

T.R.
ISTANBUL SABAHATTIN ZAIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE EDUCATION INSTITUTE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCES AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS



**QATAR'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE
CONFLICT IN YEMEN (2011-2021)**

MA THESIS

Bandar Abdo Ahmed DABWAN

Istanbul
May -2024

T.R.
ISTANBUL SABAHATTIN ZAIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE EDUCATION INSTITUTE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCES AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**QATAR'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE CONFLICT IN
YEMEN (2011-2021)**

MA THESIS

Bandar Abdo Ahmed DABWAN

Supervisor
Asst. Prof. Dr. Fadi ZATARI

Istanbul
May-2024

THESIS APPROVAL

This study has been approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for MA Degree in Political Sciences and International Relations

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Fadi ZATARI

Member of jury: Asst. Prof. Dr. Feyzullah YILMAZ

Member of jury: Asst. Prof. Dr. Hakan ERDAGÖZ

Approval by

Prof. Dr. Erhan İÇENER
Director, Graduate Education Institute

DECLARATION OF SCIENTIFIC ETHICS AND ORIGINALITY

This is to certify that this MA thesis titled “Qatar's Foreign Policy toward the Conflict in Yemen (2011-2021)” is entirely my original work and I have adhered to scientific ethics and academic rules throughout its production. All the information and data used in this thesis have been collected and utilized following scientific ethics and the guidelines for thesis writing at Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University. I have meticulously cited all direct and indirect quotations and all sources that I have used in this work.



Signature

Bandar Abdo Ahmed DABWAN

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratefulness to Asst. Prof. Dr. Fadi ZATARİ for his invaluable guidance and unwavering support throughout my thesis writing journey, which led to its successful completion. Without his patience and support, this thesis would not have been possible. As well, I would like to offer my sincere gratitude to Prof. Dr. Erhan İÇENER, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Benaouda BENSAID, Asst. Prof. Dr. Hakan ERDAGÖZ, Asst. Prof. Dr. Feyzullah YILMAZ, Asst. Prof. Dr. Ravza ALTUNTAŞ ÇAKIR, Asst. Prof. Dr. Ömer TAŞGETİREN, Asst. Prof. Dr. Melek SARAL, Asst. Prof. Dr. Mohamed MOUSSA, Asst. Prof. Dr. Ertan AYDIN for their efforts and kind behavior during this scientific journey and all the teachers who participated in this journey.

I am forever indebted to my father, who was the reason for my existence in this life. He died when I was a small child. Mercy and immortality for his kind soul. To my mother, the source of my happiness, who instilled in me a love of reading and writing and the values of hard work and dedication. She nurtured me with her love, tenderness, and prayers that did not stop for one moment. To my wife and my life partner, who was my supporter in this long journey, my sincere gratitude, as well as to my daughter Heba and my son Shawqi, for their patience and endurance because I've been far away from them for long periods during this scientific journey. To my brothers and sisters and all my loving family, who are the source of my happiness, my thanks for all of their encouragement and support throughout the study periods.

Signature

Bandar Abdo Ahmed DABWAN

Istanbul, May-2024

ABSTRACT

QATAR'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE CONFLICT IN YEMEN (2011-2021)

Bandar Abdo Ahmed DABWAN

M.A., Political Sciences and International Relations

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Fadi ZATARI

May, 2024 - 128 Pages

Since the February 2011 revolution, Yemen has witnessed important events that have contributed to the complexity of the political crisis. The Houthi group carried out a coup against the legitimate government on September 21, 2014, which led to a regional military intervention with different agendas. As a result, the conflict in Yemen evolved beyond a national issue, gaining regional and international significance. It has become an issue of great importance because of its impact on peace and security in the region and the world. Throughout the period, Qatar was among the influential countries in Yemeni affairs, being a member of the military coalition countries that intervened to restore constitutional legitimacy in Yemen. Its participation was later terminated; however, its role remained pivotal. The current thesis evaluates Qatar's foreign policy towards the conflict in Yemen (2011–2021) via a historical lens, tracing the political, military, economic, and humanitarian dimensions of Qatar's engagement over the aforementioned period. Also, this thesis analyzes Qatar's foreign policy through a soft power concept lens by Joseph Nye. Regarding methodology, this thesis uses historical, descriptive, and analytical approaches. In addition to articles, books, reports, news, and official statements that were reviewed throughout the research. In addition to highlighting the shifts witnessed by the Qatari policy towards Yemen and to what extent this policy has affected the Yemeni scene, Qatar plays a role in the region larger than its size, relying on its soft power and active diplomacy, as it has positioned itself in a competition with other regional powers, which has shaped its influence.

Key words: Qatar, Yemen, conflict in Yemen, Qatar's foreign policy

ÖZET

KATAR'IN YEMEN'DEKİ ÇATIŞMAYA YÖNELİK DIŞ POLİTİKASI (2011-2021)

Bandar Abdo Ahmed DABWAN

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler

Danışman: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Fadi ZATARI

Mayıs, 2024 - 128 Sayfa

Şubat 2011 devriminden bu yana Yemen, siyasi krizin karmaşıklığına katkıda bulunan önemli olaylara tanıklık etti. Husiler, 21 Eylül 2014 tarihinde meşru hükümete karşı bir darbe gerçekleştirerek farklı gündemlere sahip bölgesel bir askeri müdahaleye yol açtı. Sonuç olarak, Yemen'deki çatışma ulusal bir mesele ötesine evrilerek bölgesel ve uluslararası önem kazandı. Bölgedeki ve dünyadaki barış ve güvenlik üzerindeki etkisi nedeniyle büyük bir öneme sahip bir konu haline geldi. Bu dönem boyunca Katar, Yemen meselelerinde etkili olan ülkeler arasında yer alarak Yemen'de anayasal meşruiyeti yeniden tesis etmek için askeri koalisyon ülkelerinin bir üyesi oldu. Katılımı daha sonra sona erdirilmiş olsa da, rolü belirleyici kalmıştır. Bu tez, Katar'ın Yemen'deki çatışma konusundaki dış politikasını (2011-2021) tarihsel bir bakış açısıyla değerlendirir ve belirtilen dönem boyunca Katar'ın katılımının siyasi, askeri, ekonomik ve insani boyutlarını izlemektedir. Ayrıca, bu tez, Joseph Nye'in yumuşak güç kavramı lensiyle Katar'ın dış politikasını analiz etmektedir. Yöntem açısından, bu tez tarihi, açıklayıcı ve analitik yaklaşımları kullanır. Araştırma sırasında incelenen makaleler, kitaplar, raporlar, haberler ve resmi açıklamaların yanı sıra, Katar politikasının Yemen'e karşı gösterdiği değişimleri vurgulamanın yanı sıra, bu politikanın Yemen sahnesini ne kadar etkilediğini de ortaya koymaktadır. Katar, yumuşak gücüne ve aktif diplomasisine dayanarak boyutundan daha büyük bir rol oynar ve bölgesel güçlerle rekabet içinde kendini konumlandırıp etkisini şekillendirmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Katar, Yemen, Yemen çatışması, Katar'ın dış politikası

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THESIS APPROVAL	i
DECLARATION OF SCIENTIFIC ETHICS AND ORIGINALITY	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZET	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
LIST OF MAPS	ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	x
CHAPTER I	1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. The Statement of the Problem.....	1
1.2. Historical Background	1
1.3. The Rationale of the Study.....	2
1.4. The Significance and Originality of the Study.....	2
1.5. The Limitations of the Study	3
1.6. The Research Questions and the Hypotheses of the Study.....	3
1.6.1 The Research Questions	3
1.6.2. The Hypothesis of the Study	4
1.7. Methodology	4
1.8. Literature Review	5
1.8.1. Introduction	5
1.8.2. The Growing External Role of Qatar's Policy Since Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani Came to Power in 1995	6
1.8.3. The Level of the Reactions of the Qatari Government Towards the Arab Spring Revolutions, the Challenges It Faced, and Its Impact on the Future of the Qatari Role	10

1.8.4. The Qatar-Gulf Crisis and Its Reflections on the Future and the Regional and International Status of Qatar	13
1.9. The Outline of the Study	15
CHAPTER II	17
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	17
2.1. Introduction	17
2.2. Power Concept	18
2.3. Nye's Concept of Soft Power	21
2.4. Smart Power	25
CHAPTER III	29
QATAR'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD YEMEN (1962-2010)	29
3.1. Yemen-Qatar Relations During the Period 1962-1971	29
3.2. Yemen-Qatar Relations During the Period 1971-1990	32
3.3. Yemen-Qatar Relations During the Period 1990–1995	36
3.4. Yemen-Qatar Relations During the Period 1995 - 2010	38
3.4.1. The Level of Diplomatic Visits and Bilateral Agreements	38
3.4.2. The Level of Support, Cooperation, and Trade Exchange	41
3.4.3. The Level of Common Issues	43
3.5. Determinants of Qatar's Foreign Policy towards Yemen	45
3.5.1. Introduction	45
3.5.2. Internal Determinants	46
3.5.2.1. Geographical Factor (location)	46
3.5.2.2. Economic Level	47
3.5.2.3. The Political and Diplomatic Determinants	51
3.5.2.4. Media Determinants	55
3.5.2.5. The Decision-Maker and The Ruling Elite	57
3.5.3. The External Determinants of The Qatari Policy Towards Yemen	59
3.5.3.1. Regional Determinants	59

3.5.3.2. International Determinants	68
CHAPTER IV	72
QATAR'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE FEBRUARY 11 REVOLUTION AND BEYOND	72
4.1. Introduction	72
4.2. The position of the Government of Qatar on the February 11 Revolution	73
4.3. The Position of The Government of Qatar on The Gulf Initiative.....	75
4.4. The Position of The Qatari Government on The Transitional Period and The National Dialogue Conference	79
4.5. The Position of Qatar's Government Towards the Fall of Sana'a and The Coup of The Houthi-Saleh Coalition on Legitimacy	84
4.6. Qatar's Foreign Policy towards the military intervention and the deviation of the path of the war in Yemen	88
4.6.1. Introduction	88
4.6.2. The Military Intervention of the Arab Coalition in Yemen	88
4.6.2.1. Qatar's Position on The Formation of The Arab Coalition and Participation in The Decisive Storm	90
4.6.2.2. Qatar's Position on The Deviation in The Path of The War in Yemen	93
CONCLUSION	98
REFERENCES	101
CURRICULUM VITAE	118

LIST OF MAPS

Map 3.1: Yemen Arab Republic and Its Governorates 1989.....	31
Map 3.2: The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 1967.....	32
Map 3.3: Yemen Republic 1990.....	36
Map 3.4: A political Map of Qatar State	46
Map 4.1: Map of Yemen, showing the division of areas according to control.....	81



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

GCC: The Gulf Cooperation Council

NDC: The National Dialogue Conference

STC: The Southern Transitional Council

GNA : Government Of National Accord

PDRY: People's Democratic Republic of Yemen

YAR: Yemen Arab Republic



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Statement of the Problem

After the outbreak of the revolution on February 11, 2011, in Yemen, the political crisis in Yemen reached a dead end. Events developed rapidly until this political crisis turned into a military conflict between the legitimate government, headed by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and the Houthis group. As a result, the Houthis invaded the Yemeni capital, Sana'a, and controlled all state institutions on September 21, 2014. A group of ten countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Pakistan, and Jordan) formed a military alliance known as the Arab Coalition to support legitimacy led by Saudi Arabia and launched its first military operations under the name of decisive storm on March 26, 2015.

To understand the Yemeni issue, the one should study and understand the policies of the states that are active and play a key role in the conflict in Yemen, including the state of Qatar. Due to the paucity and lack of resources that deal with the analysis and study of those policies towards the conflict in Yemen, especially Qatar's foreign policy, which is a small country but plays a stronger role than its size, this study aims to explore the Qatar's foreign policy towards the conflict in Yemen during 2011-2021. This period witnessed a great turmoil and mutation in Yemen, making it a subject worthy of investigation.

1.2. Historical Background

Over the past three decades, Qatar's policy has been playing a very active role at the regional or international level. It has strengthened its capabilities, relations, and political diplomacy and actively participated in many of the latest developments. Qatar's policy in its presence was not based on hard power, but relied on soft power and foreign policy, based on the exchange of interests, conflict resolution, and being the supporter of peace-making processes. Qatar is also a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and it shares several commonalities with Yemen. Both countries have distinguished historical relationships. Qatar also stood with Yemen

during the 1994 war of secession and rejected the secession because it wanted Yemen to remain united and strong, "rhetorically often claimed to be because of Arab nationalism to keep the union" (Hansen, 2013:20). Furthermore, Qatar supported the Yemeni government in international forums and advocated for Yemen's accession to the GCC (Alrantisi, 2014).

Qatar's policy was also strongly present in the February 11, 2011 revolution and in the formulation of a Gulf initiative to resolve the political crisis. It was also a member of the Arab Coalition to support legitimacy and participated in the launch of the military operations of decisive storm led by Saudi Arabia before being expelled from the coalition in 2017. After that, Qatar's policy towards the events in Yemen changed, especially toward the policy of the coalition and its management of the war in Yemen.

1.3. The Rationale of the Study

As a result of the remarkable development in military and political events in Yemen since the revolution of February 11, 2011, the situation worsened. Until it came to military confrontations between the Yemeni government and the Houthi group, then regional and international parties intervened. So the political crisis moved from the national dimension to the regional and international dimension. Therefore, understanding the Yemeni conflict has become linked to understanding the policies of regional states related to the Yemeni affair, their agendas, goals, and tools. Qatar was among the coalition countries that participated in restoring constitutional legitimacy. From this point of view, it will be necessary to study the motives and dimensions of Qatar's foreign policy towards this conflict in Yemen during the period 2011–2021, as a strong and influential actor in both, regional and international policies.

1.4. The Significance and Originality of the Study

Since 2011, Yemen has become the scene of external regional and international intervention with different agendas, whether the intervention took a positive or negative role, with soft or hard powers.

Therefore, the importance of this study can be summarized in the following points: First, the study deals with a critical stage in the modern history of Yemen that was not investigated by the literature review, having witnessed huge transformations such

as the February 11 revolution and external military intervention. Second, the study's period witnessed a large presence of regional actors in the Yemeni scene, including the State of Qatar, so the researcher needs to study the policies of these players towards the Yemeni issue. Third, Qatar's foreign policy towards Yemen during the study period was in a state of competition with other regional powers, which affected its presence and influence. Fourth, it contributes in providing the Yemeni decision-maker with an analysis and scientific reading related to the current stage, which helps to form a correct vision and an accurate assessment of the influence of external players in the Yemeni issue. Fifth, this study will add to the scholarship a new reading of the Yemeni issue in the path of the Yemeni-Qatari relationship by bridging the gap in the literature review that has not been sufficiently explored. Sixth, it describes the role played by Qatar towards Yemen during the study's period.

1.5. The Limitations of the Study

In the study, the researcher adheres to the following limitations:

- A. Subject boundaries; which are specified in the study title "Qatar's foreign policy toward the conflict in Yemen 2011-2021". Refer to official political positions and statements, soft and hard powers, and unilateral or common tools.
- B. Spatial boundaries; the study is framed within the two countries (the State of Qatar and the Republic of Yemen), as they are the subject of the study.
- C. Time boundaries; the study is confined to exploring the Qatari government's policy towards Yemen 2011-2021.

1.6. The Research Questions and the Hypotheses of the Study

1.6.1 The Research Questions

The study seeks to answer the main question: What are the motives and dimensions of Qatar's foreign policy towards the transformations that Yemen witnessed during the period (2011-2021)?

There are several sub-research questions that this study seeks to fulfill:

1. What are the determinants of Qatar's foreign policy in Yemen?
2. What were the changes in foreign policy during the study's period?
3. To what extent did Qatar's foreign policy impact developments in Yemen during the study period?

1.6.2. The Hypothesis of the Study

The study assumes that Qatar has adopted an effective and influential policy on the Yemeni scene, but its presence is closely linked to the positions of the influential regional powers on the Yemeni issue.

1.7. Methodology

The study has used a strong and multifaceted methodological framework, drawing upon historical, descriptive, and analytical approaches to achieve accurate and objective scientific results.

Firstly, the historical approach is used as a foundational tool to meticulously analyze and document the evolution of Qatar-Yemen relations. This involved a comprehensive examination of historical records, archival materials, and relevant studies to rebuild a chronological narrative of the bilateral relationship. By charting key milestones and tracing developmental phases, the historical approach facilitates a comprehensive understanding of the historical context and provides a critical context for understanding the contemporary dynamics for further analysis.

Secondly, the descriptive approach has been adopted to systematically investigate the various dimensions and transformations of Qatar's policy towards Yemen. This involves a close examination of official pronouncements, statements, and positions articulated by Qatari officials and institutions concerning the issue, allowing for a detailed description of Qatar's evolving stance. Through a close examination of these primary sources, the research was able to identify key shifts and nuances in Qatar's policy, revealing the underlying motivations and objectives.

Thirdly, the analytical approach served as a powerful tool for interpreting and connecting the various situations, events, and statements relevant to the research topic. Considering that the underlying trends and motivations of both states and individuals are often manifested through their actions, pronouncements, and behaviors. The analytical approach provides a framework for analyzing the complex interplay of factors shaping Qatar-Yemen relations. This involved employing critical thinking, identifying causal relationships, and drawing inferences to generate deeper insights into the research question.

Regarding the data and information collection, the study employed a multifaceted approach, drawing upon both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources

constituted the backbone of the research, with a particular focus on official statements issued by Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other official institutions concerning the conflict in Yemen. These documents provide firsthand insights into the Qatari government's stance on the conflict and its foreign policy towards Yemen.

Secondary sources served as a valuable supplement, providing contextual information and diverse perspectives on the research topic. This includes a comprehensive review of relevant books, articles, research papers, and academic studies by established scholars and experts in the field. By analyzing data from both primary and secondary sources, the research ensured a well-rounded and robust analysis of the complex relationship between Qatar and the Yemen and Qatar's stance towards Yemeni crisis.

By employing a combination of historical, descriptive, and analytical approaches, the research was able to achieve its goals of generating accurate and objective scientific results. This methodological framework provides a comprehensive and multifaceted lens to examine this study topic, ultimately leading to a deeper understanding of the intricate dynamics shaping Qatar's Foreign Policy towards the conflict in Yemen.

1.8. Literature Review

1.8.1. Introduction

The study investigates the literature review pertaining to Qatar's foreign policy and the conflict in Yemen, comprising of books, scientific research, articles, reports, or scientific papers. This allows the researcher to learn from the literature, overcome the challenges encountered by earlier researchers, and identify the gaps that those studies failed to address.

Firstly, the chapter discusses the growing external role of Qatar's policy since Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani came to power in 1995, despite the weakness of the traditional power of the state (military, geographic area, population). Secondly, it analyzes the reactions of the Qatari government towards the Arab Spring revolutions, the challenges it faced, and its impact on the future of the Qatari role. Thirdly, it evaluates the Qatar-Gulf crisis and its reflections on the regional and international status of Qatar.

1.8.2. The Growing External Role of Qatar's Policy Since Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani Came to Power in 1995

Barakat (2014) explores the history of Qatari mediation in many Arab and regional issues, which could enhance its position as an important regional actor in resolving regional conflicts. This attempt of mediation is driven by several factors that enable it to achieve its strategic goals of achieving a balance between competing parties and maintaining a good relationship with all parties since Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani assumed power in 1995.

Qatar succeeded in defusing short-term crises; either in Yemen in 2010 between the Houthis and the Yemeni government, in Lebanon in 2008, and in Darfur in the year 2011. Barakat's study recommended that Qatari financial pledges should be in the form of long-term development investments to have a more effective leadership role, and Qatar should focus carefully on when and how to choose mediation and explain the reasons for doing that. It should also work on building the Qatari brand by doing permanent agreements instead of temporary solutions.

Focusing on building institutional capacities rather than individual ones, as well as documenting Qatari efforts and experiences in mediation, is essential for analyzing the conflict before engaging in future mediation. Moreover, acquiring sufficient knowledge of the cultures of countries in which Qatar is likely to participate in mediation and enjoy a degree of transparency, as this helps to reassure the neighbors regarding Qatar's political motives.

Barakat's study has not examined the motives of Qatar's policy nor analyzed its agenda in its keenness to play an active role in mediation, especially in the presence of a strong competitor in the region such as Saudi Arabia. Barakat has also neglected to study the impact of Qatar's presence in Yemen, given the strong influence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Yemen.

Baabood and Baabood (2020) discuss the historical relations between Oman and Qatar with Yemen, the role that Qatar played in solving Yemen's internal problems between former President Saleh and the Houthi group. The study also discussed the meetings hosted by Qatar between the Yemeni government and the Houthis in 2007, which led to the ceasefire (which did not last long).

Baabood and Baabood's study discusses the Omani and Qatari policies in Yemen during the period 2011-2014, the role that Qatar played in the Gulf initiative under

the auspices of the United Nations (which has recently been withdrawn from it), as well as the relief and humanitarian work of the Friends of Yemen group, which built hospitals, schools, and housing for the homeless. Baabood and Baabood's study did not indicate the reasons for Qatar's withdrawal from the Gulf initiative and the resulting effects on the Yemeni issue and the establishment of peace in Yemen, as well as its impact on the Qatari presence in Yemen.

Masaeed (2014) deals with monitoring and explaining the growing Qatari role in the region in light of the Arab Spring revolutions, including the Yemeni revolution (the February 11 revolution), using the role theory in foreign policy (based on K.L. Holsti). The role theory is based on two main variables; the role conception and the role performance, and these two variables are enacted to understand Qatar's foreign policy. Masaeed also examines the objective and subjective factors that contributed to the growth of the regional role of the State of Qatar, which includes economic resources, military capabilities, media coverage, and technological capabilities, as well as the content of the political culture of the decision-makers and the limits of this role. In addition, he researches the future of this role after handing over authority from Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani to Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani in light of the developments in the Arab region.

Masaeed's study concludes that Qatar has become a great political power that can play a significant role among other regional powers. However, Masaeed's study doesn't indicate the extent to which the growth of that role is affected by the fierce competition for influence in the region, especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Khudair (2011) starts with the hypothesis that "the growing role of Qatar in the regional and international environment stems from Qatar's desire to build itself and find an effective foreign policy independent of the Gulf Cooperation Council" (Khudair, 2011:195). Khudair's study also analyzes the mechanisms and motives of Qatar's foreign policy. It concludes that Qatar's foreign policy was able to set the pillars and goals to build itself and strengthen its regional power despite the limits of its geopolitical capabilities, as it relied on a set of material elements and value motives to achieve its strategic goal.

Qatar's foreign policy was able to achieve a double goal: the first was to support its role as a partner in some Arab issues, such as the issues of Lebanon, Darfur, and Iraq, and the second was to cut the way for the intervention of any non-Arab regional power trying to find a foothold in the region. The fact that the Khudair's study is old,

it doesn't address Qatar's positions toward many issues in light of developments in the region, especially regarding the war in Yemen, as well as the impact of the Gulf crisis on Qatar's policy towards the conflict.

Barakat (2012) investigates the rise and growth of Qatar's role and its transformation into a giant player in international mediation through peacemaking in several contexts. It is guided by three main strategies; political and economic liberation; the independence in foreign policy; and the branding of the state. Barakat's study recommends the necessity of neutrality and independence if Qatar is aiming for more success, with the need to invest in long-term projects and sustainable peace rather than temporary solutions.

Kusumawijaya and Machmudi (2022) examine the development of Qatar's foreign policy as a mediator in conflict resolution. The study argues that Qatar's emergence as a regional player in the Middle East partly stems from its successful mediation efforts. Kusumawijaya and Machmudi's study investigates how Qatar has maintained a flexible diplomatic stance, allowing it to develop relationships with several actors, including non-state actors and countries with conflicts in the Middle East. Kusumawijaya and Machmudi's study explores the fact that Qatar's foreign policy has shifted from a strategy of neutrality to a strategy of alignment, particularly since the Arab Spring. For example, in the Libyan civil war, Qatar supported the opposition forces that ultimately overthrew Muammar Gaddafi. In the Syrian civil war, Qatar called for the resignation of Bashar al-Assad and urged the international community to support the opposition. The study argues that this shift has led to Qatar being seen as a threat by some of its neighbors, including Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Kusumawijaya and Machmudi's study concludes that Qatar's foreign policy is based on a rational calculation of the costs and benefits across different options. It ultimately chooses the best option that aligns with its national interests. However, Kusumawijaya and Machmudi did not examine how Qatar has used soft power tools, including the media tool, to overcome the dilemma of hard power and did not analyze Qatar's policy goals of playing an active role in the region, especially in Yemen.

Kamrava (2011) investigates the underlying motivations, strategies, and impact of Qatar's mediation diplomacy in the regional and international arenas. The study argues that Qatar's emergence as a prominent active mediator in recent times is driven by a blend of survival strategies and a desire for international prestige. Kamrava's study finds that Qatar has endeavored to position itself as an impartial peacemaker in many of the conflicts in the Middle East. Also, it explores how Qatar's financial resources, perceived neutrality by conflict parties, and diplomatic flexibility have been successful in bringing the conflicting parties to the table and initiating negotiations. However, Kamrava's study also finds that these factors have not been decisive in achieving lasting peace settlements.

Kamrava's study examines three of Qatar's most prominent mediation cases: Yemen, Sudan, and Lebanon. In each case, Qatar's mediation efforts helped to bring the parties to the table and initiate negotiations. However, the study argues that the success of these efforts was ultimately limited due to the unwillingness of the conflicting parties to make the necessary concessions for a lasting peace. Kamrava concludes by discussing the tools and mechanisms that Qatar uses to promote reconciliation and conflict resolution. It also assesses the overall effectiveness of Qatar's mediation efforts.

Nuruzzaman (2015) investigates the role of GCC mediation in conflicts since its establishment in 1981 until the Arab Spring revolutions in 2011, although its creation aimed to counter the security threats of Tehran. Also highlights Qatar's mediation in Lebanon, Yemen, and Sudan with the support of the GCC, despite seeking to achieve independence in its foreign policy and strengthen its influence in the region. Nuruzzaman's study claims that the GCC is very effective in mediating between member states, despite it being a subregional organization that has not been directly involved in conflict resolution, except for Qatari and Saudi mediation outside the Gulf region. Also, Nuruzzaman confirms that the GCC has not made direct institutional efforts in the conflicts, except for the mediation to resolve the crisis in Yemen between the Saleh regime and the opposition. Moreover, Nuruzzaman analyzes the factors that have helped Qatar mediate many disputes with the support of the GCC and examines the limitations imposed on Qatari mediation efforts. Nuruzzaman concludes with recommendations based on the Qatari mediation experience to enable the GCC to be a successful and effective mediator in the region.

1.8.3. The Level of the Reactions of the Qatari Government Towards the Arab Spring Revolutions, the Challenges It Faced, and Its Impact on the Future of the Qatari Role

Alrantisi (2014) focuses on Qatar's foreign policy towards the Arab Spring revolutions in North Africa as well as in the Levant. Alongside, the Palestinian issue, it also examined the nature of the Qatar's role, objectives, methods, and challenges imposed by the Arab Spring. Alrantisi's study also deals with Qatar's foreign policy towards the Yemeni issue before and after the Yemeni revolution in 2011. However, it did not investigate the nature of this policy, its goals, or the obstacles that hindered it from continuing its role in Yemen. Alrantisi's study also deals with the foundations and features of Qatar's foreign policy in general, and concludes that Qatar's foreign policy in the last decade was active and effective and was able to improve its political and economic position despite the many demographic and military obstacles it faced. Alrantisi's study presents a set of recommendations, the most important of which are that Qatar should support the Arab boycott policy of Israel and remain close to the Arab peoples if it wants to be a strong player in the region.

Al-Ma'ayteh (2013) aims to analyze the positions of Qatar's foreign policy towards the Arab Spring revolutions and concludes that Qatar adopted soft power in an attempt to overcome its limited physical and military capabilities when compared to major countries. Al-Ma'ayteh adopts the descriptive-analytical approach show how Qatar's foreign policy regarding the Arab Spring revolutions affected its standing in the region and the world, as well as to demonstrate the impact of Qatar's economic position on its emergence as an effective economic and political power in the regional and international arena. But the study has not addressed the role that Qatar has played in the Yemeni political crisis.

Ahmed (2021) attempts to identify the nature and quality of the active Qatari role in foreign policy across many domains and the future of that role, thus knowing the most important variables that control the determination of Qatar's foreign policy in light of the Arab Spring.

Ahmed's study explores how Qatar's foreign policy interacts with its external environment. It relied on the content analysis method by analyzing some official speeches and statements, as well as the comparative method, where different periods were compared one by one and the performance of foreign policy was compared

between one event and another to see the extent of development in foreign policy. Ahmed concludes that the role of Qatar's foreign policy has been continuously growing and active during the past two decades, despite the difficulties it faces. Qatar was able to impose itself as a major player in Arab politics, helped by several internal factors related to the ambition of the ruling elite in Qatar and external factors represented by the decline in the pivotal role of regional countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Despite the fact that this contradicts with the reality of Saudi influence in Yemen and its control over the Yemeni scene.

Ahmed's study also presents a set of recommendations that include adhering to the policy of active and positive neutrality, diversifying its relations with all parties without prejudice to any party. It also addresses the gap between internal and external policy to avoid any contradictions and focused on long-term investments and peace-building projects.

Hüdaverdi (2020) investigates the main motives and dynamics that led to the formulation of Qatari and Emirati foreign policy, and compares the roots of differences and similarities to clarify the differences in foreign and security policy orientations and the relationship with external players. Hüdaverdi's study aims to tackle the political reactions of the State of Qatar and the UAE towards the Arab Spring. Hüdaverdi's study adopts the "process tracing" method to identify these policies' causal mechanisms and draw conclusions about the causal relationships and outcomes within the neo-classical realist framework. However, Hüdaverdi's study does not discuss the reactions of Qatari policy towards the post-February 11, 2011 revolution in Yemen, as well as the transitional phase and the National Dialogue Conference (NDC).

Leene (2023) investigates the impact of the foreign policy independence of small states and their use of international mediation on the ability of the state to deal with banned armed groups when they are related to the peace process by studying the mediation efforts of Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar in Yemeni affairs in the post-Arab Spring period. Leene's study was built on the hypothesis that the greater the independence of the foreign policy of a small state, the greater the ability to deal with banned actors.

Leene's study also examines Qatar's strategy in Yemeni affairs, noting that Qatar has gone above and beyond the 'pure mediation' approach that is typically associated with the mediation of small countries like Qatar. Leene confirms the absence of a direct role for Qatar in Yemeni affairs after the Arab Spring, in addition to its limited diplomatic capabilities and limited participation with banned actors. Actually, this contradicts the reality and the findings of the current thesis, where Qatar plays a prominent role in hosting many dialogues, bringing the points of view of the parties to the conflict, and calling for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Qatar also contributes significantly to revealing the deviation of the path of the war in Yemen from the goals declared by the Arab coalition. Leene's study concludes that Oman was more involved with proscribed actors as a result of its independence from Saudi foreign policy. Meanwhile, Oman maintained good relations with all parties.

Hansen (2013) discusses the ability of Qatar's diplomacy to resolve conflicts either permanently or temporarily due to its flexibility. Through studying the case of Yemen as an example in its mediation between the Houthis and the Yemeni government, the study's Hansen also examines how Qatar was able to pursue a political line independent of the GCC countries based on a pragmatic approach. Hansen also investigates the impact of media tools such as Al-Jazeera on Qatar's policy and how Al-Jazeera contributes to creating a positive image of Qatar among the Arab people. The study also analyzes Qatar's policy after the Arab Spring and changes in the behavior of Qatar's foreign policy as Qatar played along with Turkey in its regional policy.

The study by Hansen confirms that Qatar's influence in the region is increasing, benefiting from its support for symbolic Islamic issues such as the Palestinian issue and the resistance against Israel. The study indicates that Qatar has flexibility in choosing its friends and has the potential to make peace despite its lack of neutrality. Regarding regional hegemony, Hansen claims that Saudi Arabia's influence in Yemen or Egypt's influence in Palestine impacts Qatar's influence in the region. Nevertheless, Qatar resorts to using aid packages for diplomatic efforts, sponsoring a broad dialogue, or using non-state actors such as tribes and patronage networks in Yemen. The study concludes that Qatar will remain an important actor in regional politics due to its active diplomacy. However, Hansen did not refer to the agenda and

objectives of Qatar's behavior and did not analyze the dimensions of that policy, especially regarding the Yemeni issue.

Kabalan (2019) confirms that Qatar's lack of hard power tools pushed it to adopt a strategy based on using soft power tools to achieve its national interest, play a key role in the region, and avoid any threats to its security or survival. Kabalan also examines the strategies adopted by the ruling elite in Qatar to pursue an independent policy and overcome the security dilemma of the weakness of its traditional power. Moreover, a ruling elite with an ambitious strategic vision helped it make the best use of its financial, media, and economic resources to pursue its independent foreign policy.

Kabalan also claims that Qatar was able to overcome the prevailing assumption that material wealth hinders small states from adopting an effective foreign policy. Meanwhile, Qatar adopted an offensive and defensive strategy to achieve goals that seemed impossible for a country the size of Qatar. By relying on its soft power and taking advantage of the opportunities provided by the Arab Spring, Qatar tries to play a key role in the establishment of a new regional order, especially after the fall of some Arab regimes as a result of the Arab revolutions. Kabalan concludes that Qatar was able to build a positive image of itself through the tools of its soft power, in addition to providing a model of leadership influencing the foreign policy of small states despite the challenges of the surrounding environment, such as geography and population.

1.8.4. The Qatar-Gulf Crisis and Its Reflections on the Future and the Regional and International Status of Qatar

Sahli (2020) explores the repercussions and effects of regional and international interventions on the Yemeni crisis by analyzing the role of regional powers (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman) on the Yemeni crisis, as well as the role of international powers (the USA, Russia, and the European Union).

Sahli's study concludes that Qatar plays an important role in the political conflict in the region; in addition, there are the interests and tools of influence of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE in Yemen. Washington also sought to prevent Tehran from influencing shipping routes in the Red Sea and waterways, while the Russian role was neutral or unclear.

Rasheed and Al-Eshaq (2022) analyze the strategies that Qatar used in its foreign policy to overcome the implications of the Gulf crisis in 2017. The study used neoclassical realism theory to state how Qatar was able to enhance its position in the region. It also deals with the determinants of Qatar's foreign policy after Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani came to power in 1995.

Rasheed and Al-Eshaq's study concludes that Qatar was able to enhance its position in the region. It also critically examines the effective foreign policy role of Qatar in the Arab Spring and investigates whether this role will be sustainable in the future in light of the constraints that Qatar faces internally and externally. Also, it concludes that Qatar has no choice but to achieve a balance between its huge role in foreign policy and the necessities of regional and international reality. Therefore, Qatar must balance its relations with its neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Berni (2021) analyzes the influence of the Gulf crisis on the perspectives of Qatari policy-makers and society toward the future of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The crisis has fundamentally altered the way Qatari decision-makers, political elites, and society view the GCC and other regional actors. It has also shocked Qatari policy-makers regarding the issue of unity and confidence in the GCC. Berni's study argues that despite the blockade imposed on Qatar, the Qatari state apparatus has strengthened its relationship with society and gained the trust of society by endorsing the state's foreign policy choices, such as augmenting economic and military ties with Türkiye and economic relations with Iran.

Berni explores that the severity of the blockade has led the Qatari leadership to re-evaluate the dynamics of foreign policy, decision-making procedures, and security perspective about the GCC, leading it to seek alliances to ensure the country's security and economic and political stability. Berni's study concludes that the state's internal strength has enabled Qatari policy-makers to overcome the crisis and justify their arguments about foreign policy decisions and the issue of non-interference in the internal affairs of others.

Dogan Akkas (2021) investigates Qatar's role in Yemen through discussion of the tools of the state and the soft power of small states to increase their presence and role in international politics. Dogan Akkas attempts to answer the question: Does Qatar have a special position in the mediation in Yemen? The study confirms that Qatar has restored its relations with the Yemeni government and meanwhile intensified its

contacts with the Houthi group. The study claims that there is no direct threat from the Houthis to Qatar's security because there is no direct border between Yemen and Qatar, but this contradicts the fact that the Houthis pose a threat to the security of the GCC as a single entity, including Qatar being a member of this entity. As well, Dogan Akkas believes that the Qatari and Omani roles are acceptable to Saudi Arabia as long as they do not conflict with the interests of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Qatar's role in Yemen was limited in 2010, according to Dogan Akkas.

Dogan Akkas also confirms that Qatar's policy during 2014–2017 was supportive of the decisions of the GCC and its policies in Yemen, but after being expelled from the Arab coalition, Qatar continued to provide humanitarian assistance only. Qatar has also officially announced its desire to return to mediation efforts in Yemen, according to Dogan Akkas's study. Dogan Akkas stresses that mediation in Yemen needs a comprehensive treatment of human suffering and a sequence of security and political steps in the peace process. Otherwise, mediation will not succeed in achieving stability in the long term.

Although the importance of Qatar's role in Yemen and its impact on the future of the conflict in the region, many studies that have dealt with Qatar's foreign policy did not address Qatar's role in Yemen from the angle studied in this thesis and did not analyze the positions, goals, and dimensions of Qatar's policy toward the conflict in Yemen; thus, this thesis will address the gap by describing Qatar's foreign policy toward the conflict in Yemen, monitoring its positions, analyzing its motives and determining factors, and explaining its impact on the conflict in Yemen.

1.9. The Outline of the Study

This thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter contains overview, an introduction, and a historical background on Yemeni-Qatari relations. It also contains a statement of the research problem, the rationale of the study, and the research hypotheses, clarifying the importance and the research questions of the study. In addition, it presents the methodology used to collect the data for the current thesis. Also, provides an overview of the most significant literature that has dealt with Qatar's foreign policy as well as the conflict in Yemen, in addition to the regional competition to play a role in Yemen. To overcome the difficulties faced by previous researchers and know the gap that those studies did not address, this section deals

with the subject of the study from three points of view. First, the growing external role of Qatar's policy since Sheikh Hamad Al Thani came to power in 1995. Second, the reactions of the Qatari government towards the Arab Spring revolutions, the challenges it faced, and its impact on the future of Qatar's role. Third, the Qatar-Gulf crisis and its reflections on the future of Qatar. This chapter also contains a detailed overview of the structure of this thesis.

The second chapter explains the theoretical framework that the thesis relied on to demonstrate the position of Qatar's foreign policy toward the conflict in Yemen, which relied on the soft power concept. Chapter Third discusses the development of Qatar's foreign policy towards Yemen (1962–2010). It is divided into four sections; the first section investigates Qatar's relationship with the two parts of Yemen from 1962 to 1971; the second section study the Yemen-Qatar relations before unity during the period 1971-1990; the third section deals with the Qatar's relationship with a unified Yemen from 1990 to 2010; the four section explore the determinants of Qatar's foreign policy towards Yemen in two parts, first part investigates the internal determinants, and the second part discusses the regional and international determinants.

The Fourth and last chapter discusses and analyzes Qatar's foreign policy during the February 11 revolution and beyond. It is divided into Five sections. The first section discusses the role of the government of Qatar towards the February 11 revolution; the second section evaluates the position of the government of Qatar on the Gulf initiative; the third section examines the role of the government of Qatar regarding the transitional period and the National Dialogue Conference (NDC); and the fourth topic analyzes the position of the government of Qatar regarding the fall of Sana'a and the coup of the Houthi-Saleh alliance against legitimacy; the fifth section investigates Qatar's foreign policy towards the military intervention of the coalition countries. Moreover, this chapter will also cover the conclusion and discussions to summarize the findings of this thesis.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

This chapter is used as a theoretical framework for this study, adopting the concept of soft power by Joseph Nye to explain Qatar's foreign policy and analyze the tools used towards the conflict in Yemen. This study adopts Nye's concept of soft power as the most convincing general framework for interpreting the foreign policy performance of small countries like Qatar State because, through the soft power concept, this study can explain the external behavior of Qatar State and find out how its soft power is used to try to strengthen its influence in the region and international politics. Moreover, it helps us investigate the behavior of regional and international players in Yemen. Furthermore, the concept of soft power was used in the current study because it recognizes that small countries like Qatar can take advantage of their soft power to play a role larger than their size, enabling them to overcome the dilemma of their lack of hard power. This chapter explores the following topics, respectively: the concept of power in international relations, including hard power; the concept of soft power by Joseph Ney; and the concept of smart power.

Qatar is a small country that lacks traditional hard power tools such as military power, which leads it to rely on soft power tools to formulate its foreign policy in a way that enhances its influence and serves its interests, especially in the context of a complicated issue such as the conflict in Yemen.

Ebegbulem Joseph (2010) argues that "Nations formulate their foreign policy in a way that they put into consideration how such policies will affect their national interests" (Joseph, 2010:140). Joseph also asserts that "it is the national interest of a state that motivates that state to act the way it acts in the international system" (Ibid). Also, Hans Morgenthau, asserts that "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power" (Guzzini, 2018:16). Morgenthau also went further to argue that "no nation can have true guide as to what it must do and what it needs to do in foreign policy without accepting national interest as that guide." (Joseph, 2010:139).

In his book, *Theory of International Politics*, Kenneth Waltz focuses on the structure of the international system and relies in his interpretation of foreign policy on four determinants or principles (state, anarchy, state power, and the balance of power). In other words, the state is considered the main actor in international politics, as well as the anarchy system forces states to self-reliance to ensure their security by seeking to strengthen their power, either militarily, economically, or diplomatically, to overcome any dangers or threats. Also, the state aims to balance power against potential threats through alliances and strategic partnerships.

2.2. Power Concept

The concept of power has evolved throughout history until the modern era and the emergence of the information revolution and its impact on both hard and soft power. There are numerous definitions of the concept of power in political studies, with the realist and liberal schools of thought paying particular attention to it because they are both significant schools in the field of international relations. Historically, Thucydides attributed the Athenian war to the Spartans' efforts to counter the rise of Athenian power, highlighting power as a source of both competition and conflict (Karataş, 2020:11). In his book *The Prince*, Machiavelli (1469–1527) also contends that power is the only way to achieve success in politics: "Machiavelli did not believe in pursuing evil for evil's sake; rather, when the only way to keep power is to act evilly, those who own the state power must act accordingly" (Ali, 2015:234).

Machiavelli also considered that morality does not play a role in politics and that the end justifies the means. "Political power as an end in itself, disassociating itself from any moral as well as religious establishments, justifies all possible means" (Ali, 2015:239). While Hobbes argues that the state is necessary to impose order and control chaos, since selfish humans seek to strengthen their power at the expense of others, "the only way to bring order is the transfer of individual sovereignty to a state-like structure that he called Leviathan" (Karataş, 2020:11), as he believes that the legitimate power of the state comes from a social contract between individuals.

Positivist theories such as liberalism and realism make the concept of power at the heart of their discussions (Karataş, 2020:12). Morgenthau, who is considered one of the most prominent proponents of the realism school, in his book *Politics Among Nations* refers to the ability of an individual to exert control over the thoughts and

acts of other individuals and defines power as "man's control over the minds and actions of other men" (Guzzini, 2018:14) .

States seek to obtain greater power and compete to increase their power, so that power is both a means and an end at the same time. Edward Carr contends that "power is always an essential element of politics", and also considers that "politics are, then, in one sense always power politics" (Carr, 2016:97). Consequently, it is difficult to separate politics from power. Carr also contends that power is in "three forms: military power, economic power, and the power over opinion" (Ibid:102). In the sense that the influence on opinion has become an independent power for its importance in changing the desires and convictions of others to do what you want without using coercion, this is what Nye asserts at the core of his concept of soft power.

Morgenthau also defines national interest as power, meaning that it is linked to the issue of national survival. In his book *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz argues "that a country acts according to its national interest" (Quinn & Gibson, 2017:134). This implies that states solely pursue their national interests when engaging in regional or international affairs. Waltz also believes that "the struggle for power arises because men are born seekers of power" (Waltz, 2001:10).

As well, John Mearsheimer contends, "Power is based on the particular material capabilities that a state possesses. The balance of power, therefore, is a function of tangible assets—such as armored divisions and nuclear weapons—that each great power controls" (Mearsheimer, 2001:55). Mearsheimer also argues that "power lies at the heart of international politics, yet there is considerable disagreement about what power is and how to measure it" (Mearsheimer, 2001:55). Moreover, Kenneth Waltz asserts the concept of power to include other elements alongside military capabilities and tries to link the power of the state with the availability of such elements as material, natural, and demographic resources, the degree of economic growth, and political stability.

According to liberals, power can be defined as the ability of an actor to be able to accomplish things that other people are unable to perform under normal conditions or to have influence over the outcomes (Yavuzaslan & Cetin, 2016:396). Even though each discipline interprets the sources of power differently, it becomes clear upon

closer inspection that the definitions of the concept of power are the same across all fields of study. (Yavuzaslan & Cetin, 2016:396).

Karl Marx argues that power is connected with the class structure in the capitalist economy. Marx believes that individuals who controls the economic structure will also have power over politics and the state (Karataş, 2020:11). While Max Weber asserts that "power is an advantage that gives an individual the upper hand in a social relationship to achieve his/her will despite the resistance of others" (Ibid), Meanwhile, Robert Dahl gave a clearer definition of power: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Dahl, 1957: 202–203).

In the sense that the political unit A exerts its power over unit B to do actions against its will out of fear of the power of unit A. Bachrach and Baratz agree with Dahl's definition; they argue that "if A is able to prevent or limit B to bring new political values and practices to public consideration, A has power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970:7)". Just as power in coercion is also in prohibition and refusal (non-decision-making), (Karataş, 2020:11-12). Frederick Schumann argues that the international system is primarily composed of powerful, sovereign, independent nations that have the fundamental components of power and do not acknowledge any higher authority among other international entities (Khalifi, 2017).

That means the realists' concept of power is based on hard power and the ability of the state to use its military power to be able to be a dominant power, alongside the economic power with which they exert pressure through economic sanctions. While liberals rely on other sources as well, they claim that power is divided between different groups in the state. Therefore, "the state is not like a billiard ball, as realists claim, but rather a composition of various actors that have different capacities and capabilities" (Ibid:12). Meanwhile, realists see soft power as only a complementary tool of military and economic power. While liberals argue that soft power is an essential tool for states to realize their external interests.

In this sense, power in general is a means of achieving the interest; the interest cannot be achieved without power, and the state cannot possess power without having the resources that bring power. Thus, "power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get what one wants" (Çiçek, 2022:104–105), and according to

Çiçek, Nye argues that "you can force others with threats, you can deceive them by paying them, or you can attract them to want what you want" (Ibid:105). In other words, Nye emphasizes that power has three forms: military, economic, and soft power, through which you can change the behavior of others to do what you want in many ways, either by coercion, inducement (stick and carrot), or persuasion and attraction. Military power might be one of the most critical factors in determining a state's ability to influence international politics or not. Countries that have a powerful army equipped with the latest weapons and advanced military equipment have an advantage over their opponents, can protect their internal and external interests, and can prevent any threats to their security.

Despite the importance of military power, it is no longer enough to determine whether a state is strong. The development of international relations has led to the emergence of other determinants and new types of power, such as soft power and smart power, which are no longer limited only to the military aspect. Other factors determine the ability of a state to influence international relations, for instance, economic power (the volume of natural or produced wealth), geostrategic location (proximity to international markets and trade ports), population, and geographical area (the size of the labor force and the ability of the state to exploit its natural resources). Cultural values (the influence of the state's culture on its international image and ability to attract investments). Political leadership (the ability of leaders to make decisive decisions and competently manage state affairs). Many researchers highlight the power of states and ignore the power of individuals, although individuals, including ruling elites, can make a big difference in the power of the state. For example, what Mahatma Gandhi and Abdul Hamid II did for their states strengthened the power of the state. As well, powerful states may not always be able to make small states do what the big states want; for example, America failed in the Vietnam War, as well as the Soviet failure in Afghanistan, despite their vastly superior strength.

2.3. Nye's Concept of Soft Power

Influencing public opinion in foreign countries is no new concept. This was the situation even in ancient times, dating back to the Bible (Melissen, 2005:1). Even well-known theorists of international relations, such as E.H. Carr and Morgenthau, were cognizant of the importance of soft power, so they used different terminology.

The concept of soft power is one of the most important concepts that emerged in the field of international relations; it was coined academically and theoretically by Joseph Nye in the 1990s (Yavuzaslan & Cetin, 2016:396). Nye made a significant contribution to the development of this concept; he is one of the most prominent pioneers of the concept of soft power. Power, as conceptualized by Nye, is expounded upon in his several articles and the three subsequent books; in 1990, Nye introduced this concept in his book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, then later developed it in his famous book *Soft Power: The Means of Success in International Politics*, published in 2004, as well as in the book *The Future of Power* (2011). Nye defines soft power as "the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion." (Eikenberry and Nye, 2004: 137). Meanwhile, according to Vuving, Nye contends that "soft power is the ability to affect the behavior of others by influencing their preferences" (Vuving, 2009:6).

Actually, this concept is associated with the ability to attract people without threats or coercion. Nye identifies three main resources of soft power: culture (the state's ability to attract others through its culture, arts, and history), political values (the state's commitment to democratic values and human rights), and foreign policies (the state pursues legitimate and morally authoritative foreign policies) (Karataş, 2020:18). Nye argues that "when our policies are perceived as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is strengthened" (Nye, 2004:256). In other words, when a state loses its legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of others, others' trust in it and its influence decrease. For instance, After September 11, the Germans supported the US in the war against al-Qaeda, but in the Iraq war, their confidence in the US declined, and they did not believe the American allegations of Iraq's connection with al-Qaeda (Nye, 2004:257).

Furthermore, when Nye describes the importance of soft power in US foreign policy and the factors contributing to its success, he claims that the development of soft power plays an important role in the success of US foreign policy (Nye, 2004:270). He also emphasizes that more should be invested in the field of soft power to increase influence and attractiveness, because US diplomacy is not enough "We have been less successful in the areas of soft power, where our public diplomacy has been woefully inadequate" (Nye, 2004:270).

So "in 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called for the United States to invest more in soft power" (Nye, 2017:2). Also, having both hard and soft power is important for the success of any state, so Nye emphasizes "that successful states need both hard and soft power—the ability to coerce others as well as the ability to shape their long-term attitudes and preferences" (Ikenberry and Nye, 2004:137). Nye stresses that the world as a three-level gaming board and non-state actors may play an important role (Winkler and Nye, 2005:268).

In addition, Nye claims that if China can develop its soft power alongside its hard power, it will be more acceptable and may scare its neighbors into balancing alliances (Nye, 2017:2). Although China has significant economic growth and is considered an important attraction, "but polls show it lags behind the United States in overall attractiveness in most parts of the world, including Asia." (Nye, 2017:2). He emphasizes that addressing transnational issues such as terrorism, international crime, and climate change cannot be solved by military force alone as it represents a global cross-border threat, so "meeting the challenge posed by transnational military organizations that could acquire weapons of mass destruction requires the cooperation of other countries—and cooperation is strengthened by soft power" (Nye, 2004:259). In other words, soft power and coalition building are important to deal with issues that arise from transnational relations.

According to Nye, the United States lost its soft power by going to war alone (Nye, 2004:259) because it requires others cooperation and sharing the burden with allies and institutions to lower costs. He emphasizes that despite the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, they could not enhance democracy and eliminate terrorism but rather increased the strength of the Al-Qaeda network to attract new members (Nye, 2004:263); because democracy cannot be imposed by force, but it needs more time to strengthen it, as he criticizes the unilateral action, despite the military success in Afghanistan and the defeat of the Taliban regime, "al Qaeda still retains cells in some fifty countries" (Nye, 2003:73).

In light of increasing globalization and the dependence of states on each other, the distance between countries is shrinking, and international politics is changing in such a manner that the US cannot achieve its goals by acting alone. Nye argues that soft power is more successful than hard power in achieving goals and reducing costs. For instance, "international financial stability is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but

the US needs the cooperation of others to ensure it. Global climate change too will affect Americans' quality of life, but the US cannot manage the problem alone." (Joseph, 2017:73). That is, the most challenging for the US will be how to work more effectively with other actors and attract them to address transnational issues.

Moreover, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt argue that "power in an information age will come not only from strong defenses but also from strong sharing" (Nye, 2004:261). As well, the exchange of intelligence and experience with others leads to the development of a common point of view that helps to be able to face new challenges (Nye, 2004). In addition, the distribution of power in the era of the information revolution is also significantly different, as "power is distributed among countries in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game" (Nye, 2004:262).

Also, Nye does not see soft power and hard power as incompatible but rather as complementary tools that can be used to achieve goals. Hard power is sometimes necessary to deter aggression or protect interests, while soft power can play a crucial role in building trust and cooperation between countries and obtaining the desired results without the use of coercion. One state may be able to get the results it wants in international politics because there is another state that likes it or follows its behavior and wants to follow it. In this sense, the concept of attraction has emerged.

It may be argued that every nation employs different forms of soft power to influence the public of other countries, depending on the circumstances. Also, practically every nation's policy involves some form of soft power. (Karataş, 2020:17). According to Karataş (2020:20), almost all scholars agree with Nye on soft power tools. Culture, ideology, and other factors attract outsiders, who in turn cause less developed cultures to adopt and eventually supplant more powerful ones. As an example, American culture, which Nye deems preeminent over all others, has been penetrating other civilizations, altering their practices until they mirror American norms. Prominent corporations such as Coca-Cola, Microsoft, McDonald's, Levi's, IBM, Boeing, Facebook, Apple, and Hollywood film producers not only amass substantial profits but also contribute to the global dissemination of the American way of life, whereas a liberal economy and democracy have been regarded as the most effective political and economic systems (Karataş, 2020:20).

However, there are criticisms of the concept of soft power, including the difficulty of measuring soft power (it is difficult to measure the impact of soft power accurately), Unlike hard-power instruments such as military might or economic influence, soft-power instruments such as foreign policy, values, and culture frequently produce indirect and subtle results that cannot be measured. Moreover, with the possibility of exploiting soft power for propaganda purposes (countries with questionable human rights records, for example, might utilize cultural exchange programs or media outreach to cover up wrong actions), this phenomenon, often termed 'sharp power', manipulates soft power tools for propaganda purposes.

Furthermore, its results are slow and long-term. Compared to the immediate effects of hard power tools, soft power tools often produce slow and incremental results. Sustaining active engagement and shaping international opinion through cultural programs and political value promotion requires long-term commitment and consistent effort. So, focusing solely on immediate outcomes fails to capture the longer-term processes through which soft power shapes perceptions and influences behavior. By acknowledging these challenges and engaging in subtle analyses, it may utilize soft power more effectively and responsibly in the international arena.

2.4. Smart Power

In the post-Cold War, the international arena witnessed a significant transformation process, impacting the effectiveness of traditional power tools. The rise of international organizations, democratization, the information technology revolution, and other important factors are all driving this transformation (Gallarotti, 2015). Technological advancements in military capabilities have significantly increased the costs of using military power, making it a less effective tool for achieving political goals. It also emphasized the importance of communication and interaction between states in a more intelligent manner. Additionally, democratization restricts the freedom of leaders to use military power, subjecting them to people's scrutiny and promoting values of cooperation and dialogue, so Gallarotti claims "national leaders are much more constrained to work within softer foreign policy boundaries that limit the utility of hard power" (Gallarotti, 2015:10). while Wilson argues that "in democracies, priorities are set by elected political leaders." Also, he asserts that "smart power in foreign policy rests on politics and power as much as it draws on robust concepts and nimble institutional arrangements" (Wilson III, 2008:118).

Furthermore, globalization has fostered greater interconnectedness among states across various spheres. Gallarotti claims that "in such an environment, strategies for optimizing national wealth and influence have shifted away from force and coercion, as these methods can generate considerable socio-economic and political costs that end up being tantamount to self-punishment in an interdependent world" (Gallarotti, 2015:10), making the usage of hard power more challenging. Moreover, the rise of international organizations has facilitated the creation of a global system based on respect for law and norms, which also plays a critical role in resolving disputes and promoting international cooperation, decreasing the effectiveness of hard power and bolstering the importance of smart power. Therefore, the international conflict has become less bloody, and focusing on economic and technological competition has become a top priority for national leaders to achieve the national interest and strengthen the influence of their countries in the international arena. Wilson asserts that:

power increasingly rests on a nation's capacity to create and manipulate knowledge and information. A country's capacity for creativity and innovation can trump its possession of armored divisions or aircraft carriers, and new hi-tech tools can greatly enhance the reach of military and nonmilitary influence (Wilson III, 2008:112).

In other words, the industrial and technological revolution has fundamentally reshaped economies and societies globally, leading to the emergence and rise of new non-state actors in the international arena as influential players. Additionally, the nature of threats has evolved, with issues like cyber security, climate change, and terrorism requiring collective action. These transformations have necessitated a shift in the conceptualization of the power concept in international relations (Gallarotti, 2015), making traditional power tools, largely reliant on military force, less effective in achieving desired outcomes. This prompted the need to use various types of power within one strategy and necessitated a more subtle approach to international statecraft (Gallarotti, 2015), leading to the emergence of a new approach to using smart power as a prominent concept in international relations, which works to make the state use its capabilities in a way that enables it to achieve its interests.

According to Nye (2011), "Smart power is the ability to combine hard and soft power in a successful strategy" (Nye, 2011). In this definition, Nye advocates for strategically integrating coercive (hard power) and persuasive (soft power) resources to achieve national objectives. This needs to utilize both tangible resources, such as military capabilities and economic leverage, and intangible ones, including cultural influence, diplomatic prowess, and a positive global image. Wilson also defines "smart power as the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing, such that the actor's purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently" (Wilson III, 2008:115). Also, Gallarotti argues that:

Tangible power resources can be employed manifestly or symbolically to coerce other actors into submission or compliance; they are therefore more certain to provide protection (whether defensive or offensive). Intangible (i.e., soft) sources of power, on the other hand, can offer no such guarantees that an act of aggression can either be confronted or perpetrated to eliminate or protect against a menacing actor (Gallarotti, 2015:5).

Smart power transcends the limitations of the hard power approach by incorporating the strategic utilization of soft power alongside hard power resources. Soft power encompasses a country's cultural appeal, the attractiveness of its political values, and its legitimacy in the international system. In other words, combining hard and soft power elements allows states to achieve their objectives more effectively through a blend of coercion, persuasion, and legitimacy.

For instance, following the rise of China and the shifting economic and security landscape in the Asia region, the US employed the smart power strategy. This involved increasing its military presence in the region (hard power), meanwhile strengthening economic ties through trade agreements and promoting cultural exchange programs (soft power). As well, in the European Union's soft power approach, the EU has established itself as a global leader in soft power by promoting democratic values, human rights, and multilateralism. This includes providing financial and technical assistance to other countries, fostering cultural exchange programs, and advocating peaceful conflict resolution.

It is worth noting that smart power is not only about combining hard and soft power but rather a strategic approach that requires careful orchestration and alignment of different power resources to achieve desired outcomes. In other words, the rise of smart power reflects the need for a subtle and multifaceted approach to power in the contemporary international landscape. By utilizing both hard and soft power resources strategically, states can enhance their influence and navigate the complexities of the changing global environment.

The concept of smart power has not been without criticism. Some scholars argue that it is overly optimistic and fails to adequately address the inherent tensions between using both coercive and persuasive tools. They argue that the use of hard power often undermines attempts to build soft power, raising questions about the feasibility of seamlessly integrating these seemingly contradictory approaches. Furthermore, the using of smart power can be resource-intensive and require a sophisticated understanding of international dynamics. Additionally, measuring the effectiveness of this approach can be difficult as the impact of soft power is often intangible and long-term.

CHAPTER III

QATAR'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD YEMEN (1962-2010)

3.1. Yemen-Qatar Relations During the Period 1962-1971

The Ottoman Empire, which had ruled the Arabian Peninsula for centuries, began to decline in the late 19th century. This decline created a power vacuum in the region, which was quickly filled by European powers, including Britain. Britain extended its dominance over the Gulf region through its naval power. Britain had weakened other European powers in the region and was able to compete with them (Sno, 1998:18-20). By the early 20th century, the Arabian Peninsula was a region of political fragmentation and conflict, with external ambitions vying for control. The region was ruled by dynastic systems (Ibid).

Britain signed protection agreements and treaties with the sheikhdoms and ruling families on the coast of the Arabian Gulf. These agreements gave the sheikhdoms freedom to manage their internal affairs, as long as they did not interfere with British interests. The British government took over the management of the external affairs of these protectorates (Onley, 2009:10-11). In addition, the south of Yemen was under British colonial rule, while the north of Yemen has been divided between the areas of influence of Zaidi Imami rule and the Ottoman Empire.

After the Ottoman army left Yemen after World War I (1914-1918), the Ottoman Empire handed over its ruling areas to Imam Yahya Hameed Al-Din (1869-1948), so that all of northern Yemen would be subject to the power of the imam rule. On September 26, 1962, the Free Officers ¹, who were supported by the Egyptian regime under the leadership of Gamal Abdul Nasser (1918-1970), were able to overthrow the Zaidi imamate state supported by the Saudi regime (Aldossari, 2018:43).

The Revolution, culminating on September 26, 1962, marked a watershed moment in Yemeni history. This pivotal event resulted in the overthrow of the Imamate, and witnessed the establishment of a republican regime based on the authority and sovereignty of the people (Burrowes, 1992:41-43). This was followed by the

¹ They are military officers who played an important role in both the preparation and implementation of the 1962 revolution, which resulted in the overthrow of the Zaydi imamate in North Yemen.

declaration of an armed revolution on October 14, 1963, in the south, against British colonialism, with the support of the republican regime in the north and the Egyptian regime (Smith, 2000:193-196). With the continuation of the revolution and the weakness of the British role, on the November 30, 1967, the independence of southern Yemen from Britain was announced, followed by the departure of the last British soldier from the city of Aden.

The period that followed the revolution of 1962 in Yemen remained a period of turmoil in the form of armed conflicts and political turmoil, with the presence of regional and international intervention in the two arenas of Yemen. In the north, which was ruled by the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), and the south, which was managed by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Consequently, Yemen's ability to forge positive international relations with regional and global actors was severely impacted.


As a result of the rise of international voices rejecting and resisting the principle of occupation and colonialism, the emergence of resistance and liberation movements in the Arab world, and the decline of Britain's power, compelled the British government to change its policy in the Arab Gulf region. It decided "to grant South Arabia independence not later than 1968" (Smith, 2000:204), a decision implemented between 1968 and 1971. On September 3, 1971, Qatar declared its independence (Amiri Diwan, Founding of the State). It issued its first constitution, in the form of a basic system, on April 2, 1970, including the formation of the first cabinet, defining its terms of reference and the work of other government agencies. In addition, Qatar affirmed itself as "an Arab Muslim country, and its people are part of the Arab nation" (Qatar's constitution, article 1:1). In the same month, Qatar joined the League of Arab States and the United Nations.

Qatar wanted to build political relationships in the Arab, Islamic, and international states. In 1969, it was issued with a special decree that set up a department for foreign affairs for the state, which later became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Amiri Diwan, Law decree No. 11 of 1969).

The declaration of independence of Qatar stipulates that "the state shall work with all its efforts to strengthen the ties with its brotherly and friendly neighbors and to develop a spirit of cooperation and strengthen good-neighborly relations and

solidarity in all fields; it also works to cooperate with them to maintain peace and stabilization in the region" (Muhanna, 2001:278) *. It also stipulates, that the state's foreign policy aims to "strengthen the bonds of friendship with all peace-loving countries and peoples, based on mutual respect, common interest, and non-interference in internal affairs" (Ibid:278) *.

During the period 1962-1971, when the establishment of the YAR was declared in the north in 1962 (see map 3.1) and the PDRY in the south in 1967 (see map 3.2), until the independence of the Qatar State was declared in 1971, there was no significant relationship between Yemen and Qatar. This lack of engagement was based on the political conditions prevailing in both countries. Moreover, the nature of the challenges each of the states faced, internally and externally, including the internal conflict and political turmoil. That is why the historical archive does not preserve, in the references that I have, any political or economic activity between the rulers of Qatar and the regime in both parts of Yemen during that era.




Map 3.1: Yemen Arab Republic and Its Governorates 1989, Highlighted In Dark Orange

Source: edmaps.com

* The citation is translated from Arabic by the researcher

* The citation is translated from Arabic by the researcher



Map 3.2: The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, 1967 (PDRY)

Source: edmaps.com

Qatar is a small state ² with a limited population ³. Without strategic importance or economic resources, it had no land or sea borders with Yemen, unlike the rest of the GCC countries or Iran, and was not present in regional or international politics at the time. Unlike Qatar, Yemen and Saudi Arabia have been on a long-term friendship and share long borders, giving them a freedom and space to interact frequently. Political and military events that happened between the two countries forced them to respond to their effects, either on the political or military level.

3.2. Yemen-Qatar Relations During the Period 1971-1990

The withdrawal of the British colonization from the region in 1971 granted the independent countries of the region to practice their sovereignty, build their governmental institutions, and bridge their external relations with other countries of the world, including Arab and Islamic countries. It has also become more open to making formal economic partnerships and political alliances with countries in the

² The area of Qatar is approximately 11500 square kilometers.

³ Planning and Statistics Authority(PSA), History of Census in Qatar: The first census took place in 1970 and it was carried out by an international company where the population was (111,133).

region and around the world. So, the seventies of the last century witnessed the movement by the states of the Gulf towards building the interior and establishing good relations with the outside world.

Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, who declared the independence of Qatar on September 3, 1971 (he was Prime Minister at the time), had taken over the Foreign Ministry after independence in addition to his duties as Prime Minister. During the period 1972-1995, procedures were launched in the country to Arabize state departments, strengthen government authority, and issue laws regulating new ministries and departments.

After Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani came to power on February 22, 1972, his era was marked by several accomplishments. The government was reorganized, and the provisional basic system was altered, which included the organization of state authorities, the establishment of a Shura Council that contributes to the legislation of laws. The state concluded many oil extraction and marketing agreements with several foreign companies. Schools and institutes were set up, and the first university in Qatar was also inaugurated. Qatar established diplomatic relations with several countries at ambassadorial level (Amiri Diwan, Sheikh Khalifa). Qatar practiced its independent policy at the international level, and Sheikh Khalifa appointed Sheikh Suheim Bin Hamad as his first Minister of Foreign Affairs after assuming the reins of power (Amiri Diwan, Sheikh Khalifa).

The discovery of oil and gas wells in the Gulf region did a huge economic leap for the countries and peoples of the region, including Qatar, which was among the Gulf countries that enjoyed oil and gas wealth⁴, as its gas reserves were the largest. In 1991, the production of gas started in the Qatari North Field, which is considered the largest field of liquefied gas in the world. Qatar's gas reserves were estimated at more than nine hundred trillion cubic feet at that time, and Qatar thus became a major source of energy (Amiri Diwan, Sheikh Khalifa). The revenues from these financial resources were in favor of the development and reconstruction of Qatar,

⁴ In 1939, oil was found in Qatar after Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani signed of a concession agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1935 (Amiri Diwan, Sheikh Abdullah Bin Jassim).

where education, health, electricity, water, roads, and the infrastructure of state utilities, such as the airport, seaport, and others, were expanded.

South Yemen was suffering from an internal conflict between the wings of the ruling party and showed an uncertainty in its policy between Moscow and Beijing. In North Yemen, the internal conflict between the forces of the royal imamate and the forces of the republic concluded after an agreement that took place between the Egyptian and Saudi regimes, followed by their withdrawal from Yemen and a commitment to non-interference in its affairs. The northern regime sought to mainly strengthen its relations with its Gulf surroundings by strengthening common factors as well as the revolutionary leftist Marxist ideas that aroused the ire of the Gulf states towards the southern part.

With the success of the Iranian revolution against the rule of the *Shah* in 1979, Shiite forces rose to impose their vision on the political scene of Iran, led by Ruhollah Khomeini (1979-1989). The state of Iran was established according to the Shiite Wilayat al-Faqih theory. The new regime adopted the principle of exporting the revolution to the region, which prompted the Gulf states, backed up by the Western countries associated with economic interests, to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on May 25, 1981. It was a response to the dangers of Iranian threats that began early on to attack Iraq (Al Hassan, 2015:3). The GCC was formed at that time from six countries overlooking the Arabian Gulf: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain; they are countries with close political systems (monarchy, sultanate, and princely). Meanwhile, the two states of the two parts of Yemen remained outside of this new entity.

In light of the conditions of the Cold War (1947-1991) between the two poles of the world order, the US and the Soviet Union, the emerging entity sided with the Western camp led by the US ⁵ to stop the revolutionary tide that was being supported

⁵ In 1980, US President Jimmy Carter announced, during his State of the Union speech on January 23, 1980 (Carter, 1980), the policy of the USA regarding the Arabian Gulf, which was known as the "Carter Doctrine". an American policy that provides for allowing the United States of America to use military force to defend its interests in the Arabian Gulf region. This policy was a response to the Soviet Union's invasion

by the eastern camp led by the Soviet Union in the region against what was called regressive regimes.

On one hand, the North of Yemen found itself on the side of the GCC, despite not joining it, and on the other hand, it stood with Iraq in its war against Iran during the eighties of the last century and formed, with Iraq, Egypt, and Jordan, a parallel council to GCC, namely the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), which was announced in Baghdad, on February 16, 1989 (Ryan, 1998:386), after the end of the Iran-Iraq war.

South Yemen, which was dominated by leftist forces loyal to the eastern camp and seized the reins of power, posed a threat to the countries of the region, especially in light of its call for revolution against the Gulf regimes. Its support for the revolutionary forces there, including the Dhafar revolution (1965-1976), whose effects extended from the Sultanate of Oman to some GCC countries, resulting in the isolation of South Yemen from its Arab surroundings in the Arabian Peninsula, including the State of Qatar. As for North Yemen, it has become an arena of influence for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and has entered into a new conflict between the wings of power in Sana'a, on the one hand, and conflict with South Yemen, on the other hand. This conflict is persistent and reignites from time to time.

Qatar's relationship with Yemen was formed at this stage in two frameworks or levels: The first level, the Gulf framework, inclusive of the six GCC countries, is a common entity to coordinate their foreign policies. The second level is the Saudi framework, as it has become influential in Yemeni affairs due to several factors, the most prominent of which is its very large embrace of Yemeni workers and its great support for the ruling regime in Sana'a. Therefore, this thesis finds that Qatar's foreign policy at that stage was subordinate to Saudi Arabia's policy and not independent in its relations with Yemen in general; so, it did not record any prominent stations between both countries.

Qatar did not have a foreign policy of its own until the early nineties. Rather, it followed Saudi Arabia and relied on it to protect it from the larger powers in the regional system (Iran and Iraq). Accordingly, until the early nineties, Qatar followed

of Afghanistan in 1979, which the US administration considered a serious threat to the freedom of oil movement in the Middle East.

the subordination approach or joining Saudi Arabia in its foreign policies through the GCC, whose primary goal when established was to confront the threat of the Iranian revolution (Al-Bolushi, 2016).

3.3. Yemen-Qatar Relations During the Period 1990–1995

The period from 1990 to 1995 is considered a crucial period in the history of Yemen. This period witnessed the Yemeni Unity between the north and south of Yemen (see map 3.3). In addition, the Iraqi regime, led by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (1979–2003), invaded the State of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, a few months after announcement of the unity of Yemen on May 22, 1990. While all the Gulf States sided with Kuwait to restore Kuwait's sovereignty, the Republic of Yemen's regime sided with Iraq due to several factors, including the strong bilateral relations between Yemen and Iraq at the time. The Arab region in general has been divided between two camps; for and against.



Map 3.3: Yemen Republic 1990. source: Public domain provided by United States Central Intelligence Agency's World Factbook

The position of the unified government of Yemen aroused the anger of the GCC countries and their fears towards Yemen, so some GCC countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait worked to abort the Yemeni unity for Yemen's position in the second Gulf crisis with Iraq (Hansen, 2013:20). While Qatar stood on the contrary, as the Saudi forces attacked the Khofous center on the Qatari border and its seizure in 1992 (Ibid; The New York Times, Oct. 2, 1992). This resulted in the reinforcement of Qatar's fears that Saudi Arabia in its border dispute, would be like Iraq in its invasion of Kuwait, which prompted the Qatari leadership to strengthen its relations with the USA, through the signing of a security agreement with the USA, in June 23, 1992 (Katzman, 2017:13).

Qatar began to strengthen its relations with the Republic of Yemen in 1990 by adopting a series of steps in support of Yemen. For example its sympathetic position with Yemen in the face of the Gulf boycott that Saudi Arabia and some of the GCC countries adopted towards Yemen during the second Gulf War (1990-1991) due to Yemen's position on the crisis. Qatar was the only Gulf country that maintained good relations with Yemen at that time (1990-1994). In addition, later its supportive position for Sana'a, during the 1994 war crisis, by refusing to endorse secession and refrained from recognizing the state announced by the former Vice President of the Republic, Ali Salem Al-Beidh, on May 21, 1994 (Hansen, 2013:20; Luqman, 2017:145) *.

Moreover, Qatar took a series of positions in support of the unity of Yemen in the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the GCC, and the rest of the regional and international diplomatic forums through its soft power tools. So, these positions strengthened the relations between both countries as well as represented the most important roles of the Qatari presence in Yemen, which greatly contributed to opening the way for the growth of the Qatari role in Yemen in all fields and levels (Luqman, 2017:145-146).

During that period, Qatar witnessed a radical shift in its policy after Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani was removed from power on June 26, 1995, and his crown prince, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, assumed power with a new political vision that was different from the policy of his father. Qatar began to witness a transformation at

* The citation is translated from Arabic by the researcher

both internal and external levels, which can enhance its presence and influence on the regional and international scene.

3.4. Yemen-Qatar Relations During the Period 1995 - 2010

After Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani came to power, succeeding his father, Sheikh Khalifa, who was removed from power while he was abroad, he led his country based on a new internal and external political vision, radically different from his father's policy. Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani relied on soft power tools in his foreign policy to play a more independent and effective role than before. Qatar was a secondary state on the margins of regional and international politics, as a dependent country, and in the shadow of Saudi Arabia's policy (Abdullah, 2014).

During the era of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Qatar was transformed under the new leadership into a country that is developing and progressing at the internal level, competing for regional and international influence through building international relations, and activating the role of Qatari diplomacy in regional and international issues with independent visions and soft power (Karataş, 2020).

Yemen represented an appropriate environment for the presence of Qatar in regional politics due to the political openness that witnessed the conflict between local political actors, and the renewed events that imposed a regional and international response due to the importance of Yemen geographically at the regional and international levels. In addition, the ruling power in Yemen is looking for external support and a political ally to enhance its regional and international presence and influence as well.

The relationship between the two countries during this stage can be investigated on three levels: the level of mutual diplomatic visits and bilateral agreements between both countries; the level of support and cooperation; and the level of common issues.

3.4.1. The Level of Diplomatic Visits and Bilateral Agreements

The mutual official visits can be monitored at the highest level between the two countries, as well as visits at the level of ministries or mutual missions.

On August 6, 2000, the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, arrived Sana'a on an official visit, during which he visited the city of Aden (southern Yemen), accompanied by President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and was briefed on the free

zone and the development activities taking place in it (KUNA, 2000). Also, on June 11, 2003, the Emir of Qatar visited Sana'a and held closed talks with President Saleh in light of the talk about a political dispute between Yemen and Djibouti (Al-Jazeera Net, 2003) and Qatari efforts to mediate between both countries. Qatar took all these steps to activate Qatar's diplomacy, enhance Qatar's role in the region, and strengthen foreign relations with other countries.

Similarly, on July 30, 2006, President Saleh made a lightning visit to the Qatari capital Doha, accompanied by Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi and Minister of State and Secretary General of the Presidency Abdullah Hussein al-Bashiri (Al Motamar Net, 2006). The visit came before the Yemeni presidential elections, which were held on September 20 of the same year between the two candidates; Saleh, as the candidate of the ruling party, and Faisal bin Shamlan, as the candidate of the opposition, as the arena witnessed intense competitive momentum between the two parties. These mutual visits indicate the active performance of Qatar's diplomacy, its keenness to play an important and independent role in Yemen, and political rapprochement on many issues of common interest.

On December 1, 2006, President Saleh visited Qatar to attend the inauguration ceremony of the fifteenth Asian Games, which was held in Doha. During the visit, he met the two presidents, Syrian Bashar al-Assad and Iranian Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, according to the National Information Center (NIC, 2006). The Qatari leadership arranged these bilateral meetings in light of the armed rebellion of the Houthi group, supported by the Iranian and Syrian regimes to find a solution to the conflict between Saleh's regime and the Houthi group, relying on the active diplomatic role and soft power tools represented by the trust that Qatar enjoys with both conflict parties.

On May 9, 2007, the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, visited Sana'a at the head of a high-level delegation, in response to the invitation of President Saleh, in light of the talk about the continuation of the Qatari mediation between the Yemeni government and the Houthi group and resolving the Yemen-Iran dispute. During that visit, the two parties signed a preliminary agreement between the Yemeni General Investment Authority and the Qatari Diar Company to establish an investment project in the "Faj Attan" area of Sana'a under the name 'Al-Rayyan' (Al-Khamry, 2007). On April 4, 2010, Ali Abdullah Saleh visited Qatar's capital, Doha, to end the crisis that had arisen between the two countries.

The Yemeni News Agency, *Saba*, attributed to the Emir of Qatar his affirmation of Doha's keenness to strengthen its relations with Yemen, at all levels, emphasizing that the State of Qatar stands by Yemen, its security, stability, and unity, as he said: "We believe in the unity of Yemen, and we even consider ourselves partners because the stability of Yemen is the stability of the region, and that the State of Qatar will remain supportive of the integration of Yemen into the GCC, and the absorption of Yemeni workers in the Gulf market" (Al-Bayan, 2010) *. So, these statements and positions confirm Qatar's support in favor of Yemeni unity.

On July 13, 2010, Sheikh Hamad arrived in Sana'a on a sudden official visit that was not previously announced, two days after he received a letter from President Saleh. The visit was accompanied by Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a high-level official delegation. This visit was presumably related to the revival of the Doha Agreement between the Yemeni government and the Houthi group, especially at a time when the seventh war was expected in Saada (Almasdaronline, Jul. 7, 2010).

On January 29, 2008, the Yemeni Prime Minister, Ali Muhammad Mujur, visited Doha on an official visit, during which he conveyed a written message from President Saleh to Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (SPA, 2008). On August 17, 2010, the Qatari Prime Minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, visited Sana'a, conveying a verbal message from the Emir of Qatar to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh (Al-Raya, 2010). On January 23, 2011, the political advisor of President Saleh, Dr. Abdul Karim Al-Iryani, visited Doha, where he conveyed a message from President Saleh to the Emir of Qatar (SPA, 2011).

By extrapolating these data, it becomes clear that Qatari diplomacy was active in mutual visits and meetings with Yemen at the highest level between the leaderships of both countries. Especially since Yemen witnessed during that period several events that put it at the forefront of the regional scene, including the occupation of Yemeni islands by the Eritrean government forces in 1995 off its coasts overlooking the Red Sea, and Qatar played the role of mediator between both countries. In addition, the incidents like, bombing of the American destroyer USS COLE off the coast of Aden on October 12, 2000 (Perl & O'Rourke, 2001:52), and the bombing of

* The citation is translated from Arabic by the researcher

the French giant oil tanker "*Limburg*" off the coast of Mukalla in 2002, took place. Moreover, the rebellion of the Houthi group against the state from 2003 to 2010, and the escalation of southern protests since 2007, reached the point of violence and calling for secession.

In addition to these visits and meetings, several bilateral agreements were signed during the period 1995–2010. For example, the signing of a memorandum of understanding for cooperation and coordination between both countries' foreign ministries, an agreement on security cooperation, an agreement on avoiding duplication and preventing tax evasion ⁶, an agreement on encouragement and mutual protection of investments, an agreement on health cooperation, an agreement on Yemeni labor in Qatar, a cultural agreement for the years 2000-2003, and the first executive program of the educational and scientific cooperation agreement for the years 2000-2003, in Sana'a, in the presence of President Saleh and Sheikh Hamad, on August 7, 2000 (Al Bayan, 2000). Furthermore, both countries signed a memorandum of agreement on June 18, 2007, in Doha, discussing the establishment of the Qatar Foundation for Development in Yemen. ⁷ A preliminary agreement was also signed on May 9 between the Yemeni General Investment Authority and the Qatari Diar Company to establish an investment project in the "Faj Attan" area in the capital of Sana'a, in the presence of President Saleh and Sheikh Hamad.

3.4.2. The Level of Support, Cooperation, and Trade Exchange

The State of Qatar, along with other Gulf oil states, has significantly contributed to supporting the Yemeni government over the past two decades. This support has doubled with the coming of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani to power and his keenness to pursue an independent Qatari foreign policy based on Qatar's soft power tools, whether through economic support, spreading Qatar's culture via supporting cultural exchange scholarships, or through development and relief work, and strengthening bilateral relations between both countries. Qatar has become involved in providing economic and developmental support to Yemen, either in the form of grants or credit loans, in addition to financing some development projects in Yemen and establishing some investment projects. For example, Qatar provided an amount

⁶ See the agreement text at the link: <https://urlis.net/nxkx9gr5>

⁷ See the agreement text at the link: <https://urlis.net/9octwm5r>

of 600,000 US dollars annually to the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in the Republic of Yemen within the framework of the support, which provided for the benefit of scholarships for students abroad (Almotamar Net, Sep. 30, 2009).

Qatar has provided Yemen with a lot of charitable, relief, and development support, whether through official support for the Yemeni government or popular support for popular charitable and developmental institutions in Yemen. This fund has been channelized through many Qatari institutions, such as the Qatar Fund for Development ⁸, Qatar Charity ⁹, Qatar Red Crescent ¹⁰, Eid Charity ¹¹, Foundation Raf ¹², and others. This support includes medical, health, nutritional, educational, and relief efforts in cases of disasters, emergencies, and armed conflicts.

This support either comes directly through coordination and cooperation between both states or through the active United Nations relief, humanitarian, and development agencies in the Yemeni arena. The Qatari government stands out among the list of supporters of the projects and programs implemented by those organizations in Yemen. Despite the support Qatar provides to Yemen, the balance of trade exchange between both countries remains weak compared to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and this is due to many factors. However, Qatar has tended in years (2007–2010) to invest in real estate in Yemen, but its projects stopped after the events of 2014 and 2015.

⁸ QFFD is a public foundation dedicated to carrying out international assistance programs on behalf of Qatar, by Law No. 19 of 2002.

⁹ A global philanthropic organization. Founded in 1992, its mission is to promote the growth of disadvantaged communities worldwide.

¹⁰ A voluntary charitable organization, established in 1978, to help vulnerable people without any bias or unfair treatment.

¹¹ It was established in 1995. It is a humanitarian Foundation that cares about human welfare, inside and outside Qatar, and works to provide relief and subsidies and to develop poor communities through medium and small development projects.

¹² The RAF Foundation was founded in 2004. It is one of Qatar's organizations that focuses on humanitarian efforts for relief and social development, both locally and globally.

3.4.3. The Level of Common Issues

Unlike the other Gulf States, the government of Qatar supported Sana'a in the 1994 war by refusing to secession and refraining from recognizing the state, which was announced by the former Vice-President of the Republic, Ali Salem Al-Beidh, on May 21, 1994 (Hansen, 2013:20-21).

Qatar took positions in support of the unity of Yemen in the UN, the League of Arab States, the GCC (Ibid), and the rest of the regional and international diplomatic forums. Therefore, this position strengthened official relations between both countries, represented the most important role of the Qatari presence in Yemen, and increased its influence to later play the role of mediator in resolving some Yemeni conflicts, such as the Saada wars (2004–2010) between the Yemeni government and the Houthi group. Furthermore, it paves the way for this role's growth in all fields and levels (Luqman, 2017).

Qatar continued Supporting Yemen as a new political power on several issues, supported Yemen's efforts to join the GCC (Hansen, 2013:20) whether politically or diplomatically, through stressing more than once the importance of joining the GCC and enhancing cooperation between Yemen and the GCC, in addition to supporting Yemen in international forums and praising the importance of Yemen's presence within the GCC, also supported Yemen's hosting of the Gulf Championship 20 in 2010. Yemen exchanged positive positions with the State of Qatar. During the coup attempt that Doha witnessed on June 21, 1996, Yemen was keen to show its support for Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani in the face of the coup through diplomatic steps, political positions, and media coverage. For example, an official high-level Yemeni delegation visited Doha a few days after the events took place, and Abdul Salam Al-Ansi was appointed as Yemen's ambassador to Qatar (Luqman, 2017:147).

In early 1996, Qatar also strengthened the Yemeni position regarding the Eritrean occupation of the two islands of Hunaish (the small and large ones) and the island of Zuqar. Also, on October 14, 1998, Qatar welcomed the decision of the International Arbitration Commission regarding the Hunaish Islands dispute between Yemen and Eritrea. On October 9, the commission ruled on Yemen's sovereignty over the disputed islands with Eritrea (KUNA, 1998). Through this behavior, Qatar has tried to strengthen its influence and presence in Yemen, relying on soft power tools represented by an active diplomatic role, which has strengthened bilateral relations

between both countries. Furthermore, Qatar contributed to the mediation process between the Houthi group and the regime of President Saleh in light of the armed conflict waged by Hussein Badr Al-Din Al-Houthi against the state in 2004 and his rebellion against the state in six wars that lasted until 2010 (Shurrah, 2014).

Qatar's efforts to solve the dispute between the two parties began in 2007, more than three years after the outbreak of fighting between both parties. The mediation efforts resulted in the two parties declaring a cease-fire on June 16, 2007, and the signing of the peace agreement between them in Doha on February 2, 2008. However, some forces sought within the two parties of the conflict to thwart the Qatari efforts for goals that may be personal. As a result, this led to the resumption of fighting between the two parties until the end of 2009.

Despite the end of Qatar's role in Yemen, Qatar tried resume its mediation efforts again in the summer of 2010. Indeed, those efforts were once again successful at the end of August 2010, as the two parties signed an agreement to renew their commitment to a truce and a cease-fire (Al Qahtani and Al-Thani, 2021).

The relationship between Qatar and Yemen is not always stable and from time to time witnesses a kind of tension due to political points of views. For example, on January 16, 2009, Yemen refused to participate in the emergency Arab summit, which was adopted by the Emir of Qatar. Also, on March 30, 2009, President Saleh withdrew from the closed and final sessions of the twenty-first Arab summit, held in Doha, in protest against the lack of an opportunity to read the Yemeni vision to activate common Arab work and establish an Arab Union. The situation remained tense between the two leaderships until President Saleh met Sheikh Hamad in March 2010 in the Libyan city of Sirte, on the sidelines of the regular Arab summit, where they agreed to overcome the crisis between the two countries and restore momentum to the relationship between them (Al-Bayan, April 5, 2010).

3.5. Determinants of Qatar's Foreign Policy towards Yemen

3.5.1. Introduction

The political theories in international relations that are concerned with explaining the behavior of states; each state has a specific external behavior followed by its foreign policy, aiming at preserving the survival of the state, its national security, its national identity, its strategic interests, and perhaps its ambition to influence and hegemony. This is based on several internal and external foundations and determinants, such as its traditional capabilities, its demographic and geographic size, its diplomatic, economic, and media skills (Kabalan, 2019).

Qatar's foreign policy represents a major challenge to political theories concerned with explaining the behavior of small states because it plays a role larger than its size. It broke the rule that small states submit to superpowers for protection or form alliances that ensure their survival. The government of Qatar, during the reign of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, was able to pursue active and effective external behavior. It can bypass the dilemma of geography and the restrictions of the environment and structure and adapt it to achieve its goals in making an independent foreign policy and playing a pivotal and influential role regionally and internationally, taking advantage of its soft power tools, whether through the diplomatic role or its strong economy. In a way that may not be commensurate with its geographical and demographic size, nor with its military and material capabilities, unlike what is known in the foreign policy of small states. This policy has enabled it to shift from a strategy of balance and neutrality to one of support and bias at times, in search for a regional role.

Qatar's foreign policy, after Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa came to power in 1995, relied on several internal and external determinants that controlled its policy with other countries. this thesis will address the most prominent of these determinants of Qatar's policy in general and on Yemeni issue in particular and know how it affected Qatar's political positions. It will be addressing in two sections, the first section is internal determinants and the second section is external determinants.

3.5.2. Internal Determinants

3.5.2.1. Geographical Factor (location)

Qatar has a very strategic geographical location on the northeastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula. It shares land borders with Saudi Arabia to the south and maritime borders with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain (see map 3.4). This strategic location grants Qatar considerable control over the security of navigation in the Arabian Gulf, a crucial waterway for global trade and energy transportation. Moreover, its geographic location enabled it to form joint ventures with neighboring countries, including in the marine, oil, electrical, and technological industries.



Map 3.4: A Political Map of Qatar

Source: Pinterest

Even though small countries are not helped by their geographical size to play a regional and international role in foreign policy, the government of Qatar, despite the complex geopolitical reality represented by its size and location between two large regional countries 'Saudi Arabia and Iran', has tried to overcome this dilemma and to pursue balanced foreign policies between both countries (Kabalan, 2019:62-63).

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Oman have a greater presence and role on the Yemeni scene at the political, military, security, and economic levels more than

Qatar because the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman have land borders with the Republic of Yemen. This gives them a justification for their interest in and presence in Yemeni affairs, given the security challenges it poses to their borders. It also allowed Saudi Arabia, with its multiple capabilities, to have a greater influence on the Yemeni scene during the past decades, especially in light of the social and economic intertwining between the two countries.

Also, Qatar does not have geographical borders with Yemen, which affected the presence, effectiveness, and influence of Qatar's policy towards Yemen directly. Nevertheless, Qatar was keen to be present on the Yemeni scene through the Gulf Cooperation Council, which represents the common entity for the GCC countries.

Hence, Qatar's foreign policy towards Yemen comes through creating regional partnerships or alliances, sometimes with Saudi Arabia or Oman, and sometimes by going it alone, as in its role in mediating between the Yemeni government and the Houthi group during the period 2007-2010.

3.5.2.2. Economic Level

Qatar is one of the rich GCC countries in oil and natural gas resources, "estimated to be the third largest in the world after Russia and Iran" (Dargin, 2007:136). " It is the third of the global reserves of natural gas estimated at 896 trillion cubic feet and it is the first exporter of liquefied natural gas in the world" (Al-Maatouk and Kama, 2017:193). Qatar's oil reserves amount to 25.4 billion barrels (Ibid). Revenues from oil and natural gas exports represented more than half of Qatar's revenues for the year 2012 (Ibid).

Since Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa came to power in 1995, the national production of raw materials has increased dramatically, and the country "has spent more than 120 billion US dollars on the infrastructure of liquefied natural gas" (Ibid:194), its production capacity in December 2010 reached about 77 million tons (LNG, 2010). The Qatari economy also made great leaps, making it one of the most developed economies in the world.

Qatar endeavored to invest in the fields of gas production and industry, and to diversify sources of income by employing natural resources revenues in foreign

investments in the sectors of finance, trade, industry ¹³, agriculture, and others, through the Qatar Investment Fund ¹⁴. The government of Qatar has also established mega projects to develop the country's infrastructure ¹⁵. In addition, its political stability helped it attract large foreign investments. Furthermore, hosting global activities, such as the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

Given the importance of the economic factor in foreign policy as one of the tools of soft power for any country, the government of Qatar relied on the huge revenues from oil and gas to play an effective and influential external political role in a large way to achieve its presence and ambitious goals. Its economic resources enabled it to influence and intervene in several regional issues, including the Yemeni issue. Mediation between the Yemeni government and the Houthi group during the Saada wars (2004-2010) gave Qatar a chance to be involved in Yemeni affairs.

Participants in a symposium organized by the Preparatory Committee for the National Dialogue in Sana'a, on January 17, 2010, indicated that the losses of the six wars between the government and the Houthis amounted to large numbers that the Yemeni economy could not afford. Also, a "study reported by the US Embassy in Sana'a found that the human and economic cost of the past five wars amounted to three billion dollars." (Al-Qudaimi, 2010:1) *.

On June 16, 2007, Qatar's efforts led to a common ceasefire agreement, which quickly collapsed within a few months. As the leader of the Houthi group, Abd al-

¹³ For example, Qatar has contributed by setting up several steel, fertilizer, and petrochemical factories with foreign companies. The foreign investments in these factories total 215 billion US dollars.

¹⁴ Qatar Investment Fund is the sovereign wealth fund, headed by Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. The assets it managed worldwide in 2020 exceeded 328 billion US dollars, according to the statement of the CEO of the Qatar Investment Authority, Mansour bin Ibrahim Aal Mahmoud, during his participation in the Davos Economic Forum on January 2, 2020.

¹⁵ Such as Hamad International Airport, which cost about \$15.5 billion; Doha Port, which cost about 704 billion US dollars; railway projects that cost about \$28.8 billion; and infrastructure projects related to hosting the 2022 World Cup, which cost about 200 billion dollars (UNDP, 2002–2019).

* The citation is translated from Arabic by the researcher

Malik al-Houthi, announced a cessation of fighting with the Yemeni army, after five months of armed confrontations, in exchange for the contribution of the Qatari government and other countries to financing reconstruction in the northern Saada region (Palik, & Rustad, 2019). Qatar has officially sponsored the financing of the largest part of the fund for the reconstruction of what was destroyed by the war in the districts of Saada, which is estimated at billions, and will also pay all other financial compensation.

Qatar has sought to invest in Yemen to be more present in the Yemeni arena, relying on its strong economy as one of its soft power tools, through which it seeks to strengthen its influence in the region. So in 2008, it launched the Tilal Al Rayan real estate project through the Qatari Diar company in partnership with the Yemeni General Holding Corporation for Real Estate Development and Investment Shibam Holding, at a total cost of 600 million US dollars. The project, for which the foundation stone was laid on November 2, 2009, represented the largest tourist real estate project in Yemen, as it is being built on an area of 440 thousand square meters in the Faj Attan area, and it was scheduled to be fully completed in 2014 (Arqaam, Nov. 2, 2009).

The Executive Vice President of Operations at Qatar Diar, Dr. Hassan Al-Fadala, said at the project launch ceremony: "We are looking forward to consolidating our close relations with the Yemeni people and government, and many local business institutions, in the coming stages" (Ibid) *. He made sure to say that the project was ordered by Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa and that it was more than just a business deal. It was a sign of how much the two countries and their people really cared about each other. He explained that the project aims to show a new and modern model to develop real estate in the Yemeni capital, Sana'a. This would increase growth rates and contribute to the development of the country, as well as contribute to achieving the desire of the Yemeni people and the Yemeni government to attract foreign investments and develop trade and tourism (Arqaam, Nov. 2, 2009). Through this investment and providing support to economic projects, Qatar is trying to have a presence and influence in Yemen, this policy is embodied with the principle of soft power theory to influence in Yemeni scene.

* The citation is translated from Arabic by the researcher

Al-Fadala stated that the Qatari company's work in implementing the Tilal Al Rayan project is based on the philosophy of creating job opportunities and achieving sustainable development for the business, trade, and tourism sectors. Noting that the project is part of ongoing efforts to meet the aspirations of wise leadership in Qatar and Yemen and to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two countries, he expected Qatar to rank first in the Gulf in terms of the volume of its investments in Yemen with the launch of the project. While the head of the investment department of the Shibam Holding Company, Maher Luqman, said: The project provides about 4,000 job opportunities during the implementation stages, pointing to the importance of the project in terms of attracting foreign and local investments, revitalizing the local market, creating marketing and real estate development opportunities, and finding a project model with international standards (Arqaam, Nov. 2, 2009).

Qatar also targeted the banking sector, launching the Qatar National Bank (Yemen branch) in 2007, with net profits of 247 million Yemeni riyals in 2008 and 307 million Yemeni riyals in 2009. It was set up as a branch of a foreign bank by the Yemeni Banking Law. It owns completely for Qatar National Bank in the State of Qatar (AlmasdarOnline, June 28, 2010). The Qatari government has also contributed by providing various aid and loans to the Yemeni government several times. It was announced at the conference of international donors to support the development process in Yemen, which was held on November 15 and 16, 2006, in London with the participation of 24 Gulf and Western countries.

Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, announced that Qatar had provided 500 million US dollars, whether in grants or loans, to the Republic of Yemen. The Qatar News Agency (QNA) quoted him as saying, "Yemen's political and economic stability is important for the Arabian Gulf region and the surrounding region." (NIC, Nov. 20, 2006:1) *. Qatar was among the GCC countries that pledged a total of 4.4 billion US dollars to support the transitional process in Yemen in 2012, and it is one of the donor countries in the Friends of Yemen group ¹⁶. The financial surplus Qatar obtained in light of the oil

* The citation is translated from Arabic by the researcher

¹⁶ It is an international group established in January 2010, to support the development process in Yemen, to face the economic challenges, and to strengthen the government side in the war on terrorism. several ministerial meetings of the Friends

boom and the revenue from foreign investments enabled it to provide aid and assistance in solving global financial crises to each of the major countries and to grant it diplomatic influence, based on the strategy of using soft power concept to deal with many crises in the region, including Yemen (Khudair, 2011).

3.5.2.3. The Political and Diplomatic Determinants

Each country has its own foreign policy, which aims to preserve the survival of states, its security, and its national identity. Also, presumably there is an aspiration to influence and hegemony, which is one of the most important bases of foreign policy in light of an anarchic international system. The Qatari government has based its foreign policy on several strategies that are based on soft power theory, such as the strategy of good neighborliness, regional and international alliances, attracting and persuading others, and the creation of the brand identity of Qatar.

Qatar has maintained its presence in the GCC and its membership in the League of Arab States. Since Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa came to power in 1995, Qatar's foreign policy has witnessed great dynamism at the regional and international levels as it pursued an influential and independent foreign policy. It sought to maintain good relations with all countries and play an active role in some regional and international issues. It has made great efforts to enhance regional stability and security.

Qatar has adopted a diplomatic approach to resolving disputes by peaceful means and has played a mediating role in several regional disputes, such as wars and internal

of Yemen were held on: 24 January 2010 (London), 24 September 2010 (New York), 23 May 2012 (Riyadh), 27 September 2012 (New York), 7 March 2013 (London), 25 September 2013 (New York), and 28 April 2014 (London).

conflicts that have arisen in Sudan¹⁷, Lebanon¹⁸, Libya¹⁹, Palestine²⁰, and Yemen. It has also played a role in mediating between the US and the Taliban. Qatar has tried to be independent of the policies of the other GCC countries, especially its neighbor Saudi Arabia. It has done this by investing in soft power and making partnerships and alliances with major powers such as United State to make up for its lack of hard power, "In June 1992, Qatar signed a defense cooperation agreement with the United States, opening a period of close coordination in military affairs that has continued to the present" (Blanchard and Sharp, 2014:12).

Qatar now has a presence on the international stage on a variety of issues. With the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions, a clear shift occurred in Qatar's foreign policy. The Qatari government appeared alongside the revolutions and the people who came out demanding freedom, justice, a decent life, and support for their right to self-determination. It is a policy consistent with Article 7 of Qatar's constitution "The foreign policy of the State is based on the principle of strengthening international

¹⁷ Qatar's mediation, supported by the efforts of the joint mediator of the United Nations and the African Union, succeeded in pushing the Sudanese government and the Justice and equality movement to reach the signing of the declaration of good intentions and confidence-building agreement, in Doha, on February 17, 2009, following talks led by Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al-Thani, Prime Minister and foreign minister, to be the prelude to negotiations held between the parties to resolve the Darfur crisis. Then, the Darfur peace agreement was signed between the government of Sudan and the liberation and justice movement, in July 2011, which was known as the Doha Agreement.

¹⁸ Qatar sponsored the Lebanese national dialogue, between the Lebanese political parties, in Doha, in late May 2008, which resulted "Doha Agreement"

¹⁹ Qatar worked on reconciliation between the Libyan Tabu and Tuareg tribes to end an armed conflict that lasted about two years, where both parties signed, on November 23, 2015, in Doha, a final peace agreement to a ceasefire under Qatari auspices.

²⁰ The Doha Declaration of Palestinian Reconciliation, which represented an agreement between the Fatah and Hamas movements, was signed in the presence of the Emir of Qatar, in the Qatari capital Doha, on February 6, 2012, by Mahmoud Abbas representing the Fatah movement, and Khaled Meshaal representing the Hamas movement.

peace and security by means of encouraging peaceful resolution of international disputes." (Qatari Constitution, Article 7).

Qatar changed its role from one of mediation and neutrality to one of support and bias. For example, its participation in April 2011 in the campaign led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against the forces of Muammar Gaddafi, the former Libyan president. Also, Qatar demanded that Arab forces be sent to Syria to stop the fighting, and it was the first Arab country to do so (Reuters, Jan. 15, 2012:1). It was interpreted as a shift from a policy of neutrality and mediation to a policy of support and attribution, to search for influence and competition. This led to many security threats for Qatar, especially from some Arabic regimes, that witnessed the events of the Arab Spring, so Qatar was forced to make alliances with major countries, such as Türkiye, to ward off these threats, especially after boycotting Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain in 2017 ²¹.

After Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad came to power in June 2013, and as a result of series of changes and events in the region, such as the overthrow of the elected Egyptian president, Muhammad Morsi, Qatar's decision-makers turned to a new form of foreign policy, compatible with the priorities according to the determinants of what is called soft power theory and smart power, preserving the foreign policy constants stipulated in the Qatari constitution, and taking into account the internal situation. This Qatari diplomacy contributed, in 2007, to reach a reconciliation agreement between the Yemeni government and the Houthi group, and then led to negotiations that ended with the signing by the Yemeni government and the Houthi group, in Doha, of a document containing procedures for implementing the reconciliation agreement reached by the two sides, on behalf of the government side, Abdul Karim al-Iryani, political advisor of President Saleh, and on behalf of the Houthi group, Saleh Habra. Qatar had hosted negotiations between the government and the Houthi group, with Qatari mediation, following the renewed bloody confrontations between the two parties in northern Yemen (Barakat, 2014).

²¹ On June 5, 2017, KSA, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt, then followed by the Government of Yemen, decided to sever diplomatic relations with Qatar and impose a blockade on it by land, sea, and air.

In 2011, Qatar's diplomacy contributed in forming the Gulf initiative on Yemen, which included only two items. First, President Ali Abdullah Saleh must step down from power and hand over his powers to his deputy. Second, the formation of a government of national unity led by the opposition, which took place on April 3, 2011. It was announced by Qatar's Prime Minister on April 7 during a press conference held on the sidelines of his visit to Washington. This angered Saleh and prompted him to criticize Qatar the next day, announcing his rejection of it, considering it as an interference in Yemeni affairs, in his speech "Our power comes from the power of our great people, not from Qatar, not from anyone else" (The Nation, 2011:1).

Qatar continued to be present in its active diplomacy through the Gulf Cooperation Council, until the formula of the initiative reached its final draft. Qatar announced its withdrawal from the initiative, justifying that by saying, "Qatar was forced to take this action because of the stalling in signing the proposed agreement ...the continued escalation, the intensity of the confrontations and a lack of wisdom," (Ghobari and Al-Mahdy, May 12, 2011:1).

Qatar has decided to temporarily close its embassy in Sana'a and pull out its diplomats because Yemen hasn't responded to putting an end to the political crisis in the country. This will happen until the violence and fighting stop and the Yemeni people's demands are met, according to an official in Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ahramonline, 2011). After Ali Abdullah Saleh stepped down from power and a transitional government was set up on February 26, 2012, Qatar reopened its embassy in Sana'a (Almasderonline, 2012).

Qatar was one of the stations of Yemeni aspiration during the transitional period, between 2012 and 2014, when the President of the Republic of Yemen and the Prime Minister of Yemen visited Doha. The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, stated in the bilateral summit, which was held in Doha in early August 2012, that he has great interest in the security, unity, and safety of Yemen. He also, asserted that the security of Yemen is part of their security of Qatar and its stability is part of the stability of the region as well. Noting the importance of the flow of investments to Yemen to bring about qualitative development and the employment of manpower in various specializations, given that investment is one of the factors for consolidating security and stability. Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa added that Qatar would work with

Yemen in the context of supporting political transformations based on the Gulf initiative, its implementation mechanism, and UN Security Council resolutions, stressing that Qatar will support the comprehensive national dialogue and play an appropriate role in its success (Akhbaralyom, Aug. 04, 2012).

3.5.2.4. Media Determinants

Media has become an important tool in the foreign policy of any country. Qatar has benefited from the media field since the launch of the Al-Jazeera channel in 1996 (almeezan, Law No. 1 of 1996). This channel has been used to influence public opinion, especially in the Arab world, as well as international decision-makers, as a way to shape its foreign policy and improve its image in the international community. This has helped establishing its presence in the international community to have a presence in the region, taking advantage of some concepts of soft power. So that Al-Jazeera network became as of now is one of the most trustful and respected news agency all over the world in general and in the Arab world in particular (Al Hawary, 2023).

Qatar's government has given the Al-Jazeera network a role in the media that is open and honest. Qatar also lets Al-Jazeera live bold talk shows, which is different from how other governments limit freedom of expression. That has caused many problems in some countries. For example, some of the channel's programs like [opposite direction] *Alitijah Almuakis* have caused tension in relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Emirates, Bahrain, Syria, Sudan, Palestine, and other countries, leading to the closure of the channel's offices in some of those countries, "this was followed by political crises between those countries and Doha and caused disagreements, tensions, and political boycotts" (Al Hawary, 2023:233) *.

Al-Jazeera's coverage of events in the Middle East and around the world helps in shaping public opinion and sway political decisions. With Qatar sponsoring this huge media network, it has strong soft power in the region, such as its oil wealth and active diplomacy, and enjoys the trust of others as a neutral mediator, which helps it improve its international standing. The role of the Al-Jazeera network was evident in its coverage of the events of September 11, 2001, the war in Afghanistan (2000) and Iraq (2003), and the wars in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2008). As its news and

* The citation is translated from Arabic by the researcher

reports reached American and European spectators, it was considered the voice of the Middle East in the West (Al-Maatouk & Kama, 2017:195). In addition, its coverage of the events of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria, and others, and its follow-up to the movement of the Arab peoples, their demands for change, their rejection of the ruling regimes, and their self-determination. "Al-Jazeera channel also documented the incidents of the methods of violence that the demonstrators were subjected to and was keen to re-broadcast those images." It was "really the forerunner in broadcasting the Arab revolutions, and it was the first to create political analytical programs about the popular protests and the consequences of these revolutions." (Al Hawary, 2023:241-242) *.

Al-Jazeera has been able to create a brand for the State of Qatar and introduce it to the international media community. This has helped it gain the trust of major international media institutions and is part of the system of influencing global public opinion. This prompted several Arab regimes to call for the closure of Al-Jazeera, in addition to closing its offices and branches in their countries and arresting its correspondents and employees in those offices, because they considered this media network as a threat, for instance, the Al-Jazeera office in Ramallah was closed by the Palestinian Authority more than once during the era of the Yasser Arafat (Al Hawary, 2023:238). The government of Qatar refused to respond to these demands and insisted on the continuance of Al-Jazeera while adjusting its policy from time to time according to its interests or pressures exerted on Qatar.

Al-Jazeera network adhered to describing the events of 2011 in Yemen as a popular revolution, and remained present in broadcasting statements from the places of protest, which were described as the square of change. Aljazeera called the protesters as the youth of the revolution. Al-Jazeera covered the demonstrations that took place in Yemen, as well as the incidents of violence that took place during that period against the revolutionaries. Due to this role, armed men stormed the channel's office in Sana'a and looted some of its equipment in the existence of the security forces. Furthermore, the Yemeni authorities also deported two of the network's correspondents from Yemen. Al-Jazeera's office in Yemen had been subjected to numerous harassments, ranging from threats to confiscation of its contents and

* The citation is translated from Arabic by the researcher

beating of its employees, before the February 11, 2011 revolution (Al-Jazeera, March 22, 2011).

Al-Jazeera network has represented a rich reference for scholars and researchers on the Yemeni issue. Especially in the issues of the February 11, 2011 revolution in Yemen, the transitional period (2012-2014), and the ongoing conflict, due to the great interest that the network has shown in Yemeni affairs. As it has become revealing of the transgressions committed by the various parties in the ongoing conflict. All of this had prompted the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain to demand the closure of the Al-Jazeera channel in the 2017, which included 13 demands to solve the Gulf crisis (Reuters, June 30, 2017).

3.5.2.5. The Decision-Maker and The Ruling Elite

The state's policy is based on how the decision-maker understands the objective variables, not on how important these variables are. There are subjective personal traits and others that are acquired through experience in political life. According to the role theory, political decision-making depends on the ability of the decision-maker and his understanding of the role that plays. In the sense that the personality of the decision-maker is an important factor in decision-making and foreign policy-making. Also, the behavioral school considers the role of the decision-maker as the most important part of the decision-making process, especially in third-world states.

Usually, the decision-maker in drawing up foreign policy is the head of state or the prime minister, and they are responsible for defining the goals and objectives of the state's foreign policy that serve the national interest. The ruling elite, which includes ruling families, influential politicians, and high-ranking government officials, also play a big role in making decisions and shaping a country's foreign policy. This is because they are often part of the decision-making process and have access to information and resources that can change the attitudes of decision-makers.

It is important to note that the role of the ruling elite in foreign policy can vary based on the type of political system and the level of transparency, democracy, and accountability in the country. It is worth noting that foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy and shows the philosophy and vision of the leader in charge of making political decisions. This is embodied in Qatar's foreign policy.

Qatar's political system is to some extent the princely, sultanate, and monarchical systems which is common in the GCC countries. In such political systems, the head of the ruling regime is in charge of making decisions (Qatar's constitution, article 8). Since Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa came to power in 1995, there has been a marked change in Qatar's Foreign policy. This is due to the ambition and will of the ruler to create an independent policy for his country from the rest of the GCC countries. Sheikh Hamad pursued an independent policy that was not subservient to any neighboring country, whether Saudi Arabia or others. Also, he consolidated Qatar's relations with superpowers, such as the USA, Russia, and others, through various military and economic agreements, including military defense and oil production agreements. The permanent constitution²² of the State of Qatar in Part One, Article 6 stipulates that "The State shall respect the international charters and conventions, and strive to implement all international agreements, charters, and conventions to which it is a party" (Qatari constitution, article 6).

Qatar's system is based on the fact that "the people are the source of power, and they shall exercise the same in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution" (Ibid, article 59) and "based on the separation of powers" (Ibid, article 60). While the "Executive Authority shall be vested in the Emir, and he shall be assisted by the Council of Ministers" (Ibid, article 62). Also, "the Legislative Authority shall be vested in Al-Shoura Council" (Ibid, article 61). "The Emir is the head of State" (Ibid, article 64) and represents it internally, externally, and in all international relations (Ibid, article 66). The Emir "shall conclude treaties and agreements by a decree and refer them to Al-Shoura Council accompanied with appropriate explanatory notes" (Ibid, article 68). The Emir also concerned with issuing the Declaration of Defensive War (Ibid, Article 71), and he "shall appoint the prime minister and the ministers" (Ibid, Articles 72, 73). With the assistance of the Prime Minister, Emir of State also draws up the general policy of the state. So, along with the prime minister and foreign minister, the Emir has a big role in making the state's foreign policy,

²² On April 29, 2003, a referendum was conducted on Qatar's draft permanent constitution, with 96.6 percent of the ballots cast. On June 8, 2004, the permanent constitution of the State of Qatar was issued by order of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Emir of the State.

establishing foreign relations, and looking out for the state's interests abroad (Ibid, Article 121).

The changes that occurred in the system of government in Qatar, whether at the level of the constitution, at the level of leadership, or in light of the structure of the state's institutions, made Qatar's foreign policy a joint decision between the Emir of State, the Shura Council, the Council of Ministers, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Young people often head these bodies with a high level of education and qualifications who are willing to make an independent policy to bring Qatar to the forefront of the regional, international, and global scene, using its soft power tools to strengthen its role and influence regionally and internationally. This is noted in its political presence in international issues and regional events, as well as its active and flexible diplomacy.

3.5.3. The External Determinants of The Qatari Policy Towards Yemen

Qatar's Policy toward Yemen, due to the complexity of the Yemeni issue, is based on several regional and international factors. This is because the war and conflict in Yemen have become linked to a number of international and regional powers with which Qatar has partnerships, alliances, competition, or conflict. Hence, Qatar's policy towards Yemen is affected by a variety of external factors, such as political competition, conflict over economic interests, and how it responds to security concerns related to the Yemeni issue. Qatar's policy toward the conflict in Yemen was shaped by these external factors, which made it pursue a policy that balanced its own interests, its alliances, and its fears.

In many cases, Qatar's policy in Yemen has been affected by its relations with other regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, and Türkiye, as well as with the US and other international actors. The external determinants investigate with the regional and international determinants affecting Qatar's foreign policy toward the conflict in Yemen.

3.5.3.1. Regional Determinants

Since Qatar has become independent, several regional factors have affected its foreign policy in one way or another in line with Qatar's goals and served its interests. The regional factor affected Qatari reality due to its location between two large states, Saudi Arabia and Iran, whose tense relations had repercussions on the

state of the Arab Gulf countries. The Iraqi-Iranian war (1980-1988), the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the border dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia during the period 1992–1994 represented challenges to Qatar's policy. This made it possible to conclude several alliances with major countries, such as the USA, taking advantage of the decline in the role of some regional powers, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq (Mohammadzadeh, 2017). Qatar has hosted the largest US military base in the Middle East 'Al-Udeid' base ²³, as well as hosted Turkish military 'Alrayyan' base.

Qatar, which seeks independence in its foreign policy, faced a political crisis with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain in 2017. This crisis almost undermined its stability as the threat from these countries reached the point of taking military action to overthrow the ruling leadership ²⁴. Qatar adopted its own policy toward the Arab Spring revolutions, as it supported them and recruited the Al-Jazeera network with all its programs and broadcasting for those revolutions events. It opposed the policy of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which adopted counter-revolutions, such as in Egypt, by supporting the counter-revolution against elected President Mohamed Morsi. While Qatar was supporting the revolutionary movement and both Islamic and liberal revolutionary parties.

Qatar became involved in areas of contact and clash with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the Egyptian military regime, and Iran. This was evident in several regions, such as Egypt and Libya in general, and Yemen in particular. For this reason, this thesis can find that Qatar's foreign policy toward the conflict in Yemen has been linked to the presence or absence of some regional actors, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the extent to which the Qatari agendas match or conflict with the interests of those actors. This happened especially after the coup of the Houthi group against Yemen's government. After Arab coalition intervention in Yemen, other countries started

²³ Al-Udeid base is a US military air base in Qatar, where members of the US armed forces are stationed, most of whom are from the Air Force. It is one of the most important US military bases in the Gulf region.

²⁴ During a joint press conference with US President Donald Trump in Washington DC in September 2017, "What is important is that we have stopped any military action," Sheikh Sabah said. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/9/8/war-stopped-between-qatar-blockading-arab-nations>

getting involved in Yemen, either through proxy wars or directly. Consequently, the Yemeni scene has become more complicated, and Qatar's politics have to deal with several actors, each with its own agenda, goals, and interests. This chapter investigates how each of these regional actors has affected Qatar's approach toward the conflict in Yemen.

a) The impact of the Saudi Factor on Qatar's Policy Towards the Conflict in Yemen

Saudi Arabia and Qatar are members of the GCC and have neighborly relations and common interests in many of the region's issues. Their policies have sometimes conflicted due to their conflicting agendas and interests. Qatar was also present in the reconciliation process between the Yemeni government and the Houthi group in what was known as the Six Wars or the Saada Wars 2004–2010, through its soft power tools represented by Qatari diplomacy. Qatar intervened to end six-year wars from 2004–2010²⁵; it directly supervised an agreement between the two parties. However, Qatar later withdrew from the mediation due to the tense relationship between Qatar and the regime of the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Qatar was a member of the Arab Coalition in Yemen. However, the Arab Coalition, as a result of the conflict between the agendas and interests of Saudi Arabia and the UAE with the agendas and interests of Qatar, ended Qatar's participation in 2017 (Al Arabiya News, June 05, 2017). Following the crisis that occurred between Qatar on the one hand and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt on the other hand, it also severed diplomatic and commercial relations with Qatar, accusing it of supporting terrorism and undermining Gulf security. Furthermore, this crisis has had a negative impact on the conflict in Yemen, as the GCC countries were unable to effectively coordinate their efforts to resolve the conflict in Yemen. Also, Saudi Arabia and its allies' blockade of Qatar affected Qatar's foreign policy toward the

²⁵ The Yemeni government and the Houthi group signed, in Qatar's capital, Doha, in late August and early September 2010, an explanatory supplement and a timetable for the implementation of the agreement previously signed by the two parties in Sana'a on June 21, 2010, consisting of 22 articles, all of which are clarifications for the six clauses included in the first Doha agreement.

conflict in Yemen, especially after the legitimate government sided with Saudi Arabia and its allies.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE accused the Yemeni parties opposed to their policies in Yemen of receiving support from Qatar and also directed their affiliated and supported media to attack these parties. Thus, this thesis finds that Qatar's presence in the Yemeni issue was influenced by the presence or absence of the Saudi role, and by agreement or disagreement with Qatar. Also, Saudi Arabia was the main actor in the Yemeni scene. This led to the decline and diminution of the Qatari role in Yemen following the Gulf crisis. Overall, the ongoing tension between Saudi Arabia and Qatar has had a negative impact on the crisis and the Yemeni issue, and the efforts to resolve the conflict and achieve peace.

b) The Impact of The UAE Factor on The Qatari Policy Towards the Conflict in Yemen

UAE is linked with Qatar in the GCC, and it was part of the Gulf Initiative. Its role in influencing the Yemeni scene emerged early, through its contacts with the Houthis group²⁶, Saleh's regime²⁷, and its endeavor to abort the transitional phase and the Government of National Accord (GNA). The UAE supported the military coup in Egypt in 2013 and contributed to Libya by exporting Khalifa Haftar to lead a counter-revolution against the forces of revolution and change, which resulted in overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in October 2011 (Bakir, 2020:157-160).

According to the statement by the Congress leader, Yasser Al-Yamani, the UAE "has contributed greatly to the matters concerning Yemen, as it is the one who convinced the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, of this scenario that Yemen is currently experiencing. The UAE persuaded President Saleh and the General People's Congress to ally with the Houthis, claiming to overthrow the Brotherhood or

²⁶ Retired Saudi Major General Anwar Eshki, in an interview with Russia Today said: "The Houthis promised a Gulf state, which he did not name, said that they would strike a certain group in Yemen and they did not do that after they took the huge sums of money". available at the link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EJ_nOtXRTLk

²⁷ Retired Saudi Major General Anwar Eshki revealed that an Arab country had informed Ali Abdullah Saleh of the zero hour in Decisive Storm, which enabled him to escape from the blows of the storm. Available at the link <https://rb.gy/8z97uh>

Islah ²⁸. Unfortunately, the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Congress Party swallowed the bait, along with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi," (Sputnik Arabic, Sep. 10, 2018) ^{*}. The Emirati approach is fighting what is called political Islam in UAE media, which signifies the Islamic movements and groups that took the lead in the Arab Spring revolutions and the political scene. UAE was on the opposite side of Qatar with regards the Arab spring revolutions.

Qatar and the UAE have been participants in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. However, the UAE's policies in Yemen have aimed at empowering the Southern Transitional Council (STC) ²⁹, which demands secession, and the remnants of Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime, led by Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, and thwarting the efforts of the legitimate government to return to the city of Aden, the interim capital. The UAE has become the complete opposite of the efforts of the Qatari government aimed at ending the coup and restoring legitimacy through the Gulf Initiative and the outputs of the NDC.

Following the Gulf crisis in 2017, between Qatar and some GCC countries, Qatar was expelled from the coalition (Al Arabiya News, June 05, 2017), and a complete blockade was imposed on it on the accusation of supporting terrorism and making close relations with Iran that harms Gulf security. Blockade countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt) submitted 13 demands to Qatar via Kuwait, which intervened as a mediator to resolve the crisis. The Associated Press published excerpts from it. In the ninth item, Qatar was explicitly called to harmony itself with its Gulf and Arab surroundings at all levels: military, political, economic, social, and security, to ensure the security of the Gulf and Arab nations, and its activation of the Riyadh Agreement of 2013 and the supplementary Riyadh Agreement of 2014. In the tenth item, Qatar was requested to hand over all the databases of the dissidents it

²⁸ The Islah party is a second large political party in Yemen with a broad social presence, as it represents an extension of the Islamic movement that participated in the revolution of September 26, 1962 with others. As well, Islah party has a crucial influence on the local political scene of Yemen.

^{*} The citation is translated from Arabic by the researcher.

²⁹ The Southern Transitional Council is an entity that brings together a number of factions of the movement formed and supported by the UAE on May 4, 2017, outside the framework of legitimacy, to achieve its own agenda

supported, as well as clarification of all types of support that was provided to them (Al-Jazeera, Jul. 12, 2017).

The Gulf crisis has affected Qatar's influence in the Arab region, especially in the Yemeni scene, which has become more complex. Thus, Qatar began moving towards exposing the deviation of the military operation in Yemen, the crimes committed by the forces supported by both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the mistakes that caused great losses among civilians. Qatar uses Al-Jazeera network and other media outlets that support it as a tool for media pressure. It has also taken a new approach to dealing with the conflict in Yemen based on soft power theory by calling for a peaceful solution, becoming wary of directly engaging in the war, and convincing the parties to the conflict to dialogue and negotiation. Overall, the UAE's participation in the Yemeni issue affected Qatar's position, especially since the UAE came into many positions in harmony with the Saudi positions in the same direction. This made Qatar continue to use soft power tools through its efforts to provide humanitarian relief to the Yemeni people and to call on the conflicting parties to negotiate and reach a peaceful solution that would end the conflict.

c) The Impact of The Egyptian Factor on Qatar's Policy Toward The Conflict In Yemen

Egypt is a major Arab regional power in the Middle East. It has a great influence on the foreign policies of other Arab countries in the region, including Qatar. Concerning the situation in Yemen, Egypt joined the Saudi-led coalition in 2015, and its position was mostly the same as that of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen. On the other hand, Qatar supported the Arab Spring revolutions, which made it a major backer of the political Islamist movement, which was a prominent actor in the revolutions. Qatar supported the Muslim Brotherhood (Khaleej Times, Jan 8, 2013) in Egypt and showed a media discourse against the regime of former President Muhammad Hosni Mubarak and the Egyptian army that took power after Mubarak stepped down. Following the elected president, Mohamed Morsi, and the legitimately elected authorities were overthrown on July 3, 2013, Qatar stood with the

legitimately elected Egyptian government ³⁰. Consequently, Cairo pulled its ambassador from Qatar in February 2014 (Al-Jazeera, Mar. 7, 2014).

Egypt was one of the four countries that put a blockade on Qatar by cutting off diplomatic ties with it on June 5, 2017, and various accusations were leveled against it (Policy Brief, 2017). Cairo maintained a limited presence in the Yemeni scene due to several domestic and regional reasons, while remained politically and diplomatically supportive of the positions and policies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen, which were meant to fight the 'political Islam' movement and reduce Qatar's role and influence in Yemen.

Overall, Egypt's influence on Qatar's foreign policy towards the conflict in Yemen can be seen as limited. Also, Qatar was keen to avoid confronting Egypt over the Yemeni issue, despite its disagreement with the policies of the Egyptian government. Maybe it does not want to create new enemies and does not have the hard power tools through which it can impose its presence in the Yemeni scene.

d) The Impact of The Iranian Factor on Qatar's Policy Toward the Conflict in Yemen

Iran and Saudi Arabia are competing for power and influence in the region. On the one hand, Iran seeks to expand its influence in several Arab countries, such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Bahrain. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia seeks to assert control and hegemony in the region. Between these two axes, Qatar is trying to pursue an independent policy from Saudi Arabia and Iran. Qatar pursues a policy that supports the people's choices and demands for change and their popular revolutions against tyrannical regimes, whether supported by Iran as in Syria or backed by Saudi Arabia as in Egypt (Hansen, 2013:30). Qatar's approach, which is opposite to the policies of the two states, posed a major challenge to its foreign policy on many levels, especially regarding the Yemeni crisis, given the intertwining and complexities of the scene in Yemen.

Qatar has a good relations with Iran in several fields, especially the economy, energy, and transportation. Moreover, Qatar was a member of the Saudi-led

³⁰ The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, described on September 25, 2014, in an interview with CNN, What happened in Egypt is a coup.

coalition, which was formed for what was announced at the time for confronting Iranian expansion in Yemen. In addition, Qatar is a member of the GCC, which was formed in 1981 in light of Iranian threats to the region. But changes and conflicts on the regional scene forced Qatar to have a balanced foreign policy. In light of the Gulf crisis in 2017, Qatar sought to have strong relationship with Iran, which helped it during the Gulf crisis.

The new reality prompted Qatar to adopt a political solution to the conflict in Yemen and to adopt a reconciling media discourse with the Houthi group to avoid a clash with Iran's policy in Yemen. Iran is strongly present in the Yemeni conflict through its support for the Houthi group. For example, many Iranian shipments of weapons that were headed to the Houthi group were stopped in January 2023 by French naval forces (Al-Jazeera, Feb. 2, 2023). The most notable of these was the shipment that the US and Yemeni Navy stopped in January 2013. It was heading from Iran to the Houthi group and contained missiles, explosives, and equipment for air defense systems (Stille, 2017:122).

According to the aforementioned historical and political facts, the competition between Riyadh and Tehran for hegemony and influence in Yemen made Qatar's policy on Yemen very difficult. This is because Qatar has good relations with Tehran and geographical and historical ties to Riyadh, especially after the end of the Gulf crisis and the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar at the Ula summit ³¹. Even so, this gives Qatar the chance to act as a mediator between the regional and Yemeni parties because it has good relationships with all parties and tries to keep a balanced policy with everyone.

e) The Impact of The Turkish Factor on The Qatari Policy Towards the Conflict in Yemen

When the Arab Spring revolutions broke out, Turkish and Qatari policies sought to play active regional roles. They extended their support for the revolutions of the Arab people and their democratic choices through political roles and diplomatic efforts, and perhaps military intervention, as was seen in the case of Syria and Libya. In the

³¹ The Al-Ula Summit was held on January 5, 2021, in the Al-Ula Governorate, Saudi Arabia, and was called the “Sultan Qaboos and Sheikh Sabah Summit.” It was held at the invitation of King Salman bin Abdulaziz.

last two decades, Türkiye has become an important regional partner for Qatar's government, especially with the imposition of the blockade on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt in 2017. Türkiye declared its support for Qatar by means of rapid approval by the Turkish Parliament and the Turkish President, on June 7, 2017, just two days after beginning of the Gulf crisis, by deploying Turkish forces in Qatar (Alrantisi, 2020), which protected Qatar from any possible military intervention. The Turkish position has increased the tension between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand, and Qatar and Türkiye on the other. For this reason, the blockading countries have asked Qatar to close the Turkish military base (Quamar, 2017).

Türkiye was one of the countries that welcomed the formation of the Arab Coalition, of which Qatar was a member. Qatari forces also participated in the coalition's operations to restore legitimacy and end the coup in Yemen. However, Türkiye did not participate in the military operations of the coalition. Instead, it just kept monitoring the coalition's efforts to resolve the conflict and restore the state. Türkiye also explicitly supported the legitimate government in Yemen and provided a lot of humanitarian aid to the people. However, the policies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE severely criticized the government of the Justice and Development Party, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, due to its supportive position of Qatar's government during the Gulf crisis. Consequently, Türkiye's position in Yemen has become consistent with Qatar's vision on the need to end the war and resolving the Yemeni-Yemeni conflict using peaceful tools according to the concept of soft power theory and their conviction of the futility of continuing the war. It is a position that stems from the appreciation of both countries for the path of the war, which deviated from the objectives announced by the Arab Coalition and given the war has extended for several years, increasing the negative effects of the conflict and making Yemen an arena of chaos and proxy wars.

Just as the relationship between Türkiye and Qatar On the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE On the other hand, is intertwined in the Egyptian, Libyan, and Syrian scenes, Yemen is among the arenas affected by this intertwining. Overall, the relationship between Qatar and Türkiye may remain harmonious on the Yemeni issue. This is because both countries have the same visions and policies aimed at stabilizing Yemen, its unity, and its security, ending the conflict, and getting back

path to a peaceful democratic political path according to the Gulf initiative and the outcomes of the NDC agreed upon by all Yemeni forces and parties.

3.5.3.2. International Determinants

Yemen is no longer isolated from the influence of Western interventions. Yemen's geographic location made it a target for the Western colonial powers for a long time, as several European countries competed to colonize the Yemeni coasts, including Portugal, France, Italy, and Britain. Britain colonized the city of Aden and parts of southern Yemen for approximately 128 years, 1839-1967 (Gavin, 1975).

Yemen's strategic location remained an object of interest for Americans in light of the cold war that prevailed in the world between the two camps, eastern and western. The eastern camp, led by the Soviet Union, sought to find a military base for it in southern Yemen during the era of the PDRY, and the western camp, led by the US, sought to win over the YAR to line it up. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the US did not hide its desire to establish military bases in Yemen.

In addition, the state of conflict in Yemen wasn't too far from international plans to divide Yemen in pursuit of political agendas and economic interests and to ward off security risks. Moreover, the state of conflict has allowed several Western countries to sell their weapons and provide logistical services to the countries of the Arab Coalition, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in exchange for money. The American magazine Foreign Policy estimated the cost of the war in Yemen at about 725 billion US dollars in the first six months only, including military deals for Saudi Arabia (Ansarollah, Dec. 15, 2019).

Consequently, United States of America and Britain are strongly involved in the ongoing conflict and war in Yemen. They blessed the Gulf Initiative and were among the sponsors of it, they also supervised the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), were members of the Arab Coalition, and were present in the economic support efforts within the Friends of Yemen, and in managing the conflict through what was called the Quartet committee³². Furthermore, Yemen was used by the Americans as a card in negotiations with Iran over its nuclear file (Al-Khaleej Online, June 29,

³² It is a committee that includes the USA, Britain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Concerned with managing the Yemeni conflict after 2015.

2022). The West also used it to blackmail the countries of the coalition through the humanitarian file, human rights violations, or war crimes committed in Yemen. So, Qatar's foreign policy towards Yemen had to take into account the following international determinants:

a) United States of America

Since the second Gulf War, Qatar's relationship with the US has grown and expanded to include the political, economic, military, and security fields. Furthermore, the international issues like energy, the war on terrorism, fighting international crime, and protecting regional security, Qatar hosts the Al Udeid base on April 2003, the largest US airbase in the Arabian Gulf (Blanchard and Sharp, 2014:14).

Regarding the conflict in Yemen, the policy of the US was compatible with the policies of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It begins with its policy towards the revolution, the Gulf Initiative, and the empowerment of the Houthi group to the point of overthrowing the capital, Sana'a, through armed action without condemnation from the countries sponsoring the Gulf Initiative. Also, Washington did not reject the declaration of the coalition that expelled Qatar from participating in it, and it did not express any position against the countries blockading Qatar in 2017.

A former US State Department official says that Washington's position on the crisis with Qatar can be summed up in two main points. The first is that no military steps were taken or force was used by the crisis's parties. The second is that none of the blockade measures or airspace closures affected the freedom of movement of US military aircraft at Al-Udeid base, whether in its operations heading toward Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan. The US President, Donald Trump, had adopted the Saudi-Emirati position through his tweets after returning from the Riyadh conference, in one of which he said: "During my recent trip to the Middle East, I stated that there can no longer be funding of radical ideology. Leaders pointed to Qatar" (Vitali, Williams and Nichols, 2017:1).

Qatar has realized that the US policy in the Yemeni issue is mainly in harmony, for political, military, security, and economic considerations, with the policies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Also, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in light of the global system dominated by Washington, cannot cross the red lines or deviate from US policy in the region, irrespective of what their economic impact is on the international scene.

Therefore, Qatar has sought to present different approaches toward the conflict in Yemen based on the concept of soft power theory and to attract others and convince them of its vision. It realizes that the US is one of the main actors in the current scene in Yemen and the region, especially since it has remained a major supporter of the Saudi-led Coalition, politically, militarily, intelligence, and logistically (Robbins, Shah and Dalton, March 23, 2018).

However, Qatar is taking advantage of soft power tools and the concepts of rights, freedoms, and democracy in the policies of the US, in addition to adhering to the principles of international law and global peace, to find an appropriate way for its presence in Yemen by calling for an end to the war and a political solution to the conflict. Also, Qatar, through Al-Jazeera's large audience, can direct Arab and international public opinion and highlight the mistakes, crimes, and violations of the Arab Coalition in Yemen. Qatar also could employ the voices calling for ending the war and prosecuting human rights violators within the US by putting pressure on the parties to the conflict to abide by international law, international treaties, the Charter of Human Rights, and the Charter of the United Nations. Overall, the presence of US policy in the Yemeni scene has greatly limited Qatar's foreign policy toward the conflict in Yemen through the bias of its policy towards other countries of the region.

b) United Kingdom

The United Kingdom's significant influence on many regional issues stems from a various historical and political factors. Notably, most of the Gulf countries were under British colonization in a previous era and still maintain its military presence in the region, as well as its political influence through the ruling families. Moreover, it colonized the southern part of Yemen for nearly 128 years, 1839-1967 (Gavin, 1975). So, it considers Yemen as part of its historical colonies and deals with it in that perspective.

Britain demonstrably played a significant role in shaping Yemen's political landscape throughout the 2011 revolution and its aftermath. Notably, Britain voiced its support for the Gulf Initiative, acting as a key sponsor and actively participating within the Quartet Committee. This involvement extended to supporting the National Dialogue

Conference (NDC) and the provision of logistical support to the Arab Coalition and its military operations, including Operation Decisive Storm.

Britain has multiple economic partnerships with Qatar. "The State of Qatar is one of the largest non-European investors in the UK, with direct investments by Qatar in the UK amounting to around 43 billion US dollars. The UK is one of the first major destinations for Qatari investment." (News beezzer, June 22, 2022:3). While Britain maintains the presence of military bases in other Gulf countries, it still provides the government of Qatar with weapons, equipment, and military and security apparatus. It provides members of Qatar's army and police with rehabilitation, training, and military and security expertise.

Despite the appeal of the European Parliament to impose a ban on all parties to the conflict in Yemen and parties to the external war to prevent their use in Yemen, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, regarding the sale, export, and supply of arms to Yemen (Reuters, Feb. 25, 2016), and to impose sanctions on individuals responsible for human rights violations in Yemen, Britain still did not comply with this. As reports indicated that the value of armament contracts and military equipment provided by Britain to Saudi Arabia amounted to 3.3 billion pounds sterling since March 2015, according to Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the European Union (Sahli, 2020).

Britain has been a major and active player in Yemen, since the February 11 revolution, along with the US, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Qatar takes this into account because it strengthens the roles of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and any other countries that are against Qatar in Yemen. The difference is that Britain, like the USA, values the concepts of rights, freedoms, and democracy in its policies and the principles of international law, global peace, and international security, which allows Qatar to maneuver toward the Yemeni crisis by using its soft power tools and trying to show respect for rights, freedoms and the principles of international law.

CHAPTER IV

QATAR'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE FEBRUARY 11 REVOLUTION AND BEYOND

4.1. Introduction

There is an old historical relationship between Qatar and Yemen, "the relations between Qatar and Yemen began in the mid-seventies of the last century. It improved significantly after the support of Qatar for Yemen in the UN Security Council, the League of Arab States, and the GCC during the political crisis in Yemen in the summer of 1994" (Alrantisi, 2014:109) *.

Throughout the 1990s, Qatar's engagement with Yemen primarily consisted of financial assistance. However, with the outbreak of confrontations between the Yemeni government and the Houthi group in mid-2004, Qatar emerged as a key mediator aiming to achieve conflict resolution and reconciliation. This proactive stance materialized in June 2006 with the official declaration of Qatari mediation efforts between the opposing parties. Despite ongoing confrontations, Qatar persevered in its mediation efforts, culminating in a reconciliation agreement between the warring parties in June 2007. As a result, the leader of the Houthis, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, declared the end to the rebellion and a ceasefire with the Yemeni army, acknowledging the success of Qatari mediation (Montgomery, 2021).

Furthermore, on February 2, 2008, the Yemeni government and the Houthi group signed a document in Doha containing the procedures for implementing the reconciliation agreement, which the two parties reached last year via Qatar's mediation between both sides (International Crisis Group, 2009), after Qatar pledged to rebuild Saada and compensate those affected in the confrontations. Qatar's efforts continued to be present in the Saada war file until 2011. The February 11, 2011 revolution prompted Qatar to reassess its policy in its dealings with all Yemeni parties, taking into account the popular revolutions that swept the region in early 2011, intending to strengthen its regional influence.

* The citation is translated from Arabic by the researcher

In this chapter, this thesis will discuss the position of the Qatar government on the February 11 revolution, the Gulf Initiative, the transitional period, the NDC, and the fall of Sana'a and the Houthi-Saleh coalition's coup against legitimacy.

4.2. The position of the Government of Qatar on the February 11 Revolution

Qatar played a crucial role in the Arab Spring revolutions. Al-Jazeera channel actively dealt with these revolutions, and its media coverage of the events represented a huge excitement in the public awareness of the Arab people. It closely accompanied the events of the revolution in Arab's spring countries like Yemen. By supporting the slogans of change like *Irhal* [go out] that they were repeating, and giving wide spaces in the media coverage for youth activists. It also presented sophisticated political and media programs, such as *Direction Opposite*, which created great controversy in the Arab community (Ayish, 2019).

The leadership of Qatar, represented at that time by Shiekh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, wanted Al-Jazeera to have an influential regional and international media voice by giving Qatar a great presence in the political, cultural, and societal scene in the region. Qatar also wanted Al-Jazeera channel, one of the Qatari soft power tools, to be an expression of the new Qatari policy adopted by Shiekh Hamad after he came into power in 1995. That is why "the Qatari response to the Arab Spring represented the continuation of deeper policy trends that predated 2011, such as the delicate balancing of divergent forces that had formed a hallmark of Qatar's foreign policy." (Ulrichsen, 2014:8).

With the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions in several Arab countries including Yemen, the geographical location of Yemen and its relation to the security of the Arab Gulf states were highly sensitive unlike other countries, Yemen is a geostrategic and political area of influence in Saudi Arabia. From an early age, Saudi Arabia maintained its keen interest in the internal affairs of Yemen to prevent the emergence of a strong competitor in the Arabian Peninsula and to ensure the survival of its influence in the region (Mirza, Abbas and Qaisrani, 2021). The Special Office for Yemen Affairs, headed by Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1928-2011), was formed to obtain loyalty from several Yemeni political, military, social, and cultural figures. Over the five decades (1962-2011), this office exercised a wide influence on the Yemeni arena, which was characterized by confidentiality and informal personal contact. The Saudi stipends that reached the main political,

military, and cultural elites in Yemen have not been institutionalized (Stenslie, 2013).

Saudi Arabia's influence in Yemen has limited Qatar's ability to formulate and implement policies that differ significantly from those of Riyadh. However, Yemen represented a special situation for Qatari policy, as Yemen. With its location and characteristics, if Qatar could influence over Yemen, that will grant Qatar substantial regional status in the Arabian Peninsula and the region. The February 11, 2011 revolution in Yemen represented an appropriate opportunity for that, so Qatar sought to attend and provide support to the revolution and revolutionaries at all levels. Qatar dealt with the popular Arab protests in a different form unlike other Arab countries. Qatar supported the revolution politically, through media support, and financially without reservations to confirm its regional influence, including the February 11 revolution in Yemen (Shurrab, 2014: 141).

The Qatari government strengthened its relationships with several Yemeni political parties, such as Islah party and General people's Congress party. In addition to hosting many conferences, programs, cultural, intellectual, and dialogue activities that were directed towards the Islamic and liberal actors in the Arab world, including Yemen (Ibid:157). Qatar also assumed the periodic presidency of the Arab League in 2011 and was aligned with the forces of change and the youth of the revolution in Yemen. This was confirmed by the declaration of the Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, on April 7, 2011, that "the GCC would strike a deal for Saleh to leave" (Sudam and Ghobari, April 10, 2011:2). After this declaration, Sana'a summoned its ambassador to Doha for consultations (Trend news agency, April 9, 2011).

Qatar was initially keen on a smooth and consensual political transition between the government and the opposition. The mediation at the beginning of the popular revolution in Yemen between the opposition and President Saleh was active, but it was not accepted by Saleh and faced an explicit and declared rejection. So, Qatar supported the Yemeni opposition with financial, media, and logistics (Jargon, 2014). The Foreign Minister of Qatar was the first international party to call on President Saleh to step down from power. Demonstrations also took place through the Yemeni community in Doha, calling for Saleh to step down from power, although the momentum of popular protests against him in Yemen was still weak at the time.

Despite the Saudi influence over Yemen, the government of Qatar bets on two parties in the Yemeni issue. Firstly, it aligns with the revolutionary change forces, comprising political parties, cultural figures, and intellectual elites. Meanwhile, Qatar has been a good observer of the changing public mood in the Arab street and has been in line with their demands. Secondly, is the forces opposing Saudi Arabia, who are harmed by its policy, such as the Houthis, the Southern Movement, and some parties and intellectual currents that have ideological hostility toward Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia bets on Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime and the traditional social and military forces loyal to it, including tribals, especially in the north. This is what made Saudi Arabia, in the view of Yemeni Street, a supporter of Ali Abdullah Saleh and all that his regime means in terms of tyranny, corruption, and injustice.

Accordingly, the popular revolution in Yemen in 2011 represented an area of hidden political competition between Saudi Arabia and Qatar at the regional level, which later transformed into a political conflict, as this thesis will discuss later.

4.3. The Position of The Government of Qatar on The Gulf Initiative

As a result of the February 11 revolution's inability to achieve its revolutionary goals, in light of President Ali Abdullah Saleh's hang-on power, and his confrontation of the protest arenas with violence and weapons through the security and military forces, the Yemeni street split into two camps, either loyal to Saleh's regime or against it. Yemen is threatened with a comprehensive state of explosion, especially in light of the continuing armed rebellion in the north and a popular movement calling for secession in the south. This is what prompted the GCC countries and the international community to pay attention and intervene in Yemeni affairs to preserve regional and international peace and security, given the strategic importance that Yemen's location represents at the regional and international levels.

Thus, the GCC countries began their contact with all Yemeni political parties to reach appropriate, feasible, and peaceful solutions. With the fulfillment of the revolutionaries' demands for change and talking about Saudi-Qatari initiatives and mediation endeavors, it seemed that gradually the GCC countries were moving towards putting forward a common initiative in this regard, later known as the Gulf Initiative.

The Gulf Initiative, in its first draft, was a Qatari proposal, but several modifications were made on it, prompting Qatar to assert the independence of its decision and position from the GCC countries, which began to tend towards neutralizing the revolution and revolutionaries. In addition, the Qatari prime minister protested at the second extraordinary meeting for foreign ministers of the GCC, held on April 10, 2011, to amend the provisions of the first version of the Gulf Initiative. President Saleh rejected the Gulf Initiative in its first form and Qatar's interference in the internal affairs of his country. On April 8, 2011, in front of large crowds of his supporters in Al Sabaeen Square, Saleh said, " We don't get our legitimacy from Qatar or anyone else ... We reject this belligerent intervention," referring to the Qatari Foreign Minister's talk about an initiative to step down from power (Sudam and Ghobari, April 10, 2011:2).

The Yemeni President Saleh accused Qatar, in an interview with the Russia Today, of plotting against Yemen and funding chaos there, Saleh said that "contacts are under way for the signing of the agreement on Monday in Riyadh, but we have reservations about some mediators involved in a conspiracy" (Imaduddin, May 1, 2011). Thus, the GCC countries announced, in a statement on May 1, 2011, their rejection of Saleh's statements, which accused Qatar of conspiracy, and stressed that the Gulf initiative to resolve the Yemeni crisis represented the "joint will of GCC states" (Ibid, 2011:1). The GCC countries expressed regret over the statements issued by the Yemeni side, which included an insult to Qatar, which made efforts with other Council states to reach a comprehensive consensus that preserves stability and unity (Ibid).

Later, as a result of Saleh's intransigence and the deaths of several people as a result of his security forces' confrontation with the demonstrators and revolutionaries. Qatar announced its withdrawal from the Gulf Initiative (2011). An official source announced in Qatar's Foreign Ministry that the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, informed the Secretary-General of the GCC, Abdul Latif Al-Zayani, of Qatar's decision to withdraw from the Gulf Initiative (Ghobari and Al-Mahdy, May 12, 2011). Qatar made this decision "because of the procrastination and delay in signing the agreement proposed in the initiative" (Ibid), with the continuing state of tension, renewed confrontations, and loss of wisdom, which contradicts the spirit of a

purposeful initiative to resolve the crisis in Yemen as soon as possible (Ibid). Qatar considered what happened in Yemen in February 2011 as a popular revolution, while the rest of the GCC countries considered it a political crisis between the former president and the opposition. For this reason, Qatar's approach was different from the solution of the rest GCC countries, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The first draft of the initiative, announced by Qatar, was based on its principles of step down from power and not on a political settlement with Saleh that would restore his position and power. This prompted President Saleh to focus his attack on Qatar State, as if it was the initiative owner (Imaduddin, 2011), although it represented a collective Gulf position to resolve the Yemeni crisis. After Saleh left the power, he held Qatar responsible for the sabotage and chaos that occurred in Yemen and held it responsible for the future repercussions of the situation because it interfered with Yemeni affairs (Ibid).

Qatar's role towards the revolution in Yemen declined in favor of the Saudi role, although it remained influential through the back gates of events. Qatar has faced difficulties in strengthening its existence in the Yemeni scene as a result of the presence of the GCC as a collective umbrella for joint action, and as a result of Saudi Arabia's dominance of the Yemeni arena and its influential relations with all parties and actors in the Yemeni reality, and not abandoning its dominant role in the Yemeni issue (Alrantisi, 2014).

After Qatar has withdrawn from the Gulf Initiative, Saudi Arabia and the UAE became leaders in directing the initiative and pressuring parties to sign, supported by the US, Britain, and the European Union. Abdal-Malik al-Mikhlaifi, the former foreign minister, states in his article in *Almasdar Online* that Gulf mediators and their American partners, after handing over the text of the third initiative in the form of a draft agreement for signature, informed the opposition that there was no amendment to the text, and they should accept it as it is, despite the many remarks, ambiguity, and weak drafting. The opposition was pressured to accept its mistakes and refuse to amend the agreement to include any clarifications or interpretations (Al-Mikhlaifi, 2011). Thus, the Gulf Initiative reached its fourth draft, which Al-Mikhlaifi considered "a trap".

Qatar maintained contact with the Yemeni revolutionary parties of various orientations. And Al-Jazeera channel showed enough interest to follow up and broadcast the developments of the revolutionary scene, the paths of the Gulf efforts to sign the initiative, and the position of the various Yemeni parties towards initiative, especially the revolutionary forces and those demanding change, through news, reports, and talk shows. Al-Jazeera was considered as a global media platform for revolutionaries to convey their voices and demands for change to the world and the international community. The other programs focused on revolutionary awareness that met the needs of the community at the regional level, whether in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, or Yemen.

Despite Qatar's position rejecting the Gulf Initiative in its last draft, the parties that Qatar sought to support its policy were divided against that initiative, as the Islah party and the forces of tribal and military pro-revolution responded to the initiative, unlike the Houthi group, the Southern Movement, and some revolutionary forces, rejected the initiative and warned of its negative effects. However, the rejection did not succeed. As some regional and international power like United States of America, the European Union, and other Gulf countries exerted great pressure on the Yemeni parties, in authority and opposition, to sign the initiative to avoid armed conflict (OFAC, 2016). The US administration imposed sanctions on individuals and parties that obstructed the process of implementing the Gulf Initiative between the Yemeni government and the opposition and threatened regional and international peace and security in Yemen (Executive Order No. 13611, 2012).

The Yemeni political parties, opposition and ruling party, signed the Gulf Initiative, and the ten sponsors of the Gulf Initiative were established, including the USA, UK, Russia, China, France, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait, except Qatar, which withdrew from the initiative. The transitional phase stipulated by the Gulf Initiative began. Indeed, Saleh submitted his resignation to the parliament council, and Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, the Vice President, took his place. Presidential elections were held with one candidate, and a government of national unity was formed equally between the General People's Congress party and the opposition parties, headed by Muhammad Salem Basindwa.

The relationship between Sana'a and Riyadh had deteriorated as a result of Saudi Arabia's failure to fulfill a large portion of its financial obligations, which it had

previously pledged to provide Yemen, with signing the Gulf Initiative and its implementation mechanism. Its postponement of the donors' conference, that was scheduled to be held in Riyadh, during July 2012 and its reservations about hosting the US for the conference, stopping the oil aid that King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz had previously provided to Yemen during Saleh's era and the post-signing of the Gulf Initiative, as well as the Saudi Embassy in Sana'a stopped its activities and work, especially those related to Hajj and Umrah affairs.

President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi visited Doha on August 2, 2012, accompanied by a high-level delegation. In a clear message of the new leadership's openness to regional parties in general, in looking for the interests of Yemen, in light of Saudi Arabia's continued backing out from its commitments (Al-Lswas, 2012). This visit was followed by another visit to Qatar on October 23, 2012, by the Prime Minister of the Government Of National Accord (GNA), Muhammad Salem Basindwa accompanied by Major General Ali Mohsen Saleh Alahmar, commander of the Northwest Region, where they met the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, and conveyed a written message from President Hadi, related to bilateral relations between both countries.

4.4. The Position of The Qatari Government on The Transitional Period and The National Dialogue Conference


On November 23, 2011, the Yemeni parties signed the Gulf Initiative and its implementation mechanism in the Saudi capital, Riyadh (Al Arabiya News. Nov. 23, 2011), which states the transfer of power in Yemen, in the presence of the King of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, and the Secretary General of the GCC. The agreement was signed by the Emirati Foreign Minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, whose country was heading the GCC session at the time.

The implementation mechanism stipulated that the transitional phase would consist of two stages (Text of Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism). The first stage begins with the start of this mechanism's enforcement and ends with the inauguration day of the president after holding the early presidential elections. The second stage begins with the inauguration day of the president. After the early presidential elections, and ends with the holding of the general elections, according to the new constitution, and the inauguration of the new President of the Republic (Ibid).

The implementation mechanism also stipulated the mechanism of decision-making and the formation of the GNA, headed by a person nominated by the opposition, equally between the two parties, and the progress of the work of the GNA. It was implemented by taking the necessary steps to ensure the end of all types of violence and violations of humanitarian law (Text of Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism). Moreover, the disengagement between armed forces and other armed groups, in addition to ensuring freedom of transfer, protecting civilians, and other necessary procedures to achieve security and stability, was taken into consideration. Furthermore, all parties of conflict should facilitate and secure the arrival of humanitarian aid wherever it is needed, in addition to the formation of the Military Affairs Committee, and the achievement of security and stability (Ibid) by sponsoring a NDC in involving the youth to decide the future of political life.

Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi was inaugurated as president of Yemen on February 25, 2012. After the presidential election that was held on February 21, with one candidate, as stipulated in the implementation mechanism. The transitional phase was supposed to end on February 24, 2014, exactly two years after his inauguration, but this did not happen for several reasons. During this period, Hadi held the powers of the President of the Republic, while Muhammad Salem Besndawah assumed the leadership of the government of Yemen on November 28, 2011, until September 21, 2014. Then Besndawah submitted his resignation as a result of the storming of Sana'a by the Houthi group.

During this period (2011-2014), Yemen faced several challenges: political, military, security, and economic, even though. There appeared to be concerted efforts to impede democratic change, disrupt the peaceful transition, and thwart the GNA in front of public opinion, (Middle East Report N°. 125, 2012). The disputes emerged between the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister on the one hand, and between Saleh, who pushed his party to clash with Hadi's decisions and obstruct them, on the other hand.



Map 4.1: Map Of Yemen, Showing The Division of Areas According to Control

Source: Anadolu Agency website

Additionally, during this period, the expansion of the armed Houthi group was happening in the north, the imposing of its control over the governorate of Saada in early April 2011. Moreover, the concerns raised over the proliferation of weapons, which came from Iran and others through various ports. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda emerged in the south, extending its control over the province of Abyan on May 2011, and its announcement of the establishment of an Islamic emirate called Ansar al-Sharia. Furthermore, the Southern Movement upraised its demands for independence, disengagement, and a return to the pre 1990 conditions, imposing demands in exchange for any calls for calm and retreat. The crisis of 2011 also resulted in the collapse of the currency, the disruption of the development movement due to security chaos, the breakdown of service projects, the inflation of the state's functional apparatus, and other effects that resulted from the 2011 crisis.

Despite the progress of the transitional process including the NDC, and the continued performance of the GNA, in light of the challenges the GNA faced, this period witnessed a new regional change that had repercussions on Yemen and the region. Notably, the Egypt's elected authorities were overthrown by Egypt's military, marking the emergence what's called counter-revolutions. The state of counter-revolutions, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, imposed a kind of polarization and competition between them and other countries that supported the demands for change, freedoms, and aspirations of the people, such as Türkiye and Qatar. Yemen was the victim of such clashes.

During this period (2011-2014), Qatar relied on soft power tools by supporting humanitarian projects through its various institutions, including the Qatar Charity Association, which signed three agreements with Yemeni hospitals to carry out three thousand heart operations for Yemeni patients. Within the framework of the association's expansion of the permanent heart program, which it adopted in Yemen due to the increase in cases of heart patients in the country (Al-Fahidi, 2014).

In addition to the construction of the specialized children's hospital for orphans in Sana'a, which cost 73 million Qatari Riyals [approximately 19 million US dollars] (Al-Sharq, Sep. 17, 2014), the medical eye camp in the Ministry of Defense hospital was also initiated. Moreover, the charitable endowment project for Qur'anic projects, for 20 million Qatari riyals [approximately 5 million US dollars], and the Al-Rayahin Compound for Orphans in Hodeidah, which benefits about 500 orphan children in the field of care and rehabilitation, were established (Al-Sharq, Jan 25, 2014). Other endeavors, included; the dialysis center, the vocational training center in the city of Bajil, and the Doha Institute for Vocational and Educational Rehabilitation. The collective costs of these projects amounted to more than 81 million Qatari riyals [approximately 20 million US dollars] during the years 2012–2013 (Ibid). This increase is attributable to the establishment of a field office that directly supervises its implementation.

Qatar proceeded to sign an additional protocol to the agreement to bring Yemeni workers to Qatar to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries. This protocol aimed to activate the existing agreement that was signed in Sana'a in 2000. Both parties stressed the importance of completing the legal procedures for ratifying the protocol and accelerating its actual implementation to alleviate the economic

crisis that Yemen is going through, especially after some countries such as Saudi Arabia took measures to restrict Yemeni workers during the same period (Almasdaronline, Jan. 30, 2014).

The Qatari mission, headed by the Director of the Qatari Prime Minister's Office for Investment Affairs, Mansour Al-Mahmoud, visited Yemen on November 20, 2012, to follow up on the resumption of work on Qatari investment projects, that were suspended as a result of the events of war. The delegation aimed to start immediately the committed investment projects in the field of infrastructure and Yemeni ports. The Qatari mission was agreed to negotiate to develop a plan to resume work on the real estate investment project Tilal Al Rayan, given the project's importance and quality as an investment and the fact that it provides temporary and permanent job opportunities for more than 4,000 workers (Arqaam, Nov. 2, 2009).

soft power tools, which include media, humanitarian aid and charitable work, economic support, and the promotion of investment aspects, were what Qatar relied on at that time to loosen the stranglehold that was imposed on Yemen by crisis, also by strengthening its relations with political parties and all actors to increase its influence in Yemen and find a foothold in the region. In addition, Qatar has remained supportive of the forces of change, such as the Islah party, without meaning to break with the other parties in the political scene of Yemen.

Qatar has preserved its relations with the Houthi group because it represents an emerging force and has been present on the Yemeni scene since 2004. It seeks to influence and build alliances and partnerships with regional and international parties. The Houthi group stormed the capital, Sana'a, on September 21, 2014, in an armed and violent manner to attack the forces of the revolution, in light of the Houthi coordination with Arab and foreign embassies ³³.

³³ Retired Saudi Major General Anwar Eshki, close to the ruling family, head of the Al-Sharq Center for Strategic Studies, in TV interviews on the Arabic RT channel, on April 22, 2015, and the ALHiwar [dialogue] channel on August 16, 2016. Eshki said: that the USA and a Gulf state were the main supporters of the Houthi group for the overthrow of the Yemeni capital Sana'a in 2014, with the aim of 'hitting the terrorism or a certain category' in Yemen and they did not do that after they took the huge sums of money, available at the link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EJ_nOtXRTLk

During the transitional period, some countries of the region worked to support the Houthi group such as UAE and employ it as a spearhead in the counter-revolution according to the declaration of Yasser Al-Yamani, an official in the General People's Congress (Sputnik Arabic, Sep. 10, 2018), and the Islah party was a target for several parties, local, regional, and international. This was cleared by the events of the September, 2014, when it mainly targeted the headquarters of the Islah party and the revolutionary, social, and military forces allied with it. Qatar's ability to intervene and stop the overthrow of Sana'a was too weak, despite all the support that was provided for the survival of the revolutionary momentum and the forces of change. Sana'a was overthrown in light of Gulf, Arab, and international silence, within hours of the day, as Yemen entered a new shift of events.

4.5. The Position of Qatar's Government Towards the Fall of Sana'a and The Coup of The Houthi-Saleh Coalition on Legitimacy

The conflicts between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have evolved due to the events of the Arab Spring and Qatar's support for the revolutionary and Muslim forces demanding change. This tension intensified after Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad came to power on June 25, 2013. At the same time, the Egyptian army succeeded in overthrowing the elected government in Egypt and deposed Muhammad Morsi on July 3, 2013, led by General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, launched an organized and fierce campaign to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood, in Egypt and the region. The Qatari support for the Brotherhood came under intense scrutiny in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi (Ulrichsen, 2014:4).

The Muslim Brotherhood was officially classified on the list of terrorist organizations by Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Al-Jazeera, Nov. 16, 2014). Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the State of Bahrain increased the pressures on Qatar. Moreover, they summoned its ambassadors from Doha earlier, in March 2014, in an unprecedented step. They accused Doha of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. "The three states fell out in part over Qatar's alleged support of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar says it backs all Arabs, not just Brotherhood members" (Ibid:2).

The Houthi group began its offensive advance on Sana'a from the city of Amran, located north of Yemen, by seizing the 310 Armored Brigade on July 8, 2014,

following bloody confrontations with the group's gunmen. The clashes resulted in the death of more than 250 soldiers and officers, most notably the camp commander, Brigadier General Hamid Al-Qushaibi. Under the neutrality of the minister of defense at the time, Major General Mohammed Nasser Ahmed, after the fall of Amran, travelled to the UAE. President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi also headed to Saudi Arabia. Hadi also stated, during his visit to Amran after the Houthi group controlled it, that Amran has returned to state control (Reuters , Jul. 23, 2014).

Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia accused Qatar of supporting both; Houthi Group and Muslim Brotherhood (El Yaakoubi, 2017), exploiting Qatar's role as a mediator between the Houthi group and the Yemeni government in previous wars as a pretext for this accusation. Therefore, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar. In protest at what they described as Qatar's non-commitment to back "anyone threatening the security and stability of the GCC whether as groups or individuals - via direct security work or through political influence, and not to support hostile media", according to the joint statement issued by UAE and Saudi Arabia (BBC, March 5, 2014).

The Houthi group was able to take control of Sana'a and disrupt the political process, despite the signing by all Yemeni political forces and parties of the peace and partnership document to stop the armed action. Iran emerged as a player on the Yemeni scene (Middle East Monitor, 2014), as the Houthi began to strengthen relations and communication with Tehran in a way that Saudi Arabia considered as a threat to its security. This prompted Saudi Arabia to move with some GCC Countries in the United Nations for the Security Council to impose sanctions on leaders of the Houthi group because of obstructing the path of peace in Yemen.

The Houthi group invaded Sana'a without Gulf or Western condemnation, and the armed group headed to take down government institutions and headquarters, one after another, within hours. Al-Jazeera channel was keeping abreast of the event, reporting facts live, and taking the opinions of analysts, activists, and politicians. Al-Jazeera sought to uncover the clues of the conspiracy, which led to the fall of Amran city and Sana'a, through presenting programs dealing with recordings and leaked documents of Yemeni figures belonging to the; General People's Congress GPC, the Houthi group, tribal sheiks, and military and security leaders.

The wave of counter-revolutions was stronger than Qatar's ability to confront it. Especially the changes that followed the revolutions aroused the anger of European countries, Russia, and China as well, fearing the rise of Islamist movements. Weeks after the removal of Mohamed Morsi, the elected Troika government in Tunisia was overthrown, and months later the Tunisian political arena was dominated by the Nidaa Tunisia party. In Syria, the opposition lost its positions one by one. The forces of the dissident General, Khalifa Haftar, controlled a large area of the geography and politics of Libya. It became clear that there was an international power working against all these changes simultaneously. Therefore, Qatar was unable to move after its presence shrank, and it became threatened in its own ruling system. So it was quite natural that it was absent from the Yemeni political scene during the period from 2013 to 2015. Although it still remains present in some aspects, such as financial support for education. Qatar also released the Swiss hostage, "Sylvia Abrahat", who was working in the teaching profession in Yemen and was kidnapped in 2012 in Hodeidah city by tribal gunmen and handed her over to gunmen of the Al-Qaeda for a financial ransom of about 50 thousand US dollars (Al-Jazeera, Feb. 28, 2013).

Qatar's position towards the Houthi group's coup against the legitimate authority and the government of Mohammed Salem Basindwa can be summarized by exploring the following points: Firstly, Qatar supported the revolutions to enable the peoples to exercise their choices and express their will and contributed to supporting the democratic path in Yemen. Secondly, through its diplomatic efforts in mediation, Qatar has sought to stop conflicts and wars in several Arab countries, including Yemen, believing in the need for security and peace to achieve justice and development in the region. Thirdly, Qatar strengthened its relations with the living popular forces in Yemen, either nationalist, Islamic, or civil components, and it was a meeting point for these parties amid the conflicts. Its media network Al-Jazeera allowed everyone to express his thoughts, opinions, and positions. Fourth, Qatar's policy has followed a conciliatory approach among the political parties and provided its political and economic support to address the conflict in Yemen. Fifth, Qatar encouraged all Yemeni parties to respect international laws, United Nations charters, and the Charter of Human Rights and committed to following it in its foreign policy. "The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as a leading counter-revolutionary

force in the Middle East" (Bakir, 2020:157), also "On June 3, 2013, the UAE and Saudi Arabia backed a military coup in Cairo that toppled Egypt's first democratically elected president in the country's history, Mohamed Morsi" (Ibid:158). Therefore, Qatar stands in contrast to these trends that reject peaceful solutions, popular revolutions, and the democratic process.

Therefore, in light of the above, Qatar was rejecting what was done by the Houthi group on September 21, 2014, an armed storming of the capital Sana'a, the overthrow of the GNA, headed by Basindwa, and the elimination of the path of democratic transition in Yemen, although no statement has been made in this regard for unclear reasons until now. This is in line with its foreign policy and positions, as the coup represents a setback to the revolution that Qatar has been supporting as recently mentioned.

The joining of the government of Qatar to the Arab coalition to restore legitimacy and eliminate the coup in Yemen was a clear indication of Qatar's rejection of the coup, as well as not being involved in supporting it. Qatar's policy within the framework of the Arab coalition rejecting the creation of a parallel coup in Aden against the legitimacy of President Hadi is another indication of Qatar's rejecting this chaotic behavior in Yemen.

The accusation of Qatar supporting the Houthi group and the Muslim Brotherhood does not match the fact that the Houthi group targeted, during its storming of Sana'a, the Muslim Brotherhood represented by the Islah Party. It specifically targeted the house of Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein Al-Ahmar, who is the former chairman of the Islah Party, along with the headquarters of the First Armored Division led by Major General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, who supported the February 11 revolution, and the headquarters of Al-Iman university, affiliated with the Islahi leader, Sheikh Abdul Majid Al-Zandani. Qatar can't weaken its allies and bring them into an internal conflict as long as it benefits from their presence.

4.6. Qatar's Foreign Policy towards the military intervention and the deviation of the path of the war in Yemen

4.6.1. Introduction

After King Salman came into power in 2015, Qatar-Saudi relations have developed significantly, and Qatar has actively participated in the Arab coalition in Yemen against the Houthi group and the military forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

However, Qatar's participation in the Arab coalition did not last long, as there has been a deviation in the path of the military intervention and the goals announced at the beginning of military operations have not been achieved, namely the restoration of Yemeni legitimacy. Instead of supporting the legitimate authority, some parties in the coalition, specifically the UAE, tended to support political and military components outside the legitimate authority such as the STC (Heimbach, 2021:1-2), and worked hard to undermine the authority of the Yemeni President, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi.

After Qatar's expulsion from the Saudi-led Arab coalition in Yemen, accompanied by the withdrawal of ambassadors from several GCC countries and Egypt (Abdullah, 2014:2), Qatar faced a harsh blockade leading to the emergence of the 'Gulf-Qatar crisis.' This context prompted a significant shift in Qatar's foreign policy towards the Yemeni conflict. So, it is worth investigating Qatar's position on the Arab coalition and its role in the war in Yemen.

This chapter tends to analyze Qatar's foreign policy towards the military intervention of the Arab coalition and the deviation from the path of the war in Yemen. It will be divided into two sections. The first section, deals with Qatar's role on the formation of the Arab Coalition to restore the legitimacy in Yemen and the extent of its participation. The second section addresses Qatar's position on the deviation that occurred in the path of the military intervention of the Arab coalition in Yemen.

4.6.2. The Military Intervention of the Arab Coalition in Yemen

Saudi Arabia has a wide influence in Yemen, especially in the north, which has remained under indirect Saudi influence since the late sixties of the last century. Saudi policy relied on peaceful tools to achieve its goals in Yemen; with the

exception of the direct military intervention on March 26, 2015, through the formation of an international coalition.

The military intervention in Yemen occurred amidst significant Yemeni and regional developments. As the Iranian influence in the region has increased and Tehran has been able to extend its influence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria this influence threatens the security and political interests of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. This threat has increased after the American withdrawal from the region and the exposure of Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries security in front of the Iranian expansion politically and militarily.

In Yemen, the Houthi group managed to expand militarily and control Yemeni areas consecutively. This expansion occurred at the expense of the Yemeni forces allied with Saudi Arabia, including the influential military commander General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar and the Al-Ahmar family, known for their traditional tribal influence in Yemen. Thus, this situation represented a serious threat to Saudi Arabia's security and strategic interests. These developments led to the fall of the fourth Arab capital in the hand of Iran, as Ali Reza Zakani, a confidant Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei, stated: "Three Arab capitals have today ended up in the hands of Iran and belong to the Islamic Iranian revolution." Also, "He noted that Sana'a has now become the fourth Arab capital that is on its way to joining the Iranian revolution" (Middle East Monitor, 2014:1).

The rapid developments in the Yemen issue prompted the Saudi decision-maker to go beyond traditional tools in dealing with the situation and developments in Yemen and adopt military tools to deal with it. Saudi Arabia's unannounced steps have accelerated to form a Saudi-led Arab military alliance. Saudi Arabia called the military intervention the "Decisive Storm" in reference to the decisive intervention decision adopted by the new Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz. This was accompanied by extensive political efforts led by Saudi Arabia to confront Iranian impact in the region and in regional and international organizations. But Saudi Arabia quickly announced the end of the Decisive Storm and that it had achieved many of its military goals and moved to a new stage called "Restoring Hope". Thus, Riyadh has announced that the military coalition in Yemen, seeks to restore legitimacy, end the coup, and prevent the Houthis from controlling the country.

4.6.2.1. Qatar's Position on The Formation of The Arab Coalition and Participation in The Decisive Storm

Qatar hastened to support and join the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia in response to the successive developments in Yemen, including the advance of the Houthi group and the army forces loyal to the former president Saleh headed to Aden, along with their aviation strikes on the presidential palace. The military intervention of the coalition countries came after President Hadi left via Oman to the capital of Saudi Arabia (Al-Jazeera, Mar. 26, 2015). This section aims to study Qatar's role on the coalition and military intervention and the forms of its participation.

a) Qatar's Position on The Arab Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen

After the Houthis coup against the legitimate authority in Yemen and take the control of state institutions by force of arms, tensions escalated between the Houthis group and President Hadi to the point that they imposed house arrest on him. When President Hadi managed to escape to the city of Aden in southern Yemen, the Houthi group, bolstered by forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh headed towards Aden, then President Hadi was forced to flee towards the Sultanate of Oman. Hadi then requested military intervention from the GCC (SCR 2216).

Qatar provided the support to the coalition in terms of military, logistics, and intelligence, against the Houthis armed rebellion (Abdullah, 2015). The coalition launched its military operations by controlling the Yemeni airspace, and striking anti-missile batteries, with Saudi Arabia declaring the Yemeni airspace a military zone (Ibid:2).

With the launch of the military operation (2015), a statement from the GCC countries explained that the Houthi group supported by some regional powers aim to establish their dominance over Yemen. Thus, making the threat not only to the security, stability, and sovereignty of Yemen, but has become a comprehensive threat to the security of the region and international peace and security (Ibid, 2015:4-5). The statement also attributed the military intervention to the failure of the Houthi group to respond to repeated warnings from the Cooperation Council and the Security Council, as well as their continued violations of international law, international norms, including the continuation of its armed crowds, heavy weapons and missiles on the borders of Saudi Arabia (Abdullah, 2015).

Qatar was among the first countries to announce its participation in the Saudi-led military coalition to restore legitimacy in Yemen and stop the expansion of the Houthis, who seemed to be a stone's throw away from Aden and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, one of the most important waterways in the world. Doha's stance is consistent with the vision presented by Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, during his recent visit to Washington DC, on 24–27 February 2015. (Ibid:6).

Participation also came within the framework of regional efforts to address security threats and maintain stability in the region. Emir of Qatar said:

The recent events which were perpetrated by Ansar Allah group in collaboration with the former president are an assault on the peaceful transition process in Yemen. They vacated the results of the national dialogue of its content, confiscated the political legitimacy and broke down the State institutions, and the most dangerous of all, they sow the seeds of a newly introduced hateful phenomenon in Yemen – political sectarianism. Therefore, the Ansar Allah militia movement and former President Ali Abdullah Saleh are responsible for the recent escalation, which led to the launch of the Operation Decisive Storm (Abdullah, 2015:7).

There are several political and diplomatic factors that could have led Qatar to change its position on the alliance later. For example, political conflicts between Qatar and some GCC countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, may have had a significant impact on Qatar's attitude towards the Arab coalition in Yemen. In 2017, there was a political crisis between Qatar on the one hand and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt on the other hand, where Qatar was expelled from the coalition. In addition, the worsening humanitarian crisis in Yemen could have an impact on Qatar's position. Qatar may have decided to turn its attention to humanitarian support and relief in Yemen. The Qatari decision-makers could consider that focusing on the needs of the Yemeni people was more effective in alleviating human suffering in Yemen. Moreover, Qatar's will to remain independent in its foreign policy and enjoy the freedom to act and make its own decisions away from the Arab coalition could influence its shift. In addition to its desire to focus on diplomatic efforts and mediation to resolve the Yemeni crisis peacefully, it considers this behavior as one of

the soft power tools that enhances Qatari influence, achieves its goals at the lowest cost, and makes Qatar one of the most important regional mediators in the region.

Furthermore, Qatar has offered several times to host peace talks between the conflict parties. But the intransigence of the Houthi group led to a large-scale military intervention led by Saudi Arabia to restore legitimacy according to the declared goals of the coalition, out of which Qatar is a member.

b) Qatar's Participation in the Decisive Storm

In the context of the ongoing conflict in Yemen, Qatar publicly declared its adherence to the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) principles, explicitly emphasizing territorial integrity and the safeguarding of Saudi Arabian national security against the perceived threats posed by the Houthi movement (Alraya, 2018). This declaration followed the deployment of a combined air force contingent comprised of 185 aircraft, with Saudi Arabia contributing more than half the total, joined by the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan (Alduairy, 2015).

Since the release of military operations, Qatar has sent to Yemen a thousand soldiers from the Qatari Armed Forces, supported by heavy and medium equipment, defensive missiles, and an advanced communications system. It has also sent ten fighter jets that participated in the first phase of air strikes in the Decisive Storm operation (Al-Jazeera News, Sep. 7, 2015). A second batch of Qatari forces also joined the Saudi forces deployed to protect the southern border strip from infiltration attempts by the Houthis and Saleh's forces (Al-Jazeera ,June 8, 2017).

Furthermore Qatar's forces had participated in securing Aden and contributed to the rehabilitation and training of popular resistance gunmen. Also, they played a role in the restoration of some areas controlled by the Houthis. The Qatar Red Crescent has also performed relief and humanitarian roles due to the difficult humanitarian situation imposed by the war, providing medical assistance and the necessary supplies to fill the deficit in medical facilities, equipping many emergency departments and central operating rooms, and treating hundreds of wounded (IFRC network, 2023:7-9).

In addition to its military role, it has a crucial role relies on its soft power tools, including the relief and humanitarian work, based on its conviction of the importance of restoring Yemeni legitimacy and preserving Yemen's unity, stability, and

sovereignty, because this serves to the security of the region and enhances the Qatari role in Yemen, which increases its influence and presence in many issues of the region, this behavior enables Qatar to achieve its interests and highlight itself as a key and powerful actor in the region. Since the beginning of the crisis, Qatari aid has been arriving in Aden by sea in successive batches since the first months of 2015 through Djibouti airport. Notable efforts include the opening of an electric station in Aden at the end of May 2017, funded by Qatar and launched by a Qatari government delegation (Alsharq, June 5, 2017). In addition, the Qatari capital Doha hosted the humanitarian crisis conference in Yemen, which concluded on February 24 of the same year to raise 223 million US dollars to support humanitarian efforts, of which the Qatar Charity Foundation pledged to pay one hundred million US dollars (Qatar charity, Feb. 28, 2016). Upon the reopening of Aden airport, Qatar took the initiative to send a plane carrying a shipment of humanitarian aid, including medicines, medical supplies, and food for the Yemeni people, followed by other batches.

On the tenth of August 2015, the Humanitarian Relief Coalition in Taiz governorate announced the opening of seven hospitals in the governorate center and a number of directorates with the support of the Qatar Red Crescent to accommodate the cases of wounded and patients, especially those with dengue fever, which has increased significantly (Alsharq, June 05, 2017).

In addition to its efforts in the media aspect, the Al-Jazeera network, especially the Arabic-speaking channel, supported the military activities in its initial phase. It also contributed to weakening the position of the Houthis and former President Saleh and isolating them media, politically, and popularly. Qatar's position later changed towards developments in the path of events as a result of several of reasons, including the strained relationship between it and the other GCC countries. Moreover, in 2017, Qatar was expelled from the Arab coalition in Yemen on charges that it backed terrorism and meddled in the internal affairs of the countries of the region (AlArabiya News, June 05, 2017), will be explained in more detail in the next section.

4.6.2.2. Qatar's Position on The Deviation in The Path of The War in Yemen

The Arab intervention came to achieve clear goals, which were to end the Houthi coup, restore legitimate authority, and secure the southern borders of Saudi Arabia. However, the path of that intervention has undergone many deviations. Some parties

have supported entities outside the authority of the state and focused their efforts to undermine the legitimate authority, for example, the UAE supported the STC against the legitimate government (Bakir, 2020). Coincidentally, Qatar faced a severe blocked and boycott by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt alongside its termination of participation with the Arab coalition. These two things have caused major shifts in Qatar's policy towards the conflict in Yemen.

a) The Deviation in The Course of The Intervention of The Arab Coalition

The coalition military in Yemen did not achieve their goals and could not restore legitimacy in Yemen for several reasons, including the different agendas of the countries participating in the military operation, which were contrary to the interests of Yemen, in addition to internal conflicts between the coalition states.

Since the liberation of the city of Aden and the southern governorates in July 2015 from Houthi and Saleh forces, the UAE has taken over supervision of these areas within the framework of coordination and integration between the Saudi-led coalition countries (Al-hunaiti, 2023:496-498). But UAE has been keen to work to serve its own agenda only, which contradicts the general policies of the Yemeni government. UAE has sought to attract Salafists and some factions of the Southern Movement integrating them into the training camps established by it and forming the so-called Security Belt forces and Hadrami Elite Forces. These groups have been tasked with securing the entrances of Aden city and some areas in Hadramaut.

President Hadi tried more than once to convince the UAE of the importance of joining these forces in the National Army, but his request was rejected. Furthermore, the UAE has also succeeded in imposing and appointing some people loyal to it. For example, it has imposed the appointment of Aidarus Al-Zubaidi as governor of Aden in December 2015 after the murder of its former governor, Jaafar Mohammed Saad, along with the appointment of Shallal Shaiee; as Public Security Director of Aden. This move enabled UAE to tighten its grip on security facilities and emerging military forces in Aden and a number of southern governorates. Moreover, it gained control over the airport by regulating the entry and exit of the president Hadi into Aden through its control over airport security (Al Taher, 2017).

President Hadi felt the danger in the areas controlled by the forces loyal to the UAE. Hadi started to support the Presidential Protection Forces and deployed them in

important areas. He also ordered to move the Fourth Armored Brigade of presidential protection from the Alboqae area in Saada to Aden to strengthen the presence of the state there. In every move, the protection forces clashed with the armed Hirak [Movement] and the Security belt forces. This almost led many times to the explosion of the military situation between them. Also, Hadi's attempts to change some officials were met with rejection, and more than that, some Hirak officials took measures that affected Hadi himself. For example, airport security prevented the landing of the plane that was taking the president to Aden airport during his return from Saudi Arabia, with which he had to change the plane's itinerary to Socotra island until Riyadh intervened and allowed him to land (Ibid). Saudi Arabia instructed Hadi and his government to stay in Riyadh fearing a military clash between Presidential Protection Forces and forces loyal to the UAE.

b) The Qatari Position Towards Deviation in The Path of The War

A comprehensive blockade was imposed on Qatar and diplomatic relations were severed with it in 2017 by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt. Qatar was also expelled from the Arab coalition forces in Yemen. Therefore, Qatar's position changed very dramatically towards the path of events in Yemen. As Qatar's policy put the behavior of the coalition states in Yemen, especially the United Arab Emirates, under its radar, it assumed the responsibility of detecting the deviation in the path of the military intervention process.

Qatar played a crucial role in exposing the activities of UAE in controlling the Yemeni ports and islands, which violated the Yemeni sovereignty. Qatar also showed the UAE's bias towards the gunmen in the Salafi group and some factions of the southern Hirak [Movement], demanding secession. Furthermore, Qatar criticized the military operations that killed several civilians and destroyed government facilities, leading to the worsening of the humanitarian situation affecting the lives of millions of Yemenis (Buys and Garwood-Gowers, 2019:25). Due to the catastrophic humanitarian crisis, many humanitarian and human rights organizations have criticized the military intervention in Yemen and the coalition's policy in managing the war.

Al-Jazeera channel diligently monitored the humanitarian violations that occurred in Aden, under UAE's control, including the assassination of a large number of Salafi people who were not affiliated with the UAE and the large number of leaders of the

Islah Party, which UAE considered as a strategic enemy. Furthermore, the Qatari media highlighted the UAE's policy aimed at undermining the legitimate authority and empowering the STC. Qatar has largely succeeded in exposing the UAE's role in Yemen and in alerting Yemeni public opinion to the dangers of the policies pursued by the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Yemen.

Qatar has intensified its activity in international organizations, especially of a humanitarian nature, to attract and motivate its members to condemn the behavior of the UAE and the coalition's policy in general in Yemen. It has also been active in attracting media and politicians in Western countries and the US to mobilize an international position opposed to the UAE's policy in Yemen and the region in general.

Qatar launched a ferocious campaign against the military coalition in Yemen. Following the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in his nation's consulate in Istanbul, Türkiye, in 2018. As well, the increasing state of discontent in the international community against Saudi Arabia due to the humanitarian crisis in Yemen resulting from the "indiscriminate nature of coalition airstrikes resulting in high numbers of civilian casualties" (Buys and Garwood-Gowers, 2019:25).

The murder of journalist Khashoggi, in a terrible way, provoked a wide wave of anger with the Western media taking an opportunity to highlight the Yemeni crisis and the coalition's operations in Yemen to put pressure on the Saudi leadership to stop the war. US officials made sharp statements in this regard, especially US President Trump calling Khashoggi's murder "the worst in history," (BBC, Oct. 24, 2018), while European countries called for a ban on the sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia because of human rights violations, most notably in Yemen. Concurrently, UN reports indicated that there is a humanitarian tragedy in Yemen stemming from the ongoing war (Kane, 2021:26-27).

The US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on October 31, 2018, urged to cease all hostilities in Yemen and initiate negotiations to achieve peace in the country, stressing on the need to start independent negotiations in a third country under the auspices of the UN envoy. Pompeo stated: "The time is now for the cessation of hostilities, including missile and UAV strikes from Houthi-controlled areas into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates" (Reuters, Oct. 31, 2018).

So, Riyadh tried to find a political solution to the conflict through dialogue and negotiation to preserve its reputation after being unable to end the battle militarily during eight years of military operations.

Al-Jazeera channel, as one of the Qatari soft power tools, has played a pivotal role in exposing the deviation of the coalition's operations from their main goals, which caused terrible humanitarian crimes. So the US tried to use the opportunity to stop the war in Yemen, resolve the conflict with Qatar, and build a unified Gulf position to stop Iran's impact in the region. Qatar also stressed the importance of using soft power to find a political solution to the conflict through dialogue and negotiation, not through military power. It also hosted several conferences to support peace in Yemen, participated in many international initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict, and supported the efforts of the UN special envoys to Yemen.

CONCLUSION

During the reign of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani (1995–2013), Qatar has been able to exercise independent, active, and effective external behavior that overcame the dilemma of its lack of hard power, including demography and military power. Qatar has been able to play an effective and powerful role in foreign policy, both at the regional and international levels, using its soft power, including oil and gas wells, economic and media resources, and active diplomacy. This has allowed Qatar to influence and intervene in several issues in the region.

Qatar has also moved from a strategy of neutrality to a strategy of support in looking for a regional role, especially with regard to the Arab Spring revolutions. It sought to provide support for the February 11, 2011 revolution in Yemen to assert its influence and presence in the region. Qatar also has a deep-rooted relationship with Yemen and has gained more prominence in the Yemeni scene as a result of the mediation between the Houthi group and the Yemeni government during the Saada Wars (2004–2010). Additionally, Qatar has initially participated in the drafting of the Gulf initiative to solve the Yemeni crisis in its first draft but withdrew later, under the pretext of President Saleh's procrastination and delay in signing it. Qatar has also been expelled from the Arab coalition to restore legitimacy in Yemen, which has affected Qatar's presence and influence in the Yemeni scene, especially with the active presence and strong influence of Saudi Arabia in Yemen.

The boycott that some GCC countries imposed on Qatar in 2017 had an impact on Qatar's foreign policy towards the Yemeni crisis, particularly after the legitimate Yemeni government took sides with the countries imposing the blockade. After Qatar was expelled from the Arab coalition in Yemen, Qatar worked to expose the deviation of the military operation in Yemen and the mistakes that caused the humanitarian crisis to worsen, using the Al-Jazeera network as a tool for media pressure. Qatar also stressed the necessity for a political solution via dialogue and diplomatic tools.

Qatar's foreign policy in Yemen has been influenced by several external factors, including political rivalry and conflict in the region, as well as a result of its relations with other regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, and Türkiye. The competition between Riyadh and Tehran in controlling and dominating Yemen was

another challenge to Qatar's foreign policy towards the Yemeni crisis, especially in light of the good relations with Tehran and the Saudi rapprochement with Qatar, particularly after the Gulf reconciliation.

Also, this thesis asserts that Qatar's presence or absence is linked to the role of some regional and international actors, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, and to what extent Qatar's agendas coincide or conflict with the interests of those actors. Qatar's behavior in Yemen must be understood within the context of regional power dynamics, particularly its complex relationship with Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The presence of multiple international actors further complicates the conflict. While the US and UK supported the Arab coalition and conflict management efforts, their objectives did not entirely align with those of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This multipolarity allowed Qatar to leverage its relationships with various actors, its membership in many international organizations, its participation in resolving international conflicts, its support for peace and stability efforts, as well as its positive reputation, which it tried to draw through the Al Jazeera network, which indicates that Qatar has tried to use its soft power to take advantage of the opportunities for soft power tools to influence the behavior of others and attract them to do what it wants to do.

Qatar has realized that the policy of both the US and the European Union is largely in harmony with the policy of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen, starting with their policy towards the February 11 revolution, the Gulf initiative, and ultimately the Houthi group's control over the capital, Sana'a. Thus, Qatar has sought to provide different approaches to the conflict in Yemen, realizing that the US is one of the key actors in the Yemeni scene and the region, which means that the US's policy in the Yemeni scene has greatly influenced Qatar's foreign policy towards the conflict in Yemen by siding with other GCC countries.

This thesis argues that Qatar's foreign policy regarding the conflict in Yemen can be effectively analyzed through the lens of Joseph Nye's concept of soft power. By utilizing soft power tools (a strong economy, active diplomacy, and a positive international reputation), states can influence international politics and play a role larger than their size. As in the case of Qatar, that country recognized the importance of soft power in an anarchic system where conflicts predominated and used it as an

efficient tool in its foreign policy to pursue its objectives on the global stage. For instance, Qatar promoted its cultural and social values, hosted international cultural and sporting events such as the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and used its good reputation to mediate disputes between parties on many issues and support peace efforts.

The concept of soft power highlights the role of small states and how they can achieve a balance of power by taking advantage of their soft power as well as taking advantage of the hard power of their allies through bilateral defense agreements, as in the case of Qatar, where Qatar allied with the US and Türkiye to overcome the dilemma of hard power and achieve a balance of power. In other words, Qatar tries to achieve a delicate balance between Saudi Arabia (as a GCC member) while avoiding complete subservience and seeking opportunities to carve out its sphere of influence. This explains Qatar's initial support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen while simultaneously engaging in calling for dialogue, stopping the war, and resolving the conflict through diplomatic efforts.

The concept of soft power emphasizes the importance of aligning interests with other powerful actors and taking advantage of soft power tools, whether diplomatic, media, or strengthening relations with other countries. Qatar got an opportunity to bolster its regional image as a mediator and humanitarian power by aligning with international actors like the US and UK, which promoted the Gulf initiative and the National Dialogue Conference. However, Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood and its perceived closeness to Iran are contrary to Saudi Arabia's interests, highlighting the tensions within the regional power struggle.

REFERENCES

- Abdullah, J. (2014). Motives and Consequences of Ambassador Withdrawals from Doha, Al-Jazeera center for studies. Accessed 25.03.2023, available at the link: <https://rb.gy/xcxwkq>
- Abdullah, J. (2014). "al-Siyāsah al-khārijīyah li-Dawlat Qaṭar (1995-2013) .. rwāf'hā wāstrātyjyāthā" [Qatar's Foreign Policy (1995-2013)...Its Levers and Strategies], Al-Jazeera Center for Studies. Available at the link: <https://rb.gy/op53ho>
- Abdullah, J. (2015). Geopolitical context of Operation Decisive Storm and GCC states' attitudes toward It, Al-Jazeera center for studies. Available at the link: <https://rb.gy/xxvsb2>
- Abu Awad, Y. A. (2021). "al-Qūwah al-nā'imah wa athrhā 'alā al-siyāsah al-khārijīyah, Qaṭar unmūdhajan" [Soft Power and its Impact on Foreign Policy, Qatar is a model], Doctoral dissertation, Al-Aqsa University, Gaza.
- Ahmed , O. K. (2021). Qatar's foreign policy towards Arab spring. Democratic Arab Center, Research studies, <https://democraticac.de/?p=75424> .
- Ahramonline, (May 27, 2011). Qatar temporarily closes Yemen embassy, available at the linke: <https://rb.gy/znubzc>
- Akhbaralyom, (Aug. 04, 2012). "Natā'ij ziyārat al-Ra'īs al-qaṣīrah li-Dawlat Qaṭar." [Results of the President's short visit to the State of Qatar]. Available at the link https://akhbaralyom.net/news_details.php?sid=57391
- Al Arabiya News, (June 05, 2017). Arab coalition suspends Qatar's participation in Yemen, available at the link: <https://rb.gy/70f8>
- Al Arabiya News. (Nov. 23, 2011). President Saleh signs Gulf-brokered power deal ending 33 years in office. Available at the link <https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011%2F11%2F23%2F178702>
- Al Hassan, O. (March 30, 2015). The GCC's Formation: The Official Version, Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies. Available at the link <https://rb.gy/7pk0ds>
- Al Hawary, S. (2023). " al-Lūbī al-I'lāmī wa-ta'thīruhu fī ṣinā'at al-qarār al-siyāsī al-Jazīrah al-Qaṭarīyah wa-al-'ālam al-Īrānīyah namūdhajan" [The media lobby

and its impact on political decision-making Al-Jazeera Qatari & Iranian Al-Alam, as model]. Arab Democratic Center for Strategic, Political & Economic Studies, Berlin, Germany.

Al-hunaiti, R. A. R. (2023). The Impact of Foreign Intervention in the Yemeni Crisis (2015-2020). *Dirasat: Human and Social Sciences*, 50(6).

Ali, M. S. (2015). Morality and Politics with Reference to Machiavelli's the Prince. *European Scientific Journal*, 11(17).

Al Motamar Net, (July 30, 2006). "al-Ra'īs yabḥathu fī al-Dawḥah al-taṭawwurat fī Lubnān wa-Filasṭīn" [The President Discusses Developments in Lebanon and Palestine in Doha], available at the link: <https://rb.gy/m6tjyn>

Al Qahtani, M. M., & AL-Thani, D. M. (2021). "Siyāsāt Dawlat Qaṭar wtjrbthā fī al-Wasāṭah wa-taswiyat al-munāza'āt" [Qatar's Policy and Experience in Mediation and Dispute Settlement], *Siyasat Arabiya*, 9(51), 7-22.

Al Taher, M. (Feb.17, 2017). "Mādhā turīdu al-Imārāt min al-Yaman wa-al-ra'īs Hādī?" [What does the UAE want from Yemen and President Hadi?], Noon Post, accessed on 20.03.2023, available at the link: <https://www.noonpost.com/content/16693>

Al-Bayan, (April 5, 2010). "al-Ra'īs al-Yamanī yṭwy al-khilāf ma'a al-Dawḥah" [Yemeni President ends the dispute with Doha], UAE Al-Bayan newspaper. Available at the link: <https://www.albayan.ae/across-the-uae/2010-04-05-1.199372>

Al-Bayan, (Aug. 8, 2000). "Ḥamad ibn Khalīfah yad'ū Luqmah 'Arabīyah 'ājllh, Qaṭar twq' ittifaqāt ma'a al-Yaman wārytryā" [Hamad bin Khalifa calls for an urgent Arab summit, Qatar signs agreements with Yemen and Eritrea], Emirati Al-Bayan newspaper, accessed on 08.03.2023, available at link: <https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/2000-08-08-1.1086450> .

Al-Bolushi, M. (2016). The effect of Omani-Iranian relations on the security of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries after the Arab Spring. *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 9(3), 383–399. doi:10.1080/17550912.2016.1199461

- Aldossari, M. M. R. (2018). Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Struggle for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Membership 1979-2014. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Leeds). Available at the link: <https://rb.gy/wobvok>
- Alduairy, F., (Mar. 29, 2015). "‘Āṣifat al-Ḥazm .. qirā’ah awwalīyah" [Decisive Storm .. Initial Reading], Al-Jazeera net. Available at the link <https://rb.gy/j4dxq>
- Al-Eshaq, S. & Rasheed, A. (2022). The 'David in a divided Gulf :Qatar's foreign policy and the 2017 gulf crisis, Middle East policy, Volume29, Issue2, P.30 45.
- Al-Fahidi, L. (2014). " Qaṭar al-Khayrīyah twq‘ Ittifāqīyāt l’jrā’ 3000 ‘amalīyat qalb fī al-Yaman" [Qatar Charity signs agreements to perform 3,000 heart operations in Yemen], Alsharq, accessed on 30.04.2023. Available at the link: <https://shortest.link/isD5>
- Al-Jazeera, (June 8, 2017). "al-Qūwāt al-Qaṭarīyah al-mushārahah bālḥālf al-‘Arabī taṣīl al-Dawḥah" [Qatari forces participating in the Arab coalition arrive in Doha], accessed in 10.03.2023, available at the link <https://rb.gy/rh6kiq>
- Al-Jazeera Net, (June 6, 2003). " Qaṭar tnfy al-Tawassuṭ bayna al-Yaman wjybwt" [Qatar denies mediating between Yemen and Djibouti], available at the link: <https://rb.gy/jaead>
- Al-Jazeera News, (Sep. 7, 2015). Qatar deploys 1,000 ground troops to fight in Yemen, available at the link: <https://rb.gy/sv2tpp>
- Al-Jazeera, (Jul. 12, 2017). Arab states issued 13 demands to end the Qatar-Gulf crisis. Available at the link: <https://rb.gy/d3bo>
- Al-Jazeera, (Feb. 2, 2023). French forces seize a shipment of weapons headed from Iran to Yemen. Available in the link: <https://rb.gy/pewl>
- Al-Jazeera, (Mar. 22, 2011). "Iqṭihām wa-nahb Maktab al-Jazīrah bi-Ṣan‘ā'" [Storming and looting of Al-Jazeera's office in Sana'a], available at the link <https://rb.gy/eaxnxn>
- Al-Jazeera, (Feb. 28, 2013). " al-Rahīnah al-Suwīsīyah bi-al-Yaman taṣīl al-Dawḥah" [Swiss hostage in Yemen arrives in Doha], available at the link <https://rb.gy/24e73g>

- Al-Jazeera, (Mar. 7, 2014). Egypt envoy 'will not return' to Qatar. Available at the link: <https://rb.gy/hef8>
- Al-Jazeera, (Nov. 16, 2014). UAE lists scores of groups as 'terrorists', accessed on 30.05.2023, available at the link <https://rb.gy/khewr>
- Al-Jazeera, (Mar. 26, 2015). " Hādī fī al-Riyāḍ tmhydā lil-mushārah bālqmh al-‘Arabīyah" [Hadi in Riyadh in preparation for participation in the Arab summit], available at the link <https://rb.gy/nisq7z>
- Al-Khaleej Online, (June 29, 2022)." Hal yḥḍr al-Yaman fī al-mufāwaḍāt al-Amrīkīyah al-Īrānīyah bi-al-Dawḥah?" [Is Yemen will be in the US-Iranian negotiations in Doha?], available at the following link: <http://khaleej.online/7nN3nE>
- Al-Khamry, M. (May 9, 2007). The visit of the Emir of Qatar: news about investments and a conciliatory role with Iran, Elaph, available at the link: <https://urlis.net/5iix3u6e>
- Al-Lswas, H. (2012). "Māwrā’ ziyārat Hādī ilā Qaṭar" [Beyond Hadi's visit to Qatar], Almasdaronline. Accessed on 10.04.2023, available at the link: <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/79668>
- Al-Maatouk, N. S., & Kama, M. (2017). Determinants of the Regional Role of Qatar. J. Pol. & L., 10, 191.
- Al-Ma'ayteh, S. A. (2013). " al-Siyāsah al-khārijīyah al-Qaṭarīyah tujāha thawrāt al-Rabī’ al-‘Arabī" [Qatar's foreign policy towards the Arab Spring revolutions], (Master Thesis, Mutah University, Jordan).
- Almasdaronline, (Jul. 7, 2010). " Amīr Qaṭar yaşilu Şan‘ā’ fī ziyārat mfāj’h" [The Emir of Qatar arrives in Sana'a on a surprise visit]. Accessed on 10.02.2023, available at the link: <https://almasdaronline.com/article/9840>
- Almasdaronline, (Jan. 30, 2014). "Taf‘īl Ittifāqīyat Istiqdām al-‘Amālah al-Yamanīyah lil-‘amal fī Qaṭar" [Activating the agreement to bring Yemeni workers to work in Qatar], available at this link: <https://almasdaronline.com/article/54207>

- Almasdaronline, (June 28, 2010). "307 malāyīn Riyāl Arbāḥ Far‘ Bank Qaṭar al-Waṭanī bi-al-Yaman" [307 million riyals in profits of the Qatar National Bank branch in Yemen], <https://almasdaronline.com/article/9364>
- Almasdaronline, (Feb. 27, 2012). "al-Safir al-Qaṭarī ya‘ūdu ilā Ṣan‘ā’ ba‘da thamāniyat ashhar min ighlāq al-Sifārah" [The Qatari ambassador returns to Sana'a, eight months after the embassy was closed]. Available at the link: <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/73299>
- Almeezan, (Law No. 1 of 1996). The Establishment of the Al-Jazeera Satellite Network, available at the link <https://rb.gy/q7g9tm>
- Al-Mikhlaḥī, A. (2011). "Mubādarat Khalījīyah Rābi‘ah .. !! al-ān t’kd al-Fakhkh" [A fourth Gulf initiative! Now verify the trap], Almasdar Online. Available at the link: <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/63628>
- Almotamar Net, (Sep. 30, 2009). Discussion of cooperation between Yemen and Qatar in the field of higher education, available at the link: <https://urlis.net/ceodzwr9>, accessed on 11/02/2023.
- Al-Qudaimi, I. (Jan 17, 2010). "Ḥarb Ṣa‘dah tst‘sy ‘alā al-ḥall" [Saada war intractable solution], Al-Jazeera net, <https://rb.gy/0iamis>
- Alrantisi, M. (2014), " al-Siyāsah al-khārijīyah li-Dawlat Qaṭar tujāha buldān al-Rabī‘ al-‘Arabī wa-al-qaḍīyah al-Filastīnīyah 2011-2013" [The foreign policy of the state of Qatar towards the Arab Spring countries and the Palestinian issue 2011-2013] (Vol. 1). Doha: Al-Jazeera center for studies.
- Alrantisi, M. (2020). " Al-Siyāsah al-Turkīyah tujāha Azmat Qaṭar wjyrānhā : jam‘ al-qūwah al-bayna adawāt al-qūwah al-ṣalbah wālnā‘mhmutawassiṭah " [Turkish Policy Toward Qatar’s Crisis with its Neighbors: Middle Power’s Combination of Hard and Soft Power Means]. *Ortadoğu Etütleri*, 12-1 (2020): p274- 295.
- Al-Raya, (Aug. 8, 2010). " Risālat shafawīyah min al-Amīr lil-ra’īs al-Yamanī " [Oral message from the Emir to the Yemeni President]. Al-Raya newspaper, accessed on 13.03.2023. Available at the link: <https://urlis.net/mb17xenp>

- Alraya, (March 31, 2018). " 3 asbāb warā' Mushāarakat Qaṭar fī 'Āṣifat al-Ḥazm " [Three reasons behind Qatar's participation in Operation Decisive Storm]. Available at the link: <https://rb.gy/6tfbcm>
- Al-Sharq. (Jan 25, 2014) . "Qaṭar al-Khayrīyah" Ttfqd ba'd mshāry'hā fī al-Yaman" [Qatar Charity inspects some of its projects in Yemen]. Available at the link <https://rb.gy/vmjltf>
- Al-Sharq. (Sep. 17, 2014). "Qatar al-Khayriyah tdawy Juruh "3000" al Yamanī" [Qatar Charity treats the wounds of 3000 Yemeni hearts]. available at the link <https://rb.gy/inm4vj>
- Alsharq, (May 31, 2015). " Dawlat 'Arabīyah ablght 'Alī Ṣāliḥ bsā'h al-ṣifr l'āṣfh al-Ḥazm " [An Arab country informed Ali Saleh of the zero hour for Decisive Storm], available at <https://shortest.link/lusM>
- Alsharq, (June 5, 2017). "Qaṭar fī al-Yaman .. Mushāarakat qawīyah fī 'Āṣifat al-Ḥazm" [Qatar in Yemen.. strong participation in Decisive Storm], available at the link: <https://rb.gy/d4ck37>
- Amiri Diwan, Founding of the State. Available at the link: <https://rb.gy/oehr0k>
- Amiri Diwan, Founding of the State , Law Decree No. (11) of 1969. Available at the link: <https://rb.gy/oehr0k>
- Amiri Diwan, Sheikh Khalifa Bin Hamad Al Thani, available at link: <https://rb.gy/6yvnk2>
- Amiri Diwan, Sheikh Abdullah Bin Jassim Al Thani, available at the link: <https://rb.gy/9tcrq7>
- Ansarollah, (Dec. 15, 2019). Foreign Policy Magazine: \$ 725 Billion, the losses of Saudi Arabia in its war on Yemen within 6 months. Available at the link: <https://rb.gy/21qj>
- Arqaam, (Nov. 2, 2009). "al-Diyār al-Qaṭarīyah tdshn al-marḥalah al-ūlá min Mashrū' Tilāl al-Rayyān bi-Ṣan'a'", [Qatari Diar inaugurates the first phase of the Tilal Al Rayyan project in Sana'a], available at the following link: <https://www.argaam.com/ar/article/articledetail/id/743542>

- Ayish, M. I. (2019). Media Brinkmanship in the Arab World: Al-Jazeera's the opposite direction as a fighting arena. In *The Al-Jazeera Phenomenon* (pp. 106-126). Routledge.
- Baabood, A., & Baabood, A. (2020). Omani and Qatari Roles in the Yemen Crisis. Springer International Publishing EBooks, 165–178.
- Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. (1970). *Power and poverty: Theory and practice*.
- Bakir, A. (2020). The UAE's disruptive policy in Libya. *Insight Türkiye*, 22(4), 157-178.
- Barakat, S. (2012). The Qatari Spring: Qatar's emerging role in peacemaking. *Kuwait Programme on development, governance and globalization in the Gulf States*, 24, 94-112.
- Barakat, S. (2014). *Qatari mediation: between ambition and achievement*. Washington: Brookings Institution.
- BBC NEWS, (March 5, 2014). Gulf ambassadors pulled from Qatar over interference. Available at the link <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26447914>
- BBC, (Oct. 24, 2018). Trump says Khashoggi murder 'worst cover-up in history', accessed on 01.04.2023, available at the link: <https://rb.gy/57u2>,
- Berni, H. M. E. (2021). The perceptual shock of Qatar foreign policy in 2017 crisis: systemic factors, regional struggles versus domestic variables. *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*, 8(1), 96-119.
- Blanchard, C. M., & Sharp, J. M. (2014). Qatar: Background and US relations (Vol. 4). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
- Boyce, S. G. (2013). Qatar's Foreign Policy. *Asian Affairs*, 44(3), 365-377.
- Burrowes, R. D. (1992). The Yemen Arab republic's legacy and Yemeni unification. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 14(4), 41–68.
- Buys, E., & Garwood-Gowers, A. (2019). The (Ir) relevance of human suffering: Humanitarian intervention and Saudi Arabia's operation decisive storm in Yemen. *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 24(1), 1-33.

- Carr, E. H. (2016). Power in International Politics. The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939, 97–134. doi:10.1057/978-1-349-95076-8_8
- Carter, J. (1980). State of the Union address (No. 132). Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs.
- Çiçek, A. (2022). Soft Power, public diplomacy and public diplomacy techniques: A conceptual evaluation. *Turkish Business Journal*, 3(6), 103-119.
- Dahl, R. A. (1957). The concept of power. *Behavioral science*, 2(3), 201-215.
- Dargin, J. (2007). Qatar's natural gas: the foreign-policy driver. *Middle East Policy*, 14(3), 136
- Dogan Akkas, B. (2021). Will Qatar Return to a Mediator Role in the Yemen Conflict?.
- El Yaakoubi, A., (Jul. 20, 2017). Qatar crisis strains Saudi-led Arab alliance in Yemen war, Reuters. Available at the link <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-yemen-idUSKBN1A51XM>
- El-Deeb, F. (1990), " 'Abd al-Nāşir wa-ḥarakat al-taḥarrur al-Yamanī " [Abdel Nasser and the Yemeni Liberation Movement], (Vol. 1), Cairo, Egypt, Dar Almustakbal Alarabi.
- Executive Order No. 13611, (2012). regarding freezing the assets of persons who threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen, Federal Register, Volume (77), Issue (97), on May 18, 2012, Presidential Documents (29533). available at <https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/5951/download?inline>
- Gallarotti, G. M. (2015). Smart power: Definitions, importance, and effectiveness. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 38(3), 245-281.
- Gasim, G. (2018). The Qatari crisis and Al-Jazeera's coverage of the war in Yemen. *Arab Media & Society*, 25, 1-9. Available at the link: <https://rb.gy/bmtxox>
- Gavin, R. J. (1975). *Aden under British rule, 1839-1967*. New York: Barnes & Noble.
- Ghobari, M. & Al-Mahdy, K. (May 12, 2011). Qatar quits Gulf plan for Yemen, cites delays, Reuters. Accessed on 11/05/2022, available at the link: <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE74B2JE/>

- Group of authors, (2021). "al-Wujūd alāmārāty fī al-Yaman, qirā'ah fī al-mumārasāt wa-al-āthār" [The Emirati presence in Yemen, a reading in practices and consequences], Al-Mokha Center for Strategic Studies.
- Guzzini, S. (2018). Hans J. Morgenthau and the three purposes of power.
- Hansen, S. J. (2013). The start of Qatar as a foreign policy actor. Qatar's engagement in Yemen. in " *Religion, Prestige and Windows of Opportunity?(Qatari peace-making and foreign policy engagement)*.
- Heimbach, J. (2021). The Future of South Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council.
- Holsti, K. J. (1970). National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, 14(3), 233. doi:10.2307/3013584
- Hüdaverdi, A. S. (2020). Revolutionary change versus counter-revolutionary status quo: Tracing the reactions of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to the Arab Spring, (Master's thesis, İbn Haldun Üniversitesi).
- IFRC network, (2023). YEMEN - IFRC network mid-year report, January-June 2023. available at the link <https://adore.ifrc.org/Download.aspx?FileId=777763>
- Ikenberry, G. J., & Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. *Foreign Affairs*, 83(3), 136. doi:10.2307/20033985
- International Crisis Group ICG, (May 27, 2009). Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb, International Crisis Group Middle, East Report No. 86, p. 21 Available at the link: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/101272/086_yemen_saada_time_bomb.pdf
- Imaduddin, (May 1, 2011). GCC ministers reject Yemen's 'conspiracy' claim. Available at the link: <https://short-url.cc/i-Iw>
- Jargon, A. A. (2014). " al-Mawqif al-Qaṭarī min al-thawrāt al-‘Arabīyah wa-atharuhu fī Taḥawwulāt al-siyāsah al-khārijīyah al-Qaṭarīyah " [The Qatari position on the Arab revolutions and its impact on the changes in Qatar's foreign policy], *AL-Mostansiriyah journal for Arab and international studies*, 2014, Volume, Issue 48, pp. 30-59.

- Joseph, C. E. (2010). National Interest: a Principal Factor in Foreign Policy Formulation. *African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies*, 5, 1.
- Joseph, S. N. (2017). The Information Revolution and the Paradox of American Power 1. In *The Globalization of International Law* (pp. 153-162). Routledge.
- Kabalan, M. (2019). Actors, structures and Qatari foreign policy. *AlMuntaqa*, 2(2), 61-82.
- Kamrava, M. (2011). Mediation and Qatari foreign policy. *The Middle East Journal*, 65(4), 539-556.
- Kane, C. (2021). How to stop the unstoppable? United States arms trade to Saudi Arabia & the impacts on the conflict in Yemen (Doctoral dissertation).
- Karakir, İ. A. (2018). Ongoing conflict in Yemen: A proxy war?. *Team Akademi Dergisi*, 5(2), 121-149.
- Karataş, İ. (2020). The role of soft power in Qatar's foreign policy, Ph.D. dissertation, Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University (IZU).
- Katzman, K. (2017). Qatar: Governance, security, and US policy. Congressional Research Service.
- Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1989). *Power and interdependence: World politics in transition* (3rd ed.). Boston: Little-Brown.
- Khaleej Times, (Jan 8, 2013). Qatar raises financial aid to Egypt, available at the link: <https://rb.gy/giwo>
- Khalifi, R. (2017). "al-Wāqī'īyah fī al-‘Alāqāt al-Dawliyah: drāsh nẓryh" [Realism in International Relations: Theoretical Study], *Journal of legal and political thought*, Ammar thulaiji Al-awat University-Faculty of law and political science, Issue (1), May 2017: P. 22-29.
- Khudair, M. H., (2011). " Muqawwimāt al-siyāsah al-khārijīyah al-Qatarīyah : dirāsah fī al-sulūk al-siyāsī" [Elements of Qatari Foreign Policy... A Study in Political Behavior], *International Studies*, Center for International Studies, University of Baghdad, Iraq, Issue (49), July 2011: p. 232.
- KUNA, (Oct. 14, 1998). " Qaṭar trḥb bi-qarār Hay’at al-taḥkīm al-Dawliyah bi-sha’n Nizā’ Juzur Ḥunaysh bayna al-Yaman w’rytryā " [Qatar welcomes the

decision of the International Arbitration Tribunal on the Hanish Islands dispute between Yemen and Eritrea]. Kuwait News Agency, accessed on 10.03.2023, available at the following link: <https://rb.gy/vk54m>

KUNA, (Aug. 6, 2000). "Amīr Qaṭar yaqūmu bi-ziyārat li-‘Adan bi-rifqat al-Ra’īs al-Yamanī" [The Emir of Qatar visits Aden accompanied by the Yemeni President], Kuwait News Agency, available at the link <https://rb.gy/ug1c7q>

KUNA, (Aug. 7, 2000). "Ra’īs al-Yaman wa Amīr Qaṭar y’kdān ḍarūrah ‘aqd Qimmat ‘Arabīyah" [The President of Yemen and the Emir of Qatar Stress the Necessity of Holding an Arab Summit], Kuwait News Agency, available at the link: <https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?language=ar&id=1102389>

Kusumawijaya, K., & Machmudi, Y. (2022). Qatar foreign policy in Middle East conflict mediation. *Jurnal Middle East and Islamic Studies*, 9(2), 2.

Leene, F. (2023). Small States, Big Fish: Comparing Kuwaiti, Omani, and Qatari Foreign Policy and Engagement with Proscribed Armed Groups During Mediation in Yemen.

LNG, (2010) . Qatar Celebrates Achieving 77 Mta LNG Production Capacity, available at the link <https://urlis.net/f8409m59>

Luqman, M. (2017). " Qirā’ah fī thanāyā al-Dawr al-Qaṭarī fī al-Yaman" [Reading within the Qatari role in Yemen]. Al-Mesbar Studies and Research Center, p. 145-164. available at the link <https://rb.gy/80wg7>

MEED, (Nov. 2, 2009). Construction begins on a \$600 million Yemeni real estate project, Middle East business intelligence. Available at the link: <https://www.meed.com/construction-begins-on-600m-yemeni-real-estate-project/>

Middle East Monitor , (Sep. 27, 2014). Sana'a is the fourth Arab capital to join the Iranian revolution, accessed 11.09.2023, available at the link <https://rb.gy/t651a>

Masaeed, F. (2014), " Mustaqbal al-Dawr al-iqlīmī al-Qaṭarī fī ḍaw’ al-thawrāt al-‘Arabīyah bayna al-tarāju’ wāltmdd" [The future of the Qatari regional role in

light of the Arab revolutions between retreat and extension], Notebooks politics and law, pp. 30-60.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The tragedy of great power politics*. WW Norton & Company.

Melissen, J. (2005). *Wielding soft power: the new public diplomacy* (Vol. 275). Netherlands: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael.

Mirza, M. N., Abbas, H., & Qaisrani, I. H. (2021). Structural sources of Saudi–Iran rivalry and competition for the sphere of influence. *Sage Open*, 11(3), 21582440211032642. Available at the link: <https://rb.gy/1xog4u>

Mohammadzadeh, B. (2017). Status and Foreign Policy Change in Small States: Qatar's Emergence in Perspective. *The International Spectator*, 52(2), 19–36.

Morgenthau, H. J. (1949). *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*. Fifth Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Montgomery, M. (2021). A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present, Arab Center Washington, DC. Available at the link: <https://rb.gy/11swi>

Muhanna, M. N. (2001). " Qaṭar al-tārīkh al-siyāsīyah al-taḥdīth " [Qatar Political History Update], Alexandria: Modern university office, p.278.

Naharnet, (Apr. 29, 2011). Yemen's Saleh Accuses Qatar of "conspiracy" and threatens to quit the transition deal. Accessed on 20.02.2023, available at the link: <https://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/5911>,.

News beezar, (June 22, 2022). In Numbers... Find out how big is golf investment in the UK | Business. Available at the link: <https://rb.gy/zpvu>

NIC, (June 1, 2007). " al-Iryānī yunqalu Risālat min ra'īs al-Jumhūrīyah li-Amīr Qaṭar" [Al-Eryani conveys a message from the President of the Republic to the Emir of Qatar]. National Information Center, accessed on 10.03.2023, available at the link: <https://urlis.net/jchtgnpa>

NIC, (Nov. 20, 2006). "Mu'tamar almānhyn li-Da'm al-tanmiyah fī al-Yaman yaḥzā bi-ihtimām i'lāmī 'Arabī wa-dawlī wās'" [The donors' conference to support development in Yemen is receiving wide Arab and international media

attention], The National Information Center, available at the following link:
<https://yemen-nic.info/news/detail.php?ID=13348>

NIC, (Nov. 10, 2006). " Ra'īs al-Jumhūrīyah yḥḍr ḥafl tdshyn Dawrat al-Al'āb al-Āsiyawīyah al 15 bi-al-Dawḥah wyltqy bālr'ysyn al-Sūrī wāl'yrāny" [The President of the Republic attends the inauguration ceremony of the 15th Asian Games in Doha and meets the Syrian and Iranian presidents], National Information Center (Yemen), available at the link: <https://yemen-nic.info/news/detail.php?ID=13522>

Nuruzzaman, M. (2015). Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Qatar and dispute mediations: a critical investigation. *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 8(4), 535-552.

Nye, J. S. (1990). The Changing Nature of World Power. *Political Science Quarterly*, 105(2), 177. doi:10.2307/2151022

Nye, J. S. (2003). The Information Revolution and The Paradox of American Power. *Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting*, 97, 67–75.

Nye Jr, J. S. (2004). Soft power and American foreign policy. *Political science quarterly*, 119(2), 255-270

Nye, J. S. (2011). Smart Power. *Huffington Post*.
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/smart-power_b_74725

Nye, J. (2017). Soft power: the origins and political progress of a concept. *Palgrave communications*, 3(1), 1-3.

OFAC, (2016). Yemen Sanctions Program, Office of Foreign Assets Control, available at <https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/8261/download?inline>

Official Text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216. accessed in 25.03.2023. available at the link: <https://rb.gy/dadiwp>

Onley, J. (2009). Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms 1820-1971: The politics of protection. *CIRS Occasional Papers*.

Quinn, R., & Gibson, B. (2017). *An Analysis of Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics*. Macat Library.

- Palik, J., & Rustad, S. A. (2019). *Mediation in the Yemeni Civil War*. Peace Research Institute Oslo.
- Perl, R., O'Rourke, R. (2001). *Terrorist attack on USS Cole: Background and issues for Congress*. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
- Policy Brief, (June 9, 2017). *The Gulf: An unprecedented crisis and major repercussions*, Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies. Available at the link: <https://rb.gy/w3h2>
- Qatar charity, (Feb. 28, 2016). *The Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen Conference Attracts 223,000,000 USD Donations*, available at the link: <https://rb.gy/naqwru>
- Qatari Constitution, Article 1-150, available at the link <https://rb.gy/picrta>
- Qatar's constitution, ministry foreign policy, political system, available at the link: <https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/political-system/general-information>
- Quamar, M. (2017). *The Turkish Military Base in Doha: A Step towards Gaining 'Strategic Depth' in the Middle East*. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
- Report no. 125 (2012). *Yemen: Enduring Conflicts, Threatened Transition*, Middle East Report N°125 – July 3, 2012. Available at the link: <https://short-url.cc/jWbZ>
- Reuters , (Jul. 23, 2014). *Yemen president says Houthis agree to return town to state control*. Available at the link <https://rb.gy/ob377>
- Reuters, (Jan. 15, 2012). *Qatar emir suggests sending Arab troops to Syria*, 15 January 2012, available in the link <https://www.reuters.com/article/syria-idINDEE80D02720120115>
- Reuters, (Feb. 25, 2016). *European Parliament calls for Saudi arms embargo*. Available in the link: <https://rb.gy/c65d>
- Reuters, (Apr. 06, 2011), *Gulf states seek to broker Yemen's Saleh exit*. Available at the link: <https://short-url.cc/i-90>

- Reuters, (Feb. 28, 2013). Yemen kidnappers free Swiss woman after Qatari mediation. Available at the link <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-hostage-swiss-idUSBRE91R07J20130228>
- Reuters, (June 30, 2017). Demand for Qatar to close down Al-Jazeera 'unacceptable': U.N. available at the link: <https://rb.gy/quyjgp>
- Reuters, (Oct. 31, 2018). Secretary of State Pompeo calls for end to fighting in Yemen, accessed on 01.04.2023, available at the link: <https://rb.gy/didc>
- Robbins, T., Shah, H., and Dalton, M. (March 23, 2018). U.S. Support for Saudi Military Operations in Yemen, Center for Strategic & International Studies. Available in the link: <https://rb.gy/43kdq>
- Ryan, C. R. (1998). Jordan and the rise and fall of the Arab Cooperation Council. *The Middle East Journal*, p. 386-401.
- Sahli, M. (2020) "Altdkhlāt al-khārijīyah wa-in'ikāsātuhā 'alā Azmat al-Yaman", [External interventions and its impacts on the Yemen crisis], Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 12-2 (2020) : 455-479.
- Shurrab, M. A. Z. (2014). "al-Siyāsah al-khārijīyah al-Qaṭarīyah fī zill al-taḥawwulāt al-siyāsīyah al-'Arabīyah 2003-2012" [Qatari Foreign Policy in Light of the Arab Political Transformations (2003-2012)], Master's Thesis, Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences, Al-Azhar University, Gaza- Palestine, pp. 76 -141
- Smith, S. C. (2000). Revolution and reaction: South Arabia in the aftermath of the Yemeni revolution. *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 28(3), 193-208. DOI: 10.1080/03086530008583105. Available at the link: <https://rb.gy/ocxsx1>
- Sno, A. R. (1998). "Ittifāqāt Barīṭāniyā wma'āhdāthā ma'a Imārāt al-Khalīj al-'Arabīyah (1798m-1916m) .. fuṣūl min Siyāsāt al-haymanah wāltftyt" [Agreements and treaties of Great Britain with the Arab Emirates of the Gulf (1798-1916).. Chapters of domination and fragmentation]. *Journal of Arab History and World*, Dar al-Nashr al-Arabi lil-Dirasat wa al-Taqwim, Beirut, Lebanon 18(175), 22-39.

- SPA, (Jan. 23, 2011). " al-Yaman wqṭr-rsālḥ" [Yemen and Qatar – letter], Saudi Press Agency (SPA), accessed on 12.03.2023, available at the link: <https://www.spa.gov.sa/858275>
- SPA, (2008). " Ra'īs Wuzarā' alymn-qṭr-zyārḥ" [Prime Minister of Yemen - Qatar – visit]. Saudi Press Agency, on 29.1.2008. Available at the link: <https://urlis.net/zjeygeid>
- SputnikArabic, (Sep. 10, 2018). " Qayyādī fī Ḥizb al-Mu'tamar yakshif mufāja'at ḥawla maqṭal Ṣāliḥ wa-dukhūl "alḥwṭhyyn" Ṣan'ā'" [A leader in the Congress party reveals surprises about the killing of Saleh and the attack of the Houthis on Sana'a (1)], the Russian agency, available at the following link: <https://rb.gy/962qm>
- Stenslie, S. (2013). Not too strong, not too weak: Saudi Arabia's policy towards Yemen. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center, March. available at the link <https://short-url.cc/jUbo>
- Stille, C. (2017). Iran's Role in Yemen's Civil War. *the Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs*, 1(1), 115-129.
- Sudam, M. (2010). Yemeni officials, and rebels to talk peace in Qatar, Reuters, 17.8.2010. Available at the link: <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE67G0Y8>
- Sudam, M., & Ghobari, M. (April 10, 2011). Yemen's Saleh again rejects move to replace him, Reuters. Available at the link: <https://short-url.cc/i-Ds>
- Text of Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the Transition in Yemen Pursuant to the GCC Initiative, 21 November 2011. Available at the link <https://rb.gy/f6v8fu>
- The Nation, (April 9, 2011). Saleh rejects exit plan, available at the link: <https://rb.gy/poajyj>
- The New York Times, (Oct. 2, 1992). Qatar Says Saudis Seized Its Border Post. Section A, P. 8, available at the link <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/02/world/qatar-says-saudis-seized-its-border-post.html>

- Trend news agency, (April 9, 2011). Protests continue as Yemen summons envoy in Qatar after Gulf offer. Available at the link <https://rb.gy/d0pu6>
- Ulrichsen, K. C. (2012). Small states with a big role: Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the wake of the Arab Spring. Discussion Paper. Durham University, HH Sheikh Nasser Al-Sabah Programme, Durham.
- Ulrichsen, K. C. (2014). Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Page 1-6. Available at the link <https://short-url.cc/iYD1>
- Vitali, A., Williams, A., and Nichols, H. (June 6, 2017). Trump Credits His Middle East Trip for Saudi-Led Diplomatic Break with Qatar, NBC News, available at the link: <https://rb.gy/7161>
- Vuving, A. (2009). How soft power works. Available at SSRN 1466220.
- Waltz, K., N. (2001). Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis. New York, Columbia University Press, s. 16 – 41. (26 s.) available at the link https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2005/MVZ156/um/758391/waltz2001_16-41.pdf
- Waltz, K., N. (1979). Theory of International Politics, University of California, Berkeley.
- Wilson III, E. J. (2008). Hard power, soft power, smart power. The annals of the American academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 110-124.
- Winkler, J. R., & Nye, J. S. (2005). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. *International Journal*, 61(1), 268-269.
- Yavuzaslan, K., & Cetin, M. (2016). Soft Power Concept and Soft Power Indexes. *Eurasian Studies in Business and Economics*, 395–409. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-22596-8_28
- Yemen Economist, (Apr. 10, 2012). "Khilāl astqbālḥ bāsndwh / Walī ‘ahd Qaṭar y’kd ‘Azm blādh Tanfīdh Mashārī‘ tanmawīyah wa taqdīm tshylāt lāsty‘āb al-Mazīd min al-‘Ummāl al-Yamanīyīn", [During the welcoming of Basindwa, the Crown Prince of Qatar affirmed his country's intention to implement development projects and provide facilities to absorb more Yemeni workers], accessed on 15.07.2023, available at the link: <https://rb.gy/4ryae>

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL DATA

Name: Bandar Abdo Ahmed Dabwan

Qualifications

- Master student in international relations and political science- Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University- Currently
- Bachelor of Computer Science - Sana'a University 2006
- Diploma in English Language Exceed Institute 2008
- Diploma in Computer Networks, Engineers Center 2009

Experiences

- Director of Administrative Affairs and Head of the Computer Department - TIIB 2007-2010
- Information Center Officer in TIIB Administration 2011-2014
- Administrative Director of several institutions.
- Founding member of the Society of Yemeni Engineers - Türkiye.

Training courses

- Diploma in Diplomatic Qualification - Academy of International Relations - Istanbul 2023
- Diploma in Political Qualification - Vision Center - Istanbul 2020
- Media Spokesperson Diploma - Istanbul 2020
- News sources - their importance and how to manage them - Foreign Media Union in Türkiye-2020
- Journalism training in humanitarian affairs - Turkish Anadol Agency 2020
- Microsoft System Management - Computer Engineers Center 2008
- Diploma in the English Language - Exceed Institute - Sana'a.
- Advanced courses in the English language - Ankara University of Social Sciences - Türkiye.
- The art of etiquette and how to deal with VIPs.
- A course in opinion polling - Al-Mokha Center for Strategic Studies.