

**ESSAYS IN LATE OTTOMAN
TO POST-OTTOMAN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
VOL. I**

**SON DÖNEM OSMANLI'SINDAN
OSMANLI SONRASINA
ENTELEKTÜEL TARİH ÜZERİNE
MAKALELER
I. CİLT**

**Edited by / Derleyen
Hasan Aksakal**



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BEYOĞLU KİTABEVİ

37

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Yayın Yönetmeni

Hikmet Akyüz

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Son Okuma

Bilâl Sadi

Grafik Tasarım

Mehmet Ali Varış

© Beyoğlu Kitabevi, 2024

ISBN 978-625-98111-4-7

1. Baskı: Aralık 2024

Kitabın tüm yayın hakları Beyoğlu Kitabevi'ne aittir.
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BEYOĞLU KİTABEVİ

Akyüz Kitap Yayıncılık Nakliyat San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti.

Çatmamescit Mah. Camadan Sokak No: 25/3

Beyoğlu / İstanbul

Tel. (507) 858 35 06

www.beyoglukitabevi.com

Sertifika No: 27977

Baskı

Akademi Basın Yayın Org. Tic. Ltd. Şti.

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Matbaa Sertifika No: 47610

Bu eser Y. Alp Kozanoğlu'nun katkılarıyla yayınlanmıştır.

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**COUNTER-ENLIGHTENMENT IN OTTOMAN
THOUGHT:
THE CASE OF NÂMIK KEMAL**

HASAN AKSAKAL*

Suddenly our consciousness enlightened;
The field of wonder captured our minds
Just like the glory of the lightning of absence
We all saw the silence and illumination of the universe at that
moment

A belated eulogy to Enlightenment by Cenab Şehabettin
(1871-1934)

In recent decades, it has become clear to what extent notions of “Enlightenment” and, by extension, “modernity” has been shaped by

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those who challenged them. The philosophes of the 18th century defined themselves in opposition to the often religiously inspired critics of a modern worldview that they regarded as arrogant, godless, and conducive to nothing less than the destruction of the political, social, and moral order. Although many important studies have recently been published on the Counter-Enlightenment as it emerged in individual countries and among individual authors, unlike the Enlightenment proper, no systematic study of its global manifestations has yet been undertaken. In this paper, I will examine the works of Nâmık Kemal, one of the leading political thinkers of the second half of the 19th century Ottoman capital and part of the Islamic intellectual circles of the time, and offer a new interpretation of his work by showing how it is in dialogue with other global intellectual currents such as the Counter-Enlightenment and Romanticism.

In addition, I will attempt to understand, explain, and evaluate the emergence, development, and extended consequences of the intellectual currents and their interrelationships in the premature globalization of the 19th century. In doing so, I will be able to assess the Ottoman-Turkish conservative intellectuals in their search for an alternative approach to the question of the European path of modernity, which they wanted to use to broaden, but not to change, their perspective and world view. Just like the very limited number of pioneers before them,¹ they explored and discovered the core meaning of the Enlightenment and its influence on and dissatisfaction with

1. Fatma Müge Göçek, *East Encounters West: France and the Ottoman Empire in the 18th Century*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Carl Barbir, “The Changing Face of the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century: Past and Future Scholarship”, *Oriente Moderno*, 18 (79), No. 1, *The Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century* (1999), pp. 253-267. Bekir Harun Küçük, *Early Enlightenment in Istanbul*, University of California, San Diego: Dissertation in the History and Science Studies, 2012. Fatih Yeşil, *Aydınlanma Çağında Bir Osmanlı Kâtibi: Ebubekir Râtib Efendi (1750-1799)*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2010.

Western societies, and thus tried to open a public discussion on the Enlightenment in Turkish newspapers and magazines, as they wanted to transfer or import the two-sided binary perspective of Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment to Ottoman Turkey.

It is possible to read this cultural transfer as a “conceptual transfer” and a partial “crossed history”. As Christopher L. Hill points out, “Each of these tends simply to multiply the frame of national history in positing departures and arrivals, source and target languages, or the distinct actors of intercrossings.”² We can also add to these, concepts such as entangled history, connected history, and *transfergeschichte*.

In this modest paper I will focus on the reception of the representatives of the Counter-Enlightenment by their Turkish interlocutors. Throughout my research the central questions will be: Why were Turkish intellectuals from the very beginning been so eager to read, think and write about figures like Rousseau, Herder and Vico, instead of Diderot, Immanuel Kant or Adam Smith – is it meaningful to trace an Islamic or Ottoman Counter-Enlightenment with reference to Rousseauan and Herderian ideas in 19th century Istanbul? If so, what would it be the relationship between these Counter-Enlighteners and the Islamic –especially Ibn Khaldunian – tradition of scholarship? Or, was this current from the Vienna Congress onwards been a new attempt to analyze the dimensions, aspects and early consequences of post-Enlightenment European modernity? I will also discuss who benefits from the political implications of the Counter-Enlightenment ideas in Turkey and in what ways. Finally, I will examine whether the political interest in utilizing some of the keywords of Enlightenment

2. Christopher L. Hill, “Conceptual Universalization in the Transnational Nineteenth Century”, *Global Intellectual History*, edited by Samuel Moyn, Andrew Sartori, New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, p.135.

and Counter-Enlightenment such as “Volksgeist”, “contract social”, “Sapere aude!”, instead of earlier key Ottoman terms such as “nizâm-ı âlem (order of the world)”, or “usul-ü hikem (methods of good governance)”, plays an important part in the Europeanization process of the Turkish intellectual repertoire, or whether it is a reassessment of Turkish domestic debates within a wider, and even global vocabulary.

“COUNTER-ENLIGHTENMENT” AND ITS USES

To the best of our knowledge, the term “Counter-Enlightenment” was first used in English by Charles Gray Shaw in 1908, while in approximately the same period *Gegenaufklärung* in German also came into existence.³ Later, at the dawn of the Cold War, William Barrett, an American professor of philosophy, made use of the theme in his article entitled “Art, Aristocracy and Reason.” (*Partisan Review*, XVI:6, 1949). Almost twenty-five years after this little known study, Isaiah Berlin used the term in his famous essay “The Counter-Enlightenment” (1973)⁴, and since then –it’s been half a century– the term “Counter-Enlightenment” was considered a groundbreaking concept among a new generation of scholars and is still being used as a road map for researchers who are interested in the other side of modern intellectual history.

Despite the fact that researchers still disagree, both positively and negatively, about the concept of Counter-Enlightenment, its functionality and ability to explain are still relevant and

3. Jeremy L. Caradonna, “There Was No Counter-Enlightenment”, *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2015, p.52.

4. Isaiah Berlin, “The Counter-Enlightenment”, *Against the Current, Essays in the History of Ideas* (in), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, 1-24.

useful. In this article, I will address the Counter-Enlightenment as it is used by Isaiah Berlin, keeping the various criticisms in mind.⁵ Furthermore, I wish to discuss how this concept corresponds to and is given new life in the history of Ottoman-Turkish thought.

Berlin begins to define the term Counter-Enlightenment as follows:

“Opposition to the central ideas of the French Enlightenment, and its allies and disciples in other European countries, is as old as the movement itself. The proclamation of the autonomy of reason and the methods of the natural sciences, based on observation as the sole reliable method of knowledge, and the consequent rejection of the authority of revelation, sacred writings and their accepted interpreters, tradition, prescription, and every form of non-rational and transcendent source of knowledge, was naturally opposed by the churches and religious thinkers of many persuasions.”⁶

After setting up this framework, Berlin draws the readers’ attention to the roots of the Enlightenment’s relations with Newtonian and Baconian approaches to nature, but also to a mechanistic worldview, an unlimited trust in the idea of progress, and the importance of the doctrine of natural law. Isaiah Berlin believes the leading figure of this resistance to be Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau was best known for his opposition to the mainstream themes in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. He was a French-speaking philosopher who was part of the Parisian debates ever since

5. For instance Caradonna, *Ibid*, 51-69. Robert L. Norton, “The Myth of the Counter-Enlightenment”, *Journal of History of Ideas*, Vol.68, No.1, 2007, 635-658. James Schmidt, “Inventing a Counter-Enlightenment: Liberalism, Nihilism, and Totalitarianism”, Paper of Conference Speech, AHA, Boston, January 6, 2011.

6. Berlin, *Ibid*, p.1.

the Enlightenment was spread via the *Encyclopedie* in the last half of the 18th century (1751-1772). But at the same time others also shared these or similar ideas, such as the Italian philosopher of history, Giambattista Vico, and the German idealist Johann Georg Hamann. But also the anti-revolutionary French thinker Joseph de Maistre of the next generation. However, although considering Rousseau as the leading figure, Berlin also argues that most notably Herder and Early German Romanticism had sparked the fire of the Counter-Enlightenment. In addition, Berlin defines the “creative imagination” and “imaginative reconstruction”⁷ since the first representatives of Romantic *Weltanschauung* to re-assessing the criticisms on “scientific rationalism” and the Enlightenment. The use of the Counter-Enlightenment in post-Berlin debates tends to acknowledge the issue in the context of anti-modernist thoughts, theory of conservative revolution, political theology, vitalism and Nietzsche studies.⁸

COUNTER-ENLIGHTENMENT IN THE OTTOMAN-TURKISH CONTEXT

One can look for multiple Enlightenments in different periods of modernity. Nevertheless, when we refer to the Enlightenment, this still encompasses the 18th century Parisian intellectual circles’ efforts against the powers of the *ancien regime*.⁹ The Ottoman-Turk-

7. Berlin, *Ibid*, p.49-50.

8. On the literature of Counter-Enlightenment in Germany, Jochen Schmidt (Hrsg.): *Aufklärung und Gegenklärung in der europäischen Literatur, Philosophie und Politik von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, Frankfurt a.M. 1989. Christoph Weiss: *Von “Obscuranten” und “Eudämonisten”: Gegenauflärerische, konservative und antirevolutionäre Publizisten im späten 18. Jahrhundert*, St. Ingbert 1999.

9. Mark Lilla, “What is Counter-Enlightenment?”, Joseph Mali, Robert Wokler (eds.),

ish case seems quite like a test for this hypothesis. It is safe to say that the Ottoman Age of Reason, which happened within a “traditional” empire, only in later periods concerned itself with debates growing around the philosophy of the Enlightenment and Romanticism.¹⁰ There are various reasons for this: pressure created by the Russian Empire constantly expanding against the Ottomans; the harsh conservative response to modernization efforts regarded as “infidelization” (alienation from Islamic culture); military, cultural, and economic recession; and the repetitive political upheavals.¹¹ This is why it took so long for the Parisian Enlightenment and the reactions against it to be encountered and absorbed in the Ottoman context, as well as for these debates to be established within this context through the lens of cultural transfer. Pursuant to the sources at hand, one can say that the reactions in the beginning were remote, vulgar and superficial. Indeed, the first study on the French Revolution in the Ottoman Empire talks about Voltaire and other members of the Encyclopedic School in a negative light. It was the norm to address the French Enlightenment philosophers with phrases such as “destroying religion”, “so-called infidel, Voltaire”, and “new titans”, and one could almost expect this kind of negativity from the moment the philosophers were mentioned. Voltaire in particular had a negative connotation in Istanbul, not only because he called people to demand a true freedom, but also because he was acknowledged as one of the most dangerous an-

Isaiah Berlin's Counter-Enlightenment, Philadelphia, 2003, 1-11.

10. Some individuals –such as Ibrahim Müteferrika and Yirmisekizzâde Mehmed Said Efendi– are exceptional: Vefa Söğütbaşı, *Forerunner of the Ottoman Enlightenment: İbrahim Müteferrika and His Intellectual Landscape*, Sabancı University, Master's Thesis, Department of History, 2005. *Paris'te Bir Osmanlı Sefiri: Yirmisekiz Mehmed Çelebi'nin Fransa Seyahatnâmesi*, (edited by Şevket Rado), İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 6th edition, 2016.

11. Küçük, *Early Enlightenment in Istanbul*, Chapter 3: “Ottoman Theology in the Early Eighteenth Century”, 77-102.

ti-Turkists at that time. Voltaire wrote to Friedrich of Prussia in 1769 that he wished “passionately that the barbarous Turks be chased at once from the country of Xenophon, Sophocles, Plato.”¹² He wrote similar letters to Catherine the Great, which were also known by the Turkish elites.

To give an example of this negative image of Voltaire and the values he represents, we can look at a memorandum on politics from the beginning of the 19th entitled *Avrupa Muvazene-i Politikıyesi* (The Political Balance of Europe) written by Atıf Efendi. Atıf Efendi was a Reisülküttab (Chief Scribe), and wrote in Turkish about the concepts that were discussed and the approach taken to them within the Ottoman Empire:

“...the known and famous atheists Voltaire and Rousseau, and other materialists like them, had printed and published various works, consisting, God preserve us, of insults and vilification against the pure prophets and great kings, of the removal and abolition of all religion, and of allusions to the sweetness of equality and republicanism, all expressed in easily intelligible words and phrases, in the form of mockery, in the language of the common people. Finding the pleasure of novelty in these writings, most of the people, even youths and women, inclined towards them and paid close attention to them, so that heresy and wickedness spread like syphilis to the arteries of their brains and corrupted their beliefs.”¹³

12. Reşat Kasaba, “The Enlightenment, Greek Civilization and the Ottoman Empire: Reflections on Thomas Hope’s Anastasius”, *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2003, p.1. See also: Aslı Çırakman, “From Tyranny to Despotism: The Enlightenment’s Unenlightened Image of the Turks”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2001, 49-68.

13. Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Cevdet Paşa Tarihinden Seçmeler I*, (edited by S. Irmak-K. Çağlar), Istanbul: MEB, 1994, p.290. Nurettin Öztürk, “XIX. Yüzyıl Türk Edebiyatında Voltaire ve Rousseau Çevirileri”, *Pamukkale Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, No. 12, 2002, p.69.

The only reason for these hostile feelings towards Voltaire and the Enlightenment philosophers in general was not the French Revolution. Enlightenment was also narratively seen as anti-Turk. As all Ottoman Enlightenment critics noted, many French philosophers, including Voltaire, supported growing Russian expansionism to oppose the Ottomans. Voltaire and Diderot, of the Encyclopedists of this period, characterized the Ottoman-Turkish struggle as a war between light and dark, and barbarity and civilization.¹⁴

In his declaration of denial, Kamil Efendi, who was a member of the bureaucratic elite of the time, also combined the philosophy of the Enlightenment with the French Revolution in order to demonize the Revolution, considering it as nothing but the concrete ideas of Voltaire. “The so-called revolution in France is nothing but atheism. They seize the property of the clergy and the lands of gentry and considered sharing women to be fair. These ideas against Religious Law and Islam cannot be allowed in our borders. This revolution violating traditions is blasphemy, and denied by the sharia (expelled),” says Kamil Efendi.¹⁵

This verbal alliance of the Ottomans, the perspectives of Atıf Efendi and Kamil Efendi, was in no way a surprise. It was under these conditions that the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution were introduced and received by the Ottoman Turks. Moreover, the threat of a monarchical ally in Europe would also mean a threat to the Ottoman monarchy in due course.¹⁶ It

14. Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, İstanbul: YKY, 16th edition, 2011, p. 84. İsmail Soysal, *Fransız İhtilâli ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi Münâsebetleri (1789-1802)*, Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1999, p. 40.

15. Öztürk, *Ibid*, p.70.

16. Adnan Adıvar, *Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim*, İstanbul: Remzi, 1982, 203-214. Bernard Lewis, “The Impact of the French Revolution in Turkey: Some Notes on the Transmission of Idea”, *The New Asia: Readings in the History of Mankind*, edited by Metraux and Grouzet, New York, London, 1965, 31-59.

is for this reason that conservative politicians –and especially the Austrian chancellor Metternich– were among the most respectable statesmen in the eyes of the Ottomans. Thanks to the role of Metternich, everyone in the Sublime Port of Istanbul was against nationalism, liberty and especially republicanism, all of which grew due to the French Revolution and its aftermath, and they wanted to maintain the status quo.

However, in the decades following these initial assessments, the Ottoman Turks became more assiduous in their understanding of Westernization, and they eventually promised to adopt a modern state philosophy through the Imperial Edict of Reformation (Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu) of 1839.¹⁷ Yet the progress was much slower than expected,¹⁸ largely because the epistemological differences between Ottoman intellectuals and their Western counterparts were too great to be reconciled.

This was not only about religion or language, but also about the perception of the world and the difference between dynamism and statism in the tripartite relationship between man, nature, and God. The difference was so great that even the most basic concepts that can be used to describe modern Europe, such as *civil society*, *aufheben* or *contract social*, did not find their Ottoman-Turkish equivalents throughout the 19th century. It was also almost impossible for Ottoman thinkers to find a way to express themselves in a common language. The social structure that was based on the system of *Millet*, and concepts such as *daire-i adliye*, *iltizam*, or

17. For the crucial importance of Edict of Tanzimat, see: Roderick H. Davison, “Tanẓīmāt”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, Ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_1174

18. Halil İnalcık, “The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey”, *The Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, edited by R.E. Ward and D. Rustow, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964, 42-53.

*içtihat*¹⁹ were all foreign to the conceptual landscape of the West. Since the focus was on industrialization, urbanization, communication, and transportation technologies, issues such as freedom of expression of ideas and freedom of the press were either precluded by the state or disregarded, thereby forcing the development of a modern national consciousness to be delayed. This resulted firstly in that private Turkish newspapers issued in the 1860s were largely inefficient due to the low level of literacy. Secondly, genres such as the novel and the short story were completely unknown literary forms to most Turks. As is the case for almost the entire Middle East, the Balkans, and other traditional oral-culture-based societies, religious tales, sagas and poetry-hymns sufficed for what people wished to convey. Encyclopedic knowledge including astronomy, physics and geography was based on preserving the Islamic tradition of knowledge and consolidating it through repetition. Due to this lack of cultural-scientific dynamism (mostly because of the understanding of *bid'at*), there was only a slight difference in terms of world perception and knowledge between a 16th century Ottoman intellectual and an intellectual in the first half of the 19th century (*ulama*). To borrow from the Persian philosopher Dariush Shayegan, many of the Ottoman concepts were archaic even when they were discursively modernized. The Ottoman-Turkish intellectual world was stuck between Tradition and Modernity, in which it tried to harmonize “a post-Hegel world with a pre-Galileo consciousness.”²⁰

This was true inasmuch that even a hundred years after the Encyclopedists, the Ottomans hardly understood what French

19. For the essential terms of Ottoman Empire, see Halil Inalcik, *Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, Praeger, 1973.

20. Daryush Shayegan, *Yaralı Bilinç (Le regard mutilé, Schizophrénie culturelle)*, çev: Haldun Bayrı, İstanbul: Metis, 5th edition, 2012, p.69.

Enlightenment philosophers were discussing. This becomes especially obvious in the classical work *Tarih-i Cevdet* (History of Cevdet) (published in 12 volumes, 1854-84) by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, one of the most important Ottoman historians and statesmen of the 19th century. Cevdet shows how throughout the entire “long 19th Ottoman century”, representatives of the Enlightenment, and Voltaire in particular, as well as their critical concepts of tolerance, liberty, equality, empiricism, and the right of opposition against tyrannical regimes, were consistently degraded and denounced. At the same time, such phrases as “destroying religion”, “looters”, “leaders of swag men”, and “new titans” were repeatedly used in the works of esteemed intellectuals like Cevdet Pasha and his contemporaries.²¹

Considering this situation from the perspective of a modern paradigm, one can say that the epistemological theory informing literary or non-literary texts is “an absolutist epistemological theory. (...) In broad strokes, this was a theory formed by a method of law depending on the indisputability of the Quran, superiority of Aristotelian deductive reasoning, a world view in which good and evil are distinguished from one another with precise lines, an abstract idealism derived from the mystic tradition, sharia and Islamic law, and of a word-based enlightenment.”²² Moreover, relations between the West and the Ottoman center²³ were highly unequal. Surprisingly, following the second unsuccessful Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, the Ottomans did not acquire new channels of information except for the European stereotypes and

21. Various pages in Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, C. I.,VI., İstanbul: Üçdal, 1974: especially: C.VI, 294-301.

22. Jale Parla, *Babalar ve Oğullar, Tanzimat Romanının Epistemolojik Temelleri*, İstanbul: İletişim, 9th edition, 2011, p.15.

23. Since the most developed intellectual world was in İstanbul, I focus on the intellectual circles there throughout the article.

clichés. The total number of travelogues and books by Ottoman embassy officers on Europe from the 17th to the 20th century are only around 50, while the number of travelogues and books by Western European embassy officers about the Ottoman Empire, written during the 19th century, are over 5000!²⁴ Furthermore, ambassadors, travelers, and soldiers witnessing the economic, military and commercial superiority of the West were indifferent to the intellectual roots of Western superiority. For example, *The Leviathan*, written by Thomas Hobbes in 1651, and *Two Treatises of Government* penned down by John Locke in 1689, were translated into Turkish only in the 1990s – that is three hundred years later! As for the classics of modern thought, except for some summaries and translations, the complete editions of Marx’s *Das Kapital*, Giambattista Vico’s *Ciencia Nueva*, Edmund Burke’s *Reflections on the Revolution in France* and Alexis de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* were only translated into Turkish for the first time in the 2010s. This clearly shows an overall indifference towards classical texts that comprise the intellectual roots of European modernity. The dominance of stable cultural figures, as I have shown above, demonstrates that the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process was deprived of a clear intellectual path and became handicapped by the “lack of Enlightenment” in its attempts at Westernization.²⁵

But what was it that the Western works were interested in, and what were the ideas they put forward that this Ottoman experience of deficient Enlightenment and insufficient modernization could not cope with? To answer this question, one first has to keep in mind the fact that Ottoman modernization was hurried, unplanned, and unstable, and that it was characteristic

24. İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı’yı Yeniden Keşfetmek*, İstanbul: Timaş, 2006, p.86.

25. Hasan Aksakal, *Türk Politik Kültüründe Romantizm*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2015, 65-80.

of “catch-up modernization”. The modernizers gave priority to military and medical issues, which resulted in that textbooks on engineering were introduced into the Ottoman language more quickly and in greater numbers than works of philosophy and literature. This is an important detail that helps understand the attitude of Turkish conservatism that lasted for hundred and fifty years. The idea was that Western knowledge, and not its immorality, needed to be adopted. In contrast to Weber’s association of modernity with Protestant ethics in the beginning of the 20th century, what mainly lies behind such a selective and partial understanding of modernity is not the classical Ottomans’ total unawareness of literature and philosophy emerging in Europe, but their consideration of it as worthless, immoral nonsense.²⁶ Divan literature (mostly in Persian), which was made up of incredible compositions and mathematical detail, was an area of interest that was rich and had high philosophical-mystical-earthly symbolism for the men of letters in Istanbul.²⁷ Although many Ottoman-Turkish intellectuals who spoke Western languages and were educated in the West had knowledge of Cervantes, Shakespeare, Erasmus, and Montaigne, they used to consider them to be “empty rhetoric” and “gossip,” all the while composing Divan literature due to their loyalty to “Ottomanism”, which reinforced their classical conception of the world. It is interesting to see that even in the second half of the 19th century Ottoman-Turkish conservatives maintained the belief that Europe had more to learn from the Orient.²⁸

26. Cemil Meriç, *Bu Ülke*, İstanbul: İletişim, 15th edition, 2002, p.119.

27. For this very different form, please see: Halil Inalcik, “The Origins of Classical Ottoman Literature: Persian Tradition, Court Entertainments and Court Poets”, *Journal of Turkish Literature*, Issue: 5, 2008, 5-77.

28. This highly self-esteeming, some sort of pan-Asian perspective can be seen clearly in Ahmet Midhat Efendi’s speech at the Oriental Studies Conference in Stockholm in 1889.

During the Tanzimat period (1839-1876), or Reformation, it was made possible on cosmopolitan grounds to break with this classical reception and representation of Western culture.²⁹ A minor beginning of the representation of the Age of Enlightenment during the Tanzimat period was found in *Muhaverat-ı Hikemiye* (1859) and *Telemak* (1860). The first of these two books contained a collection by Voltaire, Fenelon and Fontenelle, while the latter consisted of translations by Fenelon.³⁰ The year 1859 also marks the publication of the first play in Turkish, *Şair Evlenmesi*, (A Poet's Marriage). The writer of this work, İbrahim Şinasi Efendi, was the first outstanding modern intellectual from Istanbul, who had stayed in France for a few years and had engaged in their folklore, folk terms, language reform and lexical studies as well as journalism. In the following years, theatre – a form of entertainment that Ottoman ambassadors and observers had not been able to make anything of since the 17th century – started to draw an interest; a result of the efforts of Ahmet Vefik Pasha, an important bureaucrat and leading statesman who was educated in Paris, some works by several artists from Moliere to Hugo were adapted into Ottoman-Turkish. On the other hand, due to the systematic censorship implemented and in force up until the beginning of the 20th century, newspapers and journals could not simply voice political criticism. Therefore, in order to raise awareness among society, intellects were forced to hide their views in plays and poetry. This happened firstly through Turkish novels, later followed by short, satirical stories. These works discussed social upheaval, and mocked and criticized (excessively) Westernized Muslim types. The first literary concepts used to discuss these types as well as

29. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Turkey*, 3rd edition, London, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002, 74-173.

30. Mehmet Kaplan, *Namık Kemal*, p.31: Parla, *Babalar ve Oğullar*, p.27.

what it meant to be Ottoman or a Turk were realism, romanticism and symbolism. Also under these circumstances arose a group of dissenting intellectuals who were known as the Young Ottoman Movement (*Jeunes-Turcs*) in 1865. Among the members of this group, who were expelled to Paris and then to London, one figure rose to prominence: Nâmık Kemal. He was soon to be regarded as the father of modern Turkish thought.

Nâmık Kemal (1840-1888) was born just a few months after the proclamation of Tanzimat and received a good classical education. The contacts he established with Azerbaijanis, Georgians and Armenians in Kars in the South Caucasia, with Bulgarians in Sofia, with Greeks and Jews in the Aegean islands and Istanbul, and with Frenchmen in Paris and Brits in London, led him to question his self-identity and to realize that he was first a Muslim, then an Ottoman-Turk, and lastly a universal human being.³¹ Just as Joseph de Maistre, Nâmık Kemal spoke against *Les Philosophes*, who believed in the universal, unchanging nature of humanity, in that mankind in fact did not exist. “There is no such thing as man in the World. In my life I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, etc.: thanks to Montesquieu, I even know that one can be a Persian. But as for man, I declare that I have never in my life met him.” says de Maistre.³² Nâmık Kemal thought similarly as he was engaged in Rousseau and his concepts. Indeed, as seen in his works written after years of maturity -1873 and later-, Kemal believed in concepts such as “Volksgeist”, “esprit de la nation”, and “national character”, and was constantly working on a form

31. The Turkish historian Mithat Cemal Kutay says that “Three most featuring aspects of Kemal were being human, being Muslim and being Ottoman.” Turan Karataş, “Nâmık Kemal’in Mizacı, Kişilik Özellikleri, Alışkanlıkları”, *Nâmık Kemal*, Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 2011, p.56.

32. Joseph de Maistre, *Considerations on France*, Chapter 6, translated by R.A. Lebrun (Montreal and London), 1974, p.97.

of idealism. Materialist, empiricist and skepticist discourses were hard for him to accept, as he thought in terms familiar to Muslim traditions. He once said:

“Though empirical sciences above all contributed to today’s developments, they could yet not be preserved from the dishonor to put all faith in thoughts and sensibility in conscious under suspicion and examination (...) materialists tend to declare fictitious and null and void what is intangible and invisible on earth. However, human spirit is different from the physical world. Mind and conscience of human beings are not made in the geometrical scale. As much as the mind frankly accepts the case $2 \times 2 = 4$, then conscience confides in the accuracy of the statement, ‘homeland is one thing, those apart from homeland are another.’”³³

Those words summarize the worldview of Nâmık Kemal and the Ottoman intellectuals following him. Additionally, they coincide with the concept of Counter-Enlightenment and tell us a lot about how these figures fit within the Counter-Enlightenment discourse. They believed that mathematical formulations of post-Newtonian rationalists are not enough to understand life and humanity; that feelings, consciousness, spirit and metaphysical values mattered as much as mathematics and engineering, or should be considered even more fundamental; and that there is a field of knowledge independent from experience. For the Ottoman intellectuals, for example, there is an absolute Islamic epistemology. It is no coincidence that Kemal was leading up to the subject of homeland, because his entire vision of the world is centered on this concept

33. Kemal, “Vatan”, *İbret*, 1873: *Osmanlı-Türk Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri* (in), İstanbul: Dergâh, 2005: p.474. A simplified version in Niyazi Berkes, “Namık Kemal ve Kanun-i Esasi”, *Felsefe ve Toplum Bilim Yazıları*, İstanbul: Adam, 2nd edition, 1985, p.197.

of “homeland”. Patriotism to Kemal, the founder of Turkish romanticism, is not something immature or superficial that can be sacrificed for universality. He continues:

“Devotion to the nation is one of the greatest, most sacred duties in every religion, nation, culture and civilization. Sense of homeland has so many reasons that each man devoted to his nation lives throughout his entire life under their influence. For the moment, it is nothing but a dream to expect that the whole world will become citizens – citizens of the world.”³⁴

The way Kemal refused the discourse of universality and explicitly adopted Herderian ideas deeply influenced Turkish patriotism. To him, every nation has a right to live with their uniqueness around a common religion, language, tradition and lifestyle. These ideas are of importance for two reasons: First, they can be regarded as an expression of the centuries-long achievement of the classical Ottoman-type “national system”, as the Tanzimat, as specified in the declaration of 1839, was a step toward a “return” to the “golden age” of the past. Second, Kemal’s “Islamism” and Turkism did not have a racial, biological or religious bias against the Greeks, Armenians or Bulgarians even while the Ottoman Empire was described as the “Sick Man of Europe” and was in danger of deterioration.

Nevertheless, in line with these ideas, Kemal penned biographies of great men – but only those who were Muslim and Turkish – marking their significant heroic deeds, just as Thomas Carlyle did. Among these great men were various “wise kings” such as Saladin, who seized Jerusalem, and Mehmed the Conqueror, who took Constantinople. Kemal produced rhetorically laden plays fraught with epic and patriotic themes and accordingly aimed at

34. “Vatan”; *Osmanlı-Türk* (in), p.476; Berkes, p.197.

creating a popular consciousness of the Turkish language, history and geography.

One should bear in mind that Nâmık Kemal tried to create the most effectual repertoire in his own nation's construction in a collapsing empire during the age when nationalism was shifting from citizenship to imperialism.³⁵ In all his works written from a Muslim perspective, it is obvious that the trinity of Homeland-Nation-Liberty is faithfully adopted just like the trinity of Father-Son-Holy Spirit. Kemal also had a charismatic power to ensure that people adopting these religious and nationalistic dispositions would gather around him. So much so that Fuad Pasha, one of his greatest foes, could not help but say, "We must hang that Kemal, then we should weep over his dead body".³⁶ That is why Nâmık Kemal represents the very poet in Herder's saying, "A poet is the creator of the nation around him, he gives them a world to see and has their souls in his hand to lead them to that world".³⁷

Both as a journalist and as a dissenting intellectual, Kemal was a statesman engaged in various duties. He was a member of the commission to form the first constitution in 1876, which is one of the most critical issues of Ottoman modernization, and he held a position for a district governorship and took on similar bureaucratic tasks during his short life. In his 48 years, he struggled to create an "ideology of sentiments" and use "great persuasive power" to revive the ancient Ottoman social order (Nizam-ı Âlem –

35. As Cemil Aydin notes, "the agency of non-Western intellectuals and historical actors who were universalizing the normative values associated with 'the West' at the same time as they were challenging Western imperial hegemony." Cemil Aydin, "Globalizing the Intellectual History of the Idea of the 'Muslim World'", *Global Intellectual History*, edited by Samuel Moyn, Andrew Sartori, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013, p.159.

36. Aksakal, *Romantizm*, p.70.

37. Vicki A. Spencer, *Herder's Political Thought: A Study of Language, Culture and Community*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, London, 2012, p.81.

or the Imperial Order), which was gradually “dying”. He explains in a famous letter why he is such an impassioned patriot: “To my mind, the only place is my homeland, the only situation is my homeland’s, the only adventure is for the homeland, the world I am in is the realm of sorrow, yet still a beautiful land... What I can do, nothing else fits into my mind...”³⁸

His works later made him, paradoxically, the most influential leader of Turkish nationalism, Turkish liberalism, Turkish constitutionalism, Turkish political Islamism, Turkish patriotism and Turkish conservative revolutionary thought. His works were diverse, and covered poetry, the theatre, the novel, biography, newspaper articles and historiography. To Turkey, Nâmık Kemal means what Adam Mickiewicz is for Polish romanticism, Sandor Petöfi for Hungarian romanticism and Dionysios Solomos for Greek romanticism. The only known objection to this movement, for a hundred and fifty years, was raised by the famous communist poet Nâzım Hikmet and his supporters during an argument in 1935. Nâzım Hikmet’s criticism drew a huge reaction. Furthermore, today Nâmık Kemal’s works are published repeatedly in the revised, modern Turkish language, and are taught at primary and secondary schools. He is revered as the “National Poet”, and is still popular in Turkey because of his representation of the Romantic Counter-Enlightenment and his principles.

Some might argue that the concept of the Counter-Enlightenment, which has never before been studied in Turkey³⁹, should not be associated with Nâmık Kemal’s ideas. However, if we start

38. Nâmık Kemal, *Nâmık Kemal’in Hususi Mektupları, Cilt II*, (Haz. Fevziye Abdullah Tansel), Ankara: TTK, 1969, p.405.

39. The only article dealing with the concept of “Counter-Enlightenment” is: Hasan Aksakal, “Melankoliden Karşı-Aydınlanma’ya: Romantizmin Moderniteye Tepkisi”, *Bibliotech Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Yıl: 4, Sayı: 13, 2011, 49-57.

with the sources of Kemal's thought, that we can make this association soon becomes clear. Nâmık Kemal never left behind Islamic knowledge or its epistemology, but rather looked for a modern European philosophical-political view that was compatible with it. In fact, the entire environment of social thinking of the Tanzimat period may be considered in this way. Like all the other Ottomans of his age, he spoke Arabic and Persian as well as French. Montesquieu was the first to draw Nâmık Kemal's attention, as Montesquie discussed the rise and fall of societies. This was an all too familiar approach in the literature of Islamic historiography, largely due to the tradition established by Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406). Kemal was the first to translate into Turkish *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence* and *De l'esprit des lois* by Montesquieu, and the abridged version of *Progres de L'esprit Humaine* by Condorcet.⁴⁰ Similar to previous Ottoman readership, Kemal also read Voltaire closely, but what this "slave trader" taught about monarchs and religion was considered excessively dangerous. Moreover, Voltaire wore away the importance of history, which Kemal was very fond of – he had a common and universal idea of humanity. Furthermore, in his works he spoke of various matters that were irritating to the Turks. Although he respected salon philosophers of the Enlightenment to some extent and adopted some of their values due to Voltaire's appealing idea of liberty, Kemal had no desire at all to abandon sharia – or the Islamic social contract – in his political and social thought.⁴¹ In literature, he admired the romantic works by Victor Hugo, whom he called "his adopted father". He adored the enthusiastic, effusive and strong voice in Hugo's view of society and history. The

40. Ö. Faruk Akün, "Nâmık Kemal", *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, C.14, İstanbul: Diyanet, 1996, p.364.

41. Şerif Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu*, İstanbul: İletişim, 1996, 325-326.

idea that there were lots of things to learn through heroic figures, an imagination dramatizing life and the “dark” ages, which philosophers of the Enlightenment disliked, captivated Kemal from the very beginning. While engaging the literature of Hugo, Kemal also found a guide for philosophy: Jean-Jacques Rousseau was a fervent dissenter who harassed authorities at least as much as Kemal did. Just like Kemal, Rousseau too was in a perpetual exile. Kemal saw in Rousseau the formulation of a general will, a social brilliance which was ruled by an assembly where each person was allowed to express his/her opinion and where the minority wholeheartedly believed in common interest while harmonizing with the majority. Though the translation of *Contrat Social* under the title of *Şerait-i İctimai* was one of Kemal’s least-known intellectual efforts, he saw in this work a representation of the social memory of the “kurultai” [general meeting] and “county councils” in the pre-Islamic Central-Asian Turkish tradition and the consensus (*shurah*) related verses of the Quran – all reminding of the necessity of consulting the public on governmental matters.⁴² Through a selective reading, Kemal was able to build his demands for the constitutional assembly on solid ground. Liberty was considered “divine benevolence” granted to humans by a divine power before societies restricted them.⁴³ The source for this liberty was holy or sacred law. For Kemal, “Everyone was the sultan of his own realm” until a divinely sanctioned ruler (emir) would emerge and stand for the general will with people’s support. From this point on, the legitimacy of the emir was about his capacity for consulting and representing the people he ruled. People would abandon their liberties partly for this; however, they would become liberalized on

42. For instance see *Quran*: Al-i İmran 3/159, Shurah 42/38 ve 42/39.

43. Nergiz Aydoğdu, “Nâmık Kemal’de Hürriyet Kavramı”, *Nâmık Kemal*, Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 2011, p.460.

a different level through this social contract. In short, the influence of this “Islamized Rousseau” over the first version of Ottoman Constitution accepted in 1876 is the result of Nâmık Kemal’s insistent demand.

There were lots of other things of key importance in the philosophy of the Enlightenment that Kemal could not accept. First, he was unable to be skeptical in Cartesian terms, for he had a strong belief in respect for the specificity of society, history and religious issues. He was so deeply devoted to his religion that he could not be open to argue on any subjects opposing religious doctrines. He was not critical at all when it comes to the role of the Church in the West or the religious leaders (*ulama*) in the East. As Hilmi Yavuz, one of the most significant professors of Turkish literature in Turkey, stated, the traditionalism of Kemal would allow him to articulate the idea of Enlightenment only as a supporter of the “romantic enlightenment”.⁴⁴ Because for Kemal, the source of law was certainly God, and not reason! The social contract granting the right to rule was a manifestation of the divine will. Religion was perfection. This was undisputable for Nâmık Kemal as for many of his contemporaries. Nevertheless, society could still progress or regress and that could be seen in history and geography. Kemal also had shared the concept of *verum factum* with Vico. Therefore, as in Isaiah Berlin’s definition of Counter-Enlightenment, Kemal, like many European thinkers, was not able to agree with the idea of “doctrine of natural law that human nature was fundamentally the same in all times and places; that local variations were unimportant...”⁴⁵ While feelings of faith and bravery, honesty and solidarity improved during periods of strength, as

44. Hilmi Yavuz, “Romantik Aydınlanmacı: Nâmık Kemal”, *Nâmık Kemal*, Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 2011, p.379.

45. Berlin, “The Counter-Enlightenment”, p.1.

he himself witnessed in his own country, when corruption started among society, it would penetrate into everything. In this sense, it is not surprising that Kemal – like the representatives of European conservative thought – resorted to an organic vision of society with a powerful myth of a golden age. Indeed, even while speaking of development and civilization, Kemal turned his face towards the past and tried to figure out what went wrong with the broken social contract. In this regard, despite the fact that he seemed to praise civilization and progress, his sole point was the reestablishment of a now corrupted but once ideal order that is the improvement of sharia, in order to reach a social order in harmony with the *Volksgeist*.⁴⁶

Kemal was the “guardian of old values and the judge of new ones.”⁴⁷ Disenchantment of the world would mean the breach of Imperial social order (*Nizam-ı Alem*) in the imagination of Istanbul intellectuals. The Empire was collapsing, and the political, industrial and scientific-cultural revolutions, which the Western Europe first encountered, were disturbing developments in the eyes of the Ottomans, witnessing these from afar. While Kemal was arguing that a great, persuasive power was needed for social mobilization, there were few adequate resources to draw from, and thus he tried to draw the energy he needed out of the past, out of spirituality, out of heroic figures and out of the power of the public. Rationalism was not the only way to revive a decaying society. In fact, there was a divine will more powerful than rationality:

46. “Being civilized doesn’t mean that we have to accept Chinese snail food or European dances and the way of wedding ceremonies. We don’t need to accept them. We can go further by displaying our own moral needs, and develop the convenient ones from our own costumes...” Berkes, *Ibid*, 195-196.

47. Parla, *Ibid*, p.61.

“If the Lord Almighty drew everything so rational like in calculation boards, there would not be any possibility or need for a sense of family, nation, country, or homeland.”⁴⁸

For Kemal and his contemporaries, it was this point that the Enlightenment failed to see; that is why, from Kemal to figures such as Ahmet Midhat Efendi, a culturalist narrative has been co-existent with intellectual research.

Geography was also of great importance for Nâmık Kemal, just like language and history. Here, Ibn Khaldun and Montesquieu were influential for his historical approach. Kemal went beyond the work of these philosophers and rendered geography a spiritual point of reference and desired to transform it into something divine for the people. Homeland was thus characterized in the feminine as “mother” in Turkish and was considered a divine force that imposed her own character on people (known as her children). Furthermore, “she” passed on some form of a transcendent “national spirit” that supposedly had arisen within its history spanning hundreds of years. In Kemal’s poetry, particularly his *Vatan Şarkısı* and *Vatan Kasidesi*, and in his historical biographic play *Vatan yahut Silistre* (1873), citizens were typified as those that feed on the motherland during their youth, and once they had grown up, they become obliged to protect her as is befitting of a son. Of course, these kinds of statements feed into a kind of masculine and heroic nationalism. In short, for Nâmık Kemal, guarding the country means protecting its national honor, the chastity of its women, and religion. That is why moral and political motifs are constantly and seamlessly intertwined in his most-renowned works:

48. Nâmık Kemal, “Vatan”, *İbret*, 1873: *Osmanlı-Türk* (in), p.474.

Can this cage of skin impede the determination
For religion, for state, for the nation in agony?⁴⁹

Thus we are reaching the point where we can speak of the key role he played in building national identity. According to Kemal, poetic ability is no special preserve of the educated; as the true “mother tongue of mankind” (as Hamann called it⁵⁰), it appears in its greatest purity and power in the uncivilized periods of every nation. But there was a need for national institutions, as Rousseau mentioned a century before,

“[T]hat is what gives form to genius, the character, the tastes, and the customs of a people, what causes it to be itself rather than some other people; what arouses in it that ardent love of fatherland that is founded upon habits of mind impossible to uproot.”⁵¹

Furthermore, just as Vico, Rousseau and Herder, Kemal also believed that one can ascertain the depth of oral culture when one pays attention to national mythology, rituals, folk songs, historical monuments, temples and ruins, local aphorisms,

49. “*Din için, devlet için, can çekişen millet için, Azme hâil mi olurmuş bu çürük ten kafesi?*”

This is one of the best known pieces from Kemal’s *Murabba* (1882), when the Ottoman Empire was defeated by Russians thus it lost most of the Balkan lands and almost entire Caucasia, but also Egypt and Cypress were seized by British Empire, <http://www.antoloji.com/murabba-9-siiri/> and he, actually throughout the work, describes how important being dedicated to one’s religion, homeland and people is. He calls all Turks for uniting the spiritual and ethno-symbolic values under the same motivation. *Murabba* is one of the most critical breaking points of right-wing literary populism in Turkey.

50. Lisa Marie Anderson (ed.) *Hamann and the Tradition*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2012, p.144.

51. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Government of Poland*, Chapter 12, translated by Willmore Kendall, Indianapolis, New York, 1972, p.87.

legendary bards and poets, epic stories about heroes and heroines in tough times. As each of these figures are seen as representatives of a Counter-Enlightenment, due to their emphasis on mystic unity, so Kemal too should be seen as one partaking in Counter-Enlightenment, because he also took these themes seriously and cared about the feeling of the “people.” He also raised the question of identity and whether it was sufficient to create those invisible connections in a nation among people who have never met each other. The Qur’an, according to some of his columns, proved that this was possible. Kemal also made some connections between the early Islamic period and the traditional ‘tales of Dede Korkut,’ which were of Central Asian Turkic background. Hence, he tried to revitalize them in order to prove the uniqueness of Turkish culture.

Again, just like the philosophers of Counter-Enlightenment in Western Europe, and Hamann in particular, Kemal tended to believe that “God is a poet, not a mathematician.”⁵² He repeatedly stated that nature was like God’s glorious fine art and a temple. He declared how he saw the sublime in nature, and pointedly disagreed with Newtonian-Cartesian empiricism. He once again, like many other European intellectuals, embraced the Enlightenment in many fields, “but sought a new synthesis whereby faith, science, and reason would be different faces of the same universe, and that all of them would express the cultivation, or *Bildung*, of the human spirit.”⁵³

52. Berlin, *Ibid*, p.8. This statement reminds us Kemal’s interest on Catholic romantics such as Chateaubriand. Interestingly Chateaubriand was one of the most popular literary figures in the eyes of Tanzimat era Ottoman intellectuals, including Kemal. Most of his works were translated into Ottoman-Turkish, Ottoman-Armenian and Ottoman-Greek between 1862 and 1889.

53. Michael Ferber, *Romanticism: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2010, p.89.

Rousseau's arguments deeply influenced not only Nâmık Kemal but also 19th and 20th century Turkish political thought as a whole, and generated other comments as well. It is noteworthy that, while Kemal admired Europe, the modernized and strengthened "other" of the Ottoman-Turks, he did not refrain from criticizing it as well. He tried to find Western examples while undertaking this task. The imperialism of Enlightened Europe made Rousseauian anti or counter-modernist remarks more powerful among Turkish intellectuals. Though not totally against civilization and development, he said that these two figures dehumanize and corrupt people after a certain point and grant the right of being human only to a privileged group of "effendis" (masters). Kemal, for example, charges the West with killing human dignity and ignoring all other civilizations but itself. This approach is noticeable in the refutation written against the work of Ernest Renan in 1883 for a conference on Islam and Science and also in his article "Avrupa Şarkı Bilmez" (Europe Doesn't Know the Orient).⁵⁴ On top of that, this Occidentalist indignation ongoing throughout the 20th century was transformed into a powerful political routine that even seeped into the Turkish national anthem. Written by Mehmet Âkif in 1921, the national anthem called Europe out on its contradictions, saying: "That battered, single-fanged monster you call 'civilization.'"

CONCLUSION

Nâmık Kemal combined the themes of Counter-Enlightenment, which he acknowledged as a combination of vitalism, relativism,

54. Nâmık Kemal, *Renan Müdafaaanamesi*, edited by M. Fuad Köprülü, Ankara: Milli Kültür, 1962. "Avrupa Şarkı Bilmez", *İbret*, 1872. *Osmanlı-Türk* (in), 62-65.

and organism, with Islamic patterns. In doing so he rejected the basic arguments of orthodox rationalism, empiricism, linear history, and European-style natural law. He was preoccupied with the ideas that arose against cosmopolitanism, Orientalism, and imperialism by holding on tight to the Islamic version of the “patrie”, unclear definitions of the “ideal social justice” and rhetoric defense of the mystic sides of the Islamic scholarship on the topics of history, nature and science. Similar to Isaiah Berlin’s Hamann, Nâmık Kemal was the most passionate, consistent, extreme and implacable enemy of the monist, Euro-centric social-political thought. Moreover, it is possible to find almost all the major themes of the Counter-Enlightenment in this modernization, but especially the idealism of a national spirit and a general will, which can also be found in the works by Nâmık Kemal.

There have been various representatives of the Counter-Enlightenment and many critics of the Enlightenment in different contexts –such as Rousseau, Hamann, Herder and Vico, but also the more contemporary Nietzsche, the Frankfurt School, post-modernists and feminists. In addition to this great chain of critics of the Enlightenment, one can also add a Turkish name to the debate, namely Nâmık Kemal, who is still waiting to be discovered by the present international scholarship.

Therefore, it might be observed that the extremely limited advocacy of Enlightenment in Turkey⁵⁵ made the 18th and 19th-century intellectuals –despite never using the concept– indirect members of the Anti or Counter-Enlightenment in a general sense. From this standpoint, in an environment around the issues of Turkish Counter-Enlighteners, it can deepen the acknowledg-

55. An extremely interesting detail about the legacy of the Enlightenment in Turkey is that there is no article related to the Enlightenment *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, the largest encyclopedia in Turkish (1988-2013), consist of 44 volumes and 24,596 pages.

ment of the arguments of Counter-Enlightenment, but also explore the refashioning of the continental European Counter-Enlightenment thinkers in a non-Western but Westernized Muslim society, which has debated and struggled with many important themes related to different roads of modernity.