott. That is Qatari position, not Saudi or UAE position.

16. How do you categorize Qatar's power; soft, smart or subtle?

Whatever is fine with. I look at reality instead of categories.

17. Considering some specific cases such as the Arab Spring and relations with neighbors, what would you do if you were Qatari Emir?

As a matter of principle endorsing what was happening rather than resisting, YES. To some degree mishandled it, e.g. in Egypt but still YES.

18. What is your expectation about the future of Qatar if it maintains current foreign policy?

It has done very well. Why would it change? It turns the crises in its benefit.

ANNEX 10: INTERVIEW WITH JOSEPH NYE (PROFESSOR AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY), 26 FEBRUARY 2018



Nye, Joseph S. <Joseph_Nye@hks.harvard.edu>
to me ▾

Feb 26, 2018, 7:11 AM ☆ ↶ ⋮

Qatar has a mixed success with using soft power. It gained from hosting Al Jazeera. It's hosting of football helped, but also hurt by exposing its labor practices to wide scrutiny

From: Ibrahim KARATAS <ibratas@gmail.com>
Date: Friday, February 23, 2018 at 7:36 AM
To: "Nye, Joseph S." <Joseph_Nye@hks.harvard.edu>
Subject: Qatar's soft power

Dear Mr. Nye,



It is my pleasure to contact you and present my good wishes for you.
The reason for disturbing you is to learn your opinion about the impact of Qatar's soft power in its foreign policy. Do you see Qatar's soft power successful? I need your opinion for my doctoral thesis.

Best Regards
Ibrahim Karatas
PhD student
Istanbul.

ANNEX 11: INTERVIEW WITH JOSEPH NYE (PROFESSOR AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY), 16 AUGUST 2018



Nye, Joseph S. <Joseph_Nye@hks.harvard.edu>
to me ▾

Thu, Aug 16, 2018, 2:23 I

Yes, that is accurate.



From: Ibrahim KARATAS <ibratas@gmail.com>
Date: Thursday, August 16, 2018 at 4:03 AM
To: "Nye, Joseph S." <Joseph_Nye@hks.harvard.edu>
Subject: Re: Gulf crisis upends fiction of a separation of sports and politics

Dear Professor,
I hope you are doing well.
Qatar, a small country with big soft power, and Turkey, a military power even if not so strong, combined their powers against their foes.
Can we call it combined power?
Wish you good health.
Regards
Ibrahim Karatas
Istanbul

ANNEX 12: MAHJOOB ZWEIHR (Ph.D., QATAR UNIVERSITY), 22 APRIL 2019

Do you think that Education City contributes to Qatari soft power as expected?

Education is a tool of soft power. Hosting universities like Georgetown and North Western that teach students from different nationalities, having activities, making researches, etc. are beneficial for Qatar in terms of having knowledge and developing policies. You even benefit from their name, for example, Georgetown. It is a part of branding and image.

Is Education City attracting foreign students?

Of course, it is attracting foreign students. A good number of university students are coming from other countries. Some families want to send their children to a Muslim country but want them also study at an international university. It is beneficial for them. It also means you are an open society and have academic freedom.

Dubai looks more attractive to foreigners? What is that Qataris don't do when compared with Dubai? For example in terms of tourism.

Maybe socially they are more open and less restricted. Maybe foreigners are seeing Qatari life more conservative.

What about the current blockade and accusations that Qatar supports political Islam?

These claims are just for justification of the blockade. It is about regional hegemony and about preventing Qatar's independent policy. The father of political Islam is S. Arabia. Everyone knows this. So, accusations don't make sense.

Qatar also intervened in the domestic politics of other countries.

It is hard to say intervening. For example, in Libya, there were international alliances. Qatar was one of them. Qatar thought the will of the people was in favor of revolution and change. It could support status quo but it preferred to support the will of people.

Qatar is also a monarchy but it supports the democratization process in other countries. Isn't it contradictory?

No. They say this is what people want, so, we support it. They don't say we support democracy. They say we support people's choice.

What about Qatar's attitude in Bahraini spring? It did not support popular protests.

Gulf situation is about regional security. Qatar is also a GCC state and has commitments. They supported the stability of Bahrain but also listened to the demands of people.

If there was not an American base, would blockaders invade Qatar? Can they do it in the future? Who will stop them?

I don't think so. In the first week, there was this possibility. But now it is not possible. S. Arabia is already involved in Yemen and draining its economy and military. Also, Americans will not allow it.

What is the role of Turkey?

It is an ally. There are good relations between the two.

Is Al Jazeera a tool of the Qatari government or an independent company?

It is independent. It does not reflect the Qatari view. But it is still a Qatari TV. TRT may reflect Turkish views but Al Jazeera does not always do it for Qatar. But it was

useful for Qatar during the blockade. Because it spread Qatari views and made people know them.

Why is Qatar making so many sports investments?

These are parts of branding. Sports bring image, tourism, willingness to collaborate, openness, etc. It is a confirmation of capability.

What is the goal of relief aids?

I am not sure it is driven by religion. Qatar collaborates with the UN and other recognized global NGOs.

In the 1980s Kuwait had the same foreign policy but it could not escape from invasion. Do you think Qatar may have the same end?

I think the world and political order have changed. I don't think the same will happen to Qatar.

What about expatriates? They form 88% of the population. Are they a threat to Qatari security?

You need development, infrastructure, etc. Qatar needs them. They are beneficial. If you have laws and maintain security, nothing will happen.

Is being so rich a threat for a country?

People will envy and be jealous of you. But it can not be a reason to attack a country.

ANNEX 13: INTERVIEW WITH MEHRAN KAMRAVA (PROFESSOR AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, QATAR), 22 APRIL 2019

Please clarify subtle power. Is it another type of power like soft power?

Yes. That is what I think. When I was giving a talk in Spain, the majority of questions were like "How do we get Qatar to invest in Spain?". This got me think what is it about Qatar that makes it so attractive? I realized over the years that Qatar has some sort of power and influence. It is not hard power (military and economic power). It is not soft power. It is a different power. There are certain characteristics about Qatar. One is Qatar, despite its size, has convening power. It has the capability to set agenda in intl forums. It has also been able to get a seat in many intl forums. I realized that it has a reputation from the mid-90s up until the Arab Spring. It was interested in negotiations, conflict resolutions, information dissemination (via Al Jazeera). I realized that there are some different Qatar has. When you put them together it forms a different type of power. It is not military, cultural, etc. It is a power behind scenes. It sets the agenda and enables Qatar to involve in certain discussions. I called it a subtle power.

In the 1980s Kuwait was doing the same. Was Kuwait a subtle power at that time then?

Soft power is not permanent. It rises and falls. Subtle power has the same. It depends on intl developments and country's conduct. I don't have an idea about Kuwait. But it was invaded by Iraq. Subtle power not necessarily save countries.

We should define power correctly. Is power the ability to influence the behaviors of others or are there other dimensions? Is it to set an agenda? Look at Switzerland or Singapore. They don't have military power. But they have some sort of profile that gives them gravitas, influence, etc. That to me is reputational power.

Qatar has soft power and Turkey has military power. When they are combined, can we call it "combined power"?

Surely when you combine these two, they will have the strength to bring issues to the table. I am not sure, but it may be.

Qatar has no human power. Most of the population are expatriates. For example, most Al Jazeera employees are foreigners. Is it hiring power? Can we call it "hired power"?

Ultimately it is Qataris that set Al Jazeera's agenda. But there is nothing wrong. Everybody does it. But you are correct. Demography is a problem for Qatar. I never thought about this. When this blockade happened, Qataris feared that expatriates would leave. That is the biggest vulnerability that Qatar realized after the blockade. I can tell you that structurally expatriates won't leave. Even in Kuwait, they came back.

Can expatriates be provoked by their home country?

Governments fear that. But I don't see this as a possibility. Because immigration is strictly securitized.

You know Bahrainis gave citizenship to Chechnians to change the demographic balance? Is it a model that Qatar can be inspired by?

They also gave to Baluchis of Pakistan. In the Qatari military, there are second or third generation Balluchis. Many in city police, there are Yemenis. Most of them are citizens. But there are different categories of citizenship. Few people with key positions were given citizenship.

Is Qatar a middle power?

Regionally it is a middle power. But not globally. But globally Qatar has more power, for example, than Egypt, Nigeria, etc.

What about smart power? Is it a type of power or strategy? For me, it looks like a strategy.

You may be right. I have never thought about that.

To where Qatar is going? Is it excessively using its soft power?

Qatar got a little too confident during the Arab Spring. They got involved in Libya. When they overran Gaddafi's compound, the first flag that was raised was Qatar's

flag, not rebels'. Then Qataris thought they could do in Syria what they did in Libya. But when more powers involved in Syria, they realized this is too much. So, they pulled back. My sense is that they are a little reluctant now.

Qatari foreign policy parallels that of Oman. But Omanis do it silently, without attention, etc. which is more effective. But Qataris do mediation as a show. They do it in Sheraton, call Al Jazeera, and turns it into a show. While Omanis are interested in the result, Qataris are interested in the process itself or let say reputation.

ANNEX 14: INTERVIEW WITH MOHAMMED FARAJ (QATAR MUSEUMS), 22 APRIL 2019

Why does Qatar build so many museums? To attract tourists?

Not exactly. It just wants to build and save its own culture. Qatar has a deep Bedouin and seaside culture but no work has been done till now. With these museums, we protect our culture and let other people see them. We have no concern about the number of tourists.

ANNEX 15: INTERVIEW WITH MOHAMMED FARAJ (QATAR MUSEUMS), 22 APRIL 2019

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ANNEX 16: INTERVIEW WITH SALEH GHARIB (AL SHARQ NEWSPAPER) 23 APRIL 2019

Please tell us something about Qatar's culture.

First of all, it has the same heritage as the Gulf area. But culturally countries are very different. Every day Qatar has cultural events. There are also many museums. Before I was preparing one page for culture. Now I prepare 4-5 pages.

Do museums attract foreigners?

Yes. Qatar Airways make tours for transit passengers. This makes foreigners know more about Qatari culture.

Dubai seems to attract more tourists, doesn't it?

After the Gulf crisis, less people visit Dubai. It is not as attractive as before.

What did Al Jazeera change?

It changed all Arab media perspective. There was censorship in Arab media. When Al Jazeera came into being, they changed everything. Broadcasted what could not be broadcasted before. Al Jazeera broadcasted without any censorship. It was for news,

not for entertainment. When Al Jazeera invited Israeli officials, other Arab countries got crazy but they had relations with Israel under the table.

Saudis founded Al Arabiya but could not compete with Al Jazeera.

Can they invade Qatar?

Invasion is not possible. Things have changed.

After the blockade started, Qatar looked for ways to break dependence on S. Arabia and achieved. It can supply food on itself.



BIOGRAPHY

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A. EDUCATION

MA: Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University, Political Science and International Relations, 2017, Istanbul

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Specialist/Supervisor, Turkish Airlines (2009- Still working).

C. PUBLICATIONS

Karataş, İ. (2019). Avrupa’da Popülist Partilerin Yükselişi; Hollanda’da PVV Örneği.
Ahi Evran Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler



