

## Democratic Transitions in new Multiethnic States: Case Comparison of Macedonia and Montenegro

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**Abstract:** The democratic transitions in multiethnic states are particularly challenging, especially at the time of the emergence of new states. The examples of the two such states Macedonia and Montenegro, provide the possibility to observe how those democratic and stateness transitions could be more or less successful. Both new transitional states had to deal with the significant ethnic Albanian factor, which looms large in several regional countries. Through the process-tracing method, this paper compares the impact of that factor in the political transitions of Macedonia and Montenegro by utilizing the most similar case design of comparative politics. It proposes three variables to explain the difference in the transitions between the two countries: (i) the border with Kosovo, (ii) the ethnic minority distribution, and (iii) the speed of stateness transition. Building upon the Mikasell and Murphy (1991) model for minority aspirations, paper observes how and why the demands of the ethnic Albanians rose and created political conflict and violence in Macedonia and prevented democratic consolidation, and why the same did not occur in Montenegro. The different outcomes suggest that, despite of the inherent differences, there is the possibility for both, conflict and cooperation between the different ethnic groups within the democratizing state.

**Keywords:** democratic transitions, multi-ethnic states, Macedonia, Montenegro, ethnic Albanians

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**Introduction**

As a result of the breakup of the Balkan country of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), seven new countries appeared on the world map (see Figure 1). Although these countries were new, many of the issues they faced in their transition to bona fide statehood were long-standing problems that until then had not been resolved. Most of these new countries were faced with three track transitions, (i) democratic (political) transition, (ii) economic transition, (iii) transition to the independent state (stateness). Two of those new countries, Macedonia and Montenegro<sup>2</sup>, had an additional challenge to resolve; the question of ethnic Albanian minority relations with the new state and vice versa.

With regard to the first task, SFRY was a mono-party communist led state without developed political and social structures independent of the unified communist party. As the result of the collapse of the Party and the subsequent collapse of the country, the process of democratic transition ensued in most of the new countries and many new parties of different political and ethnic orientation emerged. Economy wise – although SFRY had a particular kind of self-governing market socialism with a high level of local



Figure 1: SFR Yugoslavia\*

input – it was still guided by the state economic plan (Horvat et al, 1975: 256), with state owned factories and with still limited private investment and strictly regulated and observed ownership of the private property. Finally, the stateness transition occurred since all the former republics and one autonomous region now became the independent states. Most of the republics became independent states right away as the old SFRY collapsed in 1992 and 1993, except Montenegro and

<sup>2</sup> Although country is recognized by the U.N. under the name the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in this paper it will be referred to as Macedonia.

\* Map source: <http://www.unc.edu/~rdgreenb/yugomap.jpg> - accessed on July 15, 2011.

Serbia. They tried to preserve rump Yugoslavia until 2006, when they also separated and became two independent countries. Their independence was followed by Kosovo with its ethnic Albanian majority, which declared independence from Serbia in 2008. The most contested issue is Kosovo's independence which is presently recognized by 84 countries of the world, yet still unrecognized by 109 countries.<sup>3</sup> This reality exemplifies one of the big challenges facing several of the Balkan countries in transition, the question of the ethnic Albanian minority component.<sup>4</sup> This paper will compare the impact of such Albanian component in the transitions of the countries of Macedonia and Montenegro through process-tracing and the method of the most similar cases design.<sup>5</sup> We propose three factors to explain the difference between the two countries: the border with Kosovo, ethnic minority distribution, and gradual stateness transition. The intention is to try to shed light on some of the problems that the stateness and political transition of Macedonia encountered, due to its inter-ethnic relations and ineffective institutional arrangements.

Adopting the model proposed by Mikasell and Murphy (1991)<sup>6</sup> and the formula for minority aspirations  $\frac{RAP}{SAI}$  {of (recognition, access, participation / Separation, Autonomy, Independence)} and the possibilities of different ethnic population concentrations in the host countries, we will try to observe how and why the demands of

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/statistics/>- accessed on October 12, 2011.

<sup>4</sup> This paper refers to ethnic Albanians of former SFRY, unless specified differently.

<sup>5</sup> See appendix 3 and 4 to show some important indicators of similarity of the two countries

<sup>6</sup> The framework examines "the ways in which geographical and political circumstances reflect and influence minority- group demands" (p.582) which together with governmental responses to the initial minority-group demands increase or not the likelihood of conflict or accommodation. As a result of real or perceived inadequate allocation of resources minority-group might press for access and participation as well as mere recognition. If no response, those demands grow and become calls for separation, autonomy or even Independence. Relaxation of tension and reversal of the process of the increase of demands can also occur through the granting of concessions. "Progression among the categories of the [minority aspiration] formula can thus be taken as evidence of whether tension is increasing or decreasing and whether potential for conflict is being enhanced or is diminishing" (582-3). Their formula also distinguishes possible different paths of territorial and non-territorial minority aspirations which they can group as the demands in the numerator or in the denominator of the formula, while the shifts from one to another have significant implications for any state.

ethnic groups and parties arose and created stalemates, political conflicts and ethnic violence in Macedonia and prevented democratic consolidation for some time, and why the same did not occur in Montenegro.

## Definitions

A ‘democracy’ for this article is defined as a practice of regular, free elections which result in voluntary exchange of power among elected and non-elected individuals and political parties with institutionalized rules of the democratic game accepted by all players. In agreement with Linz and Stephan (1996), the backdrop for the democracy has to be the healthy civil society able to influence democratic game.

‘Democratic stability’ is defined as a recurring normal process of those regular elections and exchange of national leadership positions exclusively through the elections and probability of continuation of such an occurrence. We should keep in mind that the “discursive constructs (such as ‘democratic normality’) are social realities” (Schedler, 1998:92), and the time before such stability becomes the norm could be different. Some post-communist countries became stable democracies after just few election cycles, while others are still going through the process. In case of multiethnic countries such as the countries that we observe in this paper, that process could be prolonged because they first must resolve “tensions between the logic of nation state and the logic of democracy” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 402). However, some countries are still progressing better than others, so it is constructive to compare them.

These definitions are deliberately meant to be very broad and encompassing, thus suggesting right away that democracy, consolidation, and ethnicity could have many different variations that account for diverse cultural and political norms, which societies and states can hold appropriate for themselves. This is of course the situation where those norms are negotiated and freely accepted by the different groups of a society – not forced upon any of the groups, either through *majoritarian* or any other forms of dictatorship. Obviously, these definitions elevate the issue of the degree of legitimacy to a dimension of utmost importance – all agreeing with the democracy definitions of Lijphart (1977).

Ethnicity is delineated by various ethnic boundary markers which can be structured around the notions of history, religion, economic and/or ecological niche, by external or internal group perceptions, geographic residence, physical characteristics, and language. None of these markers is static, as Barth (1969) well observed in his seminal work on ethnic boundaries. That provides with possibility to compare different policies towards the ethnic minorities, rather than focus on long felt interethnic hatred and resentment which are latently always present as Laitin (2007) have suggested. Furthermore, as Mozaffar et al. (2003) noted, not *all* issues of ethnicity become and constitute politically relevant issues. The sensitive and often emotional ethnic issues are frequently tried to be resolved quickly to reformulate the new countries and try to “to transform their multinational demos into a ‘nation-state’” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 401), and in that speedy process they create problems, instead of resolving them.

In the case of ethnic Albanians throughout the Balkans, after 600 years under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, followed by several decades of frequent warfare by neighboring peoples, and concluded by 50 years of all-encompassing communism, no ethnic boundary marker remained as firm as their ancient language by which they most strongly differentiate themselves from their Slavic and Hellenistic neighbors. Therefore the main politicized issue for Albanians is the use of their language, while other issues of representation follow. The articulation of these ethnic demands made them into an “ethnopolitical group” as defined by Mozaffar, et al. (2003).

The individual member of any one ethnic group, that is one who actually votes, is a person who belongs to any ethnic group he or she *chooses* to belong, and who also holds a multilayered identity. Such an individual constantly negotiates and chooses which layer and element of his or her own identity to emphasize at what time, in the way of maximizing perceived benefits. We should be reminded of Downs (1957: 5) note that the rationality of an actor is measured not by goals, but by methods and cost calculations to achieve those goals.

In agreement with Brubaker and Laitin (1998), ethnic violence is defined as “as violence perpetrated across the ethnic lines, in which at least one party is not a state [agent],” while the politicization of ethnic identity is ethnic mobilization (Barany, 2005).

Finally, the concept of ethnic mobilization is considered as “the process by which groups organize around some features of ethnic identity in pursuit of collective ends” (Olzak, 1983).

### **Historical Background**

As Barany (2005) speaks of prerequisites for ethnic mobilization he notes that such mobilization requires certain prerequisites and they are often settled in the history. Although most of the literature on the Albanian question in the Balkans looks for these prerequisites in the 1980-90s, the problem actually starts much earlier, more than the discipline observers “have commonly been willing to go” (Rustow, 1970: 347). However, if we do return to what happened initially, we can better understand a given subject.<sup>7</sup> Additionally, when dealing with the questions of ethnicity the challenge of history has to be observed because “an ethnically differentiated opposition can easily be depicted as consisting of particularly dangerous enemies: historical enemies” (Horowitz, 1993: 19). We cannot reach back into history and correct it, but we can perhaps understand the roots of the contention and desires of the opposing sides, so that a democratic solution can be sought and the compromise contemplated.

If “political mobilization is a process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals [turns] to an active participant in public life” (Barany, 2005) then Albanian political mobilization started way before the breakdown of SFRY. Banac (1988: 46) states that Albanians came back to depopulated Kosovo and western Macedonia after the Serb northern migrations in seventeen and eighteen century. Skendi (1953) notes that their ethnic and political aspirations going back to the League of Prizren of 1878 when the Albanian question for the first time became an international problem. The League demanded not only the protection of the ethnic Albanian population, but also the territory for the Albanian nation state to include most, if not all, the territory where they were a majority. The critical part of that problem which reverberates throughout the region until today is the problem of Kosovo.

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<sup>7</sup> As Jensen argues for the return to the mythological beginning, in Girard (1977: 91) since mythology is essential for any consideration of ethnicity.

When the Ottoman Empire took control of the Balkans, ethnic Albanian population lived throughout the Peninsula. This Albanian population lived from the coast of the Aegean Sea in the south, to deep inside of the present day Serbia in the north, throughout the territory of Macedonia in the east and up and down the coast of the Adriatic Sea in the west. As the Albanian nation largely accepted Islam what provided the possibility for social mobility within the Empire, it also made their existing and new settlements throughout the region secured by the Ottoman troops. However, when the Empire lost the Balkan wars, the result of the Treaty of San Stefan (1878) and subsequent Treaty of Berlin was that Ottomans had to cede lands under their control and largely inhabited by the ethnic Albanians to Montenegro, to newly independent Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria (Skendi, 1953). For example Serbian historian Vasa Čubrilović notes “with the resolutions of the Berlin Congress in 1878, Serbia became independent and territorially stretched towards the south. Thus, in her frame then entered Niš, Pirot, Leskovac, Vranje and Prokuplje. The entire Albanian-Islamized population that was expelled from these parts settled down on the territory known today as Kosovo.”<sup>8</sup> That is how Kosovo emerged as the hotbed of ethnic Albanian resentments. The resettlement of the territories by the Slavic populations continued since then and it “was accomplished at the end of the nineteenth century, but systematically from 1918-1941.”<sup>9</sup> Weber spoke of “shared political memories” as an important ethnic identity building block. The memories of these expulsions, land grabs and forced resettlements were not forgot by the ethnic Albanians and their various groups and institutions from the League of Prizren until the Rugova’s lead the Democratic League of Kosovo reiterated those memories and aspirations ‘to regain what they lost.’

However the ripe moment for the transforming of those long-sought aspirations into attitudinal mobilization and for additional politicizing of ethnicity for Albanians

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<sup>8</sup> Vasa Čubrilović (1937:117), “The Emigration of the Albanians: Roots of Greater-Serbian Aggression.” as noted by Mirdita (1998). More on the numbers of expelled domestic Muslim populations (including Albanians) from the Balkans see McCarthy, 1995, or for even more details Jovanović, 2008.

<sup>9</sup> For further information: Dr. Milovan Obradović, *The Agrarian Reform and Colonization in Kosovo (1918-1941)*, as mentioned by Mirdita, 1998

occurred with the historic opportunity of the transition and disremembering of SFRY.<sup>10</sup> Finally, ethnic Albanian mobilization in SFRY was successful because, ethnic or otherwise, “political opportunity is the only mobilizational prerequisite exogenous to the mobilizing group” (Barany, 2005: 84). The breakup of SFRY brought new challenges to their ethnic aspirations. Instead of one country, ethnic Albanian found themselves spread in three new countries of Serbia (Kosovo), Macedonia and Montenegro. The focus of their ethnic demands became Kosovo, while Macedonia and Montenegro remained in close sight.

### **First Factor: Kosovo (border) Element**

In his work on Macedonia, Ortakovski (2001) notes, “Albanians may feel an ethnic tie to Albania, but the big emotional tie is to Kosovo. Kosovo is the cultural and intellectual foundation for us. The writers, the journalists, the educators all came from Kosovo; anything of value is from there. We need to defend Kosovo.”<sup>11</sup> The elite concentration in Kosovo is usually tied to the establishment of the University of Priština in 1967 which offered instructions in Albanian language at a tertiary level. The event signaled not only the recognition of the right of the language, but also the centrality of Priština and Kosovo for all Albanians in former Yugoslavia. The supremacy of Kosovo was also ensured by very limited contacts between Albania and SFRY, which did not allowed the development of ties between ethnic Albanians living along the both sides of the border. So in many ways they had developed separate paths.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Barany (2005: 79-82) explains that the transition is usually accompanied with the decline of the power of the central state, what increases “the capacity of ethnic minorities and other marginalized populations to gain political recognition through mobilization” and provided them with the direction for their political goals.

<sup>11</sup> “The Albanian Question in Macedonia: Implications of the Kosovo Conflict for Inter-Ethnic Relations in Macedonia” as noted by Ortakovski, 2001.

<sup>12</sup> “It is important to note that interstate relations between Albania and Yugoslavia were practically nonexistent during the Cold War. Albanian Stalinist’s leader Enver Hoxha, had sealed the borders in 1948 and maintained a generally hands-off policy towards the Albanian diaspora in Kosovo [and Yugoslavia].”

Since 1968, ethnic Albanians and their elites began concentrated protests about their status as a national minority and Kosovo as sub-federal unit. The federal unit status actually appropriated certain rights and privileges to the peoples in SFRY and each ethnic group hoped for their full recognition. Vojislav Zaslavsky describes the federal system of Republics and Autonomies well, when he writes, “It divided ethnic groups into those with recognized territory and certain rank in the hierarchy of the state formations and those without such territory” (as noted by Linz and Stepan, 1996: 388).

Similarly in Former Yugoslavia that was done when six republics “held the honorific title of ‘states’ while Vojvodina was autonomous province and Kosovo and Metohija an autonomous region (later, with a changed name, Kosovo, upgraded to a province) within the republic of Serbia” (Pavković, 2010). Because of the importance of the ‘titular’ nationality positions, the ethnic Albanians escalated their demands with the demonstrations in 1981. Initially, they demanded status of republic for Kosovo, improvement of economic conditions, and the release of Albanian political prisoners (Babuna, 2000). Those rights were not granted and instead Serbian crackdown ensued, which eventually led to the war of 1999, and subsequent declaration of the independence of Kosovo in 2008.



Figure 2: Montenegro & Macedonia Ethnic

Albanian distribution (Source: Le Monde Diplomatique)

Because “the excitement of mass demonstrations also tended to generate radical and utopian ideas, rather than pragmatic strategies for gradual political reform,” (Tong, 1994) it is important for the mobilizations to be led by the organized elites who can articulate and/or escalate or deescalate such actions and demands. As it is noted by observers (Ortakovski, 2001: 38), the vast number of Albanian elite intelligentsia throughout Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro attended the SFRY’s only Albanian

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International Crisis Group (10 July 1998) “The View from Tirana: The Albanian Dimension of the Kosovo Conflict.” ICG Balkans 36:2 - as noted by Jane, 2007: 164

university in Pristina. The front-line position of Kosovo's ethnic Albanian elites gave them the position of ethnic tribunes not only in Kosovo, but throughout Yugoslavia.

The Kosovo factor is also important in our comparing of Macedonia and Montenegro not only because the ethnic Albanian elites in both countries are Kosovo educated, but also as Kosovo is bordering the regions with ethnic Albanian majority in the former and not the later country (See the map on Figure 2). As it is suggested by Mikesell and Murphy (1991) "border people" tend to more readily escalate their demands, and thus, the possibility for confrontations also increases. Interestingly, in the case of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro, the border with Kosovo matters more than with their national state Albania, and Kosovo appears to be more of a "lobby actor" (Janne, 2007) for the escalation of the demands.

As it is noted by many observers (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Mainwaring et al., 1992) the important part of both democratic transitions and ethnic negotiations is the role of the elites. Ethnically driven political elites were the reality in the former Yugoslavia even before the breakup was on the horizon. Particular kind of federalism in a single party state with strong emphasis on equality among the nations and nationalities meant that "from early on, a Party cadre or a budding official knew that his (or more rarely, her) career was most likely to be tied to the cadres of his (or her) republic, even if he (or she) were to be temporarily transferred to a federal body" (Pavković, 2010). Therefore, as Linz and Stepan (1996: 372) noted for the case of the Soviet Union it is not the case of "primordial nationalism and irrational emotions," but the existing institutional arrangements in the old federal state-centered structure for carrier incentives that encouraged local political elites among the Yugoslav nationalities to organize around Republics and Autonomies. This system of incentives was based on loyalties to the center while discouraging formations of incumbents. That provided leaders of those republics a base for quick mobilization of republics' ethnic base once the federal structure weakened, as it did occur. However, in case of Albanians, their protest led them to withdraw or be excluded from all federal, state and regional government positions very early in the process of Yugoslav liberalizations (Pavković, 2010; Linz and Stepan 1996: 387). That opened up the possibility for ethnic mobilization and emergence of new elites among them, which could actually escalate their ethnic-centered claims.

Additionally that also gave the new elites more time to forge stronger connections and ties with the political and social base, as well as to forge ties with important international actors.<sup>13</sup> To use Smith's (1988: 157) phrase, by the time of the SFRY crises, Albanians were well *habituated* to a political role. Finally, the early start of mobilization gave Albanian leading parties the position at the table, right from the start of the transitions of the new states; to participate in the transition negotiations and strongly articulate their demands confident of the social support from the 'politically habituated' population.<sup>14</sup> The elites of other ethnic minority groups in SFRY, such as Bosniaks in neighboring Sandžak or Hungarians in Vojvodina could not do that during these crucial times of transitions because they were unsure of the social and international support that they could muster.<sup>15</sup> That support for ethnic Albanians was not only implicit, but also explicit through significant material resources obtained through taxing the sizeable Albanian diaspora in Western countries with the three percent of their yearly income (Babuna, 2000).

### **Second Factor: The Albanian Ethnic Dispersion in Macedonia and Montenegro**

As we have observed the historical background and the importance of Kosovo for ethnic Albanian aspirations, we can now turn to their ethnic dispersion in Macedonia and Montenegro. Both of these countries emerged out of SFRY with the i) legacy of

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<sup>13</sup> Noted as important by Huntington, 1991: 608

<sup>14</sup> The speed of transitions similarly affected other countries. O'Mahony (2003) for example notes that "the very speed with which Communism collapsed in Czechoslovakia, and the rapidity of the transition to a parliamentary democracy, did not give aspiring politicians enough time to develop constituencies within society."

<sup>15</sup> The elites among Bosniaks in Sandžak never successfully managed to form coherent front for transition negotiations. Hungarians did, and even advanced and articulated their goals through the support of Andras Agston's DCVH initiative in 1992 elections in Vojvodina with over 90 percent of the Hungarian votes (Janne, 2007). However they stopped short of open confrontations with the central state as Albanians did. Also see Barany, 2005

communism; ii) similar economic conditions at the time;<sup>16</sup> iii) similar institutional arrangements of elections and parliament (see appendix 1); iv) both had a significant ethnic Albanian population; v) and although Montenegro size and population is smaller than Macedonia, proportionally the majority of their respected populations, match the proportions of ethnic Albanians in each country (see Table 1). The main differential question when we compare these two countries, then becomes why did the Albanian component in Macedonia lead to the significant slowing down of the democratic transitions and to a short interethnic war, while Montenegro managed their inter-ethnic relations better. As noted earlier, one of the possible explanatory variables could be the position of Kosovo as a lobby actor.

In her model of “ethnic bargaining model” Jenne (2007: 159-184) also suggest that with outside lobby actors actively playing in ethnic strife explains why and if conflicts escalate or not. Her model however compares Hungarians in Vojvodina and Albanians in Kosovo and therefore has two different exogenous lobby actors of Hungary and Albania. In our observations, if we are to account for an exogenous lobby actor, it is the same one of Kosovo, or those who spoke on behalf of ethnic Albanians in the region.<sup>17</sup>

Table 1: Some ethnographic markers of the population of Macedonia and Montenegro

Ethnicity regionally recognized		Languages, dialects and alphabet		Occupied Geographical Relief			Religions	
Albanian	Slavs	Albanian (dialects only)	Slavs (Languages & dialects)	Albanian	Slavs	Albanian	Slavs	
<b>Macedonia</b>	Yes	No, claimed by Bulgaria	Gegh, some Tosk *Latin	Macedonian *Cyrilic	1.Landlocked mountains 2. hills	1.Landlocked plains 2. hills 3. mountains	1.Muslim, 2.Bektashi, 3.Orthodox Christians	1.Orthodox Christians 2.Muslim
<b>Montenegro</b>	Yes	No, claimed by Serbia	Gegh *Latin	Montegrin Serbian, Bosnian	1.Coastal, 2. Lake, 3. Continental Mountains	1.Mountains 2. Coastal 3. Lake	1.Muslim, 2.Catholic Christians	1.Orthodox Christians 2.Muslim

Source: Personal Ethnographic Notes

<sup>16</sup> Ortakovski (2001: 39) notes “Macedonia emerged as an independent state with burdensome legacy as the most underdeveloped and the poorest Yugoslav republics” while Montenegro was right behind Macedonia.

<sup>17</sup> Engstrom (2007: 171) notes that to be Slovenia’s leadership, and even Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance

Although her model accounts for a significant and undeniable foreign factor, it did not account for the factor of geography as an extremely important aspect which provides the possibility for the escalation of ethnic strife into an armed conflict. Vojvodina is a totally flat region with no large forests and only one mountain, Fruska Gora, which gives advantages to conventional armies; while Kosovo's mountainous landscape and thousand-year-old forests throughout the region provides important maneuvering space for any rebellion. Such topography, together with the excellent knowledge of the terrain, can give tactical advantage to the insurgencies. When it comes to Macedonia and Montenegro though, both regions also share very similar geography. So we have to look elsewhere for explanations of their difference.

Another factor that could explain the different outcomes in those two countries is the model of ethnic group dispersion suggested by Mikesell and Murphy (1991). The authors propose the combination of size and distribution of a minority as the signifier of possibility for the demands increase (see Figure 3). Hypothetically in the first model, ethnic minority populations are distributed throughout the host country without the border base where they constitute majority. The second option is when the ethnic minority population is both, distributed throughout the country, and has a base with a significant majority in the border region. In our case Macedonia is represented by the second situation or B model, while Montenegro is by the first situation or A model (with more even distribution across a country).

### **Macedonia Ethnic Distribution and Recognition**

Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia have a different language from their Slavic Macedonian neighbors. The majority of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia are sunni Muslims, with smaller number from Bektashi sect and some number of Orthodox Christian in the south around Lake Ohrid. These minority Albanians mainly speak Tosk dialect of Albanian language, apart from the northerners which use Gegh dialect (for more ethnicity data see Table 1). Albanians constitute about 25.2 percent of total




Figure 2: The relationship between the distribution of a minority group and its aspirations: the two of the three hypothetical situations proposed by Mikasell and Murphy (1991).

population in Macedonia, and they are predominantly densely concentrated in the northwestern region of the country<sup>18</sup> (see figure 2). Kostadinova (2007) notes that in “over 37 % of the state territory [they] constitute more than 50 % of total population.” Furthermore, 60% of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia live within the majority regions while most of the remaining ethnic brethren live in the immediate neighboring regions. In such a case the Mikasell and Murphy (1991) model suggests that this situations might direct ethnic aspirations to take two different forms; with the concentrated group seeking independence and the dispersed part of the group seeking opportunity in the national arena. The situation with two forms of aspirations represents the maximum of possible demands. This is exactly what happened with the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia since they also live in a B model (see figure 2).

As Linz and Stepan (1996) argue, “institutions do matter” and inadequate institutional arrangements could not only exaggerate tensions, but also be the very source of the problem. Since the Macedonian first constitution (amended in 1991) established that only Macedonians are acknowledged as a constitutional nation, and that the country is “a national state of the Macedonian people,” ethnic Albanians protested by boycotting the referendum for independence and then the census in 1991. They claimed to be forty percent of the country and demanded to be recognized as a partner-nation in the country (Babuna, 2000). Such recognition could ensure among the other things, the equal right for the use of Albanian language along the Slavic Macedonian language. Horowitz (1993) explains that the issues of the official language actually “reflect restrictive conceptions of indigenusness” and it is a trench over which ethnic groups will fight hard.

<sup>18</sup> The Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia are spread from Kumanovo in the northeast, over major urban areas of Skopje and Tetovo in the northwest, where they constitute 74.4% of the population. From Tetovo, the Albanians spread further to the south along the Macedonian border with Albania, through the towns of Debar, 44.55, Gostivar, 63.7%, and Struga 42.5%. (See Babuna, 2000, and Bizouras, 2005)

In their insistence on national language as the core *diacritica*, Albanians are not unique. Anderson (1991) spoke about the importance of vernacular language when he proposed the foundation role of “print capitalism” in creation of the sense of belonging to a certain group and force of nationalism. Since there was a high rate of illiteracy among the Albanians in all of the former Yugoslavia and Macedonia in particular, partly due to the lack of schools in vernacular language, that reality increased their concern for the preservation of the language in general and amplified the importance of the spoken language. Since the majority of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia were peasants and manual laborers, language served as a particularly important issue not only as the identity marker, but also because the language provided a vehicle for mobilization (Barth, 1969: 35). As an example of how language was used for mobilization, Sugarman (1999: 453) notes that “through different forms of spoken language the most crucial support of villagers for the nationalist cause was secured in part when nationalist poems – the medium of the literate middle class – were transformed into men’s narrative songs, the medium of a rural population on the verge of literacy.” Such situation with ethnic Albanians being primarily peasants and manual labor workers for Lorwin (1971) made possible the “‘total’ organization for them which one can hardly imagine proposed to a modern upper-class constituency.” Finally, any contestation of the language of the majority group, which is an essential element of the identity, would enhance the fear of ethnic security dilemma and domination by other group.<sup>19</sup> This meant that the elites would not drop the issue of language from the negotiations under no circumstances because if they did, they would lose the main toll for ethnic mobilization.

As the Mikasell and Marphy (1991) put forth in their model, in the case when the initial demands for recognition were ignored, due in part to their distribution, ethnic Albanians escalated their demands. Eventually in 1992 they held the referendum for the creation of an autonomous sector in the Albanian-inhabited parts of Western Macedonia under the name “Illyridia” (Babuna, 2000). The referendum was ignored by the major ethnic Albanian political parties at that time, but it clearly showed where ethnic Albanian frustrations with Macedonian state were going.

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<sup>19</sup> Shoup (2008:11) notes such emotions and fears as important for ethnic mobilization

As a legacy of the communist past, the notion of the “titular nationality” remains very important for all ethnic groups in the region. Just like in the communist past, those titular nationalities dominate over the non-titular. In such situation “non-titular nationalities are motivated to secede and create their own titular nationality regions,” (Bremmer, as noted in Linz and Stepan 1996: 389) and that is how and why collective rights are emphasized over individual rights, which democratic transitions aspire. The negotiations were ongoing without much possibility for meaningful compromise because the Macedonians don’t want to recognize their demands as the legitimate issue, since they consider the political representation of the Albanians in parliament and political coalitions as the evidence of their equality in Macedonia (Babuna, 2000). But as Horowitz (1993) would say, “it is one thing to demand the acknowledgment that those left in opposition are merely outside the government but not outside the community; it is quite another to require that no one be [truly] left outside the government.” This perception of ethnic Albanian participation did not translate into real governmental positions or jobs in governmental institutions.

Although major ethnic Albanian parties did participate in coalition governments, their alliances were changing with each new election. That is unhealthy for the prospects of democratic transitions since it greatly increases the level of uncertainty<sup>20</sup> and exacerbates ethnic minority apprehensions about the democracy. Mainwaring (1992) suggests that in addition to the commitment of political elites and parties to democracy, for longer term stable democracy, “[p]olitical elites must create institutions that represent interests in society and exercise moderating power over those interests” (p.311). For ethnic Albanians in Macedonia that meant constitutional equality.

As the inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia continued to deteriorate, the problems culminated in 2001 when Macedonia fought its own short war with the Albanian insurgents.<sup>21</sup> As Tilly (1975: 493) notes, “violence is sometimes preferred because it is simply the most efficient means of accomplishing some collective end” (as mentioned by

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<sup>20</sup> For Sofos (2001) the instability showed “the façade of Macedonia’s multiethnic political system which revealed: namely, the division of the political arena between ethnic parties, the failure of the existing political forces to forge long-term alliances and common platforms that overcomes ethnic divisions.”

<sup>21</sup> For more details see Babuna, 2000

Snyder, 1978). The short war was concluded with the Ohrid Peace Agreement<sup>22</sup> signed by the Macedonian government and major political representatives of the Albanian side, and under the auspices of the United States and the European Union. The peace agreement guaranteed more or less most of the rights that the Albanian populations were demanding, as well as reassured the Macedonian government of its territorial integrity and sovereignty on all of its territory.<sup>23</sup> As is, the country was finally ready to move to the next step in its path towards the democratic stability, because “the individual freedoms [which democracy requires] are best produced when supplemented with the recognition of those groups and organizations through which the individual acts” (O’Mahony, 2003).

### Montenegro Ethnic Distribution and Recognition



**Figure 4: Map of southern Montenegro with the municipality of Ulcinj and ethnic Albanian population distribution**

The mountainous and costal country of Montenegro was also faced with the competing narratives and presence of ethnic Albanian minority. The ethnic Albanians in Montenegro are largely settled in the municipality of Ulcinj where they constitute a large majority (over 80%); and smaller minorities in the municipalities of Podgorica, Plav and Rozaje. Almost

fifty percent of ethnic Albanians in Montenegro are distributed out of the majority municipality of Ulcinj and their regions within the country are not contiguous with each




<sup>22</sup> An agreement which provided a platform for normalizing the political process in Macedonia, created the current system of proportional representation and six election districts; all of which eased ethnic demands for representations and created a system of a parliamentary democracy in Macedonia

<sup>23</sup> For details see the Council of Europe web site at [http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal\\_affairs/legal\\_cooperation/police\\_and\\_internal\\_security/OHRID%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_cooperation/police_and_internal_security/OHRID%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp)

other. Their position in Montenegro is represented with the first hypothesized distribution form in Mikasell and Murphy (1991) model.

The ethnic population distribution in Montenegro was also largely the result of historical circumstances. History records that Montenegro changed its borders at last seven times since the 19 century (Helmreich, 1937). White (2000) writes of Montenegrins expansions after the retreat of the Ottomans. As a result Montenegro took over parts of northern Albanian regions around Pec, south of Zabljak, and ports of Antivari (now Bar) and Dulcigano (now Ulcinj), and the border of Montenegro then run through the Lake of Shkodra (Skadar) and along the Bojana River to the Adriatic Sea (Skendi, 1953). This land pocket squeezed between a large lake, river and sea, inhabited by the Albanian majority remained (on and off) as part of Montenegro till today (see Figure 4).

Although, ethnic Albanians boycotted the initial referendum about Montenegro’s position in rump Yugoslavia, and they had their own demands and grievances towards the Montenegrin state, from 1991 on, they have consistently showed the same political orientation towards the cooperation with the country’s nationalistic forces, which eventually led the country to full independence. This consistency could also be observed in the election results in the municipality of Ulcinj from 1991 till the recent election in 2010, where the ‘temperature’ of the ethnic Albanian votes in Montenegro could best be measured and where stable coalitions are the constant (see



figures 5, 6, 7).<sup>24</sup> Mikasell and Murphy (1991) suggest that if the ethnic minority group “is scattered rather than concentrated, its aspirations are likely to be expressed in the numerator of the formula” with  $\frac{r a p}{p}$  (recognition, access, participation) as it did happen in Montenegro.

It could also be observed that the ethnic Albanians minority in Montenegro is smaller than the ethnic minority in Macedonia, and Janne (2007) suggested that “weak minority is likely to lay low rather than radicalize in response to ethnic demands.” Yet, if because of their relative percentage comparing to the total population Albanians in Montenegro could not seek full independence, they could nevertheless try to achieve ‘border adjustments’ with that municipality (or municipalities) were they are overwhelming majority (see figure 4). They could have tried to join the motherland of Albania and correct long ago ‘mistakenly’ drawn borders, at the opportune time when new countries are being formed anyway. However, that did not happen and ethnic Albanians in Montenegro did not make such moves or demands. Therefore, we propose that thesecond explanatory variable for the different outcomes of the Albanian component in Montenegro, as compared to Macedonia, is the minority population distribution.

### **Third Factor: Three vs. Two-Legged Transitions**

As we have already noted most of the countries that emerged from the SFRY had to face three-legged transitions. This proved to be particularly hard for those which were more multiethnic such as Bosnia, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, than those less multiethnic, such as Slovenia. Even though every transition has multiple unpredictable actors which make the process multifarious and unique in each case, we could attempt to typologies the transitions in those two countries and say that democratization in Macedonia occurred through rapture, while Montenegro transitions occurred gradually. Macedonia raptured from the former Yugoslavia and former ruling

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<sup>24</sup> Figures represent aggregate results of *all* ethnic Albanian and *all pro*-Montenegro-in dependence parties’ elections results.

structures, while Montenegro did it through “incremental democratization” where first economic and political transitions started, followed by stateness transitions fifteen years later.

Although, the two countries Montenegro and Macedonia faced very similar challenges one managed to avoid inter-ethnic war, while the other did not. The different phase of these transitions appears to offer some clues and I propose that to be the *third* variable for this analysis.

After the popularly held referendum in 1991, an overwhelming majority of the Macedonian population supported the separation. The country became fully independent for the first time since the eleventh century, i.e. the time of Emperor Samuil. The European Community and the big International players suggested that international recognition rests exclusively upon the outcome of such referendums for all former Yugoslavian republics. However, the European Community on January 15, 1992, recognized Slovenia and Croatia, but not Macedonia.<sup>25</sup> The recognition of the young Republic of Macedonia was stalled because of the name and state symbols, which Greece claimed as its heritage. Bulgaria, on the other hand was the first to recognize the young Republic, with the caveat, however, of covertly denying the notion of the Macedonian nation claiming that Macedonians are western Bulgarians, because of the of the likeness of languages and folklore<sup>26</sup> and the history of Macedonian national awakenings.<sup>27</sup> Similar claims were put forth by Serbia, which for its own sake, claimed Macedonians to be nothing but southern Serbs.<sup>28</sup> The Serbian position was exacerbated by the old dispute about the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, which was strongly contested by the Serbian Church.<sup>29</sup> Albania did not have any such issues with Macedonia,

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<sup>25</sup> For more see Danforth, 1995.

<sup>26</sup> As a good illustration of this was the first meeting of Bulgarian and Macedonian Presidents in 1992 when the Bulgarian president suggested that no translator was needed for the talks, while Macedonian president Gligorov insisted on it what was reported by the several media sources.

<sup>27</sup> For Banac (1988:35) “the nineteen-century national awakening in Macedonia was undoubtedly a Bulgarian affair.”

<sup>28</sup> Serbian claims are weakened because of the clear language and folklore difference.

<sup>29</sup> Serbian Christian Orthodox Church has the same issue with autocephaly of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church.

so the Albanians soon recognized the new state. However, the issue of the exact number of Albanians within Macedonia and the protection of their minority status brought about a call for the guaranteeing of rights and universal equality in the new Republic.

This situation – with all its elements of statehood and contentions by Macedonian neighbors – created a sense of existential peril and very strong feelings of nationalism among the majority, Slavic Macedonians, who in response to the pressures, tried to impose strong symbols of their nationhood and dominance on the entire territory of the state and rushed to adopt the new constitution. That same speed turned out to be problematic. As O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) note that the rapid transitions to democracy create some real complications. They continue to say, “[t]he speed with which the rules of the game shift from authoritarian to democratic notion of power opens the door for political instability” because it usually leaves no time for careful negotiations, and the best compromise about the first and crucial constitution acceptable by all players. This was the case of Macedonia, despite the fact that some of the most important transitional actors were experienced politicians and members of the previous communist regime such as Kiro Gligorov.

Montenegro also had many of its elements of stateness contested. Their ethnicity, language and the autocephaly Montenegrin Orthodox church was not recognized by the main neighbor of Serbia which considers Montenegro an ancient Serbian land. Historically though, Montenegro was actually the only independent state throughout the Ottoman control of the Balkans, and even after “Serbia proper achieved independence in 1878, and Montenegro shared a border with the Serbian state from the conclusion of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the Montenegrins did not decide to join their ‘Serbian’ state with Serbia Proper until after the end of the First World War” (White, 2000). But, the similarity of language and, to some extent, of the folklore and national myths, provided numerous Serbs to claim Montenegrins as actual ethnic Serbs.<sup>30</sup>

The Republic of Montenegro faced similar challenges like Macedonia; they all did not come at the same time. The Mountainous country managed to delay its stateness transitions by remaining with Serbia as part of the rump Yugoslavia until the 2006.

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<sup>30</sup> For more history on the issue see Banac (1988: 44-45).

Driven by the Horowitz's (1993) observations that "ethnic conflict has fed authoritarian tendencies in Eastern Europe, as it has elsewhere" we should try to understand the reasons for the delay in political transitions in Montenegro. Gagnon (1996) gives a fitting explanation when he wrote about Serbia, and we can safely add Montenegro as well because they were part of the same entity and the political project of that time:

By sending military and paramilitary forces into other Yugoslav republics in order to start violent conflict, which was portrayed as "ethnic conflict" the regime managed to refocus the center of political discourse away from issues of radical change ... This *silencing* or *demobilizing* strategy has proved quite successful in the Serbian [and Montenegro] case.

For Montenegrins these prospects were even closer than for Serbians because the country is much smaller and war was fought literally in the neighborhood for the most of the citizens; first on the Prevlaka and then in Herzegovina (see the figure 4). The mass desertion of Albanian and Muslim conscripts from Montenegrin-Yugoslav army units, which occurred on the mountain of Sutorman in the summer of 1992, is the particularly telling evidence for this regime's 'games.'<sup>31</sup> The Montenegrin government eventually refused to send its recruits to participate in inter-SFRY wars and that signaled not only their good sense, but also their orientation towards the eventual separation from Serbia and full independence which occurred on June 3, 2006. As a testament of Montenegro's full resolution towards stateness and a democratic transition, on July 24, 2006, the European Union approved the beginning of the process of accession for Montenegro, and

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<sup>31</sup> While conscription turnout rates were very low throughout the war among all segments of the population, additionally and without much government objection, hundreds of thousands of young Serbs and Montenegrins left their countries and sought asylum abroad to avoid conscription and fighting for the 'ethnic thing,' and that could also be considered as the part of demobilizing strategy and silencing of the most productive part of the population.

was confirmed as candidate in December 2010; while on November 29, 2006 NATO invited Montenegro into the Partnership for Peace and the path for the full membership.<sup>32</sup>

Horowitz (1993) suggests that “in planning for a state that is to be democratic and multiethnic, earlier is assuredly better.” Montenegro did exactly that and chose an “inclusionary approach to the citizenship” (Linz and Stepan, 1996).

Although the economic and political transitions followed the same line of the Macedonian path, the delay in the stateness transition gave them critical time to carefully rethink the constitution and avoid the constitutional trappings of nation state preambles for multiethnic countries. Instead of defining Montenegro as a nation state of ‘titular’ Montenegrin nation, in the article one on of the constitution, Montenegro is defined as a “democratic country and ecological state of all its citizens.”<sup>33</sup> To satisfy its stateness aspirations and a sense of national solidarity, the constitution was skillfully arraigned to have the article twelve which states that “Montenegrin nationality does exist in the state of Montenegro.”<sup>34</sup> Finally, to ease ethnic Albanian apprehensions, as well as concerns of other ethnic minorities, article thirteen states that “the official language is Montenegrin, alphabet is Cyrillic and Latin, and official languages are also Serbian, Bosnian and Albanian languages.”<sup>35</sup> This opened up the possibility for the regular public radio and TV programming in Albanian language, as well as State-funded Independent University Studies in Albanian language,<sup>36</sup> with small, but nonetheless existing programs. This plays a double role, it provides education possibilities for the Albanian elites, as well as serves as a true evidence of the commitment towards the multiethnic orientation of the state so

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<sup>32</sup> Montenegro Ministry of Foreign Affairs official web site <http://www.mip.gov.me> accessed on June 17, 2010.

<sup>33</sup> Član 1, Službeni List Crne Gore 1/2007, Podgorica 25. Oktobar 19997, ISSN 0354-1541 – my translation. Službeni List Crne Gore is the Official Register of the Montenegrin state.

<sup>34</sup> Član 12, Službeni List Crne Gore 1/2007, Podgorica 25. Oktobar 19997, ISSN 0354-1541 – my translation.

<sup>35</sup> Član 13 Službeni List Crne Gore 1/2007, Podgorica 25. Oktobar 19997, ISSN 0354-1541 – my translation.

<sup>36</sup> Official Web Site of Montenegro Ministry of Education <http://www.mpin.gov.me> - accessed on June 12, 2010. The list of accredited state funded institution is available for a download at the URL: <http://www.mpin.gov.me/ResourceManager/FileDownload.aspx?rId=55582&rType=2>

much needed for consocialism<sup>37</sup> to hold and provide required minimum of political stability. With these three constitutional articles, Montenegro successfully answered the three important questions Horowitz (1993) proposed for the multiethnic states: “Who is a citizen? Among citizens, who has what privileges? Whose norms and practices are symbolically aligned with those of the state?”

This kind of possible fluidity with ethnic cooperation is often missed not only by politicians but also by scholars of democratic transition because of misplaced notions of nation and ethnicity as uniformed realities for any particular nation. Therefore when Lijphart (1977) and others argue that proportional representation is best for the consociationalism which can ensure interethnic cooperation and democratic stability, he implies the uniformity of ethnicity because “modern democracy is not simply democracy of the village, the tribe, or the city-state; it is democracy of the nation state” (Huntington, 1991). But in the real world relations between the nation and ethnicity is at least two-dimensional. As White (2000) notes, the notions of national contributes to the changing character of ethnic identities, because national identities are ever-changing themselves. The relation goes in the other direction too, because “as national identities change, they cause reevaluations of identities within ethnic group” (White, 2000).

Horowitz (1993) acknowledges that ethnically based parties primarily drive support from “an identifiable group [and] it serves the interest of that group” and consequently is being evaluated by how well those interests are served, especially when there is more than one ethnic based party as it is the case of Macedonia and Montenegro. On the other hand, he suggests that such static notion of ethnic politics does not account for all the possibilities and need for many parties to attract voters across the ethnic lines, as it occurred in Montenegro in the referendum for independence, which was widely supported by the ethnic Albanians as well. The Institute for War Peace recently quoted an ethnic Albanian editor of local radio station in Tuzi, (Montenegro) Dino Ramović, as saying, “They [Albanian parties] want people to vote for them just because they are Albanians and that’s their first mistake” (Carnaj, 2010). What this voter suggesting is also observed by Gagnon (1996) when he proposed that “if political rhetoric is based on cultural affinities, it must be recognized that such affinities are not necessarily limited to

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<sup>37</sup> For more on consocialism see Lijphart, 1999.

membership in the same ‘ethnic group’” rather, they are fluid enough to be embraced by both groups.

Once such democratic variability is established, “fluidity begets fluidity,” Horowitz (1993) concluded, and this game of “the successful persistence of democracy over time is likely to cause increases in levels of civic culture attitudes” that is very much needed for the successful democratic transitions (Muller and Seligson, 1994).

Table 2: The phase of the three-legged transitions in Macedonia and Montenegro

<i>Years with important dates in transitions for both countries</i>	1992		2001		2006		2010	
	<i>Mc</i>	<i>Mg</i>	<i>Mc</i>	<i>Mg</i>	<i>Mc</i>	<i>Mg</i>	<i>Mc</i>	<i>Mg</i>
<b>Economic</b>	O	O	O	O	O	O	X	X
<b>Political</b>	O	O	O	O	R	X	R	R
<b>Stateness</b>	O	A	O	O	O	X	X	R

**Legend:** **Mc**- Macedonia **Mg** - Montenegro  
**X** - represents full scale unhindered ongoing transitions  
**O** - represents beginning, or significant adjustments of transitions  
**R** - transition resolved **A** - transition absent

### Conclusion and beyond

When we observe the three-legged transitions which occurred in both countries we can note that the economic transitions, which take a very long time to complete through privatizations and private investment, were more or less the same for both countries so we did not account for them. Political transitions, with opening of the

political system for party competitions and party formations were also the same, as both countries right from the early 1990 had political parties of both ethnic Albanians and Montenegrins part of the competitions (see figure 5). Thus the different phase of the stateness transitions appears to be the third explanatory factor for more successful transitions because that fact allows the possibility for better institutional arrangements in Montenegro. As O'Donnell and Shmitter (1986: 39) observed, "transition as a sequence of moments" will be more successful, such as sequencing of three transitions in Montenegro, gives an important clue for democratic transition and the ethnic peace in transitions for Montenegro vs. Macedonia. In the following table, political transitions are considered resolved when institutional arrangements and clear rules of the democratic game were established. Since "national unity must always be reconstituted" (Lorwin, 1973), Montenegro has to continue its careful path towards the full democratic stability, however so far their prospects are promising.

To recap the other two factors, this comparative observation also suggested a second proposed explanatory factor to be the distribution of ethnic minority group, which is more favorable in the case of Montenegro. The first explanatory factor is the border with Kosovo of the regions with the ethnic Albanian majority. An interesting observation here is that Albania, as the 'primary' ethnic Albanian nation state, it is not the "lobby actor." Such a "lobby actor" is the newly established Kosovo, which is not defined as a "nation state," but rather just *a country* with an ethnic Albanian majority.

This paper does not intend to close the door to other possible explanations for the different outcomes in Macedonia and Montenegro, as that would mean noncommitment to the constructivist approach which utilizes multicausality not only to understand why, but also to interpret *how* the phenomenon occurred.

Some analysts suggest that particular attention in comparison should be paid to the differences of Macedonian nationalism and Montenegrin nationalism where the first is directed primarily against ethnic Albanians, while the second is oriented against Montenegrin ethnic Serbians. Although that difference could be potentially an additional layer of the transitions differences to be explored, yet the difference in orientation towards the primary opposition also confirms the findings of this review which suggests that Montenegrin government managed much better the relations of the state with its

*ethnic Albanian minorities* than Macedonian did, and those particular relations are central for my observation. One other possible avenues to explore is the intra-ethnic particularities within the same ethnic Albanian group and try to note points of shared identity and cultural elements among the different nations, which are also suggested by White (2000) but that goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, we could use his observation to conclude and to confirm that “the tensions that arise between ethnic groups and nations often come about because the dominant national group redefines the national identity in a way that contradicts the identity of one or more of its ethnic group” (White, 2000:17). If such tensions are to be avoided, dominant ethnic groups always have to think of the way to keep their governing democratic model “inclusionary” and ethnic minorities as part of the nation because “not all ethnic cleavages become politicized, and even fewer become ‘particized, that is, made into important lines of partisan division’” (Cox, 1997, as noted by Mozaffar et al., 2003). Therefore, the ethnic-based party outbidding is not an automatic process in multi-ethnic states, rather it usually occurs as the result of unbalanced and/or misguided state polices. This would signals few important facts; first, state elites do have room for maneuvering and balancing democracy in multi-ethnic states; second, there are certainly some areas of ethnic interactions where interests are shared and that provide a possibility for negotiations and compromise which could be instrumentally strengthen and encouraged. This is particularly salient in many post-communist countries where, in absence of own developed political platforms, many ethnic and non-ethnic political options are defined primarily ‘in opposition to’ and “‘we are not what you are’ politics” (O’Mahoney, 2003).

Appendix 1:

Table 3: Comparison of institutional arraignments in Macedonia and Montenegro

	Macedonia	Montenegro
* <b>Unicameral Assembly</b>	- Yes (120 seats)	- Yes (81 seats) (Mac:Mtg = 1:1,5)
* <b>Electoral Districts</b>	- Yes ( 6 districts: 20 each) 3 districts majority	- No (Single nation-wide list, through local municipalities)

* <b>Legal threshold</b>	- No (party list proportional)	(Ulcinj municipality over 80%) - initially No but now Yes with 3%
* <b>Head of state</b>	- Directly elected (5 year term)	- Directly elected (5 year term)
* <b>Albanian population</b>	- <b>25.2 %</b> (522,166)	- <b>6.64 %</b> (40,880)
	(proportion of percent of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro: 1 to 3)	(proportion of percent of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro: 1 to 3)
* <b>Majority population</b>	- <b>66.5%</b> Macedonians (1,377,937)	- <b>61.84%</b> Montenegrins (380,484)
* <b>Minority/majority proportion</b>	- 1 : 3	- 1 : 9
* <b>Main ethnic Albanian Parties</b>	- Democratic Union for Integration DUI (x; x; 18) - Democratic Party of Albanians (x; x; 11) - Albanian Democratic Union (x; x; 0)  - 2008 Total seats: 29 (24% seats)	- Democratic Union of Albanians (n/a; 1) -New Democratic Power FORCA (n/a; 1) - Albanian List – Democratic Alliance in Montenegro (2; 1) - Albanian Coalition – The Perspective (n/a; 1) - 2008 Total seats: 4 (5% seats)
* <b>Main ethnic majority Parties</b>	- VMRO DMNE (x; x; 63) - Socialist Party of Macedonia - Socialist-democrat Union  - Total seats: 91 (76% seats)	- Coalition for European Montenegro (42; 48) - Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro (8; 16) - New Serbian Democracy (10; 8) - Movement for Change (11, 5) - Total seats: 77 (95% seats)
* <b>Coalitions with Albanian parties</b>	Yes	Yes
* <b>Anti-system activities</b>	- Yes	- No

<b>* Border people</b>	- Albanians ( <b>majority districts</b> ) - Kosovo Albanians (majority districts) - Serbian Albanians (minority districts)	- Albanians ( <b>majority districts</b> ) - Kosovo Albanians (minority districts)
<b>* Elections since independence</b>	- 5 since 1991 (2 after peace agreement in 2001)	- 2 since 2003 (plus 3 as a part of rump Yugoslavia)
<b>Regional Concentration</b>	- 2 Electoral Districts with large majority - Model 2 (Mikasell & Murphy, 1991) (60% within the majority region & rest in immediate neighboring regions)	- Municipality of Ulcinj 72.14% of district population - Model 1 (Mikasell & Murphy, 1991) (48% out of the majority district)

For further comparison: Serbia with Kosovo total population 9,159,895 with:

Serbs (71% of total population) 6,463,465

Albanians (17% of total population) 1,597,242 - Proportion 4:1

67% of total ethnic Albanians of SFRY lived in Kosovo

Albanian Parties: YES (after 1989)

*Data compiled from: Election Commissions of Macedonia and Montenegro, the official Senses, and CIA World Factbook,*

Appendix 2:

Table 4: Economic indicators for Macedonia and Montenegro

Related Indicators Data	Macedonia	Montenegro
Electoral process	8.25/10	9.17/10
Functioning of government	4.14/10	5.71/10
Political participation	6.67/10	5/10
Political culture	3.75/10	5.63/10
Civil liberties	8.24/10	7.35/10
Corruption perceptions	3.8/10	3.9/10
Women in parliament	32.5%	11.1%
Political Democracy Index	6.21/10	6.57/10

Mirsad Kriještorac

<b>Freedom of the press</b>	8.75/100	17/100
<b>Exports + Imports as a % of GDP</b>	86.58%	86.82%
<b>Number of visitors as a % of domestic population</b>	9.83%	10%
<b>Net Migration (% of total population)</b>	-0.49%	12.6%
<b>15-34 year old males as a % of population</b>	19.46%	18.2%
<b>Gender ratio of population: men as a % of women</b>	1 ratio	1.02 ratio
<b>The extent of regional integration</b>	2/5	2/5
<b>Current education spending (% of GDP)</b>	3.5%	5.12%
<b>Primary school enrolment ratio (% Net)</b>	91.78%	94%
<b>Secondary school enrolment ratio (% Net)</b>	81.32%	79%
<b>Higher education enrolment (% Gross)</b>	29.78%	32%
<b>Mean years of schooling</b>	9.85yrs	12yrs
<b>Adult literacy rate (% of pop over 15)</b>	97%	97.65%
<b>Hostility to foreigners/private property</b>	2/4	2/4
<b>Willingness to fight</b>	3/5	3/5
<b>Nominal GDP (US\$PPP bn)</b>	18.922 \$ USD	8 \$ USD
<b>Nominal GDP (US\$bn)</b>	8.695 \$ USD	4.23 \$ USD
<b>GDP per capita (US\$)</b>	4,240 per capita	6,714.3
<b>Per capita Gini-coefficient</b>	39%	36%

Source: World Values Survey and World Bank for 2010

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