

T.C.
ISTANBUL SABAHAATTIN ZAIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE EDUCATION INSTITUTE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

**SUCSESSES AND FAILURES OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS: A CASE STUY ON THE UNITED NATIONS
ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (MONUSCO)**

MA THESIS

Parousia Tlhlopho SHIKWAMBANE

Istanbul
June-2022

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THESIS APPROVAL

This study has been approved in partial fulfilment of the requirements for MA Degree in Political Science and International Relations.

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DECLARATION OF SCIENTIFIC ETHICS AND ORIGINALITY

This is to certify that this MA thesis/PhD dissertation titled “Successes and Failures of Peacekeeping Operations: A Case Study on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)” is my own work and I have acted according to scientific ethics and academic rules while producing it. I have collected and used all information and data according to scientific ethics and guidelines on thesis writing of Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University. I have fully referenced, in both the text and bibliography, all direct and indirect quotations and all sources I have used in this work.

Signature

Parousia Tlhlompho SHIKWAMBANE

Istanbul, June 2022

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I never thought in my wildest dreams that I would obtain an international degree however, I came I saw and I conquered. It has not been an easy journey, but I am grateful for the opportunity to have studied at one of the prestigious universities in Istanbul, Turkey. I would like to thank God for the opportunity, for the strength and wisdom provided to complete my master's degree and for always showing me grace.

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Parousia Tihlomphe SHIKWAMBANE

Istanbul, June 2022

ABSTRACT

**SUCCESSSES AND FAILURES OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: A
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The study analyses the Successes and Failures of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The DRC has been troubled by two civil wars since the 1990s. And the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission has been actively involved in trying to maintain peace in the DRC. However, contemporary events and the history of the DRC are constant reminders that violence remains dominant and continues to impede the institutional, social, and economic development of the country. The Congo conflict is one of the most complex in Africa and the most active in the world today. To achieve peace, security, and stability and resolve the crisis in the country, the UN deployed MONUSCO peacekeeping operation. Here, it becomes significant to analyse the successes and failures of the MONUSCO peacekeeping operation and determining its outcome. The study utilises Darya Pushkina's four indicators to measure the successes and failures of peacekeeping in the Congo: Limitation of Violence, Reducing Human Suffering, Preventing Spillovers and the Promotion of Conflict Resolution. Therefore, the study investigates how the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the country has evolved and explores the challenges that peacekeeping in the DRC encounter. And it examines the factors that contribute to the successes and failures of MONUSCO in the DRC. The study suggests that the United Nations has been instrumental in achieving minor achievements but has not been effective in all areas.

Keywords: Democratic Republic of Congo, Successes and Failures, United Nations, MONUSCO, Peacekeeping and Conflict.

ÖZET

BARIŞI KORUMA OPERASYONLARININ BAŞARISI VE BAŞARISIZLIĞI: KONGO DEMOKRATİK CUMHURİYETİ BİRLEŞMİŞ MİLLETLER ÖRGÜTÜ İSTİKRAR MİSYONU (MONUSCO) ÜZERİNE BİR ÖRNEK OLAY İNCELEMESİ

Parousia Tlhlompho SHIKWAMBANE

Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü Yüksek Lisans

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Bu, çalışma, Kongo Demokratik Cumhuriyeti'ndeki (KDC) Birleşmiş Milletler Barış Gücü Operasyonu'nun başarısı ve başarısızlığını. KDC'de 1990'lardan bu yana iki iç savaştan mustarıptir ve Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) barış misyonu, KDC'de barışın korunmasına aktif olarak katılmıştır. Bununla birlikte, KDC'nin tarihi ve günümüzdeki gelişmeler, ülkede şiddetin baskın olmaya devam ettiğini ve ülkenin kurumsal, sosyal ve ekonomik gelişimini engellemeye devam ettiğinin göstermektedir. Kongo çatışması, Afrika'nın en karmaşık ve bugün dünyanın en aktif çatışmalarından biridir. BM, barış, güvenlik ve istikrarı sağlamak ve ülkedeki krizi çözmek için MONUSCO barış operasyonunu devreye geçirmiştir. Bu bağlamda operasyonun, başarısını ve başarısızlığını analiz etmek önem arz etmektedir. Çalışma, Kongo'da barışı korumanın başarısını ve başarısızlığını ölçmek için Darya Puşkına'nın dört göstergesini kullanmaktadır: Şiddetin Sınırlandırılması, İnsan Acılarının Azaltılması, Dağılmaların Önlenmesi ve Çatışma Çözümünün Desteklenmesi. Bu nedenle, çalışma ülkedeki BM barış operasyonunun nasıl geliştiğini ve KDC'de barışı korumanın karşılaştığı zorlukları araştırmaktadır. Ve MONUSCO'nun KDC'deki başarılarına ve başarısızlıklarına katkıda bulunan faktörleri incelemektedir. Çalışma, BM'nin küçük başarılar elde etmede etkili olduğunu ancak her alanda etkili olmadığını göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokratik Kongo Cumhuriyeti, Başarı ve Başarısızlık Birleşmiş Milletler, MONUSCO, Barış Gücü ve Çatışma.

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Figure 1: Map of Eastern Congo

Figure 2: Map of UN Mission in Congo



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACLED - Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project

ADF - Allied Democratic Force

AFDL - Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo

CNDP - National Congress for the Defence of the People

CNP - Congolese National Police

CPP - Comites de Pouvoir Populaire

DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DDRRR - Disarmament the Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration

DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo

FDLR - Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda

FIB - Force Intervention Brigade

GA - General Assembly

ICD - Inter-Congolese Dialogue

IDP – Internally Displaced Persons

ISSSS - International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy

JMC - Joint Military Commission

LRA - Lord Resistance Army

M23 - March 23 Movement

MLC - Movement for the Congolese Liberation

MNF - Multinational Force in Lebanon

MONUC - United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

MONUSCO - United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

MPLA - People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola

OAU - Organization of African Unity OAU

OHCHR - Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

ONUB - UN Operation in Burundi

ONUC - Opération des Nations Unies au Congo/ United Nations Operation in the Congo

ONUMOZ - United Nations Operation in Mozambique

POC - Protection of Civilians

RCD - Rally of Congolese Democracy

SADC - Southern African Development Community

SEA - Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

SSR - Security Sector Reform

UDPS - Union for Democracy and Social Progress

UN - United Nations

UNAMIR - United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNAVEM - United Nations Angola Verification Mission

UNCRO - United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNJHRO - United Nations Joint Human Rights Office

UNFIL - United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNITA - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

UNMIH - United Nations Mission in Haiti

UNMIL - United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNOSOM - United Nations Operation in Somalia

UNPKO - United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

UNPREDEP - United Nations Preventive Deployment Force

UNPROFOR-Bosnia - United Nations Protection Force

UNPROFOR-Croatia - United Nations Protection Force

UNPROFOR-Macedonia - United Nations Protection Force

UNSC - United Nations Security Council

UNSMIH - United Nations Support Mission in Haiti

UNSSSS - United Nations Security and Stabilization Support Strategy

UNTAES - United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium

UNTAG - United Nations Transition Assistance Group

USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

INTRODUCTION

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a nation plagued by severe armed conflict. The United Nations (UN) has played a critical role in ensuring that there is peace and stability in Congo by deploying peacekeeping missions to the country. The importance of peacekeeping is that it assists conflict-torn countries in establishing the conditions for long-term peace. Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the UN in assisting host countries in navigating the difficult transition from conflict to peace (United Nations 2022).

The current violence in the DRC has its roots in the two phases of armed conflict. The first phase of the conflict began in 1996 resulting from the massive refugee crisis and spill over from Rwanda's 1994 genocide. This period also included the overthrow of then-President Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997 led by Laurent Kabila. Kabila was the leader of the rebellion that toppled Mobutu. After the successful deposition of Mobutu, Kabila went on to become the president of the DRC, restoring the country's former name. While the second phase of the conflict began when Rwandans and Ugandans invading the DRC and supported a new rebellion against Kabila (Cilliers and Malan 2001:7).

As a result of the Congolese government's inability to control or defeat various armed groups, some of which directly threatened populations in neighbouring countries, the Second Congolese War erupted in 1998. The UN presence began shortly after the DRC and five other regional states negotiated the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in August 1999. The UN assumed that the Lusaka Agreement would end the Second Congolese War and that peacekeeping efforts would be required to manage the transition period. To that end, the UN sent a peacekeeping mission to the DRC with the mission of observing the ceasefire, ensuring force disengagement, and maintaining liaison between all parties. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was the name given to this mission (MONUC), after a decade long of MONUC intervention the UN re-named the peacekeeping force with a more robust mandate to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 2010. The UN presence in the Congo has spanned over two decades to quell the conflict in the country (Novosselof

2017). The subject of this thesis is to assess the successes and failures of the UN peacekeeping mission MONUSCO in the DRC.

Since the end of the Cold War there has been an increase in the number and size of the UN peacekeeping missions. In the course of time the peacekeeping operations have undergone significant changes as they have tried to adapt to changing conflicts. While some peacekeeping operations are successful others lead to failure. The UN presence in Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste and Liberia are examples of successfully completed missions, the UN involvement has made a significant difference, the operations have aided political transitions and strengthened fragile new state institutions by providing basic security guarantees and responding to crises. The UN has aided countries in closing the chapter on conflict and resuming to normalcy. Interventions in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are viewed as failures. The failure of the UN response to the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda was due to policy and action errors (Scherr 2018:122). These failures taught the international community valuable lessons about how and when to deploy and support UN peacekeeping as a tool for restoring and maintaining international peace and security.

Therefore, the question of what are the factors that determine a successful mission to that of a failed mission? How are the successes and failures measured? have gained the attentions of the scholars such as Duane Bratt (1996), Paul Diehl (1993), Darya Pushkina (2006) and Jair Van der Ljin (2010). To assess the successes and failures of peacekeeping missions several indicators have been developed to distinguish between the successes and failures of peacekeeping operations by these scholars (Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017:3). These indicators established by the scholars are applied after conflict has erupted to determine the successes and failures of peacekeeping operations. Developing the concept of successes and failures is instrumental in evaluating the results of an action in an operations progress. This study adopts four indicators by Pushkina which include: limitation of violence, reduction of human suffering, preventing spill overs and promoting conflict resolution (Pushkina 2006:13).

At present MONUSCO has been delegated to responding to the conflict situation in the DRC and carrying out the mandates of the UN. The peacekeeping force is a unique operation as it is currently the largest and most expensive of the UN's operations

therefore, the evaluation will be conducted on MONUSCO in the DRC. For decades, the DRC has been subjected to substantial political upheaval, bloodshed, and human rights violations since the country's independence on June 30, 1960. Mobutu attained power in 1965 and since then, his long autocratic and corrupt regime has markedly weakened the country's human security situation. Furthermore, the resurgence of armed conflict since 1996 has displaced thousands of people across the country and led to proliferation and abuse. Despite the signing of a peace accord in 2003 to officially stop the conflict and establish a government of national unity, the situation remains politically unpredictable and violent in some areas, particularly in the east (Rodríguez 2011).

Since its deployment in the Congo the peacekeeping operation has evolved over time which has prompted the UN to come up with three types of intervention in the conflict of the DRC over a period of many years. The first two interventions were not that stringent, whereas MONUSCO was authorized as a robust mandate allowing it to 'use all necessary means' (United Nations Security Council 2016:2). The first mission the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was established in July 1960 to assist the Congolese government in regaining control of its mutinous army and restoring order in that newly independent country, it was mainly an observer mission (Dorn 2013:1421). Whereas the second mission MONUC was established initially to plan for ceasefire observance and force disengagement, as well as to maintain liaison with all parties to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Needless to say, the UN peacekeepers encounter tremendous challenges which hinder the missions progress. In order to achieve the desired goals, there need to be steps towards addressing these challenges. Presently MONUSCO is operating in a country that does not want its presence and this poses a great obstacle as it affects the civilians at large. MONUSCO has been under increasing pressure from the DRC government and some members of the international community to devise an exit strategy that will allow it to leave the country. The DRC government had requested the withdrawal of 1,700 troops at first, followed by 10,000 troops (Stimson 2016:3-4). Again in 2019 former President Joseph Kabila has repeatedly demanded for the exit of the UN mission in the country. Likewise, President Felix Tshisekedi too supports the withdrawal of MONUSCO (Hansrod 2019). Without the presence of MONUSCO the situation in the DRC will deteriorate even further.

The Statement of the Problem

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) continues to play a significant part by deploying peacekeeping missions in the DRC (Luthuli 2016). Since the 1990's the UN peacekeeping mission has been actively involved in trying to maintain peace in the DRC. The objectives of MONUSCO's presence in the Congo has been firstly the protection of civilians which included taking all necessary steps to provide swift, dynamic, and integrated effective protection of people facing physical violence in the regions where the mission is now stationed. Secondly, through stabilization, security sector reforms, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, it should promote the stabilization and strengthening of public institutions in the DRC. The Security Council also mentions human rights and armed organizations in this mandate, emphasizing the importance of eliminating the threat presented by those armed groups (United Nations 2021). Contemporary situations in the DRC have not changed significantly as the DRC is constantly impeded by intractable conflicts (Ahere 2012). The country still experiences recurring events of violence. Regardless of the deployment of MONUSCO which is the largest and the most expensive peacekeeping mission of the UN, its presence has been important in trying to curb the conflict in the DRC (Brusset et al 2011). Needless to say, the UN grapples to address intimidations from rebel groups and promote sustainable development and therefore, continuous violence could ultimately spillover into bordering countries (Center for Preventive Action 2022). Despite the mission's mandate to protect civilians, the DRC still faces challenges of destitution, chronic humanitarian, and human rights violations. According to Manson (2021) in the Kivu provinces as of 2020, there were more than 130 armed groups. Ethnic tensions, food scarcity, corruption, and access to mineral wealth have all contributed to the conflict's escalation. As a result, these conflicts have exacerbated the economic situation, increased starvation, and resulted in rampant sexual violence. Moreover, the protection of civilians by the peacekeepers and outbreaks of conflicts are still of major concern (Kapinga 2015, Lopor 2016 and Luthuli 2016). Between January and November 2021, 2.7 million people were displaced in the DRC according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2022). At the end of November 2021, a total of 5.6 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) were recorded.

Furthermore, failure to resolve the conflict would then signify that the UN and MONUSCO, in their effort towards combating the conflict and implementing their mandate in DRC has not been successful.

The Significance of the Study

This study analyses the successes and failures of the UN and MONUSCO in the DRC as a third-party interventionist. According to Mullenbach (2005) third party actors are motivated to deploy peacekeeping missions to countries that are severely affected by humanitarian problems, as such is the case in most African countries and particularly the DRC. Fortna (2004:273) states that third-party peacekeeping has been one of the most significant developments in the management of international disputes since the end of WWII. The UN strives to resolve the world's most difficult conflicts through mediation, peacekeeping missions, and other conflict resolution tools (Reiter 2021). The UN plays the role of third-party peacekeeping efficaciously by deploying military and civilian personnel. The purpose of their deployment includes maintaining law and order, protection of civilians and humanitarian aid, monitoring disarmament demobilization and disengagement of combatants (Luthuli 2016).

The study finds relevancy in examining the UN in the DRC as the contemporary events and the history of the DRC are constant reminders that violence remains dominant and continues to impede the institutional, social, and economic development of the country (Wyss and Tardy 2014). Challenges faced by the UN intervention is an area which has not been paid much attention too, therefore, this study will address these challenges which include the Degree of Cooperation by Host State whereas the DRC government is demanding for the withdrawal of MONUSCO. The Role of Neighbouring Countries which play a critical role in the ongoing conflict in the eastern region. Lack of Funds and Capacity which focuses on budget costs and minimizing troops. In addition, by examining the DRC conflict situation, this study is adding to the existing literature in the field of peacekeeping. This study will highlight the impact of these challenges on the success or failure of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC. Although conflicts are context specific this case study may also be beneficial and serve as a new lesson for other peacekeeping interveners in other conflicts globally and regionally.

The Rationale of the Study

Ever since the DRC attained its independence, it has not experienced long periods of peace and stability. The DRC is known to be a conflict-ridden country. Additionally, the political and humanitarian situation in the eastern region of the country remains alarming and life threatening, civilians continue to live in hopeless situations.

The fundamental reason for the research, is to examine the successes and failures of peacekeeping in the DRC by the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO. Peacekeeping operations are instrumental in assisting states that are torn apart by conflicts and help to create conducive environments that result in favour of lasting peace. Peacekeeping has become one of the most significant developments in the management of international conflicts since the end of the Second World War (Fortna 2004:271).

Third party peacekeeping interventions are aimed at ensuring peace and security however, due to the challenges they face of military, humanitarian and political issues, others often regard their efforts non-effective (Vines 2013, Sarjoon and Yusoff 2019). Therefore, this study intends to shed more light on the role of MONUSCO in the DRC and its outcomes. It will do so by examining the successes of the mission on what it has been able to achieve thus far. Also delving into the failures, on what needs to improve to create a conducive environment for the people of Congo. Therefore, more analysis is needed to better understand how the UN has been responding to the conflict.

The Research Questions of the Study

The thesis has one main question and two sub – questions which seek to examine the successes and failures of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC. The thesis aims at answering the main question ‘How has the United Nations peacekeeping in the Congo evolved?’. To find out under what conditions does the UN peacekeeping improve peace and stability in the DRC as well as to examine the successes and failures of UN peacekeeping missions in the DRC – the researcher will answer the following sub-questions.

1. Which factors contribute to the successes and failures of MONUSCO in the DRC?
2. What are the challenges to peacekeeping in the DRC?

Methodology

This study utilizes a qualitative approach to assess the successes and failures of UN peacekeeping operations in the DRC. This approach provides depth and understanding in addressing the research questions. Qualitative research approach is defined as “research that aims to collect rich descriptive data in respect of a particular phenomenon with the aim of developing an understanding of what is being observed or studied” (Nieuwenhuis 2007:50). It is utilized to figure out what’s driving people’s decisions, attitudes, and motivations. It helps establish ideas or hypotheses for possible quantitative study, as well as uncovering trends in thought and opinion, and delving deeper into the subject. Liebscher (1998:669) states that qualitative studies are instrumental when the phenomena under study are complicated, are social in nature and do not lend themselves to quantification. On the same point, Wiersma (1995:212) claims that one of the virtues of the qualitative method is that it allows researchers to investigate complicated events holistically. Therefore, in this study qualitative research is most suitable as it allows the researcher to examine the role of UN and MONUSCO without any selective bias, the study’s conclusions are based on the data analysed.

A case study was conducted for the study. The case study method was selected as it explores in depth the experiences of the UN mission’s intervention in the DRC. Case studies investigate how and why things happen, they are descriptive in nature and seek to explore or explain the phenomenon that is being studied (Anderson 1993 and Babbie 2007). Royes (2011) argues that case studies are useful as they allow us to study rare phenomenon to understand it, case studies are also relevant when one needs to understand a problem to a great extent (Noor 2008). As one of the largest countries in Africa and a lynchpin of regional security, the DRC is an important country of study as it is afflicted by security and economic concerns to humanitarian imperatives. It is one of the most violent places on earth, the people of the Congo suffer from the brutality of armed groups and political instability, it was chosen due to its complex nature and the curiosity and interest of the researcher (Bjarnadóttir 2017).

Data was collected through a desk research method, which involved collecting and examining a variety of existing sources. This method entails the examination of pertinent papers, such as written material containing UN peacekeeping related information. According to Nieuwenhuis (2007:82) material related to the investigation

may include written data which comprises of published and unpublished documents, reports, memorandums, and articles. The study relied mainly on secondary sources when collecting data. To acquire this data the researcher conducted a literature search to obtain this information, which was retrieved through reviewing all readily available materials published by scholars and media reports such as books, articles, journals, government publications and the UN publications that have been written on topics covered in the study. The data was also collected from United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO), Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Human Rights Watch and United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). The secondary data also included documents of historical, political, and military significance. However, the limitation of a single case study design is that the study relied solely on secondary research to get data. Secondary research, according to Patten (2004), has limitations in terms of ensuring comprehensive research because it is dependent on data availability.

The researcher used a variety of data collection methods through a documentary method. It analysed the information collected to find the real meaning of the data to answer the research questions. The advantage of using secondary data is that it already exists and cannot be tempered. Documents are frequent and come in a number of formats, making them a very accessible and dependable data source. According to Bowen (2009:31) documents are also stable data sources, which means they may be read and reviewed several times without being unchanged by the researcher's influence or the research process. The information gathered is categorized by the formulation of research questions to be answered, the selection of the sample to be analysed, and the definition of the categories to be used. The study identified which data was going to be analysed, it explored the secondary data using written documents. It defined the data by using keywords (DRC, Successes and Failures, UN, MONUSCO, Peacekeeping and Conflict) to identify documents that contain information relevant to the study. Thereafter, articles related to the topic were downloaded however, articles most relevant were utilised and the information was grouped according to the themes of the research questions.

Design of the Study

This study, which is presented in four chapters, is focused on assessing the “Successes and Failures of Peacekeeping Operations: A Case Study on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)”. After the introduction of the study outlines the problem statement, rationale of the study, significance of study and the research questions as well as the methodology. The first chapter of the study comprises of the literature review on peacekeeping, which is divided into four themes: conceptualization of peacekeeping, the evolution of peacekeeping, the basic principles of peacekeeping and the successes and failures of peacekeeping. Chapter 2 contains the historical background of the DRC and its developments, and the three types of UN peace operations to exist in the DRC. The following chapter, 3 entails the discussion of the main findings. It answers the research questions of the study. This chapter also utilizes Pushkina’s four criteria: limitation of violence, reduction of human suffering, preventing spillovers and the promotion of conflict resolution and challenges. Lastly, Chapter 4, the closing chapter includes the conclusion of the study.

CHAPTER I

LITERATURE REVIEW

There can be no doubt that the African continent experiences a great number of conflicts (South Sudan, the Central African Republic, the DRC, Mali, and Western Sahara) for many reasons. Aremu (2010:551) states that conflicts in Africa can be attributed to a variety of issues, including arbitrary borders imposed by colonial powers, the ethnic diversity of African governments, inept political leadership, corruption, the detrimental impact of external debt, and poverty. Cilliers (2018:11) adds that democratisation, population age structure, recurring of violence and the influence of neighbouring countries are also among the factors that contribute towards the conflicts. These conflicts clearly have a negative impact on the continent and how outsiders view Africa. The continent's constant political tensions, wars, and conflicts have had a long-term negative influence on Africa's socioeconomic development, because socioeconomic development cannot be sustained in a violent, unstable, and insecure environment (Conteh 1998:20). It is for this reason that before Africa speaks of being recognized in a particular way by the global community, it ought to fix many of the issues, which lead to these conflicts. On the same breath, the continent should be in unison in trying to overcome many of the conflicts that occur in the continent. Therefore, peacekeeping becomes an integral part on the part of Africa and organ of the UN such as MONUSCO when tackling the conflict in the DRC. Another important tool in this endeavour is the existing literature on this issue. A lot has been written on the conflict in the DRC and much of the literature is very much relevant. However, more can be done to ensure that this conflict gets all the attention it ought to receive. This thesis also seeks to identify the gaps that the scholars who have written on this issue may have left out.

1.1 Conceptualization of Peacekeeping

One of the most important factors about understanding peacekeeping is to first and foremost understand what peace is. This thesis will adopt the concept of peace explained by Johan Vincent Galtung father of peace studies, defining the concept of peace as the absence of hostilities in all forms (Galtung 1969:7). Peacekeeping is an

important technique of conflict prevention which comprises of activities that result in favour of lasting peace. The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO 2004) echoes the importance of peacekeeping as it regards it as a cornerstone function of the UN. Peacekeeping has evolved and has expanded over the years; it is regarded as an important tool in the maintenance of international stability and conflict management in war torn countries (Tshiband 2010:1). In addition, the UNPKO emphasizes how peacekeeping has been instrumental and will continue to be in creating lasting peace in war-torn regions (Kandowe 2013:11). Since their first deployment in 1948, the international peacekeeping system has progressed in many respects, with new players, threats, and mandates that have emerged and evolved (Kandowe 2013:10). Peacekeeping is a strategy developed primarily by the UN to aid in the monitoring and resolution of armed conflicts after conflict has erupted (Goulding 1993:452). The role of peacekeeping is to separate armed groups, ensure the road of transition from a state of violence to a state of durable peace, protection of civilians, and reducing violence and to reinforce security (Brosig and Sempijja 2017:21). The main purpose of any peacekeeping mission or operation is to influence belligerent factions in conflict to come together in a long-term peace process by virtue of its presence. The UN peacekeeping is responsible for maintaining international peace and security through a variety of activities. Which include monitoring the ceasefire agreement, arms control verification, human rights monitoring, election supervision, assisting transitional political governments, and implementing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs and improving human conditions for sustainable peace (Serafino 2007:4). Bope (2011:11) makes the assertion that for the success of international peace, peacekeeping is one of the conflict resolution techniques that allows the UN to be represented in the field by deploying personnel and soldiers with the cooperation of belligerent parties to separate them in order to prevent and remove threats to the peace.

Peacekeeping owes its origins and formation to the UN an organization whose membership aims to maintain international peace and security as well as to enhance friendly relations among nations (Usden and Juergenliemk 2012:1-2). The UN is devoted to fostering worldwide cooperation especially when it comes to solving economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems (UN Charter 1945). Kandowe (2018:40) indicates that peacekeeping missions are not only called upon to assist in the

maintenance of peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process in conflict-affected countries. The mission also assists countries make the difficult transition from conflict to peace. Peacekeeping operations are usually authorized by one of the UN's organs either the UNSC or the General Assembly (GA).

Upon its genesis the UN traditionally described peacekeeping operations as those missions only encompassing military personnel, with the aim to help main or reinstate international peace and security in regions of conflict (United Nations 1990). Dignitaries such as the then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1992:11) defined peacekeeping as the UN presence in conflict prone countries with the consent of the parties affected, their presence is to ensure that there is peace and to prevent future conflict. Doyle and Sambanis (2006:11) argue that Boutros- Ghali's definition of peacekeeping primarily defines first-generation peacekeeping responses to inter-state conflicts rather than intra-state conflicts. Doyle, Ian and Robert (1997) describe peacekeeping in an inter-state war as second generation peacekeeping, involving tasks such as separating forces, disarming combatants, organizing elections, and protecting humanitarian and UN personnel. Today's definition of peacekeeping has evolved over the course of time, as the term has developed, so have peacekeeping operations from rigorously military to comprise multidimensional operations including civilians, police, and military (Tshiband 2010:2). From this point of view, the UN define peacekeeping as: *"a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace."* (UN 2008 p. 18). Pugh (2004) further defines peacekeeping as a multinational force, it is tasked with monitoring and patrolling ongoing conflict zones with light arms and must be impartial in carrying out its duties with the consent of the conflicting parties.

The similarity in definition is that the authors acknowledge that peacekeeping operations have evolved during the course of time. Likewise, it can also be argued that the authors assert that peacekeeping operations have a criterion, one of which is to keep the peace.

Peacekeeping as a unique and instrumental operation that helps countries torn by conflict to create the conditions that are conducive for lasting peace. It has been one of the primary conflict resolution tools. This is a clear demonstration that peacekeeping operations are essential in creating an atmosphere favourable to negotiations. Additionally, peacekeeping does not necessitate fighting but rather includes the use of military intervention that strives for management and resolution to conflicts.

1.2 Evolution of Peacekeeping

The role of UNPKO has undergone significant changes since the first observer mission in 1948 (Sloan 2014:674). To be able to critically analyse UNPKO, it is necessary to categorize their evolution by time and scope. These groups are usually referred to as “generations”. For the purposes of this study, UN peacekeeping will be divided into three broad categories.

Bellamy and Williams (2010:13) note that peacekeeping has evolved over subsequent generations, the first of which was traditional peacekeeping, in relation to the practical evolution of peacekeeping using the ‘generations approach’ during the Cold War. It evolved into the second generation, multidimensional peacekeeping (peacebuilding) in the early 1990s, the ending of the Cold War and the post-Cold War. In the third generation, it progressed to peace enforcement since the late 1990’s to date. In terms of the practice of peace operations, Kenkel (2013:125) claims that it has become common to divide their evolution into subsequent generations. Generations are divided based on three main factors: the level of force used by the military pillar of operations, the type and depth of tasks carried out by the civilian pillar, and increased UN load-sharing with regional organizations. The sections that follow describe the evolution of peacekeeping over successive generations. The transitioning of these generations signified the phasing out of the Cold War, during this period the UN developed new strategies and opportunities to help manage and resolve conflicts. Goulding (1993:452) states that the evolution presented new tasks and techniques which had advanced from what had been a homogenous activity. The concept of the word ‘evolution’ was developed in this case as an efficient way of responding to changing conflicts in changing environments (Goulding 1993:451).

The first generation of UN peacekeeping dates to the late 1940’s with the deployment of military observers. Yamashita (2017:1) indicates that the first mission of

peacekeeping began in 1948 when the UNSC approved the deployment of military observers to the Middle East to supervise the Arab- Israeli war.

Abusara (2010) introduces first generation peacekeeping operations, also known as traditional operations, which were solely UN operations. During this period the UN deployed a limited number of peacekeeping operations. Kenkel (2013:131) argues that the principle of state sovereignty and its inter-state inviolability gave rise to the development of three principles: consent, impartiality, and the use of force as a last resort. Forces were lightly armed in these operations, relying on moral persuasion to ensure mission success. Goulding (1993:456) proposes that under this generation peacekeepers as observer missions, they were limited in scope, focusing on monitoring the terms of peace agreements between sovereign states (such as Israel). According to Findlay (2002:5) traditional peacekeeping as UNPKO involves the deployment of military contingents to monitor, supervise, and verify compliance with ceasefires, ceasefire lines, withdrawals, buffer zones, and related military agreements. Findlay makes the point that the primary goal of traditional peacekeeping operations is to assist in the creation and maintenance of conditions conducive to long-term conflict resolution efforts by the parties themselves. James (1990:1) draws attention on the importance of this type of peacekeeping as the 'international help' by the deployment of the of international troops to aid disputing states. Clapham (1998:89) adds on that this type of peacekeeping argues that peace be kept between disputing countries. On which the countries have agreed upon on a provisional basis for peace with the inclusion of a third-party intervention. The involvement of third-party interventions was based on limited mandates which consisted of monitoring and observing the conflict situation. It is noteworthy to consider that during the era of the Cold War; peacekeeping operations were mainly deployed to monitor ceasefires and to reduce conflict and violence. The most notable case was that of the mission in Congo in 1960 – 1964 (Dobbins et al. 2001:7), in 1960 ONUC was the first large-scale mission, with nearly 20,000 personnel, mandated to end the Congo crisis, it merely served as an observer mission. Bellamy and Williams (2010:4) highlight that the larger purpose of peacekeeping during the Cold War was to create political space that would allow for states to negotiate a political solution with the aim of preventing the conflicts from escalating into global crises. The classic example of this type of an operation is the role of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) after the 1956 Suez crisis.

The origin of *the second generation* of peacekeeping operations goes back to the end of the Cold War. During that time there was a peak in the number of intra-state violent conflicts which gave rise to change in the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force. During this period, the nature of peacekeeping was affected due to the new security threats that emerged (Chesterman 2005; Diehl and Balas 2014, Doyle and Sambanis 2006). The second-generation peacekeeping also known as multidimensional peacekeeping or peacebuilding refers to the effort to rebuild and reform societies that have been torn apart by internal conflict. This type of peacekeeping revealed and signified that peacekeeping ought to concentrate more on economic, political, and social issues (Suleiman 2016:32). The UN gradually shifted from a traditional, moral authority to a more aggressive, physical authority, with activities in this generation being more assertive and interventionist than their forefathers. Kenkel (2013:131) on the other hand, claims that the increased tasks and challenging environment contributed to a growing gap between the means and the ends, jeopardizing the missions' ultimate success. Due to the severity of the civil wars and their devastating effects the peacekeeping missions deployed were provided with wider range mandates that not only focused on observing and keeping the peace but rather at building foundations that would result in favour of lasting peace (Andersen and Engedal 2013:15). This peacekeeping model varies from the first-generation peacekeeping model in that it has broader targets for peacekeeping functions. This model, which consists of military, law enforcement, and civilian staff, aims to provide humanitarian aid, help in the transition to a democratic system, and institution building, among other things. Bria (2007:44) elaborates that under this type of peacekeeping some missions were permitted to use force, when necessary, as this was not permissible in the first peacekeeping model. Annor (2018:25-26) proposes that because the core principles of traditional peacekeeping operations could not be applied to the current nature of conflicts. There was a shift from traditional forms of peacekeeping to more multidimensional peacekeeping operations, with peacekeepers now deployed to all volatile environments where there was little or no peace to keep. He further elucidates that the UN was able to play the role of neutrality and third party in such conflicts, making it much easier to gain the consent of one party to deploy UN troops within its borders. This generation saw a surge in the number of missions, as well as their scale in terms of manpower which increased markedly. The UNSC approved 20 new missions between 1989 and

1994, bringing the total number of peacekeepers to 75000 (Gizelis, Dorussen and Petrova, 2016:5). According to Goulding (1993:457) the traditional model of peacekeeping was replaced by so-called 'second' and 'third' generation peacekeeping missions (Goulding 1993:457). The UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia (1992-1993) according to Arachchi (2002) was the first active multidimensional UNPKO. Their involvement resulted in elections being monitored, economic, political, and social institutions being rebuilt, and human rights were promoted as part of the UN mission. Furthermore, the UN played an important role in the establishment of a democratic regime in Cambodia (Arachchi 2002). Other examples include, Mozambique (1992-1994), Croatia (1998), Namibia (1989-1990), and El Salvador (1989-1990) these countries were all active peacekeeping missions under the second-generation peacekeeping model (1989-1995). Brahm (2005) indicates that these missions were the largest and most intricate in the world and that the UN was also involved with internal conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

Second-generation peacekeeping is demonstrated when the UN intervenes in civil wars or interstate conflicts to assist countries in conflict in reaching a level of sustainable peace through dialogue. The multidimensional peacekeeping concept combines many sorts of duties to perform multiple roles (Bope 2011:13). Bope also draws attention to the fact that generally, peacekeeping missions are made up of both civilian and military personnel who are highly equipped in order to defend their security in the event of militia violence. Among other things the civilian and military personnel groups are made up of peacekeepers from developed countries, which provide financial support to peacekeepers in order for them to complete their mission (ibid).

The third-generation peace operations, also known as peace enforcement operations. According to De Coning (2017:147) peace enforcement operations are defined as those that do not necessitate the consent of the host nation or other parties to the conflict. Peace enforcements are distinguished by increased authorization to use force to enforce the goals of a mission's mandate without a major deviation in the essence of that mandate from the traditional transitional tasks of second-generation mandates (Osman 2002:5-7). These missions were an improvement over the second-generation missions in that they were more multidimensional and integrated in nature, owing to the broader range of objectives they were to accomplish. The variety of tasks has now expanded to

include security, humanitarian, and political goals. Usually, these missions are dispatched under Chapter VII. Kenkel (2013:130) argues that the emergence of the third generation can be traced back to the failures of peacekeeping in the 1990's: the missions in Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Annor (2018:30) proposes that third-generation UN peacekeeping missions frequently operate in high-risk environments, where they face complex and asymmetric security threats or violent extremists who target the missions. Despite their limited capabilities, missions are being asked to protect civilians or stabilize the security situation in areas where violent conflict is ongoing. The lessons learned on these missions had a significant impact on the guiding principles that govern peace operations. In the case of the Rwandan genocide both impartiality and the non-use of force arguably were major issues, the peacekeeping operation deployed, UNAMIR was forbidden to use force to take preventative action due to the nature of its mandate (Kenkel 2013:130). Later the UN's response to these failures would centre around the use of force. Under this generation peacekeeping operations were provided with a more robust mandate, this allowed the peacekeepers to use force, not just in self-defence but also in defence of the mission. Missions were to implement strategies that would ensure coherence between the military and civilian aspects of the engagement (Anderson and Engedal 2013:15). Third-generation missions progressed from observational missions to comprehensive 'multidimensional and integrative missions' with more ambitious objectives such as promoting complex peace agreements and maintaining peace in the post-conflict period (Tiernay 2015).

1.3 Basic Principles of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping principles are the cornerstone function of the UN, they were formed in the face of a threat to international peace and security, which the UN promised to preserve. Consent, impartiality, and the limited use of force are the three principles of peacekeeping, which at times are referred to as the 'holy trinity' or traditional peacekeeping (Annor 2018:29).

According to Charbonneau (2015:276) over the years the UN peacekeeping has grown significantly and intertwined with explicit mandates to build state authority. Traditionally these principles were established with the deployment of the UNEF in Sinai 1956, in response to the Suez crisis (Tshiband 2010:5). The crisis in Egypt

opposed by France, UK, and Israel whose forces invaded the canal, UNEF was deployed to observe the withdrawal of these countries. Essentially this was not the first UNPKO to be deployed but was the first to include armed peacekeepers, which invoked the question of the use of force (Findlay 2002). According to Montero (2019:2) these principles are instrumental when it comes to humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping.

In the process the UN's three main peacekeeping principles – consent, impartiality and the non-use of force has evolved. These principles were developed during the first-generation peacekeeping. Peacekeepers during this period were to act as impartial observers tasked with maintaining peace and containing the conflict situation until a political solution could be found (Yamashita 2008:619). Annor (2018:25) highlights that these core principles could not be applied to the nature of conflicts in the second generation. As mentioned above Peacekeepers were now deployed to every volatile environment where there was little or no peace to keep, resulting in a shift from traditional forms of peacekeeping to more multidimensional peacekeeping operations. With the third generation it focused on the lessons from failed second-generation peacekeeping which had a significant impact on the “Holy Trinity” of the UN peacekeeping principles. They had become more focused on civilian protection, more robust, and in some cases, have begun to adopt stabilization as a mission goal (Bellamy & Hunt 2015:1278).

These principles are inextricably linked and mutually reinforce one another. It is critical that all those involved in the planning and execution of UNPKO understand their meaning and relationship to one another in order for them to be used effectively (United Nations 2008:31).

1.3.1 Consent of the Parties

The first principle is that for a peacekeeping force to be deployed there needs to be an agreement between the host country and the UN. Basically, UNPKO are deployed to conflict country with the consent of the main parties to the conflict. Given the consent of both parties involved peacekeeping distinguishes this type of operation from enforcement operations. The Capstone Doctrine a document which outlines the guiding principles and primary goals of the UNPKO, states that in the absence of such consent, a UNPKO risks becoming a party to the conflict; and being drawn towards enforcement

action, rather than its intrinsic role of keeping the peace (De Coning, Detzel, & Hojem 2008:2). This then becomes crucial as the host states consent is of vital importance to deploy UN peacekeepers in its territory, in doing so it is connected to the overarching principle of respecting state sovereignty (Choedon 2020:452). Montero emphasizes that the acceptance of the peacekeeping force in the host country favours the UN and grants them the freedom to carry out their mission both political and physical in order to fulfil its mandate in the region (Montero 2019:2). Mateja (2015:358) is of the view that consent is sought in order to facilitate the work and tasks of UN peacekeepers. The consent is usually obtained through a peace treaty between the conflict's main parties. While peacekeepers are often deployed to countries that are plagued by conflicts, they are not intended to conduct their operations in the midst of open conflict. De Coning, Detzel, & Hojem (2008:2) indicates that consent by the parties to a peace- or cease-fire agreement is a dynamic and multi-layered concept, it is critical for mission's success and must be constantly managed, but it is recognized that it is frequently lacking at the tactical level. Hatto (2013:498) elaborates that since the report of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld on the establishment and operation of UNEF, one of the three fundamental principles of traditional peacekeeping (observation and interposition) has been the parties' consent. He mostly refers to the consent of the "states parties", which can be difficult in operations involving non-state groups that may not agree to the presence of military peacekeepers. During the Cold War, operations in the Congo (ONUC) and Lebanon (UNIFIL) demonstrated that if some non-state groups withdraw their consent to the UN presence, the safety of the Blue Helmets may be jeopardized.

The United Nations (2008:32) states that a peacekeeping operation must work continuously to ensure that it does not lose the consent of the main parties while also ensuring that the peace process moves forward. This necessitates that all peacekeeping personnel have a thorough understanding of the mission area's history, customs, and culture, as well as the ability to assess the evolving interests and motivations of the parties. In a post-conflict environment, the lack of trust between the parties can make consent uncertain and unreliable at times. When a party is not fully committed to the peace process, consent, especially if given reluctantly under international pressure, can be withdrawn in a variety of ways. For example, a party that has consented to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation may later seek to limit the operation's freedom of action, resulting in a de facto withdrawal of consent. The complete

withdrawal of consent by one or more of the main parties calls into question the rationale for the UN peacekeeping operation and is likely to change the core assumptions and parameters underlying the international community's strategy to support the peace process (United Nations 2008:32).

1.3.2 Impartiality

Another key principle is guided by impartiality which elucidates that UN peacekeeping missions must carry out their mandates without favour or biasness to any party. Impartiality is regarded as critical to retaining the consent and cooperation of the major parties and should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity (Mateja 2015:359). The cornerstone function of impartiality is clearly consent to peacekeeping activities; impartiality is intended to ensure the continued cooperation of all key political actors so that the operation can successfully implement its mandate (ibid). Hansen et al (2004) adds that impartiality epitomises a pillar of consent and has been referred to as the oxygen of peacekeeping. In civilian peacekeeping missions, the principle of impartiality can be equated with non-partisanship. Peacekeepers are expected to treat information with equal thoroughness and not to adopt political or ideological views of either party (Tshiband 2010:5). Nystrom (2015) highlights that, it is crucial to maintain the consent and cooperation of the main parties and other stakeholders. He and Goulding (1993:457) propose that it is essential that the UN retains strong relations with the parties involved, in addition peacekeeping operations should elude activities that could possibly compromise its image of impartiality. UN peacekeepers should be impartial when undertaking their tasks with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate (United Nations 2008:33). According to the United Nations (2021) under this principal peacekeeping operations are not to overlook the actions of the parties that in any way violate the actions of the peace process or the norms that UNPKO upholds. This principle states that peacekeeping forces are to avoid taking sides in the conflict (Tshiband 2010:5). The general presupposition is that preserving impartiality is the only way peacekeeping can carry out their mandate. Furthermore, Tharoor (1995:60) identifies impartiality as, *“The only way peacekeepers can work is by being trusted by both sides, being clear and transparent in their dealings, and keeping lines of communication open. Failing to maintain impartiality may turn peacekeepers into an enemy force, leading to attacks from one or more conflicting*

parties” (Findlay 2002:4). Despite the need to establish and maintain good relations with the parties, a peacekeeping operation must avoid activities that could jeopardize its image of impartiality. A mission should not be afraid to apply the principle of impartiality rigorously for fear of misinterpretation or retaliation, but before acting, it is always prudent to ensure that the grounds for acting are well-established and can be clearly communicated to all. Failure to do so may jeopardize the peacekeeping operation’s credibility and legitimacy and may result in one or more of the parties withdrawing their consent to its presence (United Nations 2008:33).

1.3.3 Limited Use of Force

The final principle entails the use of limited force which is limited to a very strict concept of self-defence. Peacekeepers were permitted to use force only in self-defence (Choedon 2020:452). Mateja (2015:359) indicates that the principle of non-use of force except in self-defence is one of the pillars of peacekeeping and can be traced back to the first deployments of armed UN peacekeepers. Despite this principled prohibition, it is widely accepted that peacekeepers may use force at the tactical level with the Security Council’s approval and when acting in self-defence or defence of the mandate. Consent and impartiality provide a sense of security that eliminates the need for force. Urquhart maintains that the true strength of a peacekeeping force is not its ability to use force, but rather its ability to refrain from using force, allowing it to remain above the conflict and maintain its unique position and prestige (Urquhart 1987:178-9). The term non-use of force is reinterpreted to mean “non-use of force at the strategic level” the doctrine of argues that the UN is best suited to conduct consent-based operations. But it also introduces the concept of “robust peacekeeping,” which acknowledges that the use of force at the tactical level may be necessary to protect the mission and its mandate from spoilers, as well as to protect civilians when mandated (De Coning 2008:2).

The environments in which UNPKO are deployed are frequently characterized by the presence of militias, criminal gangs, and other spoilers who may actively seek to undermine the peace process or pose a threat to the civilian population. In such cases, the Security Council has given UN peacekeeping missions “robust” mandates authorizing them to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent physical attack, and/or assist national authorities in maintaining law and order. These UNPKO have succeeded in improving

the security situation and creating an environment conducive to long-term peacebuilding in the countries where they are deployed by proactively using force in defence of their mandates (United Nations 2008:34).

Under this principle this concept permits peacekeepers to use force in situations where their personal safety is directly threatened. Therefore, the use of force should be used as last resort in peacekeeping operations, because using force would go against the principles and purpose of the mandate. It is required that the UNPKO ought to maintain a high degree of public and political acceptance in order for their mission to be carried out appropriately (Montero 2019:4).

An example of the use of force in the UN peace operations goes back to the ONUC mission in Congo in 1960 when the UNSC permitted the peacekeepers to use force. According to Abi-Saab (1978:40) this concept was developed during this era over the interpretation of the mandate especially regarding the use of force. Initially, the concept of self-defence was intended to protect peacekeepers and their colleagues in situations of hostile action (Findlay 2002:15). However, in the case of ONUC the missions mandate as expanded to allow peacekeepers to use force against armed groups, to defend their posts, vehicles, equipment's and to support UN troops from other contingents (Findlay 2002:60). The mission later covered the protection of civilian personnel as well as civilians under protection.

1.4 Successes and Failures of Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations have evolved and changed dramatically since the Cold War began, according to MacQueen (2006:234). The majority of UNPKOs around the world have been performed under UN mandates, so the term is mainly associated with UNPKOs (Cox 1967:7). Since 1988, there has been an increase in the number and size of UNPKOs (Bratt 1996). Several studies have found that peacekeeping does help stabilize conflict-torn countries, decreasing the likelihood of recurrent conflicts (Costalli 2014, Furnari 2014 and Sandler 2017). The successes and failures of UN peacekeeping missions is usually measured by the duration of peace after civil wars, these successes and failures is also a benchmark used to evaluate the results of an action in an operation's progress.

1.4.1 Criteria for Measuring the Peacekeeping Performance

Measures of successes and failures epitomize the matter of achievement of a mission and the operation's overall objectives (Diehl 1994:150). Diehl (1993:211) identifies two criteria's for evaluating the successes of peacekeeping operations: the limitation of armed conflict and the promotion of conflict resolution. To measure the successes Diehl tested these criteria on six of the most notable peacekeeping operations between 1956 and 1984, which were on conducted in these cases:

- The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) from 1956-1967 on the Egyptian Israeli border
- In the same area from 1973-1979,
- The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) between 1960-1964,
- The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) from 1964 onward,
- The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UN- IFIL) from 1978 onward,
- A Multinational Force (MNF) commanded by the United States, in Lebanon from 1982 – 1984.

By analysing the conflict situation and the peacekeeping initiatives he was further able to make the assertion that these peacekeeping operations are successful under these five conditions:

1. Consent of the parties by the host state and the third party,
2. Peacekeepers apply limited use of force except in self-defence,
3. Peacekeeping operations preserve their neutrality by not favouring or being seen as favouring either side in the conflict,
4. Peacekeeping addresses interstate rather than intrastate conflicts,
5. Peacekeepers are able to separate and demobilize the combatants.

Since Diehl's book was one of the first to address how to assess the performance of peacekeeping operations, there have been several criticisms of his work and the parameters he used. According to Johansen (1994:308) these criteria ask more of peacekeeping forces than reasonably can be expected because they are not designed for

the purpose (s) of averting war in general and resolving underlying disputes. He claimed that Diehl's criteria misrepresented the true purpose of peacekeeping.

Johansen (1994:309) states that peacekeeping can no longer be measured against an ideal state of peace for example no armed conflict after deployment or an ideal method of conflict resolution for example (the resolution of long-standing animosities). It is both normatively and scientifically ineffective to do so. He suggests two routes completely different from Diehl's criteria.: first, assessing the impact of UN peacekeepers on local people impacted by their work, and second, comparing the degree of misunderstanding, stress, or aggression in the presence of UN peacekeepers to the projected effects of balance-of-power action without peacekeeping (Johansen 1994:304).

Bratt (1996:64) establishes four ways in which operational success of peacekeeping can be measured which include: mandate performance, promoting conflict resolution, conflict containment and limitation of casualties. He states that use of these criteria greatly strengthens future peacekeeping research because it establishes a descriptive method for evaluating the success of peacekeeping operation. The criteria will also be useful for policymakers when deciding whether to establish or withdraw future peacekeeping operations.

Mandate performance: If the peacekeeping operation fulfilled its mission successfully, can be determined by reviewing the specified mandate in Security Council resolutions and assessing whether it was adequately completed. For example, if the peacekeepers were ordered to disarm the combatants, the analyst will clearly assess how far the specified tasks have been accomplished. As a result, the mandate evaluation has become the most popular method of evaluating organizational performance (Bratt 1996: 67).

Promoting conflict resolution: Assesses the operations ability to promote and assist in the resolution of the conflict's root causes. This indicator is applicable because it should be the ultimate goal of the UN efforts to assess all the underlying root causes. In reality, in recent cases, the Security Council has agreed that making progress toward conflict resolution is a prerequisite for continuing with the peacekeeping activity (Bratt 1996: 68).

Conflict containment: According to Bratt (1996:69) the operation's success is measured by whether it prevented major powers or neighbouring states from interfering in the conflict. Therefore, it is important to evaluate an operations ability to manage and contain due to that at times the only reason for deploying UN peacekeepers is to prevent a conflict from escalating.

Limitation of casualties aims to determine whether the peacekeeping operation was able to limit casualties. This is measured by comparing the number of civilian and military deaths in the conflict before and after the deployment of the peacekeeping mission. A full success, in general, necessitates a substantial reduction in casualties. Bratt applied these indicators to 39 peacekeeping operations which were overseen between 1945 and 1996 and measured each of them with a final evaluation of operations. Each peacekeeping activity was classified as a complete success, a moderate success, or a failure in his analysis for each measure of success. In doing so, he attempted to establish general standards for measuring the successes and failures of peacekeeping operations in this manner (Sigiri and Basar 2014:392). From his analysis Bratt developed three levels of operational success: Was the mandate fulfilled as set out by the Security Council resolution? The operation becomes moderately successful when one of the remaining three objectives has been considerably met (Bratt 1996:72). Finally, a failure occurs if the operation failed under all four indicators.

Van der Ljin (2010:31-32) identifies eight factors for the successes and failures of peacekeeping operations. He established these factors to justify into question 'are peacekeeping operations instrumental in the contribution towards durable peace'? These factors include; parties are willing and sincere, operations ability to provide security, attention for the root causes, cooperation from important outside actors, operations is deployed timely and at the right time, complete leadership and personnel and clear command structures, operation is part of a long-term approach & operations provide ownership.

Parties are willing and sincere; this entails the consent of the parties. The host states consent is of vital importance to deploy UN peacekeepers in its territory, in doing so it is connected to the overarching principle of respecting state sovereignty (Choedon 2020:452). Montero (2019:4) emphasizes that the acceptance of the peacekeeping force

in the host country favours the UN and grants them the freedom to carry out their mission both political and physical to fulfil its mandate in the region.

Operation's ability to provide security. Parties typically believe that if the cease-fire is overseen by a credible, large, well-trained, well-equipped, and forcefully mandated force, their security will improve.

Attention for the root causes of the conflict. It is imperative to address the root causes of the conflicts failure to do so will result in the recurrence of the conflicts. Areas such as the states disinclination, lack of good governance and the absence of legitimacy are all major sources of conflict that must be addressed.

Cooperation from important outside actors and parties. Van der Ljin (2010:32) emphasizes the support of the permanent members of the UNSC plays a vital role as they need to accept the necessary resolutions and mandates. Neighbouring countries' cooperation is critical because they often support one of the parties, and the implementation of certain "policy instruments" in a peacekeeping mission which necessitate their assistance.

Operation is deployed timely and at the right time. The deployment of a peacekeeping operation can assist and play an accommodating role if the timing is right. Additionally, early deployment of an operation is critical, as a delayed deployment can cause previously stable situations to deteriorate.

Complete leadership and personnel and clear command structures. Leadership is especially crucial when it comes to the ongoing mediation function during an operation's presence. Additionally, any 'policy tool' in a peacekeeping mission relies on qualified personnel. Clear command structures are crucial in crisis situations, but they also help in decision-making.

Operation is part of a long-term approach. For the operation to successfully contribute towards the termination of physical violence and addressing the origins of the conflict, it requires sufficient time. Therefore, this implies that operations need to build on policies that have already been implemented.

Operation provides ownership. 'Ownership' is crucial both during and after the presence of an operation. Following the end of an operation, former adversarial parties and the general public must see and feel the contribution as something they wish to keep.

Pushkina (2006:134) went a step further and sought to answer the question of success determinants, or why the UN has been more effective in resolving some internal crises more than others. In her research, she used the following broader criteria: limitation of violence, reduction of human suffering, preventing spill overs & promoting conflict resolution.

Limitation of violence in the host state: Under this approach the primary aim of peacekeeping is to keep armed conflict in the host country to a minimum. Peacekeepers are often deployed after a truce agreement has been reached, and their job is to keep the peace. This approach is used to determine if a mission was effective in minimizing large-scale violence, maintaining ceasefire agreements, reducing conflict-related casualties, and supervising demobilization, as well as evaluating disarmament progress. Data pertaining this criteria will be retrieved from ACLED and the UN.

Reduction of human suffering: Another primary aim of peacekeeping operations is to reduce human suffering and the protection of civilians. The UN is responsible for preventing atrocities against civilians as part of their mandate they peacekeeping operations are a key tool in achieving this aim. This approach is measured by the number of human rights recorded, the scale of any decline in human rights violations and the mission's progress in resettling refugees are used to operationalize this criterion. Data from Human Rights Watch and UNJHRO will be utilised to analyse this criteria.

Preventing spill over into state borders: Preventing conflict from spreading outside the boundaries of the object state is also crucial for regional security. Internal conflicts are likely to spread over into neighbouring countries in the region by the process known as 'contagion'. Violence against civilians frequently results in refugee flows, and diaspora populations can cause resource competition, sparking further conflict in neighbouring countries. To evaluate this approach, it is critical to assess the integrity of neighbouring countries and the extent to which it has been maintained. To measure the integrity of the country. The Congolese state has a major responsibility to strengthen its institutions

in order to regulate and manage its territory, protect its unity and territorial integrity, and ensure the safety of its population.

Promoting conflict resolution: This the final measure of the successes and failures of the UN operation. For peacekeeping, this stage requires a conducive environment that can prevent the relapse of any hostilities after the peacekeeping operation has departed. This approach will be evaluated in terms of how well the environment created by peacekeepers prevents potential conflict. Pushkina (2006:135) emphasises that the first two approaches should be the focus and primary goal of peace missions and the utmost criterion of their success. She applied these criteria to 17 UN peacekeeping operation deployed between 1945 – 1998, after the examination the missions were classified into three groups, successful (UNTAG, ONUMOZ, UNTAES, UNSMIH, UNMIH, UNPROFOR-Macedonia, UNPREDEP), moderately successful (UNFICYP, UNTAC, ONUC) and failed (UNAVEM III, UNIFIL, UNOSOM II, UNPROFOR-Croatia, UNCRO, UNPROFOR-Bosnia, UNAMIR).

The criteria used to evaluate the outcome of peacekeeping operations are crucial. Several authors used a few similar but also quite different criteria to assess the success and failures of various peacekeeping operations. Therefore, the study will utilise Pushkina's four criteria to analyse the successes and failures of MONUSCO based on that her indicators embody wholly the mandates of the mission and its progress. Her indicators were selected as they address the conflict situation in the DRC, they focus on the prevention of violence (limitation of violence), welfare/humanitarian situation (human suffering), Rwandan genocide (spillover) and peace efforts (conflict resolution). Pushkina emphasizes, the primary goal of peace operations and the ultimate criterion of their success should be to limit armed conflict and human suffering.

Stated unequivocally that the primary goal of peacekeeping, as the UN has attempted to do throughout the DRC's civil war, is to limit violent conflict in the host state. Pushkina's indicators continue to show that peacekeepers are frequently deployed after a cease-fire agreement has been reached, and their task is frequently to maintain that peace (Pushkina 2006:134). The DRC is currently one of the largest countries on the African continent to face dire humanitarian crises. The UN aims to bring security and peace conflict torn countries. Reduction of human suffering entails the prevention of large-scale violence, reducing the number of fatalities, assisting in the resettlement of

refugees and IDPs, and establishing safe environments in which violence does not occur after the peace operation has left (Pushkina 2006:136). Which is the desired outcome for the people of the Congo. She further highlights that internal conflict in one country can spread to other countries in the region via a process known as contagion. Without a doubt, the instability of one country can spread and weaken the systems of its neighbours. It is widely acknowledged that refugees have a negative impact on the receiving country and have the potential to incite violence and cause wars. Pushkina emphasizes that preventing conflict from spreading beyond the borders of the host state is also important for ensuring regional security. Failure to ensure regional security, continued violence may eventually spillover into Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda. Pushkina (2006:134) additionally, peacekeeping missions are successful if they control armed conflict and promote conflict resolution. Peacekeeping necessitates the creation of a stable environment capable of preventing armed conflict from resuming after the peacekeeping mission has left.

These criteria best explain how the UN mission in Congo has been performing. The criteria outlined here address both peacekeeper performance in the field – mandate fulfilment – and the mission’s contribution to international peace and security goals.

While some operations are regarded as a success; El Salvador, Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Liberia it is without a doubt that other operations are seen as a failure; Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia (Van der Ljin 2010:27). UN peacekeepers operate in the most dangerous and complicated environments in the world, they help countries circumnavigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. Successful missions are determined by whether the UN was able to make a real difference by providing basic security, by supporting political transitions and assist reinforce new state institutions (United Nations 2021). Successful missions are also guided by the three principles of peacekeeping, consent, impartiality, and the limited use of force. These factors are required for the evaluation when determining the successes. Jacobson (2018:1) states that UN peacekeeping operations have been successful in the areas of elections and communications especially after peace agreements. Failed missions on the other hand comprise of the opposite characterises as opposed to the successful ones, they consist of lack of consent from host governments, protection of civilians, late deployment, not using force even for legitimate reasons and the absence of a comprehensive agreement

(Bardalai 2018:8-9). According to Jacobson (2018:1) the failures of the are the result of the abuses of foreigners serving as UN peacekeepers, they have a history of defeats and violations. In some instances, they are rarely armed or withdraw if threatened or assaulted. Therefore, this results in the failure to protect civilians. Some of the peacekeepers (deployed by the UN) have been reported to take advantage of women and young girls, yet they are seldom punished for any crimes such as rape or other offenses. Following the two abominable events in the history of peacekeeping, a few case studies were published: the spectacular failure of the UNAMIR or Rwanda to deter or even diminish the magnitude of the Rwanda genocide, and the unsuccessful missions in Somalia (UNITAF and UNOSOM I and II). These reports, understandably, focused on the shortcomings of peacekeeping, stressing how changing conditions on the ground left UN peacekeepers with inadequate mandates and capacity to intervene effectively (Gizelis, Dorussen, & Petrova, 2016:10).

The factors contributing to the successes or failure is not comprehensive since conflicts vary. According to Rikhye, (1995) “Each conflict is different; each requires its own diagnosis and treatment”. As seen above, several authors analysed the successes and failures of peacekeeping operations. The evaluation of the successes and failures rests largely on these criterions. It is imperative to note that the challenges faced by the UN intervention is an area which has not been paid much attention too. This one of the points this thesis will elaborate on.

The success of peace operations is primarily determined by the success criteria used. Factors influencing the successes and failures of the operation/mission range from non-use of force except in self-defence one of the UN factors to cultural considerations.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE DRC

The conflict in the DRC is set in motion in this chapter. It begins by looking at the DRC's political conditions prior to the arrival of the UN and MONUSCO. It also identifies and explains the factors that led to the deployment of the peacekeeping forces in the DRC conflict. Overall, the chapter's goal is to provide insight into the country's conflict's origins, causes, and context.

2.1 DRC's Political Conditions Prior to the Deployment of MONUSCO

The Congo is a former colony of Belgium, the country gained its independence from Belgium in 1960. Seventy-five years of colonial rule did not yield a state or a nation. The period following independence was chaotic as the Belgians left behind a catastrophic state in which the DRC was never able to rebuild itself. The DRC enjoyed independence only for a short period adjusting to their new independence (Beya 2012: 2). A few months after attaining independence the DRC witnessed deep political crisis and social precariousness (Tshiyoyo 2012:11). The DRC had restricted human and institutional limit for good administration and in any event, for setting up a utilitarian government. (Obidegwa, 2004:4). As a result, the DRC had been buried in struggle for well longer than ten years, with annihilating impacts on its regular citizen populace (Carayannis 2009:6). Post-colonial DRC had been challenged with deep-seated political, monetary, and social difficulties, because of failure by the previous government to deliver genial arrangements. Furthermore, the DRC has not ensured its region and given harmony and security to its residents, which are its most essential obligations (N'Gwambwa 2011:2). The situation of the DRC is complex that no study of the country or any part of the DRC can be complete without delving into its history (Ogunnoiki 2019:27).

After a power struggle developed in the DRC between President Joseph Kasa - Vubu and former prime minister Moise Tshombe, Mobutu then commander in chief led a military coup in 1965, he seized control of the country and declared himself president of the DRC. In 1971 he renamed the country to the Republic of Zaire. Once prosperous

in doing so, the country markedly declined. Uncontrolled debasement and maltreatment of the civilian population ensued (Beya 2012:11). According to Dizolele (2014) after attaining power Mobutu promised to restore peace and order and return the country to a democratic rule within five years. The Mobutu regime began with reassurance of prosperity and an end to conflict; however, it was mired with corruption, oppression, and failed social and economic programs (N’Gambwa 2011:2). Like many before him who have had the opportunity to experience such power, he was ruthless in his ability to lead his actions were supported by the West who also helped finance him both militarily and financially (Trautman 2013:33). Scholars including Ogunnoiki (2019: 27) agree that the Mobutu administration was an autocratic kleptocracy in which during his tenure Mobutu institutionalized corruption, embezzling the funds of the state for his personal interest just as King Leopold of Belgium did in the 19th century.

It was also discovered in June 1997 that Mobutu had USD 3.4 million stashed in Swiss Banks (Ogunnoiki 2019:27). According to Schoppert (2013:76) under his rule the state operated like a business venture for Mobutu and his allies. On the socioeconomic level, during Mobutu’s tenure the people of Zaire suffered tremendously as their livelihoods deteriorated day after day. For instance, public employees would not receive their salaries for months at worst, even years as well as the army and police that were supposed to protect citizens failed to do so thereby harassing and terrorizing the citizens (Naniuzeyi 1999:673). Luthuli (2016) states that under his leadership the country became a ‘jungle’ where the rule of law did not exist, the state became a neo-colonial one that served mostly in the interests of those who ran it.

Mobutu’s dictatorship ran for three decades, his kleptocratic rule led the country to disintegrate where the inflation, unemployment, illiteracy, and infant rate skyrocketed while Mobutu and his associates enriched themselves (Diebert 2008:1). Mobutu was supported by the West as a parapet against communism in Central Africa but when the USSR collapsed, he was no longer of use to his allies, and he was left without a superpower backer (Clark 2007:30). Mobutu’s reign was characterized by uncontrollable corruption, he squandered Congo’s potential and natural resources and abused the states resources.

2.2 Regional Spill Overs and the Reason for MONUSCO Deployment

From 1996 to 2003, the Congo was beset by two major regional wars. For nearly two decades the Great Lake Region has been immersed in conflict, the DRC formerly known as Zaire is situated in the region with nine neighbouring countries. With a population of 89.56 million people, it is the second largest country in Africa (World Population Review 2020). According to Social Science in Action (2019) the DRC shares borders with countries which have security issues of their own and this is also contributes to the long-term existing conflict. Kandowe (2018:40) and other scholars agree that the outbreaks of war in neighbouring countries have been central to the conflict in the DRC.

Most of these countries during the decolonisation period witnessed the outbreak of war for example the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebellion of Uganda, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) parties in Angola (Kapinga 2015:91). Huening (2009:130) states that the 1994 Rwanda genocide and the renewed outbreak of the Burundi civil war in 1993 contributed greatly towards the two civil wars in the DRC. For Behr (2014) the eastern part of the country is the most affected and experiences outbreaks of conflicts, around this region control over the natural resources and human rights violations take place. According to Kandowe (2018:40) the eastern region being the centre of violence, with North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri often being described as the bloodiest corner of the DRC, this has led to the ongoing wars in the country which began in 1996. The first Congo War commenced in 1996 – 1997 this also contributed to the outbreak of the war that would continue later, which was described as the deadliest in Africa; The Second Congo War which span from 1998 – 2003.

It has been noted that majority of UN interventions are in this part of the country. Lamp and Trif (2017) point out that the conflict in the DRC is one that requires intervention. The section below provides further details and context to the period covering the wars.

Figure 1. UN intervention in the DRC provinces



Source: Agence France – Presse (2021)

2.2.1 The First Congo War

The First Congo War involved the overthrow of military dictator President Mobutu Sese Seko and the installation of Laurent Desire Kabila as president. The first war was called ‘a War of Liberation’ which toppled the Mobutu regime with a regional alliance of Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola (Huening 2009:130). To better understand the downfall of Mobutu in 1996, it is vital to recount the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the adverse effects it had on the DRC (Olsson and Fors 2004:323). The genocide in 1994 which involved the Tutsis and Hutu led to a civil war, the attack by Tutsis on the Hutu’s resulted in Hutu fleeing their homeland crossing into Zaire fearing for their lives. Their presence in Zaire was later used a battleground to fight their battles from Zaire into Rwanda (Kandowe 2018:40). The extensive violence did not start until 1995 when the Mobutu regime announced the eviction of the Rwandan refugees (Reyntjens 2010:6).

The path to genocide began in 1994 when tensions between ethnic groups of Hutus and Tutsis spiralled out of control therefore, resulting in the murder of 800,000 Tutsis (Cooper 2013: 4). Due to the unrest, there was an influx of Hutu's seeking refugee status in the DRC. Venugopalan (2016:2) alludes that more than 2 million Hutu's are thought to have fled to the Congo, whose eastern borders have been historically porous, upon arrival they set up camps in the region, among these refugees were militiamen who contributed to the genocide. Nzongola – Ntjala (2002:231) asserts that the two wars in Congo are a continuance of the civil war in Rwanda, with the same combatants fighting each other in a different land. By 1996 the civil war of Rwanda had spilled into Congo. Venugopalan (2016:3) states that the Rwandan Hutu armed force also known as the Interahamwe used these refugee camps to carry out their attacks against Rwanda. Additionally, with the influx of Hutus they soon dominated certain regions and started attacking Congolese Tutsi, with the support of Mobutu (Turner 2007:10). Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, and Burundi formed an alliance and invaded Zaire and fought the Hutu militia and overthrew the government of Mobutu (Reyneties 2010:6).

Rwanda and Uganda formed a political coalition in 1996, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) which was instrumental in ending the Mobutu regime. Turner (2007:11) states that Rwanda and Uganda used the AFDL as a Trojan horse to gain access to the Zairian border and launch attacks in the refugee camps against the Hutu extremists and their allies. The war against Mobutu only lasted seven months and in April 1997, the long-term dictatorship of Mobutu's regime was finally overthrown by AFDL. The weakness of the state accompanied by the external influence such as the Rwandan genocide of 1994 laid the foundation to the first conflict. However, the dominance of Kabila to power led to the end of this conflict (Kapinga 2015:92).

2.2.2 The Second Congo War

Between 1998 and 2003 the Congo descended further into chaos. The Second Congo war was the revolt against President Kabila that lasted from 1998 until 2003, Kabila proved to be inept, authoritarian, and an astonishingly poor head of state. His biggest mistake was expelling the Rwandan's who helped put him in power, which was what

started the Second War. Huening (2009:130) states that the Second War which is also commonly known as the 'The Great African War' was a highly complicated conflict which involved a variety of political actors. Countries including Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia sided with Kabila while Rwanda and Kabila built up proxy rebel groups to overthrow their former puppet. Kandowe (2018:41) states that in the absence of national authority, good and efficient governance, mass killings, rape, torture, displacement, mutilation, and cannibalism took place during this period.

Early in his presidency, Kabila showed signs of moving towards a one-man rule. He began by disbanding the political coalition that helped him overthrow Mobutu, AFDL by replacing the political coalition with the Comites de Pouvoir Populaire (CPP) which served in its own interests. He further went on to ban political parties such as the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) led by Etienne Tshisekedi (Kapinga 2015:93). Due to his dictatorial tendencies Kabila became increasingly unpopular. According to Weiss and Carayannis (2005) the alliance between Kabila and his Rwandan and Ugandan deteriorated as Kabila was no longer serving their interests. Their relationship declined as his allies who were responsible for putting him in power were dissatisfied with his performance and believed that he acted too independently and ignored advice given to him. According to Turner (2007:11) Kabila's actions angered the members of the coalition therefore, the war against Kabila began when his counterparts began supporting the new rebel movement Rally of Congolese Democracy (RCD). They incited the war as they desired a new competent leader that would support their interest (ibid). Sanguma (2012:48) states that Uganda and Rwanda used rebel forces to fight against Kabila for instance RCD was a rebel group directed from Rwanda. The Congolese wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-2003 together constitute one of the most severe humanitarian disasters since World War II. These conflicts also led to extreme poverty and agony and ravaged any aspirations of continuing with the democratisation process of the DRC which started in 1990.

Since the 1990's the DRC has been distraught by two civil wars dated between 1996-1997 and 1998-2003, each with its own dynamics and complications. Scholars Erin Morgan and John Hubbard et al (2018:239) reiterate the importance of peacekeeping as a tool for preventing future conflicts looking at the stats and consequences of the wars. As a result of the Second Congo War, 5.4 million have lost their lives while millions

more were displaced and sought asylum in neighbouring countries (Morgan et al 2018: 239). Many of these deaths are the result of the fighting and the subsequent humanitarian crisis, rather than being directly caused by violence (Brusset et al 2011). Due to the devastating effect of the Second war, the conflict in the DRC is the deadliest since World War II. The conflicts involved several countries such as Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda (ibid).

2.3 Peace Agreements and MONUSCO in the DRC

The long existing political conflict and violence has ensued in the instability of the country, consequently the DRC finds itself at the epicentre of human rights violations, chronic humanitarian crisis and sexual violence (United Nations 2011). Since the early 1990s, the country has been experiencing conflict and bloodshed, which has resulted in the displacement of millions of Congolese. North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri provinces in the eastern region have been most affected in recent years (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2020). The country has attracted many peace efforts including, the Lusaka Ceasefire Peace Agreements and the Sun City Agreement.

Efforts to resolve the conflict in the Congo began with the outbreak of hostilities (Solomon and Swart 2004:10). The Second Congo war had taken on regional dimensions and involved half a dozen African nations. Moreover, prior to the ceasefire agreement in 1999, the conflict at its most intense peak the regional leaders decided to take vigorous measures to put an end to the war that had engulfed the entire region. This led to an emergency Summit of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) leaders, which was held in Pretoria in 1998, the Summit called for an immediate ceasefire. Prior to the official signing of the agreement in 1999, various pre-negotiations occurred. ‘Various pre – negotiations occurred in the run up to the Lusaka peace agreement’ (Solomon and Swart 2004:11).

2.3.1 Lusaka Ceasefire Peace Agreement

In 1999 the heads of state from Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and the DRC collaborated to sign the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement at a summit in Lusaka, Zambia (Davis and Hayner 2009:12). Masire (2001:90) emphasizes that the signing of the Lusaka agreement was an attempt to end the Second Congolese war. Zambian President Frederick Chiluba had been instrumental in the signing of the agreement in

his role as the mediator. South Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the UN, SADC and Zambia signed as witnesses (Masire 2001:91). Chestnut (2020) states that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was the first attempt to the peace process, this would also pave way for peace in the Congo. The road to signing the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was achieved with much difficulty. The Lusaka Summit was delayed quite a number of times as the preliminary meetings of foreign ministers struggled to reach consensus on the technicalities of the draft agreement (Solomon and Swart 2004:12).

According to Solomon and Swart (2004:12) there were intensified demands for amendments to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement which threatened the basis of the peace process therefore, many hurdles had to be overcome before the document could be signed. Most of these hurdles were created by Laurent Kabila who reluctantly signed agreement under extreme military pressure. Another delay in the signing of the document was the split in the political party-Political Congolese Democracy, the differences between the movement's rival factions Rally of Congolese Democracy (RCD – Goma) which was led by Emile Ilunga and RCD – Kisangani led by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba also created another hindrance. The delay was that during the negotiation stage both factions refused to concede each other's assumed status at the peace talks as well as their authority to sign. Solomon and Swart (2004:11) states that the other challenges during this process was the selection process of a mediator who would be trusted and not viewed as biased by all signatories. Initially President Ketumile Masire was appointed as a mediator, even so President Kabila refused all cooperation with Masire thus requesting the appointment of a new facilitator.

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was a momentous first step of the peace process in the DRC. The agreement aimed at ending the Second Congo War (Cilliers and Malan 2001:14). Additionally, the agreement called for the activities which included the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement of foreign troops. The heads of state supported the notion of the withdrawal and demilitarization of the foreign troops within the country. It was expected that the DRC would form its own national army and restore stable security along the common borders between the DRC and its neighbours (ibid).

The withdrawal of the foreign troops from the Congo was one the most important items on the agenda of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. According to Dagne (2011:6) the signing of the agreement also signalled a new political chapter for Congo, through this

agreement it paved way for a political dialogue, which was instrumental among political and armed groups to settle their differences peacefully. It also called for a UN peacekeeping force, MONUC which the UN has been actively guiding the DRC with military personnel since 1999 (Davis and Hayner 2009:12).

The aim of this peacekeeping operation was to monitor the 1999 Lusaka Peace Ceasefire Agreement and the peace process of the Second War (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2018). Within twenty-four hours of signing the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement the members called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, the agreement also called for the disarmament of foreign troops in the Congo and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the DRC (Carayannis 2009:7). The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement also includes the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force in the DRC, the Joint Military Commission (JMC) made up of African countries to monitor the implementation of the agreement.

According to Carayannis (2009:8) the document entailed strengths and weaknesses. The strengths of the peace agreement were that it recognized all the actors involved in the Second Congo War. Moreover, the document was signed by most of the major parties involved including the government and the rebel groups. And lastly it acknowledged the security concerns of Congo's neighbours regarding insurgency movements trying to overthrow their governments from the bases in Congo.

The Lusaka Peace Agreement, on the other hand, fell short because it failed to recognize the areas of influence controlled by various militia groups and their sponsors, such as the Movement for the Congolese Liberation (MLC) and Uganda in the northwest and northeast, and RCD, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), and Rwanda in the east. The agreement's most serious flaw was that it excluded the Mai - Mai group, which was not represented in the Lusaka Process or the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) in Sun City; Rwanda objected to its inclusion. The Mai-Mai group an active group in the DRC was initially formed to defend local territories from rebels and other armed groups. However, this militia group has been known for taking advantage of the war for personal gain through looting and banditry (Yagi et al 2022:11). This weakness is still threatening peace efforts today, as the armed group fights Rwandese proxy armed groups in the Kivus (Carayannis, 2009:9).

2.3.2 Sun City Agreement

Chapter V of the Sun City Agreement which set the boundaries of the ICD, called for the process of negotiations to be officially launched, with the goal of achieving a new political dispensation and national reconciliation in the DRC (Rogier 2004:25). The ICD is also referred to as the Global and All – Inclusive Agreement, the main Congolese conflict parties finally signed the Agreement on the Transition in the DRC in Pretoria on December 17, 2002. This agreement reflected an agreement among the key players on how to share power at the governmental level during the 24-month transition period, at the end of which elections should be held (DIRCO 2005). It was signed by the DRC government, RCD - Goma, MLC, and the representatives of the unarmed political groups (Dagne 2011:6). According to Gijs (2017:36) the ICD intended to serve two purposes: the first as a provision to the Lusaka agreement, it was anticipated that the ICD would yield solutions to the war that broke out in 1998 in the DRC. Secondly this process aimed towards resuscitating and solidifying a democratization process that has been impeded by Mobutu, and therefore by Kabila.

The main objective of the ICD was that it would pave way for the transnational administration in the DRC pending the holding of democratic elections, as documented in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The ICD's objective as outlined in Chapter V is that it would be instrumental in facilitating an agreement among its participants on four issues related to power sharing in the (Rogier 2004:26): the creation a new Congolese army, prospective future institutions of the country, organisation of elections and the interim constitution & institutions that would govern the DRC for the duration of the transition period.

Scholars Davis and Hayner (2009:12) reiterate that the ICD was a more inclusive peace conference, that focused on addressing the broader concerns beyond the ceasefire.

Chestnut (2020) elaborates on how the Sun City agreement which was signed in 2002 provided a framework for governance in the DRC formalizing democratic institutions and elections. Summits held in these cities – Lusaka, Gaborone, Addis Ababa, Sun City and Pretoria pertaining the DRC situation are few of the various steps that have made the ICD essentially an African process (Rogier 2004:26). SADC was among one of the various African sub regional organization that were actively involved in playing a leading role (Gijs 2017:36). In December 2002, the ICD made a breakthrough when

President Kabila and the conflicting parties agreed to a transnational government (Dagne 2011:6). The Sun City Agreement is unique and has been instrumental in uniting conflicting elements within the DRC by creating a cohesive government. Through this agreement the DRC which had experience political cataclysmic since the overthrow of Mobutu would be able to create a transformative political climate for a country that has been through decades of severe political upheaval (Chestnut 2020).

2.4 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Force Intervention Brigade (FIB)

Peacekeeping is an ongoing process and one that is difficult to approach in a particular way because the nature of conflicts is different. Therefore, the UN must adopt different approaches in its peacekeeping efforts. This becomes even more difficult when it comes to the DRC because that country is always embroiled in conflict. The conflict is often about the array of natural resources that country possesses but the characters and situations are different. It is for this reason that the UN has used the DDR approach when it comes to the conflict in the DRC.

Knight (2008:25) makes the point that genesis of the DDR is Ghali's conception of post-conflict peacebuilding as a framework for ensuring that violent conflict would not reoccur post-conflict setting. The essence of DDR is to ensure that violence does not reoccur in a particular conflict. It is not unusual for violence to reoccur at places that were in conflict. One of the ways this violence can resurface is how both sides still have arms. The DDR is there to ensure that its efforts of peacebuilding are not undermined by the players having arms which can be used when that conflict resurfaces.

Knight elaborates on the fact that the word peacebuilding first became part of the UN's discourse in 1992 and it was introduced by the General-Secretary Ghali in an address titled An Agenda for Peace document (Knight 2008:26). There was a realization that some of the post-colonial states in Africa were embroiled in numerous conflicts. The UN acknowledged the fact that their agenda was to strive for peace and security around the globe. It becomes imperative to put measures that reduce the risk of those conflicts escalating and that is why the DDR became one of the measures that the UN would use in order to create a climate of peacebuilding in countries that were ravaged by conflict such as the DRC (United Nations 2022).

In operations DDR tasks involve broad provision of security, collecting, securing, and destroying light and heavy weapons, demobilizing ex-combatants, dismantling militia groups, and enhancing regional security to stem the spillover of conflicts across borders (Knight 2008:27). The activities are vital for the DDR to work efficiently. The primary task is to provide broad security to the people. When a conflict reaches its climax, it inevitably deescalates but during the de-escalation phase it can easily be ignited, and the DDR is there to ensure that such does not occur. It must also make sure that militia groups are dismantled even though this is an extremely difficult task as these groups are often well-organized. In some cases, these groups may be funded by powerful interest groups outside a country. These interest groups may have a vested interest in that conflict. This is often the case in the conflicts that take place in the DRC. Many multi-national companies have a vested interest in the gold and diamonds that can be found in that country, and it is in their best interest to ensure that one of the sides emerges victorious so they can reap the benefits of the conflict. It must be said though that the people of DRC do not benefit at all as their country is plunged in a perpetual crisis.

Muggah and O'Donnell (2015) emphasize the point that DDR activities underwent an evolution from a narrow preoccupation demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants to the much broader goals of building the conditions for sustainable peace. This shows that DDR activities from the initial mandate because the nature of conflicts was also changing. The goal was now to create a conducive environment for sustainable peace. This would also help countries develop their economies if there was peace and security. One of the biggest problems in Africa is that conflicts also impede a country's capacity to grow its economy as well as to fight many of the socio-economic ills that continue to impede African countries from growing. The DRC has also been a victim of this which is quite baffling as the country is quite rich in natural resources and minerals. But those raw materials are not benefited in the country as mostly Belgian and American companies are the ones who export these minerals to their countries. Yet the DRC has inordinately high levels of poverty, unemployment, disease, and inequality among many others.

Muggah and O'Donnell (2015) also make the assertion that the DDR has once again evolved as was the case when where some 20,000 members of FDLR were repatriated

to their home country between 2000 and 2010. Omaar (2008:12) the FDLR is an armed group which controls part of the Kivu province. This group has been known to exploit minerals, control trade and wields political power over the local population. The FDLR has committed and continues to commit widespread and systematic violations of human rights against civilians. These were foreign militias that were deeply involved in the conflict in the DRC. The DDR realized that for that situation to be calm those soldiers needed to be repatriated. It also enabled the DRC to resolve their conflict without their neighboring countries interfering. This decision was taken by the UNSC which was firmly of the view that for conflict to be resolved there had to be this kind of intervention. It also shows how important the conflict in the DRC was because the UNSC intervenes when the conflict has reached crisis levels and that was exactly what had happened in the DRC.

Edmonds et al (2009) focus on the two Eastern DRC provinces of North and South Kivu and how these were two highly contested terrains during the conflict in the DRC. These terrains were highly contested because they are rich in natural resources such as diamonds and timber. This conflict also took tribalistic undertones as it also turned out to be between two ethnic groups the Hutu and the Tutsi. This also meant that Burundi and Rwanda were also involved as this region is closer to them.

This conflict can be traced back to when the DRC's Mobutu was in power and how endemic corruption and nepotism were during this period (Edmonds et al 2009). This period could also be described as the one that laid the seeds for the deadly conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi people in Rwanda. That is one of the most painful episodes in the history of African politics as many innocent lives were lost due to narrow tribalistic behavior from leaders. The eastern Congo region has been a problematic region for a very long time and these problems can be traced back to this period which began in 1990 (Edmonds et al 2009). This also shows the extent to which the DDR has been involved in the conflict from the DRC. Sometimes it looks like they have found a solution only for another form of conflict to arise. It must be said that the African Union (AU) has an enormous role to play in trying to quell the conflict in the DRC. The African Union Peace and Security Council must work in tandem with the DDR to ensure that the situation on the ground changes for the better.

The UNSC called upon the government of the DRC to pursue the full implementation of the action plan to prevent and end the recruitment and use of children and sexual violence by the Congolese Armed Forces (Oswald et al 2019). It must be stated unequivocally that the use of children in any form of conflict is deplorable and should be strongly condemned. There is no justification to involve children in issues that are way beyond their control. Children should be encouraged to go to school for them to have a bright future. This also contributed to making Africa an illiterate continent as children is employed as child soldiers even though they should be at school. It should also be said there is no reason for the Congolese Armed Forces to sexually abuse women. That type of behavior undermines whatever cause that army would be fighting because women and children should always be protected especially during a time of conflict. The UN Security Council noticed how the situation in the DRC was deteriorating for the most vulnerable group which are the women and children (Oswald et al 2019). Therefore, the government from the DRC had to intervene to protect this vulnerable group of people. Even though the DDR was also employed, they cannot be expected to handle every issue because this is a crisis affecting the DRC and they ought to be the ones who quell it. That also means they should dedicate a lot of time in protecting their citizens so that children are not made soldiers and women are not sexually abused.

Another important instrument of the UN that compliments their DDR is the FIB. These two can operate concurrently as they aid in trying to quash conflict in various places around the globe. Tull (2017) makes the point that the FIC is the UNSC pushing the boundaries of UN peacekeeping to give it more teeth when it comes to enforcement. UN peacekeeping does not necessarily include enforcement, but the UNSC has realized that some conflicts can be hard to solve, and that peace sometimes needs to be enforced. Admittedly, this is not the first option the Council will opt for. However, as the conflict worsens as is the case in the DRC it is incumbent upon the UNSC to try find a solution that will assuage that conflict.

Consequently, to the conflict worsening in the DRC, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2098, establishing for an initial period of one year a 3,096-member strong FIB to be deployed to eastern Congo (Tull 2017). This was in 2012, as it was clear that there needed to be an extraordinary form of intervention on the part of the UNSC. Different

militias were based in the DRC as the conflict intensified and many people were dying in large numbers. There clearly needed to be some of peacekeeping which would see the Eastern part of the DRC becoming a little bit more stable.

The UNSC urged its FIB to carry out targeted offensive operations these groups that were wreaking havoc in the DRC (Tull 2017). The FIB was under instructions from the UNSC that they had to move into the DRC in order to help disintegrate the many militias that were in the DRC at that time. Their intervention could be classified as a success as they made some inroads in eastern DRC. The FIB launched its first operations using ground troops, attack helicopter and artillery (Tull 2017). This is exactly why the UNSC had deployed the FIB in the DRC. The main goal was to swing the pendulum towards the direction of peace and security in the DRC. With its heavy artillery the FIB managed to overpower the different groups that were exacerbating the conflict in that region. This could be used in other parts of Africa that also experience this kind of conflict.

Even though the FIB could be classified as a relative success, it also had the unintended consequences such as how the March 23 Movement (M23) defeat diminished the Congo government's incentives to promote peace and build institutions (Tull 2017). The M23 sometimes referred to as the Congolese Revolutionary Army was a military group located in the eastern DRC, primarily in North Kivu. It was made up of former members of the CNDP, a rebel group purportedly supported by the governments of Rwanda and Uganda (McKnight 2014:11). Even though it was a relief that the FIB had some success this inadvertently strengthened the resolve of one of the militia groups. They saw the FIB as an enemy that had to be fought back. This undermined the DRC's quest to promote peace and to build institution of democracy that would help the country solve its problems in an amicable way.

The second problem the FIB created was that rather than reinvigorating MONUSCO and making it 'a part of the solution', the M23 defeat further marginalized MONUSCO, and the government effectively ended the cooperation with the mission (Tull 2017). As a result of that the conflict in the DRC worsened because the DRC government had to cooperate with MONUSCO as they were there from the beginning and the main goal was to create long-lasting peace that would see that country progress on other facets instead of being engulfed in a never-ending conflict. Be that as it may, there can be no

doubt about the fact that the DDR and FIB strategies were of absolute importance to alleviating the conflict in the DRC. It could be argued that both strategies from the UNSC worked but the conflict in the DRC is so deep-rooted that any approach that is used to deal with it is bound to have some negatives. That is because it is multi-faceted and even has ethnic overtones as the various groups fight for the surfeit of natural resources the DRC enjoys.

2.5 The Developments of the Three Interventions in the DRC

UNPKO has underwent significant changes, that has been the case as the UN has had three types of interventions (generations) in the DRC. The first mission deployed was ONUC from 1960 – 1964. Followed by MONUC which commenced from 1999 – 2009. And the most recent peacekeeping force MONUSCO which is still currently operational in the country (Spijkers 2015). This section will focus on the interventions since the UN has been actively involved in restoring peace in the country.

Figure 2: Map of the UN Mission



Source: Democratic Republic of Congo: MONUSCO, August 2015

Peace operations are often used to enforce a ceasefire or peace accord; nevertheless, it took the UNSC two years to act when a ceasefire was originally called in the DRC. Prior to the passage of Resolution 1291 in 2000, the UN presence in the DRC was governed by Resolution 1258 (1999), which mandated military observers to monitor sides' adherence to peace agreements. Contingents from South Africa, Uruguay, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia were dispatched to carry out the mandate (Menodji 2013). The UN peacekeeping force in the DRC, which was first deployed in the midst of the Second Congolese War in 1999, is one of the UN's longest-serving deployments today. The mission has evolved dramatically over the course of its deployment, starting as a small ceasefire observer mission, and eventually growing into a large multi-dimensional presence with an ambitious mandate for electoral support, state-building, stabilization, protection, human rights, and national reform (Day 2020:23).

Due to several disagreements over how to respond to crises, most UN peacekeeping operations did not begin with a strong protection of civilians (POC) mandate. UN peacekeeping missions have always begun with a less forceful approach and then intensified later. Later UN peacekeeping mission mandates dropped the word "imminent" and replaced it with the phrase "threat of physical violence." This amendment in terminology underscores that a mission can and should take proactive and preventive action to safeguard civilians who are under threat, and that these efforts can involve any and all methods required, including the use of deadly force. Only in 2010 did the UN consider the expanded understanding of the POC. It clarified concepts using a three-tiered approach: 1: Political protection, 2: Providing physical violence protection, 3: Creating a safe atmosphere (Choedon 2021:455).

2.5.1 ONUC Mandate

The UN has a long and contentious history of intervening in DRC affairs (Parsons 1995:175). ONUC, which took place in the Republic of the Congo from July 1960 to June 1964, was a watershed moment in the history of United Nations peacekeeping in terms of the responsibilities it had to assume, the size of its operational area, and the manpower involved (United Nations 2022). In many ways, ONUC foreshadowed the current direction of peacekeeping operations. It was a large and complex operation, with approximately 20,000 personnel at its peak, and it was the largest peacekeeping operation prior to the end of the Cold War (Dorn 1995:12). Aksu (2018:100) states that

the UN was initially expected to respond to an inter-state conflict that arose as a result of the decolonization process, but quickly found itself in the position of having to redefine the principles of its involvement.

ONUC was founded by Security Council Resolution 143 (1960) of 14 July 1960, which authorized the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with military assistance. ONUC's initial mandate was to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Republic of the Congo, as well as to assist the government in maintaining law and order and providing technical assistance. The mission of ONUC was later expanded to include maintaining the Congo's territorial integrity and political independence, preventing civil war, and ensuring the removal from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary, and advisory personnel not under the UN Command, as well as all mercenaries (United Nations 2022). The mandate of ONUC included elements of policing, disarmament, and enforcement in addition to traditional peacekeeping between belligerents, such as interposition between hostile parties and the maintenance of neutral regions (Dorn 1995:12).

The specific tasks of the mission are set out in UNSC Resolution 161 of 1961 as follows (United Nations Security Council 1961:2):

Firstly, ONUC was given the authority to use force, if necessary, in carrying out its mandate. The Council urged the UN to "take immediately all appropriate measures" to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for ceasefire, the cessation of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort. Secondly, the Council authorized the Secretary-General in resolution 169 (1961) of November 24, 1961, to "take vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate arrest, detention pending legal action, and/or deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under UN Command, and mercenaries," as stated in the resolution.

The Force was phased out in February 1963, after Katanga was reintegrated into the Congo's national territory, with the goal of terminating it by the end of the year. The GA, however, agreed to allow a smaller contingent of troops to stay for another six

months at the request of the Congolese government. By June 30, 1964, the Force had been fully depleted.

2.5.2 MONUC Mandate

After the Lusaka Summit in July 1999 between the DRC and five other countries in the region, MONUC was established on 30 November 1999 by Resolution 1279 (1999) to promote peace and stability in the Congo and to supervise the peace process following the Second Congo war in 1998 (Bope 2011:38). Laurence (2019:266) construes that the first phase began with the UNSC authorizing the first deployment, he further conceals that the mission comprised of some multidisciplinary personnel, which was composed of 500 observers. The specific tasks of the mission in cooperation with the JMC are set out in UNSC Resolution 1291 of 2000 as follows (United Nations Security Council 2000:4):

The first task was to enforce the Lusaka ceasefire agreement negotiated by the opposing parties. MONUC was to coordinate with JMC to offer technical support in the fulfilment of the ceasefire agreements, including the observation and reporting on violations of the Lusaka accord. To cooperate with international humanitarian agencies and work with the parties to seek the release of all prisoners of war and military captives. Through pushing for rebel disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups. Continuing to provide information on security conditions in all areas of its operation. And lastly in liaising with all parties to the agreement, to assist with the delivery of humanitarian aid to the internally displaced persons, human rights monitoring with a special focus on vulnerable groups such as women, children, and demobilization of child soldiers.

MONUC's mandate, was limited in practice and its actions were largely that of traditional UN peacekeeping operation. The peacekeepers were intended to be neutral mediators as their role was not to take any sides and to maintain working relations with as many people as possible (Laurence 2019:266). Furthermore, the UNSC Resolution 1291 of 2000, strengthened MONUC's mandate beyond its initial mission, this modest observer mission was succeeded by a larger, more complicated deployment. Through this resolution the UNSC authorized the expansion of MONUC with 5,537 military soldiers and increased missions in February 2000. Under Chapter VII, it permitted the use of force to take the necessary steps to defend the UN and other international

officials, secure their security and freedom of movement, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical assault (Choedon 2020:455).

The mission's mandate evolved over time to reflect the changing circumstances of the conflict. For example, President Laurent Kabila was slain in 2001, and his son, Joseph Kabila, assumed control of the country. According to Olaopa and Ojakorotu (2016:251), the young Kabila was more willing to build a democratic country and put an end to the country's civil war. As a result, MONUC's responsibilities expanded to cover additional functions such as civilian protection and assisting the transitional government in restoring peace in the country. Gachoki (2018:40) states that UNSC amended MONUC's mission in October 2004 and enlarged the number of personnel by 5,900. A total of 5,537 military and 500 civilian observers were initially deployed. As a result, the number of peacekeepers has been doubled. As outlined in Security Council Resolution 1565 of (2004), the amended mission encompassed the following tasks (United Nations Security Council 2004:2):

The first task was to increase the capacity of troops to maintain a presence in key areas of instability, to encourage the re-establishment of confidence, to discourage violence, particularly the use of force to threaten the political process, and to allow UN personnel to function freely, notably in the eastern region of the DRC. Followed by the need to secure the protection of civilians, especially humanitarian staff who are continuously fearing for their lives under relentless threat of physical violence. It was to also guarantee the safety of UN employees, facilities, installation, and equipment. The mission was also required to create required operational ties with the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB), as well as the governments of the DRC and Burundi, in order to coordinate efforts to monitor and discourage cross-border movements of combatants between the two countries. And lastly, to monitor and report on the positions of armed movements and groups, as well as the presence of foreign military forces in key areas of volatility.

In addition to the aforementioned tasks MONUC was also tasked with assisting the Government of National Unity and Transition in restoring order across the country. As a result, the mission's scope was expanded to cover the following additional roles (United Nations Security Council 2004:3).

The first role was to participate actively in the safeguarding and protection of government officials in Kinshasa prior to the formation of a police unit to carry out the task. Secondly, to aid in the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced individuals, and to contribute to the strengthening of security conditions in which humanitarian aid is delivered. Thirdly, to assist the Armed Forces of the DRC in disarming foreign combatants. The fourth role was to aid in demobilization and repatriation of the disarmed foreign members of armed groups. While the fifth role was to aid in the disarmament section of the national DDR program for Congolese fighters and their dependents, by monitoring the process and providing necessary protection in some sensitive locations. The sixth role was to aid in the construction of a secure environment for free, transparent, and peaceful elections, in order to contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process outlined in the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement. Lastly, to contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights, with a focus on women, children, and vulnerable people; to investigate human rights violations to end impunity; and to continue cooperating with efforts to bring those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law to justice, while working closely with the relevant authorities.

The main goal of MONUC at the time was to support the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which attempted to end the Second Congolese War by monitoring and reporting on signatories' compliance. Only after a year and facing grave security risks the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement crumbled, the mission was granted a Chapter VII (Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression) mandate which increased the capacity of troops and a broader set of tasks. MONUC's security priority and military numbers progressively increased from 2003 to 2004, first in reaction to the increasing conflict in Ituri and then again after the CNDP led by Laurent Nkunda seized Bukavu in 2004 (United Nations Security Council 2003:1-3). MONUC's troop strength had grown to 15,600 by 2005, with a mandate to assist the Congolese army in disarming militias throughout the Kivus and to collaborate with the newly appointed Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region to find "lasting solutions" to the region's security issues (ibid). Despite the challenges encountered by the mission throughout its deployment the role MONUC played in the 2006 national elections should not go unnoticed. According to Day (2020:25) the 2006 national elections were likely the pinnacle of MONUC's political engagement, as part of a larger mission that

included technical/logistical assistance for elections, legislative support, and Security Sector Reform (SSR). Neethling (2011:24) also affirms that there is no doubt that peacekeeping mission has played an important role since the late 1990's in the DRC most specifically since 2006. On July 30, 2006, the country's first free and fair elections in 46 years took place, with voters electing a 500-seat National Assembly. President Joseph Kabila was sworn in as the head of state of the DRC, the entire electoral process was one of the most complicated the UN had ever assisted with. According to Winter (2009:3-4) a former UN Advisor in Goma adduces that MONUC may have not been able to fully protect civilians however, without the operations presence conflict would have persisted. He emphasizes that local wars would have continued, regional wars might have erupted in the Kivu provinces therefore, the abuses against the civilian population would have exacerbated. Day (2020:25) is of a different interpretation, asserting that the mission was unable to carry out its statutory and SSR mandates because, soon after taking office, Joseph Kabila began to marginalize MONUC and, within two years, advocated for its withdrawal from the DRC. During this period, security issues were also at the forefront: a feud between losing presidential candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba and President Kabila erupted in Kinshasa, resulting in bloodshed, and Nkunda's CNDP increased its attacks in North Kivu. Between 2006 and 2008, large-scale conflict in eastern Congo displaced an additional million people and contributed to the growth of armed organizations.

By late 2009 there was a request by the DRC government for the mission to withdraw its troops from the region by 2011. The announcement by the government caught many observers and role-players off guard. After all, MONUC has played a critical role in assisting the DRC government in the post-conflict process since 1999, particularly during the post-election era in recent years. MONUC was accused, rightly or wrongly, of several abuses after ten years of deployment, including complicity in the exploitation of mineral resources, sexual abuses, and the rebel armed groups continued to grow like mushrooms in the eastern DRC, causing massive mass suffering and instability among civil population and mostly women. As a result of the Congolese government's request for MONUC's withdrawal, the UNSC decided to revisit the mission and rename it "Missions of the United Nations Organization for Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of Congo" or "MONUSCO" in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1925 of May 28, 2010 (Baudouin:25).

Undoubtedly it would be biased not to highlight the fact that MONUC was without flaws. The mission faced significant obstacles in its efforts to restore peace, security, and stability in the DRC. At times, the mission personnel were directly confronted by ordinary citizens on the ground who felt that MONUC was failing to accomplish one of its core tasks, namely protecting civilians (Koko 2011:30). At the same time, the UNSC approved the withdrawal of up to 2,000 UN military personnel by 30 June 2010 from areas where security conditions were permitted, indicating that the UN considered its departure from the DRC as a political necessity (United Nations Security Council 2010:3). According to Amnesty International (2010) the DRC government's proposal for UN forces to leave the country was met with vehement opposition from several international human rights organizations and many observers. The fundamental reason was that conflict and high deaths and killings, the most of whom were civilians, continued to plague the eastern DRC. Even at the highest levels of international diplomacy, some people believe that withdrawing MONUC in 2011 would be premature (Mail & Guardian 2010). Due to the demands of the internal situation, the mission's mandate has been extended multiple times. Reynaert (2011:14) also makes the point that MONUC's mandate was constantly adapted according to changes in the national political context, she also distinguishes three phases: pre-transition (1999-2003), transition (2003-2007), and post-transition (2008-2010) which highlighted MONUC's tenure in the Congo.

MONUC served in the DRC from 1999 to 2010, until it was replaced by MONUSCO. By the end of the MONUC operation the total number of personnel on the MONUC mission reached 20,586. Military soldiers came from more than 60 countries, while police officers came from more than 30 countries throughout the world. MONUC spent \$8.73 billion during the course of ten years of operation, resulting in 161 deaths (Gachoki 2018:42).

2.5.3 MONUSCO Mandate

Since the creation of MONUC in 1999, the UN has been the dominant Inter Governmental Institution (IGI) in the DRC war. Due to the changes that occurred in the DRC between 2000 and 2010 MONUSCO was established by the UNSC in 2010 as an upgrade from MONUC, with two strategic priorities: civilian protection and support for the stabilization and strengthening of state institutions in the DRC, as well as key

governance and security reforms (Nagel, Fin and Maenza 2021:7). Ten years after its formation MONUC was renamed to MONUSCO in 2010, the remaining of the mission signalled an even more vigorous mandate and the new phase reached in the country (Van Es 2017). According to Center for Preventive Action (2022) the mission was extended to solve the humanitarian crisis, protection of civilians and to combat the recruitment of child soldiering. Much of this conflict is caused by rebel factions in the DRC, including the FDLR, Mai – Mai Sheka and M23.

The renaming of the mission to MONUSCO was ratified under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on July 1, 2010 (Andrews 2017:3). Scholars believe that this signalled a more robust mandate which undertook more stringent action as the mandate originally prioritized protection of people in addition to stabilization and peace consolidation, but it also supported DDR and other auxiliary operations (UNSC 2010:2). Even while MONUC was crucial in the disarming process and keeping foreign militias at bay, Vogel (2013) feels that Kabila was more concerned with restoring public trust. The democratic election of 2006, as well as constitutional revisions, were significant steps forward. MONUC, on the other hand, was viewed as ineffective in the peacekeeping process by the government and many other players. Following a ten-year run of the MONUC operation, the eastern Congo remained ungoverned, and many civilians were at risk from rebel groups that still controlled wide swaths of the nation. As a result, the Congolese government requested that the UNSC evacuate the MONUC forces before the country's 2011 elections (Cammaert 2010:104). MONUSCO was a rebranding of MONUC to reflect the Congolese government's progress in restoring stability. MONUSCO's precise mandate, as outlined in Resolution 1925 of 2010, contained the following (United Nations Security Council 2010:3):

- (1) the protection of civilians,
- (2) To support the DRC administration in stabilizing and consolidating the country's peace,

The mission's exact objectives included the following three basic tasks:

The termination of ongoing military operations in the Kivus and Orientale Provinces, resulting in the reduction of armed group threats and the restoration of stability in sensitive areas. To enhance the capacity of the government of the DRC to effectively

safeguard the population by establishing sustainable security forces with the goal of gradually taking over MONUSCO's security duty. Lastly, to assist in the deployment of Congolese civil administration, particularly the police, territorial administration, and rule of law institutions in areas freed from armed groups, to consolidate State authority throughout the territory (United Nations Security Council 2010:4).

MONUSCO was also ordered to leave areas that had been stabilized, such as the country's western and northern regions. As the UN reduces the number of peacekeepers in the DRC, this would allow the government to gradually seize control. As a result, MONUSCO reduced its soldier strength by 2000 in 2010 (Gachoki 2018:43).



CHAPTER III

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

The DRC, located in the heart of Africa, has been transformed into a battleground where several African states and national armed movements are fighting multiple wars at the same time. Since the beginning of the war, the conflict has claimed the lives of millions of civilians and millions of internal displacements. Many Congolese children and teenagers are regularly subjected to horrendous acts and abuses perpetrated by foreign and local armed groups, as well as the country's defence and security forces. The conflict had a negative impact on the state's socioeconomic development. The UN and MONUSCO intervened in the DRC to achieve peace, security, and stability. The entire DRC peace process has been largely driven by MONUSCO, with the Congolese government participating in a combined arms operation to ensure regional peace and security.

The chapter first gives an overview of how the UN peacekeeping force in the DRC has evolved, from its first deployment to the current deployed mission. Secondly, Darya Pushkina's criteria will be used to analyse the successes and failures in the DRC in this chapter. Limiting violent conflict in the host state, reducing human suffering, preventing conflict from spreading beyond the border of the DRC, and promoting conflict resolution. Lastly, the chapter will delve into the challenges encountered by MONUSCO in the country.

3.1 Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the DRC

The UN has been engaged in peacekeeping in the DRC since the period of the country's independence (Spijkers 2015). This shows that the DRC has been embroiled in conflict since it obtained its independence. That is quite an alarming development because when the country gained its independence it was expected that it would address its plethora of socio-economic ills. Their vast natural resources should also have been used as a catalyst to spur that much-needed economic growth and development.

The first area in which MONUC—the precursor to MONUSCO—had a strategic impact is in its contribution towards the reunification of the country (Novosseloff 2019). In the evolution of the UN's peacekeeping mission in the DRC, there was an

agreement on the part of MONUC which is MONUSCO's predecessor to reunify the DRC. This remains a tall order because the conflict has taken different directions at various times. MONUC/MONUSCO also had a strategic impact in thwarting a reappearance of a major violent conflict, by using its presence to enable other international and national actors (Novosseloff 2019). MONUSCO has also helped to lessen the reappearance of a major conflict in the DRC. Admittedly, it has not fully resolved the conflict, but it has gone a long way to stabilising the conflict. The role of MONUC/MONUSCO has also been critical in monitoring, reporting, collecting, and sharing information related to human rights violations to support international criminal justice and the fight against impunity (Novosseloff 2019). The conflict in the DRC has also seen gross human rights violations and this has been identified by MONUC/MONUSCO which has helped to record how these human rights violations have impacted the people of the DRC. The evolution of peacekeeping in the DRC has also seen MONUSCO push for the ICC to take the perpetrators of this conflict to task. As a result, many innocent lives have been lost in the course of this conflict and those responsible should be held accountable. This should also raise awareness among other African nations affected by conflict.

In 1999, the Congolese peace treaty was signed in Lusaka, Zambia. This resulted in the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC, the signing of a cease-fire agreement between the warring factions, and the formation of UN peacekeeping missions (Bayo 2012). The UN peacekeeping mission in DRC, which was first deployed in the middle of the Second Congolese War in 1999, is one of the UN's longest-serving missions today (Day 2020).

MONUC was established on 30 November 1999 by UNSC Resolution 1291 to facilitate effective accomplishment and compliance (by all parties) to the terms of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement to monitor any violations of the agreements (through proper channels); assist in the DDRRR of armed militants; and assist in the transition stage and the holding of reliable elections in the country (Bayo 2012). Over the course of its deployment, the mission has evolved dramatically from a small cessation of hostilities observer mission to a large multi-presence mandated with aspirational political support, state-building, normalization, protection, civil rights, and structural reform (Day et al 2020).

Under Chapter VII, peacekeepers are authorized to use force to safeguard Congolese civilians under impending threat of harm, as well as their personnel and facilities (Dagne 2011). The UNSC has passed a number of resolutions to deepen MONUC and its mandate throughout the last decade. Despite Joseph Kabila's proposal for the mission to be withdrawn, the UNSC passed a resolution in 2010 renaming it MONUSCO (Halabo 2015).

This is a clear demonstration of how multi-faceted the conflict in the DRC has been because the UN has had to change strategies over three times. The last strategy is also accompanied by forced intervention even if the parties may not be in favour of such a strategy. But it is of vital importance to try and coerce the warring factions to accept that the MONUSCO is a form of intervention that should be embraced by all parties. There is a clear gap in the literature that the AU and its member states should also play a more significant role in the conflict of the DRC. Even though the UN's strategy has evolved over the years, there still needs to be culpability on the part of the African continent in trying to find a long-lasting solution to the conflict in the DRC.

3.2 Darya Pushkina Indicators and Congo Peacekeeping Operations

A study of peacekeeping mediation efforts in the DRC will be analysed and placed by the Pushkina's broader indicator which is titled 'A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission'. This will help in determining whether the UN and MONUSCO's efforts have been a success or a failure. Pushkina's indicators first admits that peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most useful instruments at the international community's disposal for attempting to deal with the violent conflicts that have characterized the post-cold war period (Pushkina 2006:134). Furthermore, peacekeeping missions are successful if they control armed conflict and encourage conflict resolution. But even so, these limited criteria leave little room for assessing a mission's ability to contribute to the UN's long-term goals.

Since 1994, with refugees fleeing the Rwandan genocide and finding their way into the eastern Kivu provinces, the DRC has been at war. In 2020, the Kivu provinces had more than 130 armed groups and the country had 250 different ethnicities (Mason 2021). Ethnic conflicts, food shortages, corruption, and access to mineral wealth have all exacerbated to the conflict's escalation. As a result, these conflicts have deepened the economic condition, increased malnutrition, and resulted in widespread sexual abuse.

Armed groups fight for mineral entry in the eastern and southern provinces, using the proceeds to purchase weapons (Mason 2021).

Despite UN efforts to reduce the military confrontation, armed groups begin to evolve and capitalize on the increasing insecurity. The UN established MONUSCO, in 2010 to protect citizens from conflict and to endorse peaceful solutions. Therefore, Pushkina's indicators stated clearly that the main objective of peacekeeping, which the UN has been attempting to do throughout the DRC's civil war, is to limit violent conflict in the host state. Pushkina's indicators continue to demonstrate that peacekeepers are frequently deployed after a cease-fire consensus has been made, and the peacekeepers' task is frequently to sustain that peace (Pushkina 2006:134).

Attempting to resolve an intrastate dispute can be a difficult, risky task with high potential for escalation if warring parties do not agree to a cease-fire. Pushkina contends that in intrastate conflicts, where various military factions may continue fighting despite a general ceasefire and where international borders that could separate warring parties are absent, peacekeeping operations can be difficult (Pushkina 2006:134). She further suggests that preventing conflict from spreading beyond the boundaries of the host state is also necessary to guarantee regional security. A country's internal conflict can spread to other countries in the region through a process known as contagion.

The DRC conflict has two phases: before and after the peaceful power transition in January 2019. The former has authoritarian rule and a militarized approach, whereas the latter has a more democratic and diplomatic outlook. As a result, while there are historical parallels and connections, a new context is emerging, and other armed groups continue to operate. The conflict situation is being used to employ child (cheap) labour for mining, which has resulted in the employment of approximately 40,000 children, and Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) is rampant. The number of deaths in the first half of 2020 was roughly three times higher than in the same period in 2019 (Akamo 2021). Despite the DRC having experienced a peaceful power transition the country remains fragile, with the eastern region being the most vulnerable, and other armed groups still operating.

Pushkina emphasizes that supporting conflict resolution is a final indicator of the UN mission's performance in this corrosive scenario that the DRC's civilians face. Peacekeeping necessitates the establishment of a stable environment capable of

preventing the continuation of armed conflict after the peacekeeping mission has departed. This criterion will thus be evaluated based on the extent whereby the environment cultivated by peacekeepers discourages future violence (Pushkina 2006: 135).

Since 1945, the UN has played an important role in bringing international stability and peace to warring nations, as well as ensuring that civilians' human rights are not violated. Successful missions used it to carry out the majority of their regulations, maintain ceasefires, prevent outbreaks of huge violence, reduce the number of fatalities, assist in the resettlement of refugees and IDP's, and implement safety surroundings in which large-scale violence did not reoccur after peacekeeping operations left (Pushkina 2006:136).

Armed conflicts continue to have a significant effect on a population that is already extremely vulnerable especially in the eastern region of the country. The security predicament in the DRC's eastern provinces continues to remain a source of worry. However, the Humanitarian Action Plan for 2021, which represents the activities of more than 400 operational partners in the DRC, including national Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO's), international NGOs, and UN agencies, in coordination with the Congolese government's efforts, has responded to this (Humanitarian Response 2021). The evidence backs up the claim that UN peacekeeping missions are more effective when UN members show their commitment to the quest by providing troops and funds on time. Through the Humanitarian Action Plan, the UN aims to save lives, to aid the most vulnerable populations, ensure their access to essential social services and protect the millions of people affected by the crisis.

According to Samset (2002), the Congo Wars exposed soldiers from neighbouring countries to resource base in eastern DRC. To fuel and leverage the conflict, these soldiers started building and explored cross-border networks. Pushkina (2006:139) backs this up by pointing out that UN peacekeeping missions are less effective in resolving civil conflicts when one or both of the warring parties are backed politically and militarily by an outside states or groups during the operation's deployment.

Furthermore, in the peacekeeping literature, external support for conflicting parties, whether material, ideological, or political, is frequently cited as a primary important indicator in the instigation and progression of ethnic as well as other forms of internal

war. This factor is weighted based on the type and extent of assistance provided, as well as the source of assistance in each conflict. External support for warring parties is related to lower success rate, according to the findings by Pushkina (2006:140).

The causes of violence in the DRC, according to Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, are internal. As a result, the solution lies in resolving the internal issues that fuel the conflict. Only the Congolese have the ability to solve their problems in a long-term manner. It will not be done for them by outsiders (Mason 2021). Pushkina (2006:140) agrees with Frederick Golooba-Mutebi that the UN peacekeeping is more successful in civil conflict management when a major power takes the lead in a specific circumstance. In this scenario, the DRC government and other operators must take the initiative to resolve their conflict internally before turning to outside help.

The DRC has decided to respond to the conflict by allowing external mediators to support in the conflict resolution process. This is linked to the lack of capacity, resources, and heavy reliance on external funding which are traits that the DRC struggles to free itself from. This alludes to the notion that the internal issues of the DRC cannot be fixed by external actors. The international community has attempted multiple mediations in an attempt to end the DRC's civil war and achieve long-term peace. The UN, AU, and SADC convened a series of meetings and consultations aimed at ending the DRC conflict, culminating in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed on July 10, 1999, the ICD held from October 15, 2001 to April 2, 2003, the Global and Inclusive Agreement (17 December 2002), and the Final Act (2 April 2003) (Kapinga, 2015:43).

Furthermore, the AU and SADC share a common vision of a peaceful, socially and economically advanced Africa. The Protocol on Relations between the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), adopted in July 2007 in Accra, Ghana, serves as the framework for the AU-REC relationship. Collaboration and coordination of peace and security policies are articulated in the Protocol's Chapter 2, Article 7, paragraph 2(b), and Article 30. These provisions provide the legal foundation for a potential working partnership between the AU and SADC (Kapinga 2015:44).

When UN peacekeeping is accompanied by effective diplomacy, it is more effective in resolving civil conflicts. According to Pushkina (2006:141) the level of diplomatic efforts made prior to or during a mission has little bearing on the mission's success.

Missions can fail when sustained diplomatic efforts are made and succeed only when slight attempts are made, implying that diplomatic initiative cannot be considered a major factor in goal attainment.

In the form of traditional peacekeeping missions, the UN can only participate in a conflict if the main conflicting parties consented. Only if this condition was met could the organization act without restriction. This principle has evolved over time, and the UN now has the ability to intervene without authorization. Furthermore, “Responsibility to Protect” (2001) emphasizes that the international community has a moral obligation to intervene when a state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens.

3.3 Factors Contributing to the Successes and Failures of MONUSCO in the DRC

Peacekeeping is a technique which has been developed, mainly by the UN, to help control and resolve armed conflicts (Goulding 1993). Even though peacekeeping was mainly designed to quell conflict, there is also an appreciation that it can only control it rather solve it completely. That is an imperative point to realise because conflict manifests itself in various ways. This has proved to also be the case in the conflict in the DRC. Which has prompted the UN to come up with three types of intervention in the conflict of the DRC over a period of many years.

To determine whether a mission is successful or unsuccessful, it is crucial to examine its mandate and objectives, as well as the latest developments in the country and the mission's actions. This way, it is possible to identify which areas the mission was able to fulfil its mandate and which areas it was unable to do so, allowing for a better understanding of the mission's overall outcome. This section will bring current developments in the DRC, as well as the activities MONUSCO has done in its effort to bring peace and stability, as well as help address the threat posed by the numerous armed groups that are still active in the country, to the analysis.

Even though the UN had made significant progress in the DRC and many regions had begun to stabilize, the eastern DRC was still plagued by many issues. Including humanitarian crises, serious violations of human rights and exploitation of natural resources due to the presence of a variety of domestic and foreign armed groups and the ongoing interference regional actors. Because of the power and security vacuums

in the eastern DRC, these groups take advantage of the situation to commit violations of international humanitarian law and human rights (Lyra de Magalhaes 2021:58).

3.3.1 Limitation of Violence

One of the first factors that contributes to the success of a peacekeeping operation, according to Pushkina (2006:145), UN peacekeeping is more effective in civil conflict management when the mission has strong enforcement functionality. There is no strong connection between an enforcement provision in a mission and the relative impact of UN missions, according to the evidence. Most mission mandates did not call for the use of force, and these missions were met with varying degrees of success.

On the book titled ‘Failures and Successes of Peacekeeping in Africa’ scholar Osee R. Lieberman argues that despite the negative publicity MONUC – MONUSCO has attracted, the peacekeeping force has achieved a few successes (Lieberman 2017). Vogel and other experts share the same sentiments with Lieberman and reiterate the importance of a peacekeeping force and further stress the point that without the intervention of peacekeeping insecurity in the DRC would be worse (Vogel 2013). Every strategy implemented is not without strengths and weaknesses. It is clear to see by the aforementioned that peacekeeping is essential in reducing violence and that without its presence, taking into consideration the current conditions in the country the lack of intervention will negatively impact the civilians, thus allowing for the conditions in the country to deteriorate.

According to Das (2019) since the transformation of the force from MONUC – MONUSCO the mission has been able to restrict armed groups from civilian areas which has been effective in providing humanitarian assistance, and instrumental in facilitating peaceful elections notably the first free and fair elections since 1960 in 2006. Scholar Alexander Novosselof asserts that the presence of the mission has allowed peacekeepers to monitor, observe, report, and share information related to violations of human rights with the Human Rights NGO’s and ICC in its prosecutions (Novosselof 2019).

MONUSCO’s military delegations, according to Novosselof (2019:6), patrol to prevent attacks, respond to outbreaks of violence, and train and conduct joint operations with the Congolese national military. In terms of reducing violence, MONUSCO has aided

the Congolese government's DDR efforts. Among other things, the mission has implemented quick-impact projects in local communities and secured and protected IDP camps. As a result, cutting military personnel and budget costs would be detrimental to the Congo. Due to a lack of resources, rebel groups would emerge, leaving the civilian population at the mercy of these armed groups. There would be an increase in the number of conflicts and human rights violations as a result of this. Besides a nearly 14-year deployment origins, MONUSCO's existing situations to civilian protection has demonstrated inadequate. MONUSCO forces are not particularly robust, flexible, mobile, well-trained, or fully capable of deploying across the entire eastern DRC. Despite having a Chapter VII mandate by being one of the world's largest peacekeeping operations, the MONUSCO has proven incapable of protecting civilians from attacks and dealing effectively with rebel groups until the creation of an intervention brigade (Cammaert 2013). In November 2012, for example, the M23 rebels captured Goma and committed massive human rights violations despite the availability of MONUSCO troops in the city (Arieff 2014).

However, the mission was largely unsuccessful in limiting the country's violent conflict. Government forces have launched and continue to launch attacks on rebel positions, while civilians and MONUSCO personnel have also been targeted. According to ACLED (2019) there have been nearly 1,900 total conflict-related fatalities reported including over 760 deaths from violence against civilians. The report also states that during the first six months of president Tshisekedi's tenure the violence escalated and spread throughout the DRC, there were 630 organized political violence events in nearly 260 locations, with approximately 500 reported fatalities (ibid). The MONUSCO mandate gave the peacekeeping mission the authority to protect civilians in the immediate vicinity who were under imminent threat. These phrases are open to various interpretations and place little or no obligation for civilian protection on the peacekeeper. Protection mandates are usually not prioritized due to the size of the mission, operational considerations, and the large scale of operations. In this case of the MONUSCO, being the largest, longest, and most expensive mission, priority levels fluctuate due to the new and recurrent conflicts which need to be prioritised. This is seen by the recent decision by the UNSC to maximum authorised strength on a temporary basis (MONUSCO 2022).

MONUSCO's greatest failure on its peace mission included the army's lack of a legal obligation to better accomplish mutual understanding and instant involvement in Congo issues. Another failure is that MONUSCO lacks a conceptual framework for providing peace because it is unable to understand the issues that Congolese people face, particularly ethnic and political issues, making it difficult to solve the issues in their entirety. The majority of Congolese respondents claimed that MONUSCO peacekeepers are unwilling and unprepared to protect civilians. MONUSCO peacekeepers would be unprepared to face such a threat.

3.3.2 Reduction of Human Suffering

In acknowledgement of the reality that conflict and post-conflict contexts are high risk regions for HIV transmission, MONUSCO, under the UNSC, established initiatives and awareness programmes, such as HIV/AIDS preventative measures education for women in the Congo in peacekeeping missions to limit the contraction and spread of the virus in the host country. To this end, MONSUCO played a pivotal role in the M23 rebellion's defeat which was responsible for war crimes, forced recruitment and rape has reawakened hopes for the country's stabilization, which the UN is preparing for following the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS), (Barrera 2015:1-2). The goal was to improve MONUSCO's ability to continue monitoring and reporting on rebel troops, weapons, and related materials across the DRC's eastern border. Put simply, the agency facilitates peacekeeping dialogue between the Congolese government and the M23, which has helped to ease tensions between the two warring parties. Pushkina (2006:142) agrees with the last view expressed above, namely that UN peacekeeping is more effective in civil conflict management when all warring parties believe that conflict should be resolved through peaceful methods.

This is interpreted to mean that peacekeeping can only succeed when warring parties believe military indicates are no longer efficient in implementing their objectives. To assess such perceptions, the research looks at whether parties were willing to negotiate and, if so, whether negotiated ceasefires were followed through on. When parties refuse to negotiate, express their requests in zero-sum terms, conduct military strikes during talks, or refer to their opponents in cruel and inhumane terms, the level of mutual antagonism is considered high.

According to the Special Representative of the DRC, a permanent solution to the violence demands a new strong commitment to tackle the root causes of conflict (African Media Agency 2021). MONUSCO Secretary-General Bintou Keita argued that for stabilisation to revert back to eastern Congo, “the Country must succeed in maintaining and restoring the people’s confidence and the ability to safeguard, administer, bring justice, and fulfil their basic needs.” Furthermore, UN peacekeepers and the mission will continue to assist the armed forces in protecting civilians and neutralizing armed groups (African Media Agency 2021).

MONUSCO has failed to reduce human suffering because human rights violations have been the most neglected aspect of the peace process. Human rights violations have tarnished the government, which the international community has failed to acknowledge with the offenders. Despite rumours of crimes perpetrated by his forces, Kabila was recognized by the international community when he came to power. Despite the fact that a UN team was sent to investigate the rumours, Kabila used every tactic possible to thwart it, and no substantial steps were taken to break this cycle (Solomon and Mngqibisa 2000). The rebels have also been accused of human rights violations, and it is overwhelmingly probable that they will not face justice because they may make immunity a situation for reaching agreement in the national discussion.

MONUSCO has been mandated to monitor and report on the human rights violations. The mission has worked to carry out its mandate in a variety of ways, including working with the UNJHRO. This division was created to improve accountability by providing regular and vital reporting on human rights violations. This includes reporting on violations perpetrated by armed groups and government forces, which is essential for holding parties accountable and preventing future abuses, as well as tracking progress (The Stimson Center 2016:5). According to the UNJHRO report the rights to life, physical integrity, liberty and security of the person, and property rights have all been violated by the ADF and other armed groups in the region. The recruitment of children forced labour, and attacks on hospitals, health clinics, and a school are all confirmed violations of international humanitarian law (MONUSCO 2020:4). In 2020, the UNJHRO documented 7,909 human rights violations and abuses in the DRC, including the rights to life, physical integrity, liberty, and personal security, as well as property rights, have all been violated, averaging 659 violations per month. This reflects a

deterioration in the security situation in armed conflict-affected provinces, particularly North Kivu, Ituri, and South Kivu, where the UNJHRO recorded a 46 % of armed groups' abuses (MONUSCO 2020:6).

According to Human Rights Watch (2018), the DRC's human rights situation continues to remain severe, with much more than 5.2 million citizens internally displaced and well almost a quarter of the population suffering from severe food insecurity. This is Africa's biggest number of internally displaced persons (United Nations 2021). In eastern Congo, approximately 130 armed groups are active. Many of their fighters, as well as frequently unjust government security forces, have carried out massacres, kidnappings, sexual violence, child recruitment, and other attacks on civilians often with near total impunity. Repression of activists, journalists, politicians, and peaceful protesters became more severe.

The mission has occasionally been able to prevent recurring conflicts from resurfacing. It has also averted the spread of future casualties and minor hostilities to other parts of the country and neighbouring countries. Nonetheless, recent events have demonstrated that insecurity in the country, particularly in the east, remains at a high-level, as security improves in some areas while deteriorates in others. Long-term, MONUSCO has been unable to provide a conducive environment for its people, despite its comprehensive mission spanning crucial areas for the country's stabilization and its extended years of deployment. As a result, despite the challenges MONUSCO has faced, the organization should not leave the DRC because doing so now would exacerbate the suffering of the country and its people, making peace impossible to accomplish.

3.3.3 Preventing Spillover

Preventing conflict from extending beyond the object state's borders is also important for regional security. Internal disputes are likely to spread to neighbouring countries in the region through the 'contagion' process. Refugee flows are common as a result of violence against civilians, and diaspora populations can promote resource competition, prompting further conflict in neighbouring nations (Pushkina 2006:134).

Undoubtedly the instability of one country can spillover and weaken the systems of its neighbours. Political instability, violence, and conflict have serious consequences that spread to neighbouring countries. The DRC's conflict is likely to spread into its

bordering countries. Located in the Great Lakes region the DRC surrounded by countries with their own unique problems most of them have a weak economy that is insufficient to deal with and cope with the spillover effect from the neighbour's instability. According to Salehyna and Gleditch (2006:334) studied the link between refugees and the spread of civil wars and instability. It is common knowledge that refugees have a negative impact on the receiving country and are capable of inciting violence and causing wars. Furthermore, refugees have a negative impact on the economy because the receiving country will have to provide for an additional population.

In this regard, for the DRC to have a powerful peacemaking process, it must first have a massive military and the able to defend its citizens. Since the warring parties may continue to dominate villages during the peacekeeping process, it is critical for the state to remain vigilant at all times. When conflict is 'ethnic,' UN peacekeeping is less effective in managing civil conflict (Pushkina 2006:145). Ethnic conflicts are no more or less resistant to peacekeeping than other types of conflict. Peacekeeping missions have failed in conflicts with strong ethnic components, according to the author's research, which the Congolese war was also divided into tribal lines.

To examine the Congolese state failure as a major impediment to MONUSCO's efforts to maintain peace in the midst of a long-running conflict. The DRC is frequently referred to as a failed state around the world. MONUSCO's military might was insufficient to resolve Congolese conflicts. Several academics have also emphasized the significance of political solutions for UN peacekeeping. According to peacekeeping experts, the success of a UN peacekeeping mission cannot be measured without considering whether it made a significant contribution to the creation of a political environment conducive to the implementation of the peace agreement reached by the conflicting parties (Pushkina 2006). As a result, peacekeepers in the DRC faced a hostile political environment.

The primary responsibility of the Congolese state is to develop stronger state institutions to regulate and govern its territory, defend its unity and territorial integrity, and ensure the safety of its citizens. This demonstrates that MONUSCO's success was highly improbable because it was operating in a failed state. Another argument alludes that without a road map for conflict resolution and political settlement, it would be

impossible to assess the success of a UN peacekeeping mission. The mission for the DRC to develop stronger institutions did not materialized.

According to Vries (2015), the government of Congo's involvement with the eastern provinces is used to sustain and broaden a state that is kept intentionally weak so that private interests can better try to influence it. This can be seen in the government's focus on the state's trappings (buildings, equipment, and training), but not on how it operates. Furthermore, due to a number of strict limitations and a limited set of technical formats for interventions, the international community, particularly MONUSCO, has been unable to counteract these dynamics. These formats, particularly those involving 'restoring state authority,' have become so entrenched that more creative approaches to peace operations and normalization have been overlooked (Vries 2015).

3.3.4 Conflict Resolution

Promoting conflict resolution is a final criteria of the UN mission's effectiveness. Peacekeeping necessitates the establishment of a stable environment capable of preventing the resumption of hostilities after the peacekeeping mission has left (Pushkina 2006:135).

In the peace process, it is critical to encourage regional organization cooperation, which has progressively been cited as a component contributing to the success of peacekeeping missions. For example, Alan Henrikson has contended that without regional intervention, peacekeeping is "likely to lack consistency and continuity" (Pushkina 2006:141). The importance of outside peacemakers cannot be overstated. The experiences in the DRC highlight the importance of outside actors in assisting the country in achieving long-term peace. Outside peacemakers' involvement in having provided both financial resources and expertise aided significantly in achieving peace to the war-torn country.

The participation of regional organizations like the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the SADC did not necessarily result in greater regional stability. Because of shared ethnic groups, these organizations, unlike their Western counterparts, may have lacked the resources, experience, training, and impartiality expected to participate in long-term, independent peacekeeping. Some of the fundamental issues are a lack of shared values among member states, a reluctance

among SADC states to cede some of their sovereignty, and the overall weakness of many of the member states (Menodji 2013).

As one of the most powerful local peacemakers, young people continue to play a critical role in limiting and preventing conflict in the DRC. MONUSCO, in collaboration with UNICEF, launched Radio Okapi Enfant in 2020 with this goal in mind. Radio Okapi Enfant aims to assist the DRC government by providing a public discussion board for children and teenagers to express themselves and advocate for their rights (Keita 2021). Similarly, UNICEF has supported the establishment of youth parliaments, which have played an important role in promoting positive and productive youth engagement, including in peacebuilding processes, within the political arena throughout the DRC.

Local peacemakers have a greater understanding of the conflict in their country than outside actors. Because there were few local peacemakers engaged in the formal peace process, the parties became heavily dependent on the recognition of outside donors. At the start of the conflict, local peacemakers such as Felix Tshisekedi, the current President of the DRC, offered to act as a mediator between the parties; however, he was rejected by the then government before his reign in office due to both parties' distrust of prospective peacemakers.

Conflict between international agents can result from a clash of interests, complicating the implementation of a negotiated peace agreement and increasing the likelihood that local agents will sabotage the peace process (Pushkina 2006:138-39). International attempts to eradicate the violence have repeatedly failed, for reasons ranging from a misinterpretation of the conflict's roots to an inability to devise a suitable exit strategy. The failures of peacekeeping in the Great Lakes region appear to be the result of a misalignment between short- and long-term objectives. Another factor was a shortfall of major equipment expected to undertake out UN obligations in the peacekeeping missions, with a particular emphasis on the DRC conflicts, had created a “growing chasm” between expectations and perceived performance in the flagship mission, which delegates claimed was already overloaded, underfunded, and stretched to the limit.

3.4 Challenges to Peacekeeping in the DRC

Meanwhile, the largest and most expensive UN peacekeeping deployment in history is tasked with safeguarding civilians and promoting inclusive governance. Despite these attempts, the number of armed groups in the DRC increased to around 130 by 2019, resulting in fragmentation rather than stability. Insecurity, repeated government repression, and tumultuous elections plague citizens across the country (McNamee and Muyangwa 2021:295). The DRC continues to face numerous problems that threaten to unravel the delicate transition. It is essential to examine the challenges that have persisted to thwart the DRC's successful transition to peace, which has been threatened with a full-scale return to conflict (Swart 2012:44). Since the conflict began more than two decades ago, North Kivu has been the epicenter of Congo's violence. While the rest of the country was celebrating the dawn of peace, the omnipresence of war clouds in the east has continued to cast a pall over the critical gains and achievements made toward securing long-term peace and has provided compelling evidence to support the argument that the DRC was on the verge of a situation of 'no war, no peace,' particularly in its volatile equatorial region. Democratic transitions, conflict transformation, and economic development are all harmed by the replication of conflict potential (ibid).

In recent years, the peace and security situation in the DRC remains fragile, this poses ongoing challenges to the UN peacekeeping force as mission capability, humanitarian impact, force protection, personnel safety, security and many more of the intricacies in the country are violated on a broad scale and remains precarious (Neethling 2011).

3.4.1 Degree of Cooperation by Host Country

One of the three guiding principles of UN peacekeeping is that missions should only be deployed with the approval of the major conflict parties. Because the host-state government has the legal authority to allow or deny the mission's entry into its sovereign territory, the UNSC has focused on obtaining the host-state government's consent before authorizing a new peacekeeping mission, only occasionally consulting with other parties to the conflict. One major distinction between peacekeeping and warfighting is the requirement for host-state permission, which lends UN peacekeeping missions a distinctive legitimacy (Gorur 2019:11). According to Gorur (2019:13) the host-state consent proposes three elements: acceptance of the mission's presence on the

ground, acceptance of the mission's mandate, and dedication to the political process that the mission is meant to support.

Nagel, Fin and Maenza (2021:11) state that MONUSCO functions in an environment that is highly complicated, politically volatile, and geographically dispersed. Several humanitarian crises exist in the DRC, including severe poverty, acute food shortages, a significant displaced population, and infectious diseases. The resurgence and spread of violence in the country's east has proven difficult to contain, and it is frequently worsened by state military forces and foreign parties. MONUSCO's position is complicated by the central government's lack of competence and political will to ensure security, as it must preserve constructive relationships with decision-makers while also urging them to do more.

Novosselof and other scholars have observed that MONUSCO is working with a government that does not fully accept its presence on its premises (Novosselof 2019). According to Neethling (2011) the DRC government planned to see the mission out of the country by September 2011, the Congolese government is of the opinion that their military can deal with the security situation and does not require intervention from the UN.

The Kabila government employed rhetoric in the run-up to the 2011 elections that suggested it wanted to withdraw its strategic support for the UN peacekeeping presence. It is generally believed that this was an attempt to limit the mission's ability to monitor and report on election-related wrongdoing or repression, as well as to demonstrate to the public that security conditions in the country had improved and to fuel nationalist feeling (The Stimson Center 2016:7). According to (Solhjell & Rosland 2017: 9) where individual authorities may be impacted by lost trade income and prefer to continue backing armed groups for their own reasons, there is a question of political will on the part of the Congolese government to support stabilisation processes. Again in 2016 prior to the presidential elections the Kabila government revived its tactics on cutting down on the size of the mission. It is said that the government requested to reduce the authorized troop ceiling by 1,700 (The Stimson Center 2016:7).

Anten (2010:23) states that in the DRC, authority is distributed based on loyalty rather than formal institutional processes, leaving senior officials with limited incentives to work in the public interest, Solhjell and Rosland (2017: 9) support the statement, that

influential politicians and businesses engage in lucrative trade with Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, while profiting from privatized armed groups that protect products import and export. According to the Stimson Center (2016:8) while the mission's tasks are essential, there is general agreement that they are not feasible due to a lack of government buy-in and political will. The mission's POC and stabilization actions will not have a long-term impact without support from the central government to strengthen governance and service delivery, as well as to establish an effective and accountable security sector. In February 2021, Felix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo, President of the DRC, was appointed President of the AU. Tshisekedi emphasized that insecurity in Africa, including the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, is a top priority (Manson 2021).

3.4.2 Role of Neighbouring States

Despite its lack of presence at or distance from the grassroots, the DRC government has struggled to manage the country's institutional and operational crisis in the east (Spittaels 2008). Rwandan and Ugandan rebels fighting alongside their governments on the other side of the DRC's borders lack a strong base in their home countries. As a result, they use the DRC's porous borders as safe havens from which to attack and interact with vulnerable communities (Akamo 2021:4). The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) are two examples of such insurgent rebels. The ADF is a Ugandan rebel group that has been based in the eastern DRC since 2007. The group's goal is to free Uganda from what they see as a domination attempt by Rwandan Tutsi.

The FDLR is a Hutu rebel group that left factions of Rwandan rebels still active in the DRC, a group hostile to Tutsis. Their presence fuels instability in the eastern and northern region of the DRC (International Crisis Group 2020). Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi's rivalry, as well as their internal crises, pose a threat to the DRC. These countries have used militias operating in the DRC to fight proxy wars with one another. For example, the FDLR is linked to Uganda and Burundi in their fight against Rwanda (International Crisis Group 2020). In turn, Rwanda is linked to rebel groups operating in South Kivu against Burundi, as well as insurgents such as the ADF against Museveni's Uganda. This dynamic is what President Tshisekedi hopes to resolve diplomatically, hence an arrangement for rapprochement between Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi (Akamo 2021:8). Maeresera (2017:142) recurrence of conflict in the DRC,

particularly in the eastern DRC, is not a new phenomenon. These armed groups' activities have had devastating effects on the Congolese population for nearly two decades, ranging from the killing of a large number of innocent civilians, mostly women and children, to numerous cases of rape, the forcible recruitment of child soldiers, and the displacement of more than half a million people.

Therefore, their interference impedes the mission to carry out its mandate, it can also be argued that peacekeepers are faced with a challenge to completely disarm the rebel groups (Bayo 2012). Almost every step of the DRC peace process has been marked by the presence of external actors who have played crucial roles that have been both beneficial and detrimental at times. The conflicts in the DRC featured a large number of countries and militant groups. Most, if not all, of these stakeholders had strong feelings about how the transitional arrangements would turn out (Curtis 2007:105). Although the war officially ended in mid-2003 with the installation of the transitional government, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, all of whom fought in the Second Congo War, have conducted incursions into eastern DRC since then (Ahere 2012:3). These invasions have primarily been motivated by national security concerns, but they have ultimately contributed to the DRC's instability.

In the case of Uganda, the ADF is situated in the eastern DR Congo's Rwenzori Mountains. The group was formed as a result of their dissatisfaction with the overthrow of former president Dada Idi-Amin. They use economic and religious tactics to recruit people and appear to be receiving funding from unknown source, though the Ugandan officials accuse Rwanda of supporting them. The ADF is a highly secretive organization with unknown strength. In terms of its hatred for Tutsis, it is associated with ISIS and aligned with FDLR. In recent years, they've collaborated on attacks (Akamo 2021:7). They are most active in Beni territory, North Kivu. The most recent defeat they suffered sparked insecurity for those in Ituri region as a result of their retaliatory attacks. Other retaliation attacks in the past had eroded locals trust in MONUSCO forces (Fabricius 2020). Another insurgent group is the LRA which is a rebel movement infamous for rampant child conscription and a history of human rights violations. The group, which began in northern Uganda in the late 1980s, is responsible for the kidnapping of at least 20,000 children and the relocation of more than 1.9 million people (Kelly et al, 2020: 1). One of the most notorious armed groups in recent history is the LRA. It has the

regrettable distinction of being the first fighting party to be indicted by the ICC in the Hague. The LRA's acts of violence have become textbook examples of human rights breaches because to their extreme severity (Spittaels and Hilgert 2010:7). Joseph Kony the leader of the group who arrived in the Congo in 2005 has been contributing towards the conflict in the country. The LRA have settled in the north whereby they carry out the most atrocious acts of crimes, by kidnapping, raping, and recruiting child soldiers. In 2009 it was reported that the group they abducted a 13-year-old girl and used her to carry out the Christmas Massacre LRA attacks on civilians in the north-eastern Congo.

Rwanda has been also known to fuel the conflicts in the Congo although local violence and insecurity in eastern Congo never abated, situations in North Kivu took a turn for the worse in May 2012, when a formidable new rebel group formed. The M23 originated largely as a result of prior ineffectual attempts to satisfy the political, economic, and security concerns of officers and businessmen affiliated with the old RCD insurgency and, later, the CNDP (2004–2009), but also, critically, neighbouring Rwanda. The purported non-implementation of a 2009 peace pact between the Congolese government and the M23's precursor, the CNDP, has sparked discontent among these actors. The M23 swiftly took large portions of North Kivu, aided by Rwandan weapons and supplies. Supported by Rwanda with weapons and logistics, the M23 quickly occupied substantial parts of North Kivu. The organization enrolled 3,000–4,000 warriors at its peak. The government's inability to quell the uprising, along with its unwillingness to make compromises, resulted in disaster in November 2012, when the M23 overran Goma, North Kivu's capital. The occupation of Goma was a humiliating loss for not only the government, but also MONUSCO, the world's second-largest UN peacekeeping force at the time. (Dull 2018:173-174).

Armed group proliferation is currently the main source of instability in North and South Kivu (the eastern DRC). The FDLR, the largest foreign armed group in the DRC also operates in North Kivu. It consists of Rwandans who were expelled in 1994 as well as Rwandan refugees. There is a disagreement about its goal because, on the surface it appears to advocate for open dialogue with the Rwandan government while secretly attempting to overthrow it. Over 2,000 combatants make up the FDLR (MONUSCO 2021). Rwanda uses the continued existence of the FDLR to justify its intervention in the DRC. It is critical to note that the FDLR is most likely supported by Uganda and

Burundi. Their continued attacks on Tutsis and failed negotiations with the Rwandan government pose a long-term threat peace in the DRC. The FDLR is a source of tremendous brutality against civilians and is one of the biggest human rights violators in the area (Rodriguez 2011:176). The FDLR group has been several times been accused of deliberately targeting Congolese civilians. The FDLR has a long history of rapes and other sorts of sexual abuse against women, as well as killing individuals of all ages and setting fire to schools, churches, and health centres, it's especially noteworthy that they utilize sexual assault as a weapon of war. Although rape is common among other rebel factions, the FDLR's rape incidents appear to be among the most heinous (Rodrigues 2011:177). The FDLR, on the other hand, continued to commit killings in Eastern Congo, as did dozens other national armed factions it has also been accused of wreak havoc on the economy and finance themselves with the management of mining regions. IDP numbers had risen to 1.7 million by the end of 2011 and had risen to about 2 million by the beginning of 2012. Even where the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) actions were focused, these figures showed that the situation in Eastern DRC was once again unstable (Paddon and Lacaille 2011:14).

In this context, the DRC and Rwandan governments play critical roles. The FDLR is a menace to the whole civilian population in Kivu, according to the DRC. It is a roadblock to the Congolese government's efforts to reclaim its authority, as well as an impediment to the open and transparent utilization of the DRC's natural resources, which may benefit the country's economy. After years of direct backing to the FDLR in its war against Rwanda-backed militias, the DRC government has shown a greater willingness to confront the FDLR since 2007, launching joint operations with Rwanda to target rebel groups in eastern DRC (Rodriguez 2011:178). By 2020 there were more than 130 armed organizations in the Kivu provinces and 250 ethnic groups in the country. The war has been worsened by ethnic conflicts, food scarcity, corruption, and access to natural resources. As a result, these disputes have exacerbated the economic condition, increased hunger, and resulted in widespread sexual assault. Armed groups also battle for resource access in the eastern and southern provinces, using the proceeds to purchase weapons. The main weapons suppliers to the DRC, according to Amnesty International (2010), are China, Egypt, France, South Africa, Ukraine, and the United States. In 2020 UN experts also accused additional countries like the United Kingdom,

Israel, Iran, North Korea, and Sudan (Mason 2021). Despite the efforts of the UN to alleviate the conflict, armed groups continue to emerge, taking advantage of the growing instability.

3.4.3 Lack of Funds and Capacity

Despite the UNSC resolution that authorized the mission to take necessary action, without capacity and funding the mission is unable to protect civilians and assist according to the purpose of their deployment (Bayo 2012). Munson (2017) highlights that in 2017 U.S President Donald Trump publicised his plans to cut \$1 Billion from UN peacekeeping. The decision to withdraw military soldiers and cutting of costs will escalate the predicaments the country is faced with, violence against women and children will increase, more children will be subjected to child soldering and security within the country will decline. MONUSCO is the largest UN operation ever deployed, and it has been given the greatest budget to pay its costs, which is now around \$1.24 billion MONUSCO has been given an adequate funding to carry out its objectives in compared to other peacekeeping missions (Wistuba 2017:36). MONUSCO's mandate is sometimes referred to as the "strongest" currently held by a UN peacekeeping force (Rhoads 2016). The UN organization operation in the DRC, on the other hand, began in 1999 as a small-scale monitoring mission with a Chapter VII mandate (Reynaert 2011:14). MONUSCO is the UNSC's second peacekeeping force to be given a POC mandate. Within two years, MONUC secured a Chapter VII mandate and an increase in force strength to 5,537 military soldiers. In reality, the expedition remained woefully under-equipped, and it essentially served as an observer mission (Reynaert 2011:15). The disparity between the mission's protective purpose and its actual capacity was highlighted in 2002, when RCD-Goma militants murdered 160 civilians.

The budget of the UN can be measured by the resources allocated to military spending, as it is these that allow for a sufficient budget to maintain armed actions, both in terms of paying salaries to troops and purchasing new weapons and munitions. As a result, it will examine military spending as a percentage of GDP and in relation to the country's budget (Rufanges and Aspa 2016:19). The UNSC extended MONUSCO's mission by a year in 2020, as indicated in resolution 2556 of (2020:8) however, there was a reduction in the number of authorized military personnel. As of the time that this paper was written, the most recent report considering the current situation in the DRC and

MONUSCO is the report S/2021/274, which dates from March 2021. The most recent budget the UNGA authorized a total of US\$ 1,154,140,500, of which US\$ 1,075,338,600 should be used to keep the mission going (UNGA 2020: 8). MONUSCO has 17,673 civilians, staff officers, and volunteers on the ground, as well as 18,316 uniformed soldiers, which includes military troops, military observers, police, and specially formed police units (MONUSCO 2021).

In its most recent mandate update, the UNSC's decision to reduce MONUSCO's size and budget, will have a significant impact on the forces capability to protect citizens. This is due to the new resolution which resolution emphasizes the importance of prioritizing civilian protection when deciding how to use available resources (UNSC 2020) however, with limited resources and given the size of the country, such a complex priority makes it arduous for the mission to achieve its objectives. To exemplify this point, some MONUSCO facilities were closed without an adequate replacement presence, leaving civilians without safe havens in the event of an attack and creating fears that non-state armed groups might recover regions left by the mission, leading to an increase in civilian abuses (Novosseloff et al, 2019). This never-ending churn of events and effects, on the other hand, is detrimental to the mission, as what is at risk are the innocent lives of citizens as well as a state's peace and security. This is yet another factor undermining MONUSCO's credibility and legitimizing the mission, reducing its effectiveness. Furthermore, this has an impact on how locals perceive the mission, as the citizens no longer associate the peacekeeping force with safety and have called for its departure from the DRC.

The military budget of a country like the DRC, which is embroiled in a conflict in which resources devoted to internal security issues have a clear militarizing character and the goal of acquiring weapons, necessitates some thought about the concept of opportunity cost. The different parts of the conflict that are maintained due to factors such as the war political economy, on the other hand, necessitate prioritizing social spending. The latter is in favour of conflict resolution and violence reduction processes. (Rufanges and Aspa 2016:19).

Occasionally, the mission has been able to prevent recurring conflicts from resurfacing. It has also prevented future casualties and minor hostilities from spreading to other parts of the country and neighbouring countries. Despite this, recent events have shown that

insecurity in the country, particularly in the east, remains high, with security improving in some areas while deteriorating in others. However, regardless of the difficulties MONUSCO has faced, the organization should remain in the DRC, its untimed exit would aggravate the suffering of the Congolese citizens thus, making peace impossible to achieve.



CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The aim of the research was to examine the successes and failures of the UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC. The study's main point of departure is the role of the UN as a third-party peacekeeping interventionist. The study specifically analysed the role of MONUSCO in trying to bring political change and stability in the DRC. It examined their successes and failures in relation to their mandates and responsibilities in combating conflict in the DRC. The examination of both the UN and MONUSCO revealed new insights into peacekeeping and the challenges as well as constraints peacekeepers face in conflict-torn areas.

The UN plays the role of third-party peacekeeping efficaciously by deploying military and civilian personnel. The purpose of their deployment includes maintaining law and order, protection of civilians & humanitarian aid, monitoring disarmament demobilization and disengagement of combatants (Luthuli 2016). Despite the deployment of numerous peacekeeping operations in the DRC contemporary situations in the DRC have not changed significantly as the country is constantly impeded by intractable conflicts (Ahere 2012). According to Diercks et al (2011:31) in spite of the several agreements and thousands of troops, the conflict in the DRC has not been resolved. The DRC political crisis and subsequent continuous violent conflict are not the result of the international community's failure to intervene to resolve the conflict. In fact, the UN has been supporting the DRC's peace process for nearly two decades. It has facilitated the negotiation and signing of numerous peace treaties, as well as the deployment of thousands of troops (Luthuli 2016).

The ongoing Congolese conflict, which has spawned a slew of armed groups, is one of Africa's most complex. The UN has been engaged in peacekeeping in the DRC since the period of the country's independence (Spijkers 2015). In the Congo peacekeeping has evolved over subsequent generations, the first of which was traditional peacekeeping. It evolved into the second generation, multidimensional peacekeeping. In the third generation, it progressed to peace enforcement since the late 2010 to date (Bellamy and Williams 2010:13). This shows that the DRC has been embroiled in conflict since it obtained its independence. This is a clear demonstration of how multi-

faceted the conflict in the DRC has been because the UN has had to change strategies over three times. The causes of this problem are as complicated as the difficulties in attempting to resolve them. The DRC's non-military solutions to the underlying causes, such as peace making and state building, are still very fragile the situation in the DRC allowed the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in peacekeeping operations, as well as other regional and intergovernmental organizations, to intervene in order to prevent conflict and develop peace.

In the study there is no denying the reality that the larger part of the UN peacekeeping intercessions is situated in Africa, which this reality is mostly a reflection of a number of African conflicts. Peacekeeping is characterized as the deployment of the UN presence to aid countries plagued by conflicts. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a considerable increase in the UN peacekeeping literature, and a large number of studies have examined the prospects for peacekeeping from the perspective of failure and success. UN missions have also played an important role in the DRC, where international intervention through peacekeeping operations is attempting to find a long-term solution to the DRC conflict. For example, the mandates of the missions, as well as contributions from peacekeeping troops, were expected not only to end the conflict in the DRC, but also to attempt to transform the conflict into peace, particularly for Congolese. Due to the complexity of the DRC conflict, its magnitude, and on-the-ground requirements, UN missions have proven to be generally incapable of managing the conflict (Diercks et al 2011:31).

To assess the successes and failures of peacekeeping missions in the DRC, several indicators have been developed by different scholars. Diehl applied two criteria: limiting armed conflict and encouraging conflict resolution. Whereas Johansen proposed two alternatives to Diehl's criteria: first, assess the impact of peacekeeping forces on local people affected by their work, and second, compare the level of misunderstanding, tension, or violence in the presence of UN peacekeepers to the estimated results of balance-of-power activity in the absence of peacekeeping. Bratt applied four indicators: mandate performance, facilitation of conflict resolution, conflict containment and limitation of casualties. Van der Lijn used the phrase "durable peace." And Pushkina utilized four criteria: limiting violent conflict in the host state,

reducing human suffering, preventing conflict from spreading beyond the borders of the object state, and promoting conflict resolution.

The study applied Pushkina's four criteria to assess the successes and failures in the DRC. Despite its disagreements over how to handle the situation in the Congolese conflict, MONUSCO took the lead in the DRC peace process. MONUSCO has been entailed in the Congolese war through military intervention and mediation. Despite the fact that the war is currently in progress, the peacekeeping mission has been able to settle some issues, and the Darya Pushkina indicator made the peacekeeping analysis simple and straightforward. According to Pushkina (2006:136) successful missions accomplished most elements of their mandates including, maintaining ceasefires, preventing major conflict outbreaks, reducing the number of casualties, and establishing safer environments in which extensive violence did not occur after peacekeeping operations had withdrawn. On the contrary failed missions exhibit opposite features including, the persistence of violence after the mission has departed and continuation of severe human rights abuses. The question of success determinants can be answered by examining the level of UN commitment, diplomatic efforts, consent of parties and outside support.

Based on the findings, besides a nearly 14-year deployment origins, MONUSCO's existing situations to civilian protection has demonstrated inadequate. The mission was largely unsuccessful in limiting the country's violent conflict. Government forces have launched and continue to launch attacks on rebel positions, while civilians and MONUSCO personnel have also been targeted. The DRC's rebel groups continue to pose a threat to regional stability as well as civilians, who are frequently targeted in their attacks. The DRC conflict is extremely entrenched, and a step change in the UNPKO is unlikely to resolve it. Despite the mission's mandate to protect civilians, the DRC still faces challenges of destitution, chronic humanitarian, and human rights violations. The protection of civilians by the peacekeepers and outbreaks of conflicts are still of major concern (Kapinga 2015, Lopor 2016 and Luthuli 2016). It is without a doubt that MONUSCO has failed to reduce human suffering because human rights violations have been the most neglected aspect of the peace process. According to Human Rights Watch (2018), the DRC's human rights situation continues to remain severe, with much more than 5.2 million citizens internally displaced and well almost

a quarter of the population suffering from severe food insecurity. This is Africa's biggest number of internally displaced persons. The DRC being a victim of the Rwandan spillover effect which has contributed greatly to the country's predicament, the UN and MONUSCO managed to keep the internal conflict from spreading beyond its borders. It is the primary responsibility of the Congolese state to develop stronger state institutions to regulate and govern its territory, defend its unity and territorial integrity, and ensure the safety of its citizens. The mission has been instrumental in encouraging conflict resolution. MONUSCO in alliance with UNICEF has established youth parliaments which have played an important role in promoting positive and productive youth engagement, including in peacebuilding processes, within the political arena throughout the DRC.

According to Pushkina (2006:147), judging success based on mandate fulfilment and focusing only on a comparatively tiny set of potential success factors may eventually be of little value in trying to make general claims about UN peacekeeping. This can question an amount of widely held beliefs by judging success and failure based on a broader set of criteria than has historically been used, by contemplating a wide range of potential impacts on rates of success, and by analysing operations from the point of view of both international support and the scenario confronted by UN peacekeepers. In this case, these accomplishments were made despite a number of strategic constraints, including the host state's declining level of cooperation, the position of bordering states in boosting destabilization, and the lack of a champion for MONUSCO. The mission has also encountered a series of operational limitations, including the perennial tactical and operational challenges of not having adequate methods and capabilities to accomplish the mission, having delegations unwilling to perform the given mandate, and lacking strong leadership and poor pre- or in-mission mentoring; the issue of varying interpretations of what peace operations is and the operation's mandate; and the complete absence of a strategic communications plan to counted on.

Based on the challenges encountered the UN peacekeeping mission remains one of the most effective ways to respond to the challenges of peace and security in the world today. These obstacles to the successes and failures of UNPKOs in Africa are not unique to the continent. MONUSCO operates in an environment that is highly complex and politically volatile. The DRC is experiencing one of the world's longest running

and most complex humanitarian crises. The country is dealing with armed conflicts, food insecurity, and recurring epidemics all at the same time. The insecurity has resulted in large-scale forced displacement (Nagel et al 2021:11). These obstacles have continued unabated in thwarting the DRC's successful transition to peace, which has been threatened by a full-fledged return to conflict (Swart 2012:44). MONUSCO's role is complicated by the central government's lack of capacity or political will to establish security. MONUSCO's mandated tasks have expanded over time, but resource allocations have not kept pace with its growing list of responsibilities.

The study proposes three strategies such as the Degree of Host States; the causes of violence in the DRC, according to Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, are internal. As a result, the solution lies in resolving the internal issues that fuel the conflict. Only the Congolese have the ability to solve their problems in a long-term manner. In the case of the DRC, when a party is not fully committed to the peace process, consent, can be withdrawn in a variety of ways may later seek to limit the operation's freedom of action, resulting in a de facto withdrawal of consent (United Nations 2008). The DRC has voiced out on numerous occasions to see MONUSCO out of the country. It is generally believed that there was an attempt to limit the mission's ability to monitor and report on election-related wrongdoing or repression, as well as to demonstrate to the public that security conditions in the country had improved and to fuel nationalist feeling (The Stimson Center 2016:7). Undoubtedly, MONUSCO is working with a government that does not fully accept its presences in the DRC. This hinders the progress of the UN and MONUSCO in bringing out the desired goal for the people of the Congo. The Role of Neighbouring Countries; Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi's rivalry, as well as their internal crises, pose a threat to the DRC. These countries have used militias operating in the DRC to fight proxy wars with one another. Therefore, their interference impedes the mission to carry out its mandate, it can also be argued that peacekeepers are faced with a challenge to completely disarm the rebel groups. Lack of Funds and Capacity; despite the UNSC resolution that authorized the mission to take necessary action, without capacity and funding the mission is unable to protect civilians and assist according to the purpose of their deployment. The decision to withdraw military soldiers and cutting of costs will escalate the predicaments the country is faced with, violence against women and children will increase, more children will be subjected to child soldering and security within the country will decline.

This study sought to demonstrate that the roles of the UN and MONUSCO in peacekeeping in the DRC have not been fully explored because conflict persists in the eastern DRC. Nonetheless, it is equally clear that without their intervention, the situation in the DRC would have been far worse than it is now.



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