

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GLOBAL SECURITY

Nation - States and Fragile
Transnationalism



Dr. Murat Aslan

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON

GLOBAL SECURITY

NATION-STATES AND
FRAGILE TRANSNATIONALISM

- PANEL I** Global Patterns of International Politics | Shadows over Multilateral System
- PANEL II** Co-existent Cooperation and Competition | Sustainable Regionalism
- PANEL III** Challenges to Security, Old and New, in a Post-Pandemic World: States as Providers and Consumers
- PANEL IV** Transnationalism | New Perspectives and Beyond

28 2022
April Thursday

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CONFERENCE



Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft / German Orient-Foundation
-Deutsches Orient-Institut/German Orient-Institute-
german-orient-institute



1. THE CONCEPT OF THE CONFERENCE¹

Introduction²

The quest of reaching a 'secured' environment somehow de-securitizes the state actors due to competing 'multiple and complex' units, motivated by contradicting goals. Other than states, a range of units are either dependent or challengers to the security architecture of the state actors. Given the spectrum of the individual human, social groups, society at all, transnational society, and non-state actors, either armed or not, humanity as a whole covers the future generations. The states are concerned, constrained, and committed to achieving security by emerging aspects and means.

The security conceptualizations comprise both hard and soft concerns of modern life. In this sense, the military is the essential pillar of the security establishments. But there exist emerging trends in the frame of the intangible factors such as societal rights and order, prosperity, rule of local and international law, environmental concerns, and human rights. In this sense, the single word of equity and respect have become new parameters for displaying a secured life. Accordingly, states are still in charge of responding to the mentioned concerns, but it is a fact that the state actors are short of settling them since the root causes of 'modern' threats and concerns, along with the ones who are exposed. Hence, the analysis's complete range of units mentioned above, additional to state actors, has been blended into a search of varying security commitments. On the other hand, the 9/11 attacks beamed a new wave of assessments to review the widening and deepening security themes retreating the modern interpretations to the hard power practices across the new emerging term 'homeland', mainly in the USA. This term argues the integrity of the demarcated country against any threat type even through 'pre-emptive measures' though; threat conceptualization has changed, as can be observed by the perceived societal security against immigration and environmental and humanity security under the shade of climate change.

¹ This concept has partially been submitted to the Politics Today Journal for publication. Murat Aslan, "Stability, Resilience and Chaos in the New World Order", Politics today, 13 March 2022, <https://politicstoday.org/stability-resilience-and-chaos-in-the-new-world-order/>, accessed on 26 April 2022.

² The Introductory remarks are excerpted and updated from the concept of the International Conference of 'Homeland Security': Emerging Trends, Challenging Aspects which had been drafted by Dr Murat Aslan. Murat Aslan, Abstract Book of the International Conference of 'Homeland Security': Emerging Trends, Challenging Aspects (Gaziantep: Hasan Kalyoncu University, 25 May 2021).

Global security has the extraordinary characteristics that states, irrelevant to their strength, are short of responding through their capacities. Global escalations, with surprising inputs in our knowledge base, have affected the transforming normal of humans, society, and humanity in this sense. The term 'normal' has been blurring since old-fashioned, modern, and post-modern have intertwined with each other. We are experiencing a mixture of old and new conceptualized (or not conceptualized) political phenomena enriched by emerging challenges. Such a composition of complex developments pushes all actors of international politics into perplexity.

The scholarly frequented phenomena of today shaped our understanding of international and transnational security under the clout of natural disasters, societal mobility, pandemic diseases, climate change, or living standards. There is no unity and resilience to address these emerging risks among the state actors, though; the awareness has been expanding among individuals, civil society, and the global public. In this frame, actors of the international community are encouraging the consciousness to put the concerns on the agenda. This pattern requires resilience, collaborative engagements, and compliance with the prerequisites of the exposed dangers. Unfortunately, the states' commitments to keep it at the least tolerable level are not the same as those affected by global security concerns.

There occurred a consensus among state actors to take joint action against the well-circulated threats. Nevertheless, they ignore the issues that have an economic or political impact on the continuity of sovereignty, economic interests, and territorial gains. For instance, global climate change has been the theme for most states, in parallel with the demand of individuals or societies. The developing states with vast populations, like India and China, refrain from complying with the Paris Conference decisions, while the US stance is vulnerable to any governmental policy change. In other words, individuals and communities press for a 'change', and states resist while individuals and society, by themselves, challenge the climate objectives by insisting on consumption habits. Like the climate challenge, the protectionism in culture and identity pushed the individual and community press on the state. Cultural and identity protectionism have been equated to countering immigration and alienating differences.

Another case worth scrutinizing is the pandemic disease of the last two years. There has been a solid stance to fight against COVID-19 at all analysis levels and units in international politics. But vaccine diplomacy, affiliated with the vaccine economy, diverted the firm stance to a competitive pattern of the states to profit most from the vaccine sales. On the other hand,

the economic consequences of the pandemic disease boosted the concerns on political security and regime continuity in some countries. In other words, the pandemic could not prevent conflicts across the globe, like in Syria and Libya, while its consequences can devastate the order of the international political system. It has caused the resilience away from the dedicated cooperation and grants of the developed states to the least developed ones other than symbolic commitments.

Global concerns, as depicted with the emerging 'soft' threats and challenging situations above, are not only about the experienced traumas in our lives but cover a broader spectrum. The newly emerging concerns can form a long list like digital currencies, space mining, cultural expansion, shaping consumption habits, digital space, or importing the 'brains' from the developing states. These new challenges will be on our agendas as humans and society feel their impact in the ordinary course of our lives, surpassing the degree of toleration. Hence states or groups of them will be compelled to compete for more gain or most protectionism against the new interpretations of security.

Visiting Past Adapting the New in the New Security Agenda

The demise of the Soviet Union, or the end of the Cold War, has brought a new era, described mainly by attractive words. For instance, Fukuyama's *The End of History* celebrated the triumph of capitalism, while the United States of America (USA) was perceived as a 'hyperpower' by some American scholars. Meanwhile, the scholars of International Relations focused on alternative readings of the theoretical debates. In the post-Cold War era, concurrent with the Agenda for Peace of Boutros-Ghali, peace operations introduced and justified new sorts of interventions. But 9/11 attacks and the Arab Spring introduced many new concepts, mainly emanating from the practices of the states, such as the War on Terror, pre-emptive strikes, demography conflicts, asymmetric warfare, hybrid war, proxy, etc.

Other than global peace and conflict trends, Russia – based concerns of 2020 reminded a crucial fact to the globe. Russian expansionism, essentially towards Europe, reminded the Cold War conflicts, which can be reviewed by conventionality – unconventionality, regularity – irregularity, or stability operations, although the new concepts enriched the old ones. This pattern, which I call 'robust-security', will require a modified strategy-making across the globe, spanning from individual to supra-states, considering the old and new concerns.

Strategy-Making for Multilayered and Multilateral Security

Strategy-making of this era, with its obligation to address the complicated structures and threats, requires flexible and critical thinking with intelligent technologies. The policymakers

must scan more dynamics, actors, and variables of all sorts with an analysis and synthesis capacity. Predictability becomes compelling as options increase for all brands of actors in the international realm. In other words, the probabilities of 'misunderstanding' and 'miscalculation', which may spark any conflict, have become a risk for peace and stability. Besides, the features of the contemporary era, which integrate modernity and pre-modernity with new interpretations, require all international community actors to invent sui generis modus operandi for all political, economic, military, or environmental courses of action. Then, the strategy-making of today must address multi-layered concerns of 'unusual' situations to be prepared for the worst-case scenarios.

For all sorts of actors, and against the new security environment, the strategy-making process needs to cover the emerging structure of today's politics. In this frame, actors prefer to use multilateralism as the new mood of the day. This phrase implies the existing superpower – the USA, and the potential ones with long-term projections like Russia, China, or the EU. For instance, Russia is concerned about re-establishing the former Soviet 'sphere of influence'. At the same time, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is inclined to be a superpower to honour the 100th anniversary of the PRC with a pledge to the teachings of Mao and Deng Xiaoping.

On the other hand, the USA is committed to countering the emerging superpowers while building a check mechanism upon the Allies and partners. One can then question whether multipolarity brings stability as the Cold War achieved through mutually assured destruction or impose a 'Cold Peace' to sustain the low-intensity conflicts with emerging modus operandi. The picture in this international politics expands the courses but strains the states' options.

Regionalism's Scattered Structure

Other than global politics, there exists another complexity of actors, dynamics and events in the regional systems. Buzan's regional security complex includes new, uncontrollable inputs that classical balance of power or bandwagoning strategies do not fit modern concerns. For instance, the Gulf Countries are beyond their traditional area of interest but span vast regions, rather than the Gulf itself, with their wealth, only to compete.

The 'glocalism' pushes these states to observe the concerns of their citizens due to the trauma of Arab Spring (or winter) while displaying that their regimes (not their state-actor) can play a challenging role only for credibility. On the other hand, there has been no change in searching for security from the external actors with their rentier economies. Compared to the Gulf countries, the Middle East appeared to have more regional systems inside with a multilayered regional system. On the other hand, regionalism in Central Asia, the Balkans, or

the Caucasus reminds the Cold War era. As a result, regions have their *sui generis* characteristics. Nevertheless, the region's complexities can bring back the traditional threat perceptions of the Cold War.

States and the organizations of what the states make are short of covering the cobweb of individuals and communities. The strength of individuals vastly increased last two decades thanks to communication technology and human mobility. The interaction among the individuals of differing communities achieved new communities of interest as pressure groups on the state actors. States are not in total control of the individuals concerned about maintaining the state and regime securities. The fundamental challenge to the state is about loyalty, sacrifice, and dedication of the communities. Hence, a self-organizing body of individuals and their collectivity exist with unique interests, concerns, and commitments. This picture compels states to take conservative measures to preserve the societal order while encouraging a change abroad through access to the digital world. Hence, transnationalism is a threat to the state but inspired by the state for a controlled transformation in other actors.

After all the discussion on global and regional systems (and sub-systems), the scrutinized themes denote changes in the structure of actors and engagements in the international system. Traditional responses are still valid, but the expansion and deepness of the sectors and units in international politics entered a new phase. The essential feature of this new phase is the unsteadiness, intertwined dynamics, and degradation consequences. In this sense, neither of the international situations can be fixed to a particular course but needs a flexible treatment. The intertwined nature of the actors and dynamics requires a multidimensional response to the problems. Their synergy makes the new threats and concerns devastate all actors surpassing the capacity of any actor. Finally, degradation is about nature, humans, ethics, societies, or politics. Once degradation starts, norms and standards will be ostensible arrangements that international actors would normalize the conflicts, disregarding *Jus ad Bellum* or *Jus in Bello*. Finally, transnationalism consists of paradoxes for sustainable changes like the composition and course of the international system.

Then, the questions appear whether we should turn to original settings of international politics or keep up with the complex transformation by concise and precise engagements.

2. PROBLEM STATEMENT OF THE CONFERENCE

This Conference is designed to delving the emerging trends of security. For this purpose, the main argument of the Conference is that "**the conflicts are simmering, and peace is blurring anymore**". Therefore, the Conference will discuss the motto "simmering conflicts and blurring

peace" with a broad assessment of global patterns, regionalism, nation-state, and transnationalism. The overall problem statement in the Conference is whether global security is travelling to 'Cold Peace'. In this sense, the Conference will examine the questions delineated under the session discussions.

3. MODUS OPERANDI

The Conference will have four-panel sessions, either being physically attended in each venue of the participating organizations or through virtual meetings. Each panel will have a moderator with a keynote speech, and panellists will present their proceedings for distinguished scholars' critiques, comments, or contributions. The language of the Conference is English. The partnering organizations will arrange attendance and administrative coordination with the Conference Committee.

The Conference is partnered by the following universities and institutions:

SETA Foundation, Ankara (TÜRKİYE)

CAMEA / ISSI, Islamabad (PAKISTAN)

New Strategy Center, Bucharest (ROMANIA)

Deutsches Orient-Institut, Berlin (GERMANY)

Institute of International Relations, Athens (GREECE)

Georgia Strategic Analysis Center (GEORGIA)

Center for Diplomacy - Andrassy University Budapest (HUNGARY)

Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University (TÜRKİYE)

Hasan Kalyoncu University (TÜRKİYE)

Andrassy University (HUNGARY)

4. THE THEMES OF THE CONFERENCE

Keynote Speeches

10.30 hrs (Turkish Time)

Prof. Burhanettin Duran, General Coordinator of SETA Foundation

H.E. Amb. Dr Andreas Reinicke, The Director of Deutsches Orient-Institut

H.E. Amb. Aizaz Ahmad Chahudhry, The Director of Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad

Prof. Ahmet Cevat Acar, Rector of Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University

Prof. Heinrich Kreft, Center for Diplomacy, Budapest Andrásy University

Mr. Nodar Kharshiladze, the Founder of GSAC, Former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia

Panel I. Global Patterns of International Politics | Shadows over Multilateral System

SETA Foundation – Leading Institution of the Panel

International politics of this century is future-centric and inspired by political history. The foreseen multilateralism, which is in litmus test due to soft concerns and retreat to the conventional thinking of the Cold War, intertwined the international and transnational modes of politics. On the other hand, multi-centrism (or de-centrism), rather than multilateralism, might be another description of international politics to include transnationalism and regionalism across the sub-systems of the global structure. The new era is open to any interpretation of such, while the dynamic scope of not well-checked means transforms the modus operandi of different actors. In this sense, the panel will scrutinize the projections on multilateralism to visualize what contextual transformation could be observed. Under the shade of soft concerns, the blurring posture of peace and conflict will be examined. The problem to be addressed in this panel is if multilateralism is an appropriate conceptualization to depict the global political system.

Moderator: Prof. Murat Yeşiltaş, Director of SETA Foreign Policy Department, Faculty Member of Ankara Social Sciences University.

TIME	SPEAKER	TOPIC
11.00	Moderator's Introduction	
11.00	Prof. Talha KÖSE	Peacebuilding and Multilateralism
11.10	Prof. Heinrich Kreft	The Liberal Order Under Fire
11.20	Amb. Teodor Meleşcanu	Multilateralism in the New Political Environment
11.30	Mr. Nodar Kharshiladze	Two Factors of International Security
11.40	Q&A	

Deutsches Orient-Institut /ISSI – Leading Institutions of the Panel

Global events and dynamics are essential determinants of the international structure and developments. At the same time, regionalism has long been an appropriate response with which individual states react. Such reactions can be to global challenges, but they often revolve around regional issues. Subsidiarity has already been accounted for by Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, clearly encouraging the foundation and operation of regional organizations.

Aside from such primary literature, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver have introduced a more nuanced understanding of regionalism through their theory of regional security complexes, according to which regions are defined by the (security) interactions between different actors. The patterns of such interactions are understood as reliable, stable and definite, and often, such interactions are more frequent the closer the individual states geographically are.

This perspective can be helpful guidance in developing a more extensive understanding of regional dynamics, even though the borders of regions are sometimes blurred and overlapping, allowing for further division into subregions. The regional focus of this panel, the Middle East, is illustrative of this. A wide array of bilateral and multilateral relations exists between the different countries, some formalized, some not, far exceeding a narrow understanding of security.

In this panel, we would like to discuss the different layers of regional security in the Middle East. Among other ones, guiding questions to this end are: How do regionalism and regional security in the Middle East relate to international security? What effect could a higher level of (formalized) regional cooperation have on security in the region? How do recent events such as the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan or Russia's war against Ukraine affect these dynamics?

Moderator: Benedikt van den Woldenberg, Deutsches Orient-Institut

TIME	SPEAKER	TOPIC
12.00	Moderator's Introduction	
12.10	Amb. Martin Kobler	Regional security in the Middle East: The perspective from Germany
12.20	Amina Khan	The perspective from Pakistan on regional security

12.30	Dr. Murat Aslan	Coopting and Competing with Russia: Türkiye's Case
12.40	Bilgehan Öztürk	Türkiye's Normalization Efforts
12.50	Q&A	

Panel III. Challenges to Security, Old and New, in a Post-Pandemic World: States as Providers and Consumers

NSC – Leading Institution of the Panel

It can be hardly overstated that security has been increasingly complex; nor can one help but notice that reactive attitudes to challenges included therein are finely balanced by proactive steps when dealing with this reality. A simultaneous diversifying process is underway on both sides of the security equation, even as the expanding scope of old challenges is joined by new ones disregarding borders separating "hard" and "soft" security. The extent to which High-Tech is penetrating military products makes some worry about human responsibility being replaced by artificial intelligence; democratization of information, which has effectively contributed to development leaps, also opened opportunities for misusing social media and turning it into components of warfare. Moreover, the pandemic and geopolitical shifts in the power-relationship among various states and in different, yet interconnected regions, have revealed the impact of security-related factors on the global production and distribution chains of goods and peoples' mobility alike. All these developments fuel the need to review concepts and practices in international law and its enforcement.

Moderator: H.E. Ambassador Doru Costea, Member of the Scientific Council of the New Strategy Center, former State Secretary (Deputy Foreign Minister) for Global Affairs, Romania

TIME	SPEAKER	TOPIC
14.00	Moderator's Introduction	
14.10	Prof. Dominique David	Actors and Strategies: A New World – a French View
14.20	Amb. Dr. Andreas Reinicke	Repercussions of the Pandemic in the Global System: Geopolitics and Bloc Dynamics
14.30	Assoc. Prof. Ahmet Keser	From Asymmetric to Asymetrix Warfare in the Historical Progress of Recent Conflicts in Multi-layered and Multilateral Structure
14.50	Q&A	

Georgia Strategic Analysis Center – Leading Institution of the Panel

Transnationalism refers to the spread of economic, political, and cultural processes beyond national borders. The accelerated development of communication, transport, trade, and information networks through globalization has strengthened the countries' connections. It creates a greater degree of relationship between countries, communities, and societies across borders, bringing about changes in the social, cultural, economic, and political landscapes of societies of origin and destination. The appropriate policy interventions implement cross-border connections by States.

Leading transnational, multi-sited lives means that exchanges and interactions across borders are a regular and sustained part of countries' realities and activities. Nowadays, the role of international organizations is crucial for transnationalism. Global and regional organizations give countries equal ground in the international political arena, no matter their political, economic, and military capabilities, to voice their opinions and positions. Organizations create political and economic unity and mutual understanding between countries and help them to develop. On the 4th panel of the Conference, the most important issues are economic and political transnationalism. On these matters, our distinguished speakers will discuss the challenges and future perspectives of transnationalism, the role of organizations, and opportunities for small countries.

Moderator: Dr. Murat Aslan, İstanbul Sabahattin Zaim University, SETA Researcher

TIME	SPEAKER	TOPIC
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15.00	Moderator's Introduction	
15.10	Amb. Gheorghe Magheru	Transnationalism and State Transformations: from the Black Sea Region to the Balkans
15.20	Dr. Seher Bulut	Re-evaluating the regional integration in the ME: A Cause for regional (in)security?
15.30	Assoc. Prof. Mesut Şöhret	Transnationalism and Rising National Walls
15.40	Dr. Coşkun Soysal	Hegemony in World Politics: Toward a Transnational Hegemony?
15.50	Q&A	

5. ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES:

The transcripts of the speeches and presented proceedings will be published in an edited report. In this context, partnering institutions are highly expected to provide the texts in compliance with the provided format.

The Conference will be a hybrid of physical participation with required COVID preventive measures in the venue of each partnered institution and virtual presentation among the capitals. The virtual attendance needs special care for the functionality of their connection, software (ZOOM), and sound checks. The participants must display themselves on the screen during presentations. Technical control may be confirmed one day before the Conference to prevent any possible deficiency.

6. IMPORTANT DATES

Concept Submission to Partners (Completed)	9 February 2022
Coordination Meeting 1 (Completed)	25 February 2022
Coordination Meeting 2	23 March 2022

Coordination Meeting 3	13 April 2022
Paper Submission	15 April 2022
Coordination Meeting 4	22 April 2022
Coordination Meeting 5	26 April 2022
Technical Control of the Conference Conduit	27 April 2022
The Conference	28 April 2022

7. THE CONFERENCE BOARD

Prof. Burhaneddin Duran

Prof. Murat Yeşiltaş

Prof. Heinrich Kreft

Amb. Gheorghe Magheru

Assist. Prof. Murat Aslan (Coordinator)

Ms. Amina Khan

Ms. Helene Rang

Ms. Izel Selim

Mr. Benedikt van den Woldenberg

Ms. Ruso Chlaidze

8. CONFERENCE COORDINATOR

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Prof. Ahmet Cevat Acar

The Rector of the Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University

Dear Colleagues, Distinguished Guests,

On behalf of Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University, I would like to present my gratitude and thank those who facilitated this occasion. In this sense, I welcome future cooperation with the partnered institutes and Universities. I believe this event will contribute to our knowledge base after listening to the different perspectives of scholars and experts from nine countries and ten organizations.

This year's Conference's theme is global security regarding nation-states and transnationalism. Although the Conference was planned long before the Russia – Ukraine War, mainly focusing on the complexity of security concerns, the conflict of the latest two months reminded us of the mutual interaction of states and transnational patterns. We are now experiencing a war of conventionality and probability of non-conventionality. The post-Cold War era was coined with ambiguity and multi-ethnicism. The new millennium pointed out the outcomes of 9/11, although terrorism was not a recent phenomenon. But the colourful revolutions and Arab Spring, or winter, raised societal concerns. Maybe, due to the Iraq and Afghan interventions, security literature continued its expansion inventing new words, like proxies, hybrid etc.

Meanwhile, soft threats pushed the states to act. In this context, humanitarian catastrophes, societal turmoil, climate change, cultural protectionism, and many emerging concerns moved states to mobilize accordingly. Furthermore, societies demanded prosperity, a more stable environment for progress and honoured life. Once the State has ignored it, societal pressure has become an igniter to start revolts.

Today, we faced an old paradigm, war! Russia has started a military campaign with self-style arguments. Hence humans and humanity at all have scrolled back to the original settings of conventional warfare. But emerging soft threats that make states vulnerable are still there. It is most likely that immigration and wildfires of the latest year will continue to occupy our agenda. The pandemic will end, though; its economic impact will challenge the regime security in many states. We may face new soft threats that we could not even imagine now.

What should we, the epistemic community, do? First, we must continue searching and exploring to contribute to the progress. Then, we must share what we have concluded. It is a fact that neither of the states, communities, individuals, or humanity at all has the privilege to have an exception and exemption from the outcomes of current in-security.

I see this Conference as an opportunity to discuss the issue fields of questions of all sorts. The Conference is being broadcasted to nine countries. It will expand the consciousness of the communities in these countries.

I wish for a fruitful exchange of perspectives. I thank you, precisely the organizing committee since they built this opportunity.

Dear participants, Most esteemed guests, all our viewers from around the world,

I am glad to be addressing this meaningful Conference from SETA's offices here in Türkiye. Such forums that bring together valued experts such as yourselves are the engine behind research centres and academia, making this a significant event. I am glad to be with colleagues from Pakistan, Romania, Germany, Greece, Georgia, and Hungary in a truly international environment.

"Global security" has become a buzzword in the last two decades and has been the cause of many debates. As citizens of the world, we have witnessed how our societies and states have securitized in the last two decades. Some of this securitization impacts our own lives. We see this every time we take a plane or cross a border.

Security-related thinking has been dominating the international arena as well. The end of the Cold War did not bring about de-securitization but exacerbated the situation even more. Post-cold War peace operations in the Balkans, the deterioration of security in the Middle East, 9/11 attacks have characterized the first phase of securitization in our own region and the entire globe.

In the more contemporary era, discussions on security have focused on the post-Arab Spring in the Middle East, hybrid warfare, proxy warfare and the struggle against terrorism. Türkiye sits at the nexus of such developments. Türkiye's southern border continues to present one of the most complex security challenges in the region.

The situation in Syria and Iraq has led to heightened security calculations on Türkiye's part. Security in this sense does not simply refer to more stringent military activities or cross-border operations. Türkiye - like many other countries - is facing multi-dimensional security challenges.

Irregular migration, climate change, and asymmetric adversaries are all part of the list, with new challenges also presenting themselves. As recent events have illustrated, one of the most significant challenges to Euro-Atlantic Security, which Türkiye is an indispensable part of, emanates from Russia.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has once again highlighted the complex post-Cold War security environment for Europe and its immediate neighbourhood. Conventional methods of thought predicted that power, security, and competition would balance out in the post-Cold War world.

Instead, we are witnessing the resurgence of revisionism, hard power politics and heightened security calculations.

The security challenges of today's world are not singular like before. Bipolarity and unipolarity have given way to a novel multipolarity. Today's security challenges are complex, multi-faceted and asymmetrical. Countries and collective security organizations such as NATO are recalibrating their security architecture with these conditions in mind.

The events in Ukraine have reminded the world that the notion of security remains a highly fragile one. Yet today, our analytical lenses are more equipped than ever to contemplate such fragilities and produce responses.

I would once again like to welcome all of you to this Conference and would like to wish for fruitful debates.

"Europe is in danger"

The infamous and often quoted statement of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joseph Borrell, may have sounded exaggerated to some ears last year. This has changed dramatically!

The recent major Russian offensive in Ukraine, which began in the early morning of February 24 after seven years of frozen conflict, has triggered extraordinary international reactions that are likely to completely reshape the geopolitical reality in Europe and maybe even globally. This change must have come as a shock to many, including decision-makers in Russia.

Germany announced an extreme reshaping of its foreign and security policy, sending lethal weapons to Ukraine and announcing a drastic increase of its defense budget.

The EU is still a "military dwarf," but the organization's decision to support one of the fighting parties with lethal military aid could spark a debate on the supra-nationalization of the CFSP.

Current events have reinvigorated domestic debates in Finland and Sweden about possible NATO accession. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have officially asked for EU membership.

The escalation has also demonstrated the indispensability of the U.S. as NATO's anchor country and Europe's protecting power.

The only thing that is certain today is that Europe's future security architecture will look very different from what it did before February 24.

With a major war at the gates of the European Union we face an uncertain geopolitical future – also with a view to China and the global balance of power.

The liberal world order is under fire from various sides. I will be talking about this in my panel. Therefore, this conference is very timely!

My university is based in Hungary and Hungary has a border with Ukraine and was flooded with refugees like Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Moldova.

The EU has always not only been in the shadow but also in the dependence of NATO and thus of the USA and its military strength.

The order that had defined our world since the Second World War is changing, with profound impact on global security. A new multipolar world is emerging. Unilateralism by some powers is on the rise. Reliance on multilateralism is on the decline. The UN Charter principles of respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity are being disregarded and violated. Hatred for outsiders, also called Xenophobia, and hatred for Islam, called Islamophobia, remain at dangerously high levels. Consequently, the world politics is becoming deeply polarized. Amidst this growing global disorder, a complication of far-reaching consequences is emerging. The US is now locked in a major power strategic competition with China and Russia. This competition is now intensifying. There are concerns about the world getting divided into camps. Smaller and middle-sized countries are struggling to find the right balance in maintaining their relations with opposing major powers. Another challenge to today's geopolitics is the emergence of non-traditional security threats such as climate change, food insecurity, water scarcity, energy crunches, migration issues, cyber issues, disinformation campaigns, and lawfare. The world economy has also come under serious pressure firstly because of Covid 19 pandemic, and now more recently because of the war in Ukraine.

Ukraine War:

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has complicated the geopolitics of the world. The end to war is not in sight. A stalemate is prevailing. The NATO countries seem determined to provide a high level of military assistance for Ukraine. However, they have refrained from direct involvement in the conflict. This will likely prevent the war in Ukraine from spreading to other parts of the world. But, meanwhile, the civilian casualties are mounting. Ukrainians are fleeing to neighboring countries. The United States, European Union and members of NATO are likely to scale up their sanctions against Russia.

Since many of the European nations are dependent on Russian oil and gas, the European Union would need to find urgently ways to diversity their sources of energy away from Russia and into LNG imports and wind and solar energy. It is noted that the West is somewhat divided over implementing blanket sanctions against Russian oil and natural gas exports.

China is extending rhetorical support for Russia and many Chinese companies are maintaining their operations in Russia. While many Western companies are exiting Russia because of sanctions, the China's companies could fill the gap, and without violating the sanctions, they could expand their presence in Russia.

The COVID impact

The COVID 19 cases are trending down in most countries. This has enabled some recovery in services sectors and resumption of supply chains. China is still dealing with localized outbreaks. Since China is following zero-COVID policy, it may expedite steps to relocate manufacturing outside the country. China is also looking for new sources of energy, food and raw materials, which could bring some relief to commodities exporters.

Türkiye

The Turkish economy is also adversely affected by high inflation, a weakening lira and new global economic interruptions caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. On the Ukraine war, Türkiye, like many other countries is in a tight spot. On the one hand it needs to maintain neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war as it is worried about Russian energy and food exports to Türkiye. On the other hand, Turkish neutrality will not be appreciated well by its fellow NATO allies. In these circumstances, Türkiye might find it useful to improve relations with regional countries to get increased investment and trade.

The Gulf countries

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates could leverage their positions as major oil producers to win diplomatic concessions and military assistance from the United States.

Iran

The US and Iran are endeavoring to reach an agreement to resume compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, but there remain significant roadblocks to the nuclear deal. Regional tensions are also persisting, particularly between Iran and Israel, and between Iran and the Gulf Arab countries. On the positive side, if an agreement is reached, this could reduce pressures on global oil market. From the perspective of global security, any escalation of conflict involving Iran could be deeply destabilizing and oil infrastructure and commercial vessels in the Middle East could become a target. So, there are huge stakes in the nuclear deal negotiations.

Central Asia

As Russia's economy severely contracts due to Western sanctions and boycotts, the economies of Central Asia states, which are highly interdependent upon Russia, will undergo their own economic downturns. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are heavily dependent on Russian remittances, will likely be hit the hardest. There could be political instability and unrest.

India

India has adopted neutrality on the Ukraine war, mainly because of its highly interdependent relationship with Russia. This has caused some anxiety in the US, but the US has not reacted sharply because it considers India as an important ally in its counter China policy. On the economic side, energy and food prices are going up in India and supply chain disruptions are occurring for goods such as Russian fertilizers on which India depends. The priority for Indian government at this stage is to manage the economy such that there is no social unrest.

Pakistan

Pakistan is pursuing a policy of balanced relations with all major powers, including China, the US, and Russia. Its main preoccupation in the security realm is to deal with the terrorism threats posed by TTP and BLA. Pakistan is also concerned about the situation in Afghanistan. If peace does not prevail there, it would affect Pakistan. Within the country, the political uncertainty has brought the country's economy under stress. High oil and commodities prices are forcing the government to provide additional subsidies for low-income households, leading to higher fiscal deficits. The country has adopted a national security policy that gives primacy to economic security.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is suffering from a worsening economic situation and a humanitarian crisis of serious proportions. The Taliban government has not yet been recognized formally by the international community. Some terrorist groups are resurfacing. All this is a recipe for continuing instability in Afghanistan. The world expects the Taliban to meet the expectations of the international community on inclusive government, women rights, and counter terrorism measures. The ineffective governance and instability in Afghanistan should be a matter of concern for the world because if terrorist entities come back to Afghanistan, the region and the world will suffer. Abandoning Afghanistan will be a huge mistake.

In conclusion, it is important to identify four issues that continue to have an immediate impact on global security and the security of nearly every country of the world, as noted above: Without a doubt the war in Ukraine has complicated global security. The West's sanctions against Russia are also a factor of instability because while sanctions may achieve part of the

objectives, they create considerable negative side effects. It is not clear when and how the war would end. However, what is clear is that even if the Russia Ukraine talks succeed and a ceasefire is achieved in the Ukraine conflict, the West's sanctions against Russia are likely to continue. The Western countries would be reluctant to purchase Russian crude oil and natural gas. Food and energy prices would thus remain high.

As a result, high inflation has gripped major parts of the world. Food, fertilizer and energy prices have shot up. This is undermining economic recovery of most countries. The poor countries have been hit the hardest. Apart from the energy crunch and price hike, supply chain bottlenecks are also disrupting the economic recovery of most countries.

Social unrest in the developing countries and emerging economies could increase because the high energy prices have slowed down economic growth worldwide and are now affecting household cost of living, and operational costs of running businesses. Food and energy shortages will be a huge challenge for most of the emerging and developing economies because the governments have less fiscal space to find the right balance between fighting inflation and encouraging growth. Moreover, the threat of Covid 19 pandemic may have receded in some parts of the world. But its continuing presence in China indicates that the world must not lower its guard, learn to live with it, and find the right balance between economic growth and social distancing measures. There is also the threat of new, more contagious, variants of the virus.

While the world is going through testing times, it is important to accept the situation as it is and not as we want it to be, and thus is a timely reminder that global security is a collective responsibility – We are all secure if each one of us is secure. Conversely, we are all insecure if some of us are insecure. A return to UN Charter principles of inter-state conduct has never been felt more compelling than it is today.

Member of the Scientific Council of the New Strategy Center, Former State Secretary (Deputy Foreign Minister) for Global Affairs, Romania.

The first decades of this millennium started and ended more or less a scare that hardly materialized yet had a particular impact on people. Then 9/11 happened. And the world's security has never been the same by the decade's end. The economic crisis was raging in ways that they may remember the great depression almost a century ago, yet it was not. So, on the second day, in retrospect, the Arab spring at the beginning of that decade seems now to have heralded the developments that have been quite unthinkable. The pace of events quickened roughly every two years, and the world was jolted from one consequential happening to the next in 2014 due to Russia.

Next to 2016, the U.S. scored less than the conventional new administration in the White House, and the EU shrank for the first time in its history. At the end of the decade, we left the start of a crisis that has yet to end. We are at the beginning of the decade; Russia's invasion of Ukraine is another ongoing crisis. The uncertainty is the characteristic of that end and even more so for the day often. Now, these events have in common that all of them continued or raised challenges to security. Some of them are old, while others are pretty new.

However, these challenges share their relationship to security in its broadest meaning. And this is what makes them differ. One from another is primarily the actors involved in state and non-state players, yet their actions are often intertwined. Hence, another challenge emerges because the bottom line is where the critical responsibility for citizens and societal security. It is the state that is the depository of this responsibility. And then we must remember that everything happens against the background of all compasses fourth industrial revolution.

Although this industrial objective is a conventional term since the impact of the set revolution is hardly limited to the streets. Quite the contrary, I would say technical breakthroughs have been used first in the military domain since man's ancestors attached a sharp rock to a stick. So, the spear was born or the battle-axe or the arrow. Now unmanned aerial vehicles are joined by unmanned underwater. Drones' war is turning into hyper war, hybrid war, and cyber war. And the list is longer than I would care to mention right now; last but not least, the so-called unconventional or non-traditional challenges to security, like

climate change, the unintended consequences of the information, revolution, persistence, and social gaps.

This category of challenges seems to lose its novelty and unconventional nature gradually. One reason may be that finding viable solutions takes too long, transforming the challenges into familiar realities of our everyday life. Therefore, one needs to think out of the box because of the apparent truth; old solutions cannot settle that new problem. Even if they proved efficient, all these developments are fuelling the need to review concepts and practices of international law and its enforcement, among many other things.

11. ABSTRACTS

Peacebuilding and Multilateralism

Talha Köse³

The architecture of international peacebuilding shaped after the 1990s has undergone a significant change in the last couple of years. There is an increasing inclusion of local NGOs, local governments, and regional organizations that act in coordination with the UN or other international organizations. The overall organizational framework and logic of action of all these actors used to be compatible with specific reasoning. Coordination efforts of all these actors were, at the same time, a process that generated a common language and logic of action. The earlier experiences of multilateralism that tried to create a consensus forced local actors to adopt the multilateral organisation's perspective and sense of action. The overall track record of early efforts of multilateral peacebuilding did not generate harmonious policy practices.

In many cases, the local actors and transnational organizations had conflicts that reduced their effectiveness. Moreover, the trust gap between those actors led to dysfunctional practices strengthening the local capacity. Top-down coordinated multilateralism was designed to be more effective, but the track record of all the practices contradicted the expected outcomes. A more local-oriented, culture-sensitive and bottom-up approach to multilateralism was an alternative perspective that prioritizes the local capacity. This new logic of action prioritizes the local actors. The coordination problem between the local and transnational actors is still an issue, yet this shifts the sense of multilateralism to a local orientation. This will be a new experience in the coming years. The likely scenario is the emergence of new hybrid forms. Peacebuilding efforts in various parts of the world will be different forms of hybrid transnationalism. The specific practices of peace efforts will be the test case of this hybrid multilateralism.

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After World War II, a rules-based international order emerged under American leadership that overcame the chaos of the interwar period. It made a long period of prosperity and peace possible in the Euro-Atlantic region and other places like East Asia. And in the last instance, it also helped to reduce the antagonism between East and West. This order was decisively deepened after the end of the Cold War, and from then on, it can be called a liberal world order.

Such a liberal world order contains incentives for the democratization of the participating states. It builds on international institutions to deal with interdependence problems. It secures reasonably open borders and aims at the recognition of individual rights. This liberal world order and the global governance associated with it have come under tremendous stress in recent years from two sides. For example, shortly after Donald Trump's inauguration as US President, well-known political analyst Robert Kagan wrote that "the collapse of the world order, with all that, entails, may not be so far off." Later he added in even clearer terms, "The democratic alliance that formed the foundation of the liberal world order under U.S. leadership is unravelling."

At least in Eastern Europe, the peace that that alliance and that order underpinned collapsed on February 24 with Russia's attack on Ukraine. Donald Trump, however, was not the cause but the expression of a more profound crisis of the liberal order.

For years, we have seen a growing scepticism of multilateral organisations and free trade in the US and some other countries. Worldwide we have seen growing illiberal, nationalist critique of the existing order. To be sure, the catchphrase "liberal world order" is often described as a complex web of norms and institutions that was neither clearly laid down in one document nor was ever free of contradictions.

But suppose one looks at its normative core. In that case, three basic principles can be identified, which are also referred to in political science as the "triangle of peace" because of their peace-promoting effect:

Liberal democracy as the guiding model; economic cooperation within the framework of open economies; and institutionalized multilateralism within the framework of a rules-based order.

⁴ Professor for Diplomacy, Chairman of Diplomacy/Head of International Relations - European Studies / Hungary,

The institutions founded in the middle of the 20th century, such as the United Nations, in the economic sphere, the institutions created by the Bretton Woods Agreement, and in the security sphere NATO, but also the network of bilateral security guarantees of the United States in Asia, still form the backbone of this order today.

This order was still essentially limited to the Western world during the East-West conflict. Still, it became “globalized” to a certain extent after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Never before had liberal ideas determined world politics in such a profound way. In almost every part of the world, regional organizations adopted treaties to protect democracy UN-peacekeeping missions followed a liberal script and served as transmission belts for liberal regulatory policies.

Non-Western great powers such as China and Russia were increasingly integrated into the liberal order, linked to the hope that they would become “responsible stakeholders” in that order. Further free trade rounds accelerated the exchange of goods, capital and services. At the same time, the network of international organizations grew ever tighter, and their power increased. The European integration process took on new momentum in the 1990s, leading to both an enlargement and a deepening of the EU. And while the latter remained the most far-reaching example of supranational cooperation, many regional organizations followed the European model of regional integration.

International jurisdiction was further developed, establishing the International Criminal Court as the provisional culmination. The global responsibility to protect was claimed, and various measures were linked to respect for human rights. State sovereignty was defined more and more restrictively. The world order became increasingly liberal. This process has been reversed for some time. The current phase can instead be described as an “illiberal moment”. A phase in which these basic liberal principles are being called into question.

They are called into question from the outside by the rise of authoritarian-great powers that pursue divergent ideas of order and have just not integrated into the liberal order as smoothly as hoped. And these basic principles are also called into question from the inside by the emergence of illiberal political forces in almost all countries of the West.

The conviction that liberal democracy is the only legitimate model of political order is being challenged by various actors. An alternative illiberal model of an order has emerged: autocratic state capitalism – which, at least because of its economic success, has found supporters around the globe. It is being presented by its representatives – particularly the China of Xi Jinping – ever more aggressively and confidently as an alternative to the combination of liberal democracy and a market economy.

On February 24th authoritarian Russia opened even a large-scale military attack to crash the infant liberal democracy in Ukraine. At this point, it is still open if Russia wins the upper hand in its southern neighbour country or if Ukraine can conserve its sovereignty and liberal democracy with the help of the free and democratic world.

I first thank the initiative of Mr Aslan in organizing this event. And I hope this is a fantastic possibility to discuss these issues. We are talking about the need to readjust international society in competition. Unfortunately, multilateralism is one of the tools.

We should start it with the Cold War with your permission about the evolution of this issue. For the European countries, maybe one of the pillars was in August of 1975 when a significant diplomatic agreement was signed in Helsinki and the conclusion of the first conference on security and cooperation in Europe. This Helsinki agreement was the first effort to reduce tension between the Soviet and the Western blocks by securing common acceptance of the post-World War II as a status quo in Europe, the courts were assigned, and many countries joined. There is also a significant UN effort on behalf of different other countries. The end of the communist regimes and the steps to try to find some solutions for security in Europe in 1990. Some proposed the creation of a permanent council of European cooperation. Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a vision of a Euro transcending the military Alliance. Based on pan-European institutions, some others attempted to create a European Confederation combining the states of the Western and Eastern poles.

The Russian Federation is one of these players since USA and China were preoccupied with their security. The approach of Russia was to build a buffer zone between them and NATO and European Union as well. Another military force was China, competing for economic and military superiority. The only system still exists after the post-Cold War era is the United Nations, together with the regional organizations. We should support the UN mechanisms based on international law and mutual respect.

There is an issue which is the nuclear armaments of nuclear states but recognized by the non-proliferation treaty. They decided not to use a nuclear weapon. The examples of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are very bad examples with no provisions. I hope that they do not desire the destruction of the Earth. The use of nuclear weapons costs much money and has fewer benefits. Few countries can afford to develop atomic weapons to destroy themselves.

⁵ H.E. Ambassador, Member of the Scientific Council of New Strategy Center, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania.

The military conflict in Ukraine is a demonstration. Those negotiations cannot arrive at a solution without difficulties. My main idea is to underline the importance of multilateral structures and their relationship with bilateral diplomacy. One of the top issues to use is the role of mediators. When we speak about Ukraine and Russia in times of confrontation between states, which have difficulties in a dialogue, they should be putting down the instruments of fake news and looking for a dialogue using mediators. Clearly, we should use all the instruments, public international law, and international and regional organizations. This commitment will solve a lot of confrontations and proposals, which will contribute to final agreements. When we speak about the future of security in our region, Romania is a country in a fascinating place.

We are presenting the eastern border of NATO and the European Union. And at the same time, Romania is practically a country in the Black Sea and the extended region. One of our top priorities is to try to find solutions to support the United Nations. But at the same time, using, as I said, the activity of the regional organizations.

The time of Romanticism in IR, which was part of the 90s, is over. Nor China nor Russia will be the responsible players in the international system; that's a fact. They will be players, of course, but they will have their agenda, which might coincide or not coincide with the western agenda. The world is no more western-oriented. That's what we have to understand. It's not necessarily a bad thing. Because the Cold war used to have all the focus on the west, and now we see more and more players emerging in the other parts of the world. However, one thing we have to admit is that things are changing rapidly. Sometimes more quickly than we can comprehend, our systems are not necessarily designed to comprehend such a change because now we are in one of the unique stages of history where we have a double change, a double challenge. It means we still have old challenges of the Cold War era. Let us look at what happened in Ukraine, a classic military invasion, the older type of challenge. At the same time, scientific-technological, informational evolution, social media, trends, and multilateral cooperation, brought new challenges.

International terrorism and international criminal organizations are becoming more and more powerful and negatively influencing the international system. We have seen a coalition of countries try and fail to tackle such threats. So, this is a double challenge, on the one hand, old challenges and, on the other hand, new challenges. Is the system geared up to handle those challenges? Hardly. Because on the one hand, we have the UN, which used to be dealing with that, but it is an utterly outdated structure, which hardly reflects the realities of the nineties. Which has extended security council and massive bureaucracies.

We also have the EU, which turns out to be more unified than we expected in case of a crisis, which is a good thing. of course. We have a NATO, of course, which continues to be the most successful military alliance in the history of humankind because it served its initial purpose. This wear is geared up to the old cold war challenges. And after that, things changed very rapidly. The US is in the most challenging situation now. President Obama announced a shift toward Asia, which was very categorical. But now, suddenly, Russia reminded everybody that Europe is still a concern. The US still needs to deal with these challenges. Does the US have the resources and political will to deal with this double challenge? The death of civilians

⁶ Founder of The Georgian Strategic Analysis Center.

and atrocities committed by Russia will fuel public opinion for some time, but by our modest analysis, this conflict will not end soon. So will Europe and US be able to maintain this kind of unity, as time will put more and more pressure? That's also part of the test of the multilateral system.

Also, Türkiye's role is increasing, which has always been at least a geographical bridge between west and east. And today, Türkiye has become a literal bridge. Because Türkiye has a very interesting position because it gets gratitude from Russia and Ukraine, Türkiye must continue to do so. Türkiye can mediate and provide a neutral position. This situation is very concerning to the countries of our region because almost every action directly impacts our economies and politics. All our countries are looking forward to sustainable peace, which is hard to find now. So, things are moving fast; I would suggest that we should come up with new ideas on how to handle this crisis because it's not only Ukraine. There is still a crisis in Afghanistan and Africa, and things in these regions might escalate because the resources and attention are drawn to Ukraine now. So, at this point, these crises will become more complicated. So, I hope we will come up with many exciting ideas and solutions on how we can increase regional security.

In the last decades, no multilateral efforts to create regional or subregional security produced sustainable results. The reasons are manifold: Failure to address the root causes of the conflicts or, if done, failure to pressure stakeholders to stick to agreements and/or abide by international law. The GCC, however, is a successful example of economic integration (and security), although sub-regional interests hamper further integration. Chances that this will improve after the Russian invasion of Ukraine are slim (diverted attention, at least medium-term confrontational environment with all its consequences). The leading root causes which should be addressed are the fragility of some states in the MENA region, lack of good governance, religious radicalization, involvement of violent non-state actors, economic injustice, increasing environmental degradation and food insecurity after 24/2. These questions will most probably not be adequately addressed any time soon, reinforcing the trends of social unrest, spillover, violence, proxy wars and escalation. Focus on international, regional and sub-regional initiatives on the economy and environment and SDGs could mitigate the negative fallout of the hostile global environment.

⁷ H.E. Amb., The Deutsches Orient-Institut.

The situation in Afghanistan has drastically evolved and continues to do so since the Taliban came into power in August 2021, followed by the US withdrawal. Without a negotiated settlement, a takeover by the Taliban was certainly expected at some point. However, such a rapid transition was definitely not anticipated even in Afghanistan's immediate neighbourhood. Since then, the situation has resulted in unaddressed questions such as what the Taliban's rule means for governance, political freedom, human / women rights, counter-terrorism assurances, and regional peace and stability. Even within the confines of the current interim set-up, the real test for the Taliban began the day they assumed office. It is not limited to securing power, but revolves around legitimacy, acceptance, performance and recognition. The group has been engaging independently and through Doha with the international community and regional countries, and while it seeks recognition, present engagement does entail de facto recognition. Domestically, the group is struggling as it attempts to consolidate its power and formulates policies toward Afghan institutions.

Moreover, the group has not only inherited weak institutions but a non-existent economy and is now an ongoing humanitarian crisis; in other words, it is a work in progress. Moreover, ambivalence surrounding the future of international assistance has strained the Afghan economy. Providing humanitarian aid to Afghanistan by certain countries, primarily regional, is certainly reassuring; however, it is not enough to stabilize the economy, let alone sustain the Afghan population. This is a massive dilemma for the Afghan population and remains one of the biggest challenges.

It is essential to quote what the UN's Special Representative for Afghanistan, Deborah Lyons said 'Afghanistan is on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe, saying the main cause is financial sanctions on the Taliban, which have paralysed the banking system, affecting every aspect of the economy' moreover that 'Afghanistan's collapsing economy is heightening the risk of extremism.' In such circumstances, the Afghan population not only continues to struggle for survival but also becomes vulnerable to transnational terrorist groups - therefore, this also calls for the international community to revisit the question of engagement and recognition. – this remains a significant concern for the immediate neighbourhood of which

⁸ Director, CAMAEA, Islamabad.

Pakistan is a part. In fact, if the Taliban are not able to consolidate their position and ensure some semblance of stability, the fear is not so much of a civil war emanating but instead of transnational terrorist elements taking advantage of the situation and filling the vacuum, such as the ISKP – and in Pakistan’s case the TTP. Since the Taliban assumed power, there has been a significant spike in attacks by the ISKP domestically and by the TTP based in Afghanistan against Pakistani security forces along the border.

Now that the Taliban are in power, it is imperative that they deliver on all accounts and ensure that they honour their pledges of reform pertaining to governance, human/women rights, and a representative political framework which is not only limited to an inclusive government but rather a diverse and robust opposition.

While one has seen an overall improvement in the country's security, governance remains a considerable challenge that can undoubtedly be overcome if the Taliban honour their commitments. Moreover, while children have been returning to schools, recently, the Taliban reversed their previous decision to allow Afghan girls to return to high schools; this is both unfortunate and regrettable, to say the least – and a significant issue of concern for regional countries including Pakistan.

It is imperative for the Taliban to realize that although Afghanistan has been at war with itself and the international community, the masses have evolved and would like their rights to basic yet fundamental issues such as human/women rights and education, to name a few. Hence, if they do not honour their reform pledges, the group will lose the support and recognition it desperately needs from the international community and regional countries to legitimize its rule. This issue will make it extremely challenging for regional countries to engage with the group or consider formal recognition, including Pakistan. Instead, the Taliban should focus on governance and cash in on Afghanistan’s true potential as the Heart of Asia; however, the group needs to focus on a viable, sustained, and sustainable economic development strategy to achieve this. Given its enormous natural resources, Afghanistan has the potential to become a regional roundabout where nations can connect for the common good. Therefore, the focus should be on regional connectivity and integrated projects like CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) and TAPI (Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India) Pipeline, amongst others. CPEC's possible extension to Afghanistan will benefit the economy of the region as a whole, particularly Afghanistan, which desperately needs economic and infrastructural development. Including Afghanistan in mega projects like TAPI or CPEC would not only help bring much-needed stability to the country but deny space to transnational extremist elements. Still, it could also boost the country’s economy by providing foreign

investment and businesses along with employment and reducing its dependence on international aid. It would also help Afghanistan benefit from its untapped resources and become a part of the regional trade hub by connecting China with Central Asia and Pakistan. Moreover, the project could also help provide Afghanistan and Pakistan with a platform to improve and strengthen their often-strained bilateral relationship, leading to mutual economic interdependence, thus reducing the chances of tensions.

On the bilateral front, both Pakistan and Afghanistan need to realize that the geopolitical region of today is not what it used to be. Regional dynamics have changed; with more challenges such as internal survival and economic security –climate change and the urgent need for economic and infrastructural connectivity. There needs to be a realization and acceptance on both sides to face and own up to the prevailing ground realities. Both countries need to define the parameters of their bilateral relationship by working further to overcome differences between the two states and focus on areas of cooperation that go beyond the narrow prism of security and focus on economic and infrastructure connectivity and work toward an organized Pak-Afghan economic partnership. As a starter, they could focus on entering into a comprehensive bilateral /strategic partnership covering all areas of political, economic, security, trade, water, and people-to-people interaction; subject to the group honouring their human/women rights, CT assurances and international recognition.

While Afghanistan is being viewed as a regional issue – particularly in terms of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, this is a gross miscalculation because, as the past has proved, Afghanistan has always had global ramifications and the threat of transnational terrorist groups like the ISKP will not remain a concern for the region alone as it has global aspirations as it believes in a global caliphate. Hence no conflict should take precedence over the other - Afghanistan should not be abandoned nor ignored as it has been in the past – Afghanistan is a global issue that warrants a collective and dedicated response. There is no qualm that a peaceful and prosperous South Asia or the world cannot be attained without sustainable peace in Afghanistan, which has been referred to as the Heart of Asia. However, all sides need to learn to compromise and accommodate each other to achieve this. Instead of viewing Afghanistan as a regional issue, it must be viewed as a collective/shared responsibility. In conclusion, one only hopes that a better sense prevails amongst the Taliban - where the focus is on a political set-up that is responsible, accountable and lastly, one that serves the Afghan people because Afghanistan's future greatly shapes the security architecture of the region.

Türkiye's foreign policy, like the other states, leans on *sui generis* principles inherited from its history, culture, traumas, national objectives, and not controllable, independent variables. Türkiye's Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements clearly emphasize the priorities and fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy with broad mottos in engaging both events and actors. In this sense, legitimacy and international law are equally treated as the referent positions other than the interests of Türkiye with a pro-active engagement, which is depicted by 'enterprising spirit and humanitarian values'. Nevertheless, the frame of this thinking is the global and regional patterns that Türkiye is subject to or able to keep under control.

Under the clout of the principles mentioned above and global/regional patterns, Turkish- Russian relations reflects a 'gate' diplomacy for bilateral ties and western – Russian resonance. Although Türkiye was accused of shifting its axis due to improving relations with Russia, probably due to the personal interaction of Putin and Erdoğan, Türkiye's reading differs from this allegation. Türkiye perceives the 'new' global diplomacy as an output of the parallel mood of politics. In this context, the global political patterns – like multilateralism, multipolar and multi centrism – abstract a *sui generis* strategy to realize the interests. States may prefer cooperative and competitive attitudes in the meantime that may require absolute and relative gains spontaneously. Türkiye and Russia achieved communication for Syria through the Astana process and improved economic and energy-related relations while directly challenging each other in Idlib. Meanwhile, independent foreign policy, which repelled the American and European political pressure, pushed Türkiye to counter critiques towards Türkiye's membership in NATO.

Türkiye's relations with Russia correlate to American and European attitudes toward Türkiye. Specifically, taking the imminent Russian reaction to the July 15th coup attempt, the Turkish decision-makers started a compare-contrast analysis of the western and Russian approaches to Türkiye. Despite the perceived western hostile perception, Russia was an actor in balancing the West. In this sense, a traditional realist conceptualization has become the motivating factor through the Astana process. On the other hand, the strategy of 'fight and talk' was the reality of a mutual relationship. Türkiye's normalization with the West, after the

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calming situation in the eastern Mediterranean and Russian aggression in Ukraine, did not erode the Turkish – Russian communication conduit. The western security architecture perceived Türkiye as a gate of indirect resonation with Russia.

Consequently, Türkiye's relations with Russia are about managing the common issues in question together with Russia, even though it reflects cooperation and confrontation. The leader-level interaction between Erdoğan and Putin inspires us to resolve the incompatibilities. Nevertheless, the western attitude is to accept and benefit from this sort of new relationship as far as geopolitics and geostrategy urge to keep up with the challenging actors through the combination of the Cold War and modern thinking. In this context, Türkiye's foreign policy has become more tolerable for the western allies due to the preserved gate for indirect diplomacy while benefiting from Türkiye's foreign policy assets. Türkiye, on the other hand, relies on the main foreign policy principles of the modern era while preferring strategic autonomy while pursuing a flexible foreign policy.

The Middle East is going through a phase of rapprochement between the two rival geopolitical blocks of the past decade, namely Türkiye on the one hand and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt on the other. Since the geopolitical rivalry between the two camps was both far-reaching in its geographic scope spanning the Horn of Africa, Libya, Eastern Mediterranean, and Syria; and fierce in nature, the drivers and timing of the rapprochement merit substantial explanation. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the rapprochement does not eradicate all outstanding issues between the two blocks: both parties engage in this rapprochement while the elements of both cooperation and competition exist simultaneously in the bilateral relations of the respective countries.

Several push factors determine the timing and constitute the drivers of the ongoing rapprochement effort between the prominent players of the Middle East. Regardless of which geopolitical block these countries belong to, they all received a cold shoulder from the Biden Administration, in stark contrast to the Trump Administration. This attitude of the Biden Administration is also coupled with a strong will to revitalize the nuclear deal with Iran, which brought back the spectre of the Iranian threat for all the traditional US allies in the Middle East. Since both the cold shoulder to traditional US allies and a strong drive to strike a nuclear deal with Iran at the same time were the hallmarks of the Obama Administration, the said traditional US allies in the Middle East are drawing the logical conclusion: the Biden Administration is ‘The Obama Administration 2.0’, and it will recreate the post-JCPOA, bolstered and ever-expanding Iran across the Middle East.

The traditional US allies in the Middle East do not want to go through the same phase of ‘Iranian supremacy’ at the expense of their own interests and influence in the region. This urge is also exacerbated by a much bigger structural factor: the strategic reorientation of the US. The Asia-Pacific region’s primacy for US strategic calculations forces it to either ‘freeze’ or downgrade its engagement in the Middle East. The US’ lesser commitment to the region also forces its traditional allies to deal with their issues among themselves. Thus, the

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rapprochement in the Middle East is mainly a result of certain push factors, which preserves the elements of 'competition' in the game along with those of 'cooperation'.

I will start to see what the post-pandemic world is, what it may be, and what the consequences are. The consequences are substantial. So let me identify what I see as political and geopolitical consequences of the pandemic, which we have to deal with. And I would like to start with Europe because the panoramic in Europe has two very interesting moves.

The first was the almost reflects of the states and the populations to close the borders. So, to avoid the virus travels, we could see this in Germany, a country with eight neighbours, that suddenly closed its borders to France, Denmark and much closer to Germany, Italy, and France closed their border. Of the spirit of the European Union, which is the Schengen area to be a free flow of people and goods. Suddenly, the medical masks were scarce and not delivered to other countries. This was the first reflex. It was quite dangerous because it was contradictory to the essence of the European Union.

In the second phase, which I think, as we know in international politics, is very fast, the leaders realize the danger of this move. So, there were sitting together in Brussels and trying to see how to overcome these situations. Now we realize that we need to stop certain movements, which we did worldwide. The borders were a natural way of doing it, but still, the negotiations, how to open it and how to become more flexible, where the products were delivered internationally within Europe very fast, and even the people who were sick and suffered from COVID. If the hospitals were full but transported to Germany, they took some from Italy and France. The bottom line is people just went to the closest hospital on whichever side of the border.

So, I think this was a new era, which we learned during the pandemic, including the production of vaccines. And it's also the fact that we need to buy a vaccine [00:12:00] European-wide was unified a process, which was not the case before. And at that, say, without this experience, Which I have just described within the European Union, the brief discussions and fast decisions, not in the Ukraine crisis may not have been possible because, in European Union, we realized the danger of we, if we do not stick together. So, I think we made it better this time.

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The second issue is that we realized the danger of the worldwide supply chain. Again, it was known a little before, but all the medical masks were produced in Indonesia or Malaysia. When suddenly the Suez Canal was blocked because of a ship, we realized how and what influence it could have. For the first time, due to the pandemic, we realized the negative sides of the supply change. The public suddenly realized that this is an issue we must confront. And again, with the Ukraine war, we see it even clearer, but the pandemic exposed this issue.

The third issue is that we realize a conflict or a competition between the political systems. I dare to say that we had three different approaches. One was Trump in the United States, another was Brazil and finally, China with differing lockdowns.

My fourth point is that we also realized, maybe more in Europe than in Türkiye or Pakistan, it is particularly based on the question of who gets vaccines. From a health point of view, we all knew that everybody needed to be vaccinated. We also learned that not everybody could be put, not be vaccinated and how to resolve this issue. This proceeding was a painful discussion in France. And I do not think this discussion is over yet. The issue is that health is a global good and that we need global answers. Decision makers and the general public are aware of the situation.

Finally, as the Ukraine - Russia War is concerned, the old classical war is persistent while challenges like pandemics or climate change are still there.

The pandemic has not only had a very personal impact on our lives, but it also had – and continues to have – repercussions throughout the international system, some of which I will outline and analyse.

Public health has quickly assumed a much more prominent role in bilateral and multilateral relations. The provision of medical equipment, personal protective equipment and vaccine doses later played a critical role in diplomacy. The challenges of the pandemic have sometimes been met with largely fact-based responses, but at times also highly politicised ones. Name some examples: whether countries or blocs of countries accept each others' vaccines and how they classify one another in terms of travel risks and/or restrictions were topics of contention, as were questions surrounding cross-border travel overall. The "geopolitics of vaccines" soon became a framework for cooperation and contestation.

Some of these topics will remain important in the short term, while others are expected to affect international relations more substantively in the years to come. For one, public health issues are likely to be a more significant concern to countries around the globe than pre-pandemic. Relatedly, a globalised world economy with complex supply chains is challenged by increasing tendencies to re-localise the production of goods considered critical infrastructure, such as personal protective equipment. Similarly, the EU has begun to coordinate and combine procurement processes much more closely than before, as joint vaccine orders exemplify. Responses to the crisis have largely followed bloc dynamics – a tendency that might be here to stay.

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This study investigates the changing nature of the conflicts, starting from Afghanistan to Syria, Syria to Libya, and Ukraine. Within the frame of the rings of this conflict chain, the changing character of recent type multi-layered and multilateral wars were analysed in the evidence-based investigation. The latest version of the ongoing wars has gone into a transformation starting from the invasion of Afghanistan. When the ongoing conflicts in Syria are investigated, it is possible to see a telescoped structure. The above-mentioned multi-layered structure of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq has converted the previous asymmetric warfare into a supra-asymmetric one named asymmatrix warfare. With a snap-shot of the multi-layered conflicts in Syria and Iraq, which included a kind of covered international macro-scale proxy conflict among the global and regional powers, explicit mesoscale conflict among the significant internal actors, explicit mesoscale interlayer conflicts among the actors of different layers, and micro-scale, intra-layer sub-conflicts among the actors in each layer, the recent formation of the war and conflicts in the multi-polar global order can be stated as a Hybrid War composed of Matryoshka Conflicts which is named after as an asymmatrix war in this study.

The latest version of the ongoing wars has gone into a transformation starting from the invasion of Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the conflicts were at the level of Asymmetric war, which means that by using the terrain and guerrilla-type irregular warfare tactics, even very small units can achieve very successful results beyond the measure of their power on more powerful but conventional military units. But starting from internal conflicts in Syria after 2011, the character of war has begun to have a transformation again.

Transformation of Security and Changing Character of Warfare

¹³ This proceeding is derived from the following article of the author: Keser, A., (2016). "Labor Pains of the Final Gains: Glocal Integrated Governance at All Levels of Multi-Polar Games (Nihai Kazanımların Doğum Sancıları: Çok Kutuplu Oyunların Tüm Düzeylerinde Küreyerel Bütünleşik Yönetişim)", *TURKISH STUDIES*, Volume 11/2 Winter 2016, ANKARA/TÜRKİYE, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.7827/TurkishStudies.9094>, p. 685-710.

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Inclusion of very different powers from local to the global, from terrorist organizations like PKK/PYD and ISIL to insurgent groups, from internal opposition forces to Regime forces, and from the neighbouring regional powers to the global ones, as well. Within this environment, the global powers preferred not to go into a direct conflict with each other. Instead, they preferred to use proxies to fight their war. Russia has given and still supports the Regime, while the USA supports PKK/PYD against ISIL. On the other hand, both global powers conducted operations against ISIL, while the USA was in coalition with some Western countries, including Türkiye. The dilemma here is that PKK/PYD is defined as a terrorist organization by Türkiye, while the USA separately evaluates them, and PKK is categorized as a terrorist organization while PYD is a political entity. Besides, while there is a good economic relationship between Russia and Türkiye, they have different approaches regarding the Assad Regime. When the conflicts ongoing on the ground in Syria are investigated, it is possible to see a telescoped structure which can be determined as below:

In the most external 1st layer (Surface layer): There is a covered power collision and struggle among the world's global powers, which constitutes the 1st layer reflecting the signs of a cold conflict.

Both within and under the 1st layer: Another semi-covered power collision and cold conflict is ongoing among some of the global powers and regional powers, and/or among the regional power centres both within and under the 1st layer.

2nd layer reflects both the signs of an internal conflict and proxy conflict: An explicit hot conflict takes place between the Regime Forces (supported by one part of the global and regional actors: Russia) and the Opposition Forces (supported by the other part of the global and regional powers: the USA, Türkiye and other allies), simultaneously and which has if not global at least regional impacts, because of the current status of refugees and the borders (Migration and immigrants turned out to be new types of weapon in this new warfare (uncontrolled mass human accumulation))


Within the 3rd layer, which consists of different sub-layers in itself, some of which can be explained as below (explicit hot and/or economic conflicts among the Opposition Forces themselves):

1. Economics-based conflicts, ongoing related to the control of Oil Production fields between some Opposition Forces.
2. Ethnic-based conflicts, ongoing related to the control of some strategic settlements between the Kurdish groups and Arabic groups.
3. Sectarian conflicts, ongoing between the Shia and Sunni groups.

The 4th and most internal layer: Last but not least, there are some additional power clashes and/or cold conflicts between some parts of the Opposition Forces and regional administrations of the neighbouring states. For example, the struggle between the Northern Iraq Regional Administration and the Kurdish Groups in Syria affiliated with PKK terrorist organization can be evaluated within this frame.

The above-mentioned multi-layered structure of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq has converted the previous asymmetric warfare into a more chaotic and matrix structure as a supra-asymmetric one which is named asymmatrix warfare.

Figure1: The Multi-layered Structure of the Asymmatrix Warfare in Iraq and Syria



Source: Own study

After the given snapshot of the multi-layered conflicts in Syria and Iraq, which includes (1) a kind of covered international macro-scale proxy conflict, (2) explicit mesoscale conflict among the significant internal actors, (3) explicit mesoscale interlayer conflicts among the actors of different layers, and (4) micro-scale, intra-layer sub-conflicts in each layer, the recent formation of the war and conflicts in the multi-polar global order can be stated as Hybrid War composed of Matryoshka Conflicts which is named after as an asymmatrix war in this study.

The given nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria can be adapted to other existing or possible conflicts elsewhere during the multi-polar global era, as in the case of Ukraine. This asymmatrix structure also brings an incubator potential to regional conflicts. This means that each micro but asymmatrix conflict may have a potential for global diffusion. For example, the multinational participation in radical terrorist organizations creates a nesting environment for the global spread of conflicts upon the return of their members to their home countries, or the war in Ukraine has the potential to diffuse to all Europe and/or the globe rapidly. This is only a presumption not proved yet, but there is one certain thing: the conflicts' multi-polar and multi-layered structure has already added new factors to warfare. Within the frame of the evolvement towards multi-polar world order, we may indicate at least five new factors as new weapons, which carry out the potential of changing the nature of the war

1. The integration of the “UAVs and the robots” into the warfare field,
2. Cyberwar,
3. Media activities,
4. Migration,
5. Economic means and natural resources such as natural gas.

There is something certain that UAVs have been used intensively in conflicts successfully and are being used as the primary tools and or primary manoeuvre units.

Related to the second factor, cyber war, it can be asserted that there is no requirement for reciprocity. This factor seems as if it does not have a direct fatal or injurious effect on the hostile party at first glance. But its indirect impacts can cause severe results if used to attack the adversary side's air traffic control and/or health systems.

When the third factor, media, is investigated, it is possible to assert that real-time communication devices, such as cell phones or other devices functioning through the internet and social media, have changed the path of media activities (E.g. In Ukraine, Russian forces could not sustain their regular communication with usual military means and relied on cell phones, which bring its disadvantages as well). The conventional army communication system based on the top-down order transfer and from down to top reporting system through the HQs and the bureaucratic process was beaten by this direct and fast mechanism.

The fourth (Migration) and fifth factors (Economic means and natural resources like natural gas) are taking their places rapidly among the weapons or tools of warfare. Migration is threatening the sustainable socio-cultural environment and demographic structure of the nation-states. With the fleeing and accumulation of human masses from East to West and from South to East, all the previous paradigms related to border control, the economic

security of the states, and even the approach to fundamental rights such as the right to live and freedom of movement are going into a transformation. Economic resources such as natural gas are now being used as the weapons of this new asymmatrix type war as did by Russia towards European countries, including Bulgaria and Poland.

All these developments and the chaotic nature of the multi-polar system itself coerce the leaders, decision-makers, and/or policy makers to seek new mechanisms to handle the difficulties they have not met before. The above developments did not change only the nature of conventional war or conflicts but the characteristics of peace negotiations, internal and international politics and diplomacy. That's why humanity and policymakers need to develop new tools to handle the challenges of this new type of asymmatrix warfare.

Exactly two weeks ago, I was in London for a meeting on the consequences of the Ukraine – Russia War, like the regional issues and humanitarian disasters or refugee flows. It was the concept of looking at the present situation generated by the vision of Russia from regional angles. One was the Eastern flank, naturally Türkiye, but it would be a series of events comprehending the whole area impacted by the invasion of Ukraine. The results would be interesting because foreign policy practitioners need to see what is going on because our destinies are directly affected by current events. I would appeal to modesty, whereas claiming to be a specialist in transnationalism, as a career diplomat, conceptual novelties, and as the former Political Director is triggering.

I am generating the curiosity to see where this fits into our established mental framework. The beginning of my intervention was the following, which will indicate the common denominator. I think, although all the other interventions are most of them, the state remains the most important political unit of the modern world. And in the most recent phase of globalization, the role and position of the state have changed. Frequently proclaimed, the social sciences have reached a consensus about the ongoing centrality of states. And I think Michelle De Vita pointed this out as one of the outcomes of the current crisis.

The other point I wanted to make, entities part of the title of my intervention, is that transformations are fundamental changes in the state. And we are confronted because I was trying to look at transnationalism and see which is the conceptual binder from my point of view; the conceptual binder and the reference are still the states because, as you rightly said, we are not yet able to evaluate.

The internal structure or unique U-turn structure of this crystal, which is always dependent on another source, is globalization. I think here; we refer to Francis Fukuyama with the end of history, which was mentioned in the concept of this conference, vessel reaching a peaceful Harbour after the rough seas of world history. Well, Mr Fukuyama was dealing with tribalism with identity. He was not speaking of military defeat. He was talking about his vision

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for the development model of the global society and returned to the basic tenants of modern society.

A theme, which in no way can be exhausted in a couple of minutes, is the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans for two evident reasons. One is Romania, let's say one of the countries probably the longest border of NATO with Ukraine. Romania has a long border with Moldova after Poland. I think we hosted most of the refugee transiting from Ukraine, correlated with those from Moldova.

The other point is why fixing on the Black Sea and the Western boldness. Another straightforward reason for the historically big bang is the edge of the Cold War. It was marked by significant processes of emerging new states in Europe. The former Yugoslavia, for instance, make up a state transformation process. This transformation process was marked after the first World War by the Kingdom of the Slovenes and Serbs. We know the results in the early ninetiets. And now we have the reverse process, which is the integrating process.

he significant point here is the European Union. We have to point out that except worsening Herzegovina, one of the epicentres of the crisis potential crisis in the Balkans, Kosovo and Serbia. They are not members of NATO, but all the others are. NATO members surround them. Now we have the enlargement process, and here they are. The critical voices, pushing the Romanians, also do for accelerated integration of the Western Balkans.

The emergence of new states in former Yugoslavia was not automatic, linear and instant. There have been several stages culminating in 2000 and 2008. The problems have not yet been set up, but you have the phenomenon of transnational. I want to lay on the grounds for future exploration. One is related to globalization and nationalism in the Balkans. This is a term I would like to introduce into our discussion, but also the negative face of resilience. We some new forms of exclusion, inequality and a culture of conflict. We have transnational organized crime and fundamental Islamic streams other than the positive dimension of Islam. We have social, political and economic change movements, which are by-products of globalization. We have the criminal political formations expanding drastically in the newly emerging democracies. We have weak government structures, a deteriorating domestic economy, and so on.

Regionalism has been understood as a process of this different geographical regions appearing as political and economic units. Historically, regionalism has taken various forms, such as security, political and economic regionalism. In today's international system, neighbouring countries are motivated to build regional corporations because of their capability to stand up to new global challenges. Despite intensive diplomatic relations among the Middle Eastern countries, regional structures are relatively underdeveloped, as is evident in the cases of the Arab League, GCC, MEFTA and GAFTA. As an exceptional country in the Middle East, space for regional cooperation for Israel and its neighbours in the Middle East is very limited after the first war between Israel and Arab countries. Israel's focus on actors beyond the region created a new space for Israel to improve ties with especially European countries. Due to this situation, Israel did not contribute enough to strengthening the regional structure. Although the first peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979 and the Oslo Process did not bring peace between conflicting parties, Israel gained important acceptance in the states like Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, and Qatar established diplomatic ties with Israel at different levels.

The 2010s led to important regional developments like the most notable Arab Spring'. The increasing presence of Iran in Syria alarmed Israel and paved the way for a reconciliation process between Israel and Arab countries. According to some observers, the agreements were seen as a historical turning point that could transform the region. However, different reasons for the rapprochement process to be found regimes' belief that the normalisation with Israel helps them protect their security and brings them closer to the US is generally accepted. The fact new process ruptured years of consensus among most Arab states is overshadowed because of the critical stances of societies in these countries. Although a normalisation process started due to a need to come together and talk about multidimensional problems and due to pressures coming from the new international challenges, difficult to say that the normalisation also brings a new approach to the Middle East about revising or reassessing the regional structure. Based on this background, I argue that the status quo powers of the region prefer to sit on the fence and only adapt to a do-nothing approach to the region's real and profound problems.

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Transnationalism understood as a component of globalization, is a phenomenon that encompasses all activities that cover the social, economic, and political spheres, which cause greater interaction and interconnectedness between countries and continents. Thanks to globalization, international and transnational activities are increasing – changing at a pace that governments and institutions cannot respond to with their traditional structures. Especially after the Cold War, the development and expansion of communication and transportation made the world smaller and revealed the intensity of interaction between people while strengthening world consciousness.

However, at this point, nationalism and the tendency to protect national borders are increasing worldwide. In other words, while transnational activities are rising in the world with the effect of globalization, the other hand, states prefer to build or raise their walls to protect their national borders. Transnationalism creates a greater degree of connection between individuals, communities, and societies across borders, bringing about changes in the social, cultural, economic, and political landscapes of societies of origin and destination. Today, the circulation of goods, services, and money have become relatively easy. Still, the circulation of people has become more difficult compared to the cold war period, so it seems almost impossible for people to go from one country to another unhindered. Let alone the disappearance of borders, the number of national border walls and barbed wires rising today has become more than before. I argue that globalization disrupts the harmony between the state and society, removes some of the sovereignty rights of the nation-state, and transforms the nation-state following this process.

However, at this point, especially after the global economic crisis in 2008, it is seen that the nation-state has not disappeared anywhere, and the nation-state has returned with borders. During the COVID-19 process, borders and walls have been very important in showing

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that nation-states are not going anywhere. The most significant indicators that the nation-states have not disappeared are the walls and fences rising around the national borders.

Keywords: Transnationalism, Globalization, National Borders, Rise of National Borders, Rising of National Walls

The debates over transnationalism have been at the forefront since the end of the Cold War. In the heydays of the early post-Cold War period, there was a tendency to view political history as pursuing a linear and supposedly progressive way from empires to nation-states and now toward a borderless world with a cosmopolitan identity. When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, this further empowered debates over a supposed “empire” that transcended borders instead of employing the concept of imperialism, which was thought to have already been outdated in an era of “liquid modernity” and “liminal identities”. Moreover, regional integration projects that were primarily economic also proved to accelerate these debates, with the European Union being the most noteworthy case as a supposedly “supranational” organisation. Yet, from 2008 onwards, the global financial crisis and the resurgence of Russia as a military and China as a great economic power rocked such accounts to their foundations. This has become much more the case since Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine began on 24 February 2022.

This paper argues that the concept of “hegemony” is essential in conceiving both domestic and international politics. As a concept, it both connotes a form of political rule and indicates various levels of that particular form of rule. Hegemony always has its roots in domestic social formations. However, once hegemony has been achieved and proved sustainable at the domestic level, it is also possible to project it regionally and internationally. The benefits and new technological possibilities brought about by neoliberal globalisation for the finance capital to project its hegemony all over the world sometimes overshadow its domestic roots and sources for hegemony. Hence the paper argues that the supposed tendency toward transnationalism, if it ever exists, should also be discussed within the framework of hegemony. Thus, what appears to be “transnational” may not be that much “transnational” despite its regional and international orientations and power projections, and the concept of “imperialism” steps in just at this point with its emphasis on hierarchical power relations and coercion at the international level. Russia and China have emerged as contenders and pose a challenge to the international hegemony of the Euro-Atlantic finance capital and the U.S.-led imperialism as the only countries that could build a relatively

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independent power base due to their particular features. The paper ends with a discussion of the prospects for the international order regarding this challenge, especially in light of the recent war in Ukraine.