


T.C.
ISTANBUL SABAHAATTIN ZAIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE EDUCATION INSTITUTE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS



ETHNICITY AS A CAUSE OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN
KENYA (1992-2008)

MASTER THESIS

Amanda LEBESE

Istanbul
June-2022

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Supervisor
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THESIS APPROVAL

This study has been approved in partial fulfilment of the requirements for Master in Political Science and International Relations

Chairperson of jury

Asst. Prof. Dr. Murat ASLAN

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SCIENTIFIC ETHIC STATEMENT

Throughout the research process titled “**Ethnicity as a cause of Electoral Violence in Kenya (1992-2008)**” the researcher complied with the ethics and academic rules. This paper reflects the authors' own research and analysis truthfully, and the paper has not been published or submitted to any institution anywhere else. I declare that all sources used in this paper have been properly disclosed through intext referencing and all authors that appeared in the content as intext reference have been included in the reference list.




Amanda Lebeso

Istanbul, June 2022

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Amanda Lebesse
Istanbul, June 2022

ÖZET

KENYA'DA SEÇİM ŞİDDETİNİN BİR NEDENİ OLARAK ETNİK KÖKEN (1992-2008)

Amanda LEBESE

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Danışman: Asst. Prof. Dr. Murat ASLAN

Haziran-2022, 87 Sayfa

Kenya'nın tek partili sistemi eski cumhurbaşkanı Jomo Kenyatta tarafından 1963'ten 1978'de ölümüne kadar yönetildi. Ve 1978'den 1992'ye kadar hüküm süren onun halefi Daniel arap moi tarafından yönetildi. Kenya 2002 yılına kadar çok partili siyaseti başlattığı zamana kadar ikisi de yirmi dört yıl hüküm sürdü. Bu araştırma, Kenya seçimlerinin neden şiddet ve siyasi istikrarsızlıkla bağlantılı olma eğilimini incelemektedir. Amacı, araştırma sorusunu tartışmak ve sosyolojik fikirleri seçim şiddeti araştırmalarına uygulamaktır. Çalışma, etnisitenin seçim şiddetinde nasıl ve neden rol oynadığını ve seçim sonrası dönemi nasıl etkilediğini incelemektedir. Bu tez nitel bir eleştirel çalışmadır. Ayrıca Kenya'da özgür ve adil seçimlerin teşvik edilmesinde demokratikleşmenin rolüne de bakmaktadır. Çalışma, vatandaşların haklarını güçlendirmek ve korumak için hükümetleri yasa şeklinde önemli bilgileri yasama organlarıyla paylaşmaya teşvik etmektedir. Verilere göre etnisite siyasette önemli bir etkiye sahiptir. Seçimle alakalı şiddet, Kenyalıları oy kullanmaktan veya siyasete katılmaktan caydırmaktadır. Kenya'da etniste, seçim şiddetine katkıda bulunan bir unsurdur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokrasi, Demokratikleşme, seçim şiddeti, etnisite, Kenya

ABSTRACT
ETHNICITY AS A CAUSE OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN KENYA
(1992-2008)

Amanda LEBESE
Master, Department of Political Science and International Relations
Advisor: Prof. Dr. Murat ASLAN
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Kenya's one-party system was ruled by former president Jomo Kenyatta from 1963 till his death in 1978 and his successor Daniel Arap Moi who rule from 1978 through 1992 when Kenya introduced multiparty politics until 2002, both of whom ruled for twenty-four years. In 1992, the advent of a multi-party system was accompanied by electoral violence, resulting in greater fragmentation and substantial instabilities. This research studies why Kenyan elections tend to be linked to violence and political instability. Its goal is to discuss the research question and apply sociological ideas to the study of election violence. The study looks at how and why ethnicity plays a role in electoral violence, as well as how it affects the post-election period. The thesis is a qualitative critical study. The study aims to provide strategies and understanding of how to prevent electoral violence in multi-party democracies. It also looks into the role of democratization in promoting free and fair elections in Kenya. It encourages governments to present crucial information in the form of laws to legislatures in order to strengthen and protect citizens' rights. According to the data, ethnicity plays a significant effect in politics. Election-related violence discourages Kenyans from voting or participating in politics. In Kenya, ethnicity is a contributing element of electoral violence.

Keywords: Democracy, democratization, election violence, ethnicity, Kenya

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU:	African Union
CAR:	Central Republic of Africa
DRC:	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC:	East African Community
EACJ:	East African Court of Justice
EALA:	East African Legislative Assembly
ECK:	Electoral Commission of Kenya
EMB:	Election Management Bodies
FORD:	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy
GEMA:	Gikuyu Embu Mera Association
IGAD:	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ICC:	International Criminal Court
IIEC:	Interim Independent Electoral Commission
IREC:	Independ Review Commission
JEM:	Justice Equality Movement
KADU:	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU:	Kenya African National Union
NARC:	National Rainbow Coalition
PNU:	Party of National Unity
PR:	Proportional Representation
RUF:	Revolutionary United Front

R2P:	Responsibility To Protect
SLA:	Sudan Liberation Movement
TANU:	Tanzanyika African National Union
UN:	United Nations
UNITAF:	Unified Task Force
UNOSOM:	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNOWAS:	United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel
WB:	World Bank

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

According to Jenkins (2008:10) ethnicity came from the ancient Greek word *ethos*, which refers to a variety of situations in which a group of people lived and functioned together (Ostergard, 1992a:32). On the other hand, Brubaker et al (2006:11), states that an ethnic group is predicated on the notion that its members share a common ancestor, no matter how distant. In social anthropology, Eriksen (2002:4) claims that the term ethnicity still conjures up thoughts of "minority concerns" and "race relations" in this context, but it refers to components of the target community who feel themselves to be culturally distinct.

Nasing'o (2017:7) assert that many African countries are amongst the most varied in ethnic makeup. The nation states were also basically, in many ways, or mostly, created as projects of colonial imperialism. According to Bogaards (2007:168) Africa's democratization has traditionally been associated with ethnic conflict. The term "ethnic conflict" denotes group activity that is confined to regions without statehood or control of the state apparatus (Angstrom, 2000: 25). Conflict appears everywhere in ethnic terms. Most wars during independence have been along the Nigeria-Niger Border or in Darfur, followed by the Biafra conflict and the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, followed by the 2007 and 2008 post-election violence in Kenya.

Elections, according to Laasko (2007:224), are a mechanism for peacefully resolving political problems in general, but this has not been the case in African politics, which has seen violence, particularly during elections. Election violence can be used to create the appearance of democratic legitimacy or to demonstrate the process's lack of legitimacy. Failure to respect free and fair elections, leads to people resorting to violence to undermine the positions of the winning candidates. Electoral violence is an attempt to either influence or ensure the fairness of the procedures and elections (Laakso, 2007:227). Election violence has a variety of causes, but one thing they all have in common is that there are groups of individuals who have crossed boundaries and policies that have been affected, with some being suppressed by the other (Venkatasawmy, 2015:26).

Kenyan politics has historically been dominated by one-party systems, with Jomo Kenyatta serving as President from 1963 until his death in 1978. Kenyatta was deposed by Daniel Arap Moi, who ruled for twenty-four years and was beset by accusations of political polarization. There was tremendous internal and external demand for political liberalization at the end of 1991, and the first multiparty elections were held in 1992, resulting in political liberalism being retained despite the country's upheaval. Kenya was a unique source of political and economic stability in Africa at the time. A violent outbreak during elections occurred in the province of the Rift Valley which left 5000 people dead and forced 75,000 displaced (Makogango, 2005:28).

In chapter one the study serves as an introduction of the research as well as a brief overview of the historic background of Kenyan electoral violence from the reign of President Daniel Arap Moi to the power sharing of President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga. The link between ethnicity and electoral violence has long been discussed, and ethnicity has become a normal part of life in Kenya as well as a tool for political participation. As explained in chapter one, a brief review of the literature revealed that Kenyan election violence is influenced by ethnicity. The first chapter discusses the study's introduction and background, highlighting that every country desires to have elections free of ethnic violence, and that ethnic violence kills lives and assets, causes mass displacement, and devastates society's social fabric by instilling deep mistrust between ethnic communities.

Chapter two dealt with the study's literature review. Various conceptualizations of elections, electoral violence, and ethnic politics were discussed in order to acclimate the reader with relevant literature. Chapter two examines the nature of violence, the actors in internal conflict, and peacebuilding; much literature will emerge from Kenya's experience in these conflicts, intervention, and mediation processes in relation to the East African Community (EAC), the African Union (AU), intergovernmental organizations, and electoral violence prevention and mitigation. However, the literature reviewed just a small amount of information about electoral violence caused by ethnicity; the majority of violence, particularly in, is caused by a lack of service delivery, maladministration, corruption, and, most importantly, the overstay of leaders in power.

The majority of violence is associated with coup operations and the battle for mineral resources, as seen in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central Republic of Africa (CAR). The literature emphasized the Asian election violence on the part of Arab nations, where the

majority of the violence is about region (Jihad) and the preventing of Western and US intervention. In addition, the literature examined the involvement of international communities in resolving the violence in Kenya and bringing ceasefire solutions.

In chapter three, the study's research methodology is discussed. This chapter discusses the various methods used to collect data for the research, and the methodology was qualitative approach. Since the study will gather human behavior between ethnic groups in Kenya who are at conflict with one another, this method was accompanied by the interpretivism paradigm. This study utilizes the tools of both primary and secondary research. Through primary data collection the study will utilize semi-structured interviews, whereas secondary data collection, the study will utilize google scholar, exiting data from books, articles, written journals and University Library database. This chapter describes the technique used in the study to answer the research questions, starting with an explanation of the exploratory approach, the research strategy and design, and the research methodology.

Chapter four and five focused on the Kenyan electoral violence conflict, which lasted from 1992 to 2008. Chapter four interpreted, discussed, and analyzed the brief history of the violence and chapter five provided a theoretical framework that analyzed the obtained secondary data, which is structural violence theory by John Galtung and Kumar Rupesinghe's model. This analysis demonstrated that the electoral violence in Kenya was caused by a number of influences, and it discussed the critical role played by the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), the African Union, and the United Nations in contributing to the return of security and cooperation in Kenya, as well as the conduct of peaceful elections in the years ahead.

The final chapter of the study, chapter six, present the study's findings, recommendations, and conclusions. The study discovered several factors at play that led the public to turn against one another in Kenyan politics, the majority of which is ethnicity. However, following the 2008 elections, Kenya's parliament depended on a coalition government, which still exists today. The Kikuyu, the country's largest ethnic group, remains at the forefront of leadership. Based on some of the knowledge gained from ethnicity-related electoral violence and taking into consideration the implications for the Kenyan government as addressed in this chapter's findings, this study also makes some recommendations for future research.

1.1.Thesis Subject

The relationship between ethnicity and electoral violence has long been debated. Studies have focused on how ethnic grievance often led to electoral violence more, especially in Africa (Ishiyama et al., 2016). Ethnicity in Kenya is often the basis for political and electoral violence. The main reason is that ethnic groups identify themselves through shared values, knowledge, and understandings, making it easier to mobilize for collective political action such as electoral violence. As ethnic groups seek ethnic survival in both the economic and political landscape, elections have become the battlefield wherein they must maintain their ethnic supremacy (Onuoha and Ufamba, 2017: 209).

The subject of this study is ethnicity as a cause of electoral violence in Kenya. Ethnicity and electoral violence are two significant concepts that have shaped the political understandings in Kenya. Ethnicity has become a fact of life in Kenya and an instrument of political mobilization. Until recently, it was believed that the wider Kenyan public ignored the ethnicity's role in Kenyan politics. Some scholars have held that in Kenya, political motivations have obscured their approach to how ethnic identity can be addressed when allocating power and resources (Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008: 281; Briggs, 2014:194).

Ethnic conflicts have hindered political and social order and economic progress. This type of conflict threatens states' international security and has significant ramifications for policymakers. The country was embroiled in political violence before it even adopted multiparty politics and the violence that erupted following the 2007 election. Kenya's political and economic progress was impacted by electoral violence. With the multiple factors influencing election violence in Kenya, the study seeks to analyze the connection between ethnicity and electoral violence in Kenya.

1.2.The Purpose of the Thesis

Electoral violence has dominated African politics for decades. There are many causes for such, with ethnicity being the common cause of electoral violence. Ethnicity is politicized, access to political power and economic resources is based on ethnicity (Fearon, 2014: 2). In the case of Kenya, ethnicity has dominated the political developments by causing electoral violence. Kenya's multi-ethnic cultures has experienced multiple outbreaks of electoral violence throughout its history. Kenya is one of many African countries at risk of ethnically motivated electoral violence.

Since the beginning of multiparty politics, the country has been experiencing violence; elections have always been violent (Amadi, 2014: 2). Since its independence in 1963, Kenya has been beset by domestic violence. Ethnic friction and violence are inevitable in a multi-ethnic nation like Kenya. It was previously seen as a symbol of optimism and peace in Africa, but that has changed since the government adopted a pluralist democratic political system in 1991. Election violence linked to ethnic strife has plagued the country ever since (Wambua, 2017).

This study explores the question of why ethnicity that is forged from deep historic causes has led to election violence in Kenya. The study will also look at the factors that contributed to election violence. A broad range of factors causes conflict during elections at the national, regional, and global levels. Understanding these elements is essential when putting procedures for a reasonable basis for conflict resolution among individuals, communities, and governments. Many African countries, including Kenya, have suffered political unrest during election seasons.

1.3.The Scope and Content of the Thesis

Although ethnic communities are acknowledged as international, this study is restricted to examining Kenya's ethnic dynamics. Moreover, it is limited in reviewing the role of ethnicity in electoral violence, which has mainly resulted from the time leading up to elections, which set ethnic groups against one another. While the study acknowledges that Kenya has about 42 ethnic groups, the study will not detail each of these communities in this study. Instead, the study will look at some of Kenya's most influential ethnic groups as an example of how ethnicity is constructed and used in the country's political arena, rather than the other way around. The scourge of ethnicity and electoral violence goes way back to the 1990s. This study will focus on Kenya's history of ethnicity and electoral violence from the 1990s until 2008. After gaining independence, in 1963, there was the banning of opposition parties in Kenya. That led to the Kenya African National Union (KANU) being the dominant party. The violence started in 1991 when the ban was uplifted, and there was an introduction of multiparty politics. The elites mobilized for ethnic violence and killings during the 1992 and 1997 elections to keep political and economic power from the opposition. The Human Rights Watch (1993: 1) asserts that the government-sponsored the violence.

1.3.1. Basic Questions of the Thesis

Kenya is home to more than 40 different ethnic groups. Approximately two-thirds of them are represented in parliament, resulting in significant competition between the larger ones, the Kiyuku, Luo, Kalenjin, and Maasai. The race and ethnicity of the President influence the appointment decisions made in Kenya. Voters prefer candidates who are members of their ethnic group to those outside their ethnic group because they are suspicious of non-members and dislike participants from other ethnicities.

The main question of the thesis is to scrutinize “to what extent ethnic diversity and the democratic proceeding can be achieved without election violence in a multi-ethnic community”?

The study questions comprise of:

1. Are the countries with ethnic diversity more prone to election violence to suppress the ethnic groups with a quest to dominate the political ground, specifically in Kenya?
2. What are the motivations and outcomes of election violence in Kenya towards the ethnic social entities mainly between 1992 to 2008?

1.4.Thesis Hypothesis / Hypotheses

The study will examine the following hypotheses:

Ethnicity defines the degree of election violence in Kenya. To an extent, ethnic politics in Kenya have been structured around exclusion and victimhood, which has resulted in the use of violence. Unequal access to resources such as land, properties, and political benefits contributes to ethnic conflicts that manifest during elections.

1.5.The Importance and Original Contribution of the Thesis Subject

Every country wants elections free of ethnic violence because ethnic violence kills people and property, causes mass displacement, and destroys society's social fabric by creating distrust among ethnic groups. Voter apathy results from the problem, with some people declining to engage in the political process. They are abusing their constitutional right to vote by doing so. Long-term tranquility, economic success, and political development need the peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups. Ethnic differences should not be permitted to damage the social fabric of society at the

expense of peaceful cooperation. More research is needed to inform solutions to this social problem by providing an empirical picture. This necessitates study to inform solutions to this societal challenge by offering a practical perspective on the issue. The study aims to add to the expanding knowledge about ethnicity and electoral violence, mainly taking the Kenya case to the epicenter of academic debate.

This study is critical for policymakers and those in charge of system development to ensure that elections in this country are free of ethnic violence. As a result, the broader public will benefit from this research, mainly if its recommendations are included in mitigation plans. When ethnic violence in the election process is decreased, the country will portray a democratic image to the rest of the world.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

The literature on ethnicity will be reviewed in this chapter. as a source of electoral violence in Kenya. The literature will first provide an overview of how elections and electoral violence are conceptualized in a general context. Ethnicity or ethnic politics will be reviewed and discussed in light of various scholars' presumptions. The chapter will present a global perspective on electoral violence as well as an African perspective. Through background discussion, nature of violence, actors in internal violence, and peacebuilding, much literature will emerge from Kenya's experience in these conflicts. Lastly, the chapter will look at the intervention and mediation process in relation to the East African Community (EAC), the African Union (AU), intergovernmental organizations, and electoral violence prevention and mitigation.

2.2. Conceptualization

2.2.1. Elections and Electoral Violence

According to a growing body of research, the election process is a viable alternative to violence in achieving good governance. When an election process is regarded to be unfair, unresponsive, or dysfunctional, its political legitimacy is questioned, and interested parties are encouraged to depart from recognized standards in order to achieve their objectives (Abulwahab, 2017). Election is a set of operational operations that results in the choosing of one or more persons for positions of power in a community from a large number of candidates (Onuoha and Ufomba, 2017:207) It is democracy's institutional technology, with the possibility of making government more accountable while also increasing legitimacy.

Electoral violence is defined by the Research and Advocacy Unit (2013) as a subtype of political violence in which actors use violence and intimidation to advance their public interest or achieve a particular political goal. Magdaleno (2012) maintain that election fighting has become an international effect that is primarily linked with developing and underdeveloped countries. Electoral violence also includes threats, threats of force, and intimidation of opponents, voters, or election officials, as well as the murdering of opponents or unexpected fist fights between opposing

factions of supporters. Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund (2020:4), add that violence instills dread of physical injury and actual loss of human life, resulting in emotional repercussions on humans and society that differ from those predicted from fraud, vote-buying, and other forms of political manipulation.

Daxecker (2014:232) argues that electoral violence is unlikely to go unnoticed by international observers, who are more likely to condemn violence than, instance, vote-buying, and that observer condemnation might result in a loss of international credibility and private donations. Electoral violence differs from other forms of organized violence in that the institutional frameworks that surround elections have an impact on how violence is employed during elections. Both the time and the targets of electoral violence are influenced by the people, practices, and institutions that make up the electoral framework (Fjelde, Hanne, Höglund, & Kristine, 2016:9).

According to the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) (2017), electoral violence differs from political violence in that it has a specific goal. Matter of fact, it is aimed at influencing voter behavior, candidate behavior, or distorting election results. Furthermore, electoral violence is more common in countries that have experienced political instability, civil war, or a coup. In such circumstances, elections harden the positions of previously antagonistic parties who rely on violence as their sole means of expression.

Electoral violence, according to Ojo (2014:4), is defined as any act of violence committed in the name of a political cause, such as hooliganism, the use of excessive force to disrupt government meetings or voting at polling stations, or the use of destructive weapons to coerce voters and other electoral processes, or to cause physical harm or injury to anyone associated with the election systems. Electoral violence occurs when a strong or weak party discovers that the other party is unilaterally adjusting the rules for its own advantage during the electoral period.

2.2.2. Ethnic Politics

Birnir and Hultquist (2017) provided a comprehensive view of the study of ethnicity and ethnic minorities in politics, which spans topics such as ethnic identity formation, how ethnic divides communicate with electoral law to form political systems, and the corresponds of ethnic war. Furthermore, Ethnicity studies are frequently geographically restricted within each topic because many scholars study ethnicity and conflict exclusively, and sometimes only in specific regions or

even countries (Birbir and Hultquist, 2017). In addition, ethnicity is defined by scholars like Hashmi and Majeed (2020:1) as an important characteristic of human identity that expresses differently in distinctive communities. It reflects diversity in society, for whom the internal harmony and stability safeguards how ethnic diversity is accommodated in the state's and society's pluralistic framework.

Furthermore, political identities have always been shaped by ethnic issues. However, the appearance and feel of such an identity is purely subjective. Politics based on ethnicity has evolved over time. The social, political, cultural, and racial dimensions can all be traced back to a shared threat or frustration felt by the people (UKEssays, 2018). Much more important than ethnic identification or political exclusion along ethnic lines are the content and institutional incentives for staging a revolution against the government.

According to the well-known insurgency model of Fearon and Latin (2003), when governments are weak, hostilities erupt, and rebels have plenty of places to hide from troops while recruiting unemployed young men for whatever cause they want: national freedom, revolutionary advancement, the spread of true religion, or a hefty reward. Civil wars also occur where revolts are most likely to succeed, rather than where players are motivated by ethnic or social stigmatization, according to Collier and Hoeffler (2004). More precisely, they suggest that readily available economic resources make it simpler to form and maintain a rebel group.

Once ethnicity is a political issue, the task of forming coalitions often revolves around whether ethnic groups are included or excluded (Bormann, 2019). Across Africa's post-colonial authoritarian regimes, forming dominant coalitions required balancing the requirement for ethnic inclusion to assure collaboration with the possibility of violent challenges from excluded communities (Roessler, 2016). Furthermore, the ethnic makeup of the state evidenced elite bargaining among a subset of all ethnic groups who agreed to work together in exchange for executive power.

2.3. Global Experience on Electoral Violence

The institution of elections is essentially universal in today's society. With the exception of a few regimes such as Brunei, China, Eritrea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and South Sudan, citizens today have the ability to elect their leaders in national elections. Elections are held even in times of armed

conflict; for example, since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan in 2001, voters have gone to the polls eight times (Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund, 2020). Over the last three decades, most nations around the globe have adopted democratic constitutions, but peaceful political competition has yet to become the norm in many of them.

Understanding Electoral Violence in Asia, a report by the United Nations Development Programme Asia-Pacific Regional Centre, examines seven South and Southeast Asian countries, providing electoral violence case studies for each. The perception of corruption, ethnic dominance, and voting system fraud account for a significant portion of electoral violence. Embattled President Victor Lukashenko used violence to neutralize and intimidate the electoral opposition in the August 2020 Belarusian presidential election. In the run-up to the hotly contested August election, opposition candidates and party members were arrested and threatened, sparking widespread outrage (Frank, 2021).

The majority of electoral violence studies also look at violence between actors competing in the election. On the other hand, Mehler (2007) identifies a different type of election violence with a different motivation. The election in Sierra Leone in 1996 serves as an example. The election campaign took place in the midst of the government's civil war with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Prior to the election, the RUF committed several acts of severe violence against civilians in an attempt to delegitimize the election, which it was not contesting. This was done in order to scare voters into not going to the polls (Fischer, 2012).

Sri Lankan politics was dominated by two major political parties following independence in 1948. Sri Lanka has a background of election violence, and the current government did not shy away from using violence against political opponents in 2015. There were killings and explosions between supporters of the two major coalitions during the 2000 and 2001 elections, for example, as well as severe police brutality (Höglund & Piyarathne, 2009:414). Additionally, vote buying, ballot box stuffing, and other forms of electoral malfeasance are common in Sri Lankan elections. In the end, the majority of the people's fears of high violence were unfounded. Several violent incidents, including a few election-related deaths, occurred during the campaign. However, despite the risks, the country avoided widespread violence.

2.4. African Experience on Electoral Violence

There has been a common argument by scholars that exiting Western powers brought democracy to newly independent African countries in the 1960s. However, several of these countries bore the brunt of Cold War politics, in which the United States and the Soviet Union backed African dictators. Until the Cold War ended in the 1990s, democracy was restricted to a two-party system. Despite the fact that there has been a shift to multiparty politics, the system is still in its infancy. Today's leaders and their opponents are still embroiled in 'Big Man' and ethnic politics (Goldsmith, 2015). Since the early nineties, elections in Africa have frequently served as a platform for expressing violence. To name a few countries, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, South Sudan, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Cameroon, Central Republic of Africa, and Lesotho have all experienced varying degrees of electoral violence.

According to Frimpong (2012), electoral violence has a variety of consequences in African countries, one of which is the introduction of poverty. Poverty is a serious problem in Africa, and it provides fertile ground for exploiting the unemployed majority in order to support all forms of electoral violence. Furthermore, a person who is subjected to these problems is more likely to engage in electoral violence than someone who is wealthy. When economic hardship becomes severe, violence becomes more likely. The "army of unemployed young" therefore becomes a weapon of electoral violence (Frimpong, 2012).

Lastly, according to Frimpong (2012), electoral violence has rendered many people homeless across Africa. As a result of political violence, Africans become orphans; some become physically deformed; starvation and death are the least of their concerns. This should not, at the very least, be the case for black Africans. There needs to be a change in the way our continent's electoral processes are conducted.

Ethnic politics is a popular strategic approach for securing vote banks around the world, according to Bjarnesen and Kovacs (2018), and it plays a major part in African politics. Powerful people have control over natural and monetary resources, and members of the leader's ethnic group or alliance have access to them, including government positions. Therefore, a culture emerges in which the "winner takes it all," while the loser is left to fend for himself. Several scholars alluded that political assassination has been a major issue in Nigeria since 1999. Top party leaders,

candidates seeking high-stakes elective offices, and those already in elected or appointed political positions are among those who have been assassinated (Omotola, 2010).

According to a thorough review of the literature, electoral violence in Africa has resulted in a high death rate. Angola's 1992 election triggered a 10-year civil war that resulted in the deaths of thousands of people (Isola, 2018). Around 200 people died as a result of election-related violence in Ethiopia after the 2005 election. Around 1500 people were killed in Kenya's 2007/2008 election. Ivory Coast's presidential election in 2010 resulted in approximately 3000 deaths. Following the establishment of the fourth republic in Nigeria after a long period of military rule, the majority of elections held in the country have been marked by violence, with thousands of people killed as a result of election-related violence. During the 2011 election violence in Nigeria, more than 800 people were killed, according to Human Rights Watch (Isola, 2018).

Many Zimbabweans have been displaced and homeless as a result of the country's electoral violence. The 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections were marred by state-sponsored intimidation and violence, which resulted in over 253 deaths (Smith, 2011:1). Uganda is a classic example of state-sponsored electoral violence resulting from a culture of violence engendered by military rule, as well as the militarization of politics in the aftermath of long-term military rule (Genyi, 2013). All of the elections from 1962 to 1980, 2001 to 2006, and 2011 were marred by widespread violence. Electoral violence and intimidation, including kidnapping, occurred in all of these elections.

Electoral violence takes on a different tone in Tanzania and Kenya. Despite having a dominant one-party strand, both countries have a more appealing knowledge with representational government. Even with the Mau Mau uprisings in Kenya prior to independence, the states have limited militarization experience. Tanzanian elections were mostly held under the Tanzanyika African National Union (TANU) from 1957 to 1990, and they were relatively peaceful (Genyi, 2013). Electoral violence, on the other hand, made a ferocious debut in the 1995 general election, the first since the introduction of multiparty politics. Assaults, murders, disruption of campaign rallies, fighting, malicious property damage, and even bombings occurred in both the 1995 and 2000 general elections (Schwartz, 2001)

Some of these conclusions are supported by existing research, while others are questioned. In the 2007 Nigerian national elections, Bratton (2008:622) finds that electoral violence did indeed reduce voter turnout. Bekoe and Burchard (2017:73), on the other hand, reported no substantial impacts of electoral violence on voter turnout rates in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, using cross-national data.

2.5. Kenyan Context on Electoral Violence

Cooke (2009) conducted a study on the background of Kenya's post-election conflict. Kenya has had a hard journey to democratic governance since independence, moreover, the present coalition administration is weak, with a number of crucial reforms blocked. Kenya's political calm over the years stands in stark contrast to that of the majority of its neighbors. Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Rwanda were all wracked by far more violent conflict than Kenya has ever known. However, the post-election violence in January 2008, which left over 1,000 people dead and 350,000 displaced, was indeed a vivid reminder of the nation's everlasting tensions and complexities, as well as the fallibility of its democratic path (Cooke, 2009).

2.5.1. Background

Kenya's elections are unmistakably distinguished by ethnic undercurrents and the country's evolving multi-ethnic strategy. Kenya, which was previously seen as Africa's symbol of peace, has been plagued by electoral turmoil since the emergence of multicultural democratic politics in 1991. (Wambua, 2017). Kenya became a one-party state immediately after independence in 1963, under President Jomo Kenyatta and the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU).

Kenyatta's government happened to come to favor the interests of his own ethnic group, the Kikuyu, most dominantly, despite KANU's initial representation of several ethnic groups (Taylor, 2018). Vice President Daniel Moi, a Kalenjin, succeeded Kenyatta as president after his death in 1978. Moi reigned as an autocrat, balancing the best interest of Kenya's various ethnic groups through violence and patronage. The administration of President Daniel Moi (1978–2002) accelerated the unrestricted accumulation of state assets (Wambua, 2017).

Ngesa (2008) contend that Kenya is home to more than two tribes. A total of 43 tribes makes up the 34 million-strong country. A small number of tribes, including the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba, Kalenjin, and a few coastal tribes, make up the majority of the population. All of them are

aware of the problems that Kenya, like all Sub-Saharan African countries, faces poverty, HIV/AIDS, and security concerns. In 1998 and 2002, Kenya was hit by devastating terrorist attacks, and refugees from Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda flocked to the country. Furthermore, the wealth gap between the rich and the poor continues to widen. Unemployment is rising among the urban poor, whereas a small group of wealthy people continues to prosper thanks to kinship (Ngesa, 2008).

Mohamed (2015) large body of literature point out that post-independence political negotiations were tarnished by ethnic divisions and the governing elite's egotism, which appeared to have carried over into the multiparty era. Ethnic clashes in the 1990s are thought to have foreshadowed the 2007 electoral violence in the Rift Valley region between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities, which was largely defined by ethnic violence, as opposed to state-sanctioned violence in Kisumu. This is consistent with Branch and Cheeseman (2008) concept that electoral violence in Kenya involves the state police and rival militias targeting members of ethnic communities assumed to be government supporters, as well as the state police and rival militias attacking those protesting the election results.

Matilda (2018) argues that elections in Kenya have been heavily disputed, with the exception of the 2002 elections, which saw a calm handover of power, since the introduction of multi-party elections in 1992, there has been an increase in the trend of electoral violence in the last six elections. Because of the fear of a repeat of the violence seen in 2007/2008, there was no electoral violence in 2013. It's worth noting that the rise in electoral violence hasn't been linear, despite the fact that 2007 was the country's worst year for electoral violence. According to Mueller (2008), Kenyan politics has been viewed as a "winner-take-all zero-sum ethnic game" because the national economic stake is at stake, necessitating the election of a fellow ethnic as president.

In Kenya, democracy is still imminent. The iron-fisted one-party tyranny of then-President Daniel arap Moi was challenged in the late 1980s by opposition voices. Battering's, arbitrary arrests, and detentions were all part of the scene. Multi-party competition was only implemented in 1992 (Taylor, 2018). Moi's handpicked successor, Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of Jomo Kenyatta, was defeated in the 2002 election by opposition candidate Mwai Kibaki of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). NARC was a multi-ethnic coalition of opposition parties whose goal was to

depose KANU (Ngesa, 2008). The fight for better governance continued after that, and Kibaki's election victory in 2002 was widely regarded as a second liberation.

According to Meredith (2006), politicians have exploited ethnicity for political gain by spreading ethnic hatred and ethnocentrism. With the assumption that the "big four" (Kikuyus, Kalenjines, Luo Luhya) ethnic groups dominate most sectors of the economy, other ethnic groups have been marginalized. According to Qaveman's (2013) analysis, negative ethnicity has divided Kenya, resulting in post-election violence in 2007. One of the primary factors which contribute to electoral violence is ethnicity.

Furthermore, Human Right Watch (2008) reported that the racial tensions exhibited in the aftermath of the presidential election have deeper origins than the presidential election. The violence that erupted in Kenya as a result of the disputed presidential election on December 27, 2007, shook the world. Two months of bloodshed in a country seen as a shining beacon of economic and political stability in a difficult region resulted in the deaths of over 1,000 people and the displacement of up to 500,000 people.

2.5.2. Nature of Violence

Kenya's election disputes have been compounded by tensions and contestations, not least in the democratic system, according to some experts. It is possible to analyze several facets of Kenya's election crisis. Mwangi (2008:10) and Wamwere (2008:30) gave a historical framework, highlighting the need to gain progress on the uneven distribution of economic and political assets, which played a crucial part in the country's cycle of electoral disputes. The fundamental source of electoral conflict has been recognized as inequitable allocation of land resources in the country's productive and economically viable areas.

According to Barkan (2013), presidential candidates' use of ethnic mobilization to mobilize voters has resulted in electoral violence. This is aided by a strongly divided electorate and outbursts of violence between members of different ethnic groups. In order to control their opponents, Kenyan politics has always been a struggle in which the leaders of the country's main ethnic groupings establish ethnic coalition governments with the rulers of lesser ethnic groups.

2.5.3. Actors in Internal Violence and Peacebuilding

Free and fair elections, supported by seamless transfers of democratically elected governments, are one of the core foundations of democracy. Kenyan elections, on the other hand, have always been violent before, during, and after the general election. Kenya's electoral problems, according to Snodgrass and Achieng (2019), can only be solved through multi-stakeholder participation. Gatimu (2012) analyzed the media's involvement as actors in Kenya's 2007-2008 violent election strife.

The concept of the media's pivotal role in every contemporary struggle for power informs the broad understanding. Furthermore, the study revealed that the media played both a good and bad impact in the conflict. Following the outbreak of violence, the media played a constructive role in pressing opposing parties to engage in discussion and calling for an end to the political crisis, and the media played a positive role in pressuring opposing sides to engage in dialogue. Finally, the research revealed that the media has been engaged in promoting peace across the country (Gatimu, 2012).

2.6. East African Community (EAC) and African Union Intervention

Since the 1960s, when the East African Community (EAC) was at its peak, the structures of regionalism have been tested in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, with results that have improved trade and investment ties, boosted service collaboration, and created a shared local identity (Khadiagala, 2009). The EAC did not outlive its architect's vision, as major disparities in identities, ideology, and integrated benefit allocation coalesced to derail the program in 1977. Since the mid-1990s, a new push in the area has formed to rejuvenate the EAC, propelled by rising economic integration and significant political pluralism, as well as the growing need to strengthen security and military cooperation in response to emerging challenges (Khadiagala, 2009). Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda are members of the East African Community (EAC), which has its headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania.

Eastern Africa was unprepared for the civil unrest that engulfed its major member state, Kenya, despite substantial efforts by the EAC and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to establish varied institutions for advance detection, conflict prevention, and management. After all, the more distant African Union (AU), led by former UN Secretary-General

Kofi Annan, initiated a mediation operation that mostly ignored regional entities (Elowson and de Albuquerque, 2016).

KPTJ (2010) report that the EAC treaty was expected to open up new avenues for human rights activism and to put an end to election violence. The East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), the East African Community Summit, and the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) are among the subregional institutions that have played a role in attempting to resolve such conflict issues. Furthermore, Kenyan human rights organizations are considering using the United Nations (UN) human rights treaty monitoring bodies, as well as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism. On the other hand, the Summit, the Council of Ministers, the Co-ordinating Committee Sectoral Committees, the East African Court of Justice, the East African Legislative Assembly, the Secretariat, and the Community are the seven principal institutions of the EAC. There are nine institutions in the EAC, three of which started operations in July 2015.

Several studies show that Kenyans were unable to seek a way out of the mess and refused to accept the first attempts at international mediation, which came only after a small group of prominent African personalities. It is worth noting that the key intermediaries in Nairobi were able to persuade the two sides to agree that the, for them, vexing question of "who won the election" (Elklit, 2011). Furthermore, Independent Review Commission (IREC) was given three to six months to respond to the numerous questions posed to it, successfully dismantling the technicalities and potentially unforeseen implications of different electoral issues at least for the time being. The negotiating team could then turn their attention to more pressing issues, such as how to stop the violence right now (Lindenmayer and Kaye, 2009:14).

Sithole and Asuelime, (2017) account that the outcomes of the AU pre-election mission acknowledged that major political actors exploiting ethnic tensions through the use of deeply provocative campaign messages was a reason for concern. Ethnic violence dominated the post-election violence of 2007/8. According to Article 2.1 of the Protocol creating the PSC, the Security Council is a "stand-alone decision-making organ for the prevention, management, and settlement of conflict" (Protocol Establishing the PSC, 2002: 4). Through official meetings, briefing discussions, and consultations, the PSC considers the route forward in terms of conflict interventions.

According to Williams (2009: 614) "policy decisions requiring action, whether in the shape of mediation, peace operations, or sanctions regimes" have been made by the PSC. Furthermore, according to Juma (2009: 413), the PSC established consensus on 21 January 2008, in keeping with its responsibility, to commence negotiations in the Kenyan crisis within an African framework, based on a recommendation from the AU commission after a consultative process.

The impact of the African Union's mediation efforts on reducing violence in Kenya, mending the disintegrated relationship between the competing parties, and the stability that happened to come with the end of the conflict cannot be overstated. The AU's ability to manage electoral-related disagreement is limited by a variety of issues, including the organization's institutional ethos of supporting incumbents, as discussed in the discussion. According to this report, post-election violence has escalated as a result of the African Union's insufficient response, partly because it heavily relies on mediation, despite the reality that active intervention is often required to separate incumbents (Sithole and Asuelime, 2017).

2.7. International Community

The study by Cooke (2009) alludes that the international community reacted swiftly to the Kenyan ethnic violence. Then, in Nairobi, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with the two parties to try to negotiate a deal. Presidents Kikwete of Tanzania and Kuffuor of Ghana intervened on behalf of the African Union, Desmond Tutu and Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa offered their offices, and eventually, a concerted international push led by Kofi Annan and Kenyan civil society groups pushed the two contenders to form a grand coalition government, with Kibaki as president and Odinga in the newly created position of prime minister.

After several international pressures, according to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Kibaki and Odinga agreed on a timeframe for peace negotiations. The important handshake was finally reached after weeks of bloodshed, international pressure, and tense negotiations (Dercon, and Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012). Following the disputed elections, President Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga decided to share control. Kibaki intended to remain President, Kalonzo as Vice President, and Odinga as Prime Minister, a position that the Kenyan constitution did not recognize at the time.

According to Juma (2009: 421), international actors such as the World Bank (WB), the EU, and the US put immense pressure on the Kibaki government to comply with the mediation, threatening to halt support (donor aid) if a diplomatic solution to the political issue could not be found. Significant progress was made during the two months of negotiations, according to Baldauf (2008), thanks to concerted foreign support for the AU-led procedure (Juma, 2009: 421). The UN, for example, made contributions to the mediation team in the form of staff members who assisted with analysis, policy advice, and general staff support (Juma, 2009: 422).

Under tremendous international and domestic pressure, Kenya's leaders reached an agreement on a political solution. However, several major issues were left unaddressed by the April 2008 agreement, and while the commissions may provide reform recommendations, there is no sign that they will be adopted. On the one hand, exposing the "Waki list" could rekindle violence, but it could also be the best hope for ending the country's established culture of impunity.

2.8. Electoral Violence Prevention

The literature also contributes to the literature on the role of electoral institutions in reducing the risk of armed conflict in general. According to the International Republican Institute (2021), donors must develop techniques and initiatives that enable main political actors to embrace nonviolent means of contesting politics in order to prevent and mitigate electoral violence.

Even in nations where governments purposefully provoke violence to keep power, donors can equip opposition forces with political tools to acquire a competitive advantage over incumbents and become role models for change. To mitigate electoral conflicts, African leaders could pay more attention to the issue by addressing structural and cultural issues in their countries, fostering confidence in democratic rule's ability to help solve internal problems (Isola, 2018).

Furthermore, Isola (2018) posits that Election Management Bodies (EMBs) must begin improving more transparent way in the interests of voters and work collaboratively with local law enforcement agencies to make sure that election violence prevention laws are enforced. Other than using violent tactics to resolve election-related disputes, law enforcement agencies should consider other options. African countries can benefit from establishing special enforcement bodies to track and reduce the spread of small arms and light weapons, which would help avoid their use during election conflicts.

According to Taylor's literature (2018;9), the success of Malawi's violence reduction programs in enlisting political candidates as active participants is a significant difference worth mentioning. While most Kenyan violence prevention projects ignored politicians, multiple Malawian programs went to significant pains to incorporate both national and local political candidates in pre-election ceasefire measures and subsequent mediation attempts.

The adoption of proportional representation (PR) systems, which illustrate that the political party makeup of the legislature largely reflects the proportion of votes gained by each party among the public, is another tool for election prevention. Minority parties are frequently able to gain at least some national representation in these systems, giving them a voice in the political scene. Fischer et al. (2015) claim that one reason South Africa has had less election violence since 1994 is because of its PR voting system, which allows minority parties to participate in the legislature despite the African National Congress' dominance.

2.9. Findings from the Academic Literature

As per the findings of responses to academic literature, the fact that elections in Kenya frequently exacerbate inter-communal conflicts have roots in political developments during and after colonial rule. It was also found that previous political leaders and aspirants used group-based grievances to mobilize voters and, at times, violent militias. Elfversson (2022) appended that in Kenya, land has stayed inextricably linked to communal identity. Land is important not only for survival, but also for belonging. Ancestral land and first-comer status narratives have frequently played a role in political mobilization. Former President Daniel Moi, for instance, threatened his Rift Valley core voters that if they voted for the opposition, they might well lose access to their ancestral land.

One of the scholars found out that the influence of violent election contexts in regions seen as competitive by the incumbent may have helped contribute to post-election violence. The Moi regime's one legacy is the establishment of a violent electoral environment (Kigumba, 2011). Regional inequalities were another historical factor that fueled ethnic violence. All of the country's political regimes have deeply embedded certain historical biases and prejudices, which the wider populace, civil society organizations, and the development partners have prompted the regimes to correct. Several Kenyan governments have set up commissions to look into certain national concerns, but neither their findings nor suggestions have been made public.

Another finding is that the Kikuyu tribal group has dominated Kenya's political vacuum; for example, Kenya has had four heads of state since its independence from Britain in 1963. First was Jomo Kenyatta, his son Uhuru Kenyatta, the fourth, and Mwai Kibaki, the third, are all Kikuyu. There was Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin who governed for a very long time, from 1978 until 2002. Across many African communities, losing the election can lead to the isolation of an entire ethnic group from power, accompanied by discrimination and even suppression. As a result, competing ethnic groups may develop the mindset that they must win at all costs in order for their ethnic group to be covered.

According to the study, Kenya avoided referring the investigation and potential prosecution of post-election violence accused persons to the International Criminal Court (ICC) under Article 14 of the Rome Statute. It appears that neither Kibaki nor Raila needed to confront the political fallout from having handed over the destiny of some of their most high-ranking cabinet officials to the ICC. Thus, the ICC will still continue to serve Kenyan people by undertaking perhaps the most conclusive investigation and potentially prosecutions of its post-election violence offenders before the ICC (Musyimi, 2013).

However, Kenya's judicial and criminal justice systems have been repetitively admonished and chastised for failing to address immunity from prosecution. Given that the domestic criminal justice system has made little to no progress in investigating and prosecuting those most responsible for Kenya's post-election violence under current legislation, a Special Tribunal would be hampered in its ability to operate with as much autonomy and support from the government. The inability to create a Special Tribunal underscores the possibility of impunity. Thus, if permitted to proceed, the ICC Prosecutor's probe might provide one of the best opportunities for holding individuals responsible for crimes covered by the ICC Statute accountable (Musyimi, 2013).

2.10. Conclusions

The field of election violence research has grown significantly in recent years, as evidenced by the literature review presented here. Several questions, however, must be addressed in order for practitioners to develop effective policy solutions. The specifics of ethnic election violence, particularly in Europe, are largely unexplored. According to the literature, ethnic electoral violence

is most common in Africa and Latin America. Even less is known about how to prevent and mitigate ethnic-based electoral violence. In addition, little is known about why some incumbent governments are more supportive of violence prevention programs than others, or how donor finances alter incentives to encourage or inhibit violence. Kenyan elections are similar to those in many African countries.

It is clear that Kenya's electoral management in 2007 had a significant impact on East Africa's regional security. This assumes that, in the aftermath of regional integration, a regional approach should be taken in order to find better ways to mitigate future similar situations. The concern is that almost all of the countries in East Africa appear to be at the same stage of democratic development. They appear to be maturing at one point while rapidly deteriorating at another; perhaps a severe economic incorporation would be a way to ensure the preferred regional stability by all parties involved, regardless of ethnic associations.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

This chapter will go over the study's research methodology. First, the study will explain numerous research paradigms and then select the one that best describes the current study, followed by a discussion of research methodologies or the nature of research. Furthermore, the research design, data collection methods and data analysis will be thoroughly described. Again, the study will cover the ethical consideration and apply the study's trustworthiness or quality criteria. Finally, the concluding chapter in a synopsis.

3.2. Research Paradigm

A research paradigm, according to Nirod (2005), is a method or model for doing a study that has been verified by the research community for a long time and has been utilized for decades. The bulk of research paradigms are the result of one of two research approaches: interpretivism vs. positivism (Nirod, 2005). Furthermore, a research paradigm is a set of assumptions within which theories and practices operate, and it is a reflection of how a researcher views the evolution of knowledge. The interpretivism paradigm will be used to conduct this research.

According to Khaldi (2017), interpretivists believe that human behavior is complex and that it cannot be anticipated by pre-defined forecast models. It also relies on the circumstances and is impacted by factors other than genes. Human conduct is not like a scientific variable that can be easily manipulated. Human behavior is impacted by a multitude of factors and is mostly subjective. As a result, interpretivists prefer to study human behavior in the field rather than in the laboratory (Khaldi, 2017). Dammak (2015) add that interpretivists think that reality is multi-layered and complicated, and that people are innovative and actively build their social reality.

Since the subject of this study is ethnicity as a source of electoral violence in Kenya, the interpretivism paradigm will guide human behavior between ethnic groups who are at conflict with one another. Election violence in Kenya is a societal reality that has been going on for decades.

According to Grix (2004), the world is produced by the interaction of individuals. As a result, rather than separation, the relationship between the knower and the topic to be known is one of involvement and interaction. Interpretivists believe that the only way to comprehend social reality is via the eyes of those who are involved in the ongoing action being studied, which may be applied to the Kenyan study.

3.3. Nature of Research or Research Approach

Qualitative research methods will be used in the study. Quantitative research requires acquiring and interpreting numerical data for statistical analysis, whereas qualitative research does not. (Bhandari, 2020). A research methodology seeks to connect the data to be gathered and the conclusions to be reached to the research questions (Symeou & Lamprianou, 2008). The technique, principles, and processes by which a researcher approaches problems and seeks answers are referred to as research methodology (Kobus, 2011:20). Methodology relates to how a researcher implements his entire study design: it should be intelligent and strong enough to withstand criticism; it should be rational, methodical, and consistent with the research questions; and it should ensure valid and trustworthy findings based on high-quality data (Symeou & Lamprianou, 2008).

A qualitative research approach is also referred as ethnographic research. It investigates objects in their natural environments and attempts to interpret them. It requires using and gathering a variety of empirical materials, such as a case analysis, personal knowledge, introspection, personal background, interviews, observation history, engagement, and visual materials, in order to do research (Abhinash, 2013). Inductive analysis, the formation of hypotheses, people's attitudes, processes, and beliefs are among the major things' researchers keep in mind during this type of research, according to Worthington (2013). However, one of qualitative research's faults is that it is wide, ambiguous, and all-encompassing.

Qualitative research, according to Bhandari (2020), is the collection and examination of non-numerical data, such as text, video, or audio in order to fully understand the theories, viewpoints, or experiences. It can be used to develop in-depth knowledge of a subject or to generate new research ideas. The current study on ethnicity as a cause of election violence in Kenya will collect both primary and secondary data in the form of text, and audio.

3.4. Research Design

The methods of gathering, analyzing, interpreting, and presenting data in research investigations are referred to as research designs (Boru, 2018). In other words, the study design specifies the method for getting the required data, the methodology for collecting and analyzing the data, and how all of this will be used to answer the research question (Grey, 2014). The research design is the overarching strategy used by the researcher to logically and cohesively combine the many components of the study, ensuring that the study will answer the research questions; it is the design for data collection, measurement, and analysis (De Vaus, 2001).

The study will be conducted using an exploratory research design. An exploratory research design, according to Swedberg (2020), is an attempt to learn something unique and exciting as you advance through a study topic. The researchers adopted this approach to better understand and address the issue of electoral violence by delving deeply into the topic under study, particularly in the African continent. This analysis will aid in a better understanding of the issue and the prevention of a recurrence of the problem.

3.5. Data Collection Methods

Data collection is usually done after the observation and experimentation. Data collection, which can be qualitative or quantitative, is useful in planning and estimating (Singh, 2022). There are two types of data gathering methods: primary and secondary data collection methods. The study will employ both primary and secondary data collection methods. According to Gangrade (1982), primary data is gathered from respondents, whereas secondary data is gathered from published and unpublished materials and is frequently referred to as library research. Primary and secondary data are gathered using a variety of tools. (Gangrade, K. D. (1982). Methods of data collection: Questionnaires and Schedule. *Journal of the Indian Law Institute*, 24(4), 713-722.)

3.5.1. Semi-structured Interviews

Under primary data collection the study made use of semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews, according to Fylan (2005), are simply conversations in which you know what you want to learn about, have a list of questions to ask and a good idea of the subjects that will be covered, but the conversation is free to change and is likely to differ significantly between participants. The interviews were held in order to make the study unique and give it intellectual credibility. Overall,

this helped the study by allowing it to compare qualitative data to data from the past and the future. (Fylan, F. (2005). *Semi-structured Interviewing. A Handbook of Research Methods for Clinical and Health Psychology*, 5(2), 65-78.)

Before conducting the interviews, a population has to be selected. According to Singh & Newman (2011: 319) a population is an ideal notion that refers to a large group of numerous cases from which a researcher chooses a sample and applies sample results. The study population for this study comprised Kenyan citizens that were interested in the subject being studied. Kenyan residents took part in this research, particularly those who were eligible to vote in elections of 1992 and 2007, those who were involved in ethnic conflict and those who were not eligible to vote but were affected by the impact of ethnic conflict. Therefore, the study's population includes all individuals, groups, and organizations who participated and were impacted by post-election political violence.

Kenyan citizens from various fields made up the study's population. Demographic information was obtained about participants' gender and age. Twenty individuals, 20-50 years old were all interviewed. There were 20 in total, including 2 females and 18 males. Of the 20 participants, 8 were eligible to vote in the 1992 and 2007 elections, and 2 of them took part in the election-related violence. The other 8 were not eligible to vote because they were under the voting age in 1992 and 2007. All 20 participants were additionally impacted by election violence, some physically and others by its effects. Because of their ability to provide in-depth descriptions of their knowledge and experiences, the population study was selected.

According to Kamangar and Islami (2013), the process of choosing a scientifically representative large group of individuals from a population of interest is referred to as sampling. Sampling is an important strategy for research studies because the population of interest is usually too broad for any study endeavor to engage as participants. There are two types of sampling methods: probability sampling and non-probability sampling. Etikan and Bala (2017) describe that probability sampling sometimes known as 'random sampling,' is a type of sampling wherein every item in the world has an equal chance of being present in the sample.

Moreover, non-probability sampling, on the other hand, is a sampling method that does not give a foundation for generating an opinion about the possibility of components from the universe being included in the study sample (Etikan and Bala, 2017).

The participants in this study were limited to a certain number. The study adapted non-probability sampling, which is a judgement sample. According to Marshall (1996:523) judgement sample is when a researcher intentionally picks the most productive sample to answer the study issue, this is also known as a purposeful sample. This may require developing a framework for the variables that may influence an individual's participation, which will be based on the researcher's practical knowledge of the research issue, existing literature, and data from the study itself. Although age, gender, and socioeconomic status are important factors, this is a more sophisticated method than the simple demographic segmentation employed in epidemiological research. This sample strategy was employed in the study since it is less expensive financially and takes less time. As a result, the interviews were done over the phone, owing to the researcher's location in South Africa and the participants' limited mobility due to the global pandemic.

3.5.2. Secondary Data

The study used desk-top research called secondary data to gather its data. Internal and external information sources are both included in secondary data collection techniques. The study used external data sources, which included government census data, information from books, journals, and newspaper articles, historical archives, and research data on the internet. Clark (2013:57) defines the term "secondary data" as information that has already been gathered and is usable. (Clark, 2013:57).

The advantages of adopting secondary data collection methods were discussed by Boslaugh (2007). The advantage is that the data has already been obtained, therefore the researcher does not have to spend resources to this phase of research. Johnson (2017) and other studies outlined the advantages and disadvantages of secondary data collection methods in the table below.

Table 1: Advantages and Disadvantages of Secondary Data Collection Methods

Advantages	Disadvantages
<p>Secondary data is extremely easy to gather because researchers only need to discover the source of the data and then collect it. Furthermore, when compared to primary data, the time and expense required to obtain this form of data is far lower.</p>	<p>Many types of secondary research data are not tailored to a researcher's requirements. As a result, the researcher cannot just rely on secondary research material, which is of limited utility to him/her</p>
<p>Another advantage of secondary data is that it is now much easier to access secondary data due to the internet. The literature review, as an example of a research study, can be thought of as secondary material that is easily accessible.</p>	<p>The data that is obtained secondly is frequently collected by someone other than the person who will use it. As a result, secondary data is usually skewed in favor of the person who collected it, and it may or may not satisfy the needs of another researcher (Sparrow, 2012).</p>
<p>Additional advantage of secondary data is that it may be used to perform longitudinal analyses, which are studies that are undertaken over a longer period of time. The ability to discern a trend is usually present in secondary research data.</p>	<p>It's possible that a researcher won't be able to find exactly the right secondary data. A researcher doing a study on a certain issue may occasionally be unable to locate data that adequately answers his or her research question and goal.</p>
<p>The researcher can utilize random sampling using secondary research data, resulting in a greater sampling size than is achievable with original data gathering. According to Lopez (2013) larger samples are usually used by organizations that have already collected data</p>	<p>Secondary sources of information, such as books and historical surveys, may not be up to date and may alter dramatically over time. As a result, there can be another disadvantage of secondary research data, where the significant</p>

and can be used later by other researchers for their studies.	delay issue arises, posing a high danger to the research study.
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3.6. Data Analysis

Data analysis, according to Kelley (2022), is the process of cleaning, modifying, and processing raw data in order to obtain usable, appropriate data to assist organizations in thinking critically. By presenting valuable insights and facts, often displayed in charts, images, tables, and graphs, the procedure helps reduce the risks associated with decision-making. This study's data will be analyzed thematically. One of the most prominent qualitative research approaches is thematic analysis, which gives a brief description and interpretation of a data set in terms of themes and patterns (Majumdar, 2022). Braun and Clarke (2006) enable a systematic way of seeing as well as the preparation of qualitative data through coding. Furthermore, thematic analyses go beyond counting explicit words and expressions to identify and describe both implicit and explicit concepts, or themes, in the data.

Thematic data analysis was utilized to examine the information gathered from the participants. Because the study aims to explore and understand social contexts, feelings, and thoughts, this approach of analysis was used. The researcher listened to the audios three times to obtain a feel of the direction the interviews were taking. The researcher transcribed the audio recording. To have a better understanding, the researcher carefully examined transcriptions. Understanding and identifying the topics were aided by the interview questions.

The researcher noticed while gathering data that ethnicity is a regular source of election violence in Kenyan politics. Because no one likes to lose, it becomes a contest to see which ethnic group can come out on top. So, when the researcher investigated about the reoccurring election violence, notably the 1992 and 2007/2008 elections, the participants claimed that elections were peacefully prior independence until the introduction of multiparty politics then there were vote imbalances.

Additionally, the participants feel that ethnicity is still a driving force in Kenyan politics, and that moving away from the ethnic narrative in politics and elections, as predicted by the next elections, will take years. Kenyans also believe that, based on previous election violence experiences, future elections will be free of violence since they have learnt a lot from the previous one, including how

it harms humanity and hinders the economy. These participants claim that the prior election violence is still having an impact; for example, there are still people who are displaced and have not recovered from the election violence of previous years, meanwhile other citizens are still physically affected.

3.7. Ethical consideration

Ethical consideration explains and guides what should be done and what should not be done during the data collection process, whether the participants are animals, plants, or people (Van Heerden, Visagie, & Wessels, 2016). Ethics are observed in research regardless of the number of participants, which could be zero or many. In research, ethics refers to the rules that govern acceptable behavior between the researcher and the participants. Through semi-structured interviews and secondary data collection, the researcher managed the data gathering process. All individuals displayed consistency in their responses during the semi-structured interviews. The researcher checked for bias in the data collection process to assure the study's dependability. The interviews were performed over the phone with the interviewees' assistance, and the participants were made to feel at ease in an appropriate psychological setting that guaranteed their privacy as well as that of the researcher. All secondary source data will be acknowledged, and plagiarism will be avoided at all costs. The study will also take into account the Covid-19 regulations, which were recently implemented.

A consideration for the study was research ethics. Prior to gathering the data, the participants were informed of the study's goal and all the required procedures. The participants' understanding of the study's purpose and goals, however, was more important. The consent form was discussed jointly by the researcher and participants, which made it easy to accomplish that. The participants were informed that it was entirely up to them to participate and that they could stop at any point if they felt uncomfortable or dangerous. One of the most crucial research ethical principles that every researcher must respect is confidentiality. It guarantees the confidentiality of any information or detail shared by the participant. Therefore, the participants' personal information is kept private; neither an individual nor a group outside of Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University will have access to it.

3.8. Trustworthiness

Mouton and Babbie (2002) The term "trustworthiness" refers to the demonstration that the information for the stated results is valid, as well as the strength of the argument made based on the results. To achieve accurate data interpretation, the researcher will apply four quality criteria such as credibility, transferability, conformability, and dependability.

3.8.1. Credibility

The qualitative researcher's conviction in the validity of the findings of the research study is referred to as credibility. The researcher will conduct quality verification by sharing data interpretations and conclusions to ensure trustworthiness. This will assist the researcher in determining whether the material provided is based on real experiences of ethnic groups that were at war during Kenya's electoral violence.

3.8.2. Dependability

Dependability refers to the degree to which a study may be replicated by other researchers and the results remain consistent. To ensure dependability, the researcher will ensure that the findings are properly reported, and that falsehoods and dishonesty are avoided. The researcher will make sure that the research technique for this study is clear and precise enough that other researchers will likely find comparable findings if they employ the same methodology in a different situation. The researchers will also double-check to ensure that he/she did not make any mistakes while interpreting the data.

3.8.3. Transferability

The term "transferability" refers to the researcher's ability to demonstrate that the findings of a research study may be applied to a variety of situations. This criterion is comparable to external validity. The researcher will establish transferability in this section by discussing and emphasizing the background or setting of the study. The detailed description of ethnicity in electoral violence will be completed in order to provide further information for future researchers.

3.8.4. Confirmability

Confirmability refers to the degree of impartiality in the research study's findings. This signifies that the conclusions are based on participant replies from secondary data. The researcher will make

sure confirmability by ensuring that information and bias do not impact the understanding of what the research subjects report. Here, the researcher will protect against bias and personal motivations.

3.9. Conclusions

This chapter explains the method utilized in the study to answer the research questions, starting with an explanation of the interpretivism paradigm, research methodology and design, and research methodologies. The data collecting, capture, and analysis strategies used in the study. The primary and secondary data gathering methods were already mentioned in this chapter. This chapter also focused on the concerns that arose throughout the study, and it concluded with a summary of the moral components that were considered to assure the research's integrity and satisfaction.

CHAPTER IV

THE HISTORY OF KENYA'S ETHNIC CONFLICT : 2007/08 POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE

4.1 Introduction

The study looks at ethnicity's role in Kenya's post-election violence from 2007 to 2008. The study investigates how the media, politicians, victims, researchers, and academics have linked ethnicity to post-election violence. It's worth noting that the study will focus on ethnicity in Africa during colonization period. The link between ethnicity and conflicts in Africa, with an emphasis on Kenya, is also investigated. The study looks at the impact of ethnicity in Kenya from 1963 to 2008, then focuses on ethnicity and the post-election violence of 2007/08. The chapter finishes with a description of ethnicity's significance in Kenyan strife.

The events of December 2007 sparked controversy, highlighting ethnicity's persistently problematic importance in African democracy. In political forms, ethnicity has always been a symbol of power, leading the question of whether ethnicity is a major component in conflict, or whether it is minor or exaggerated. Van den Berghe (1983:228) states, that there are a variety of reasons why ethnicity continues to dominate the political and intellectual agenda. To begin with, ethnic conflicts ostensibly driven by ethnicity, the fall of communist rule, the ensuing outbreak of nationalist movement in Eastern Europe, and the greater visibility of racial hatred in the West have all pushed ethnic issues to a new and pressing front.

These innovations have contributed to a perplexing situation of paradigms lost in the academic world. Most importantly, both as an analytical and practical agenda, the strengths of materialist analysis have been substantially weakened. Marxists have long seen ethnicity, like nationalism, as a kind of illogical false consciousness, but it can no longer be explained or dismissed in this way (Horowitz, 1985:67). We must try to fathom its workings because it is with us in some way or another. In Africa, the new international order has also aided in the eradication of some of the stigmas associated with ethnicity (Toland, 1993:58).

The tragedy of ethnic cleansing serves as a reminder, according to Lund (1996:18), that ethnic conflict is not solely an issue in Africa, for instance the events in Rwanda, the past Yugoslavia, Sudan, and the issue of Western racism all contributed to the naturalization of ethnic strife.

Furthermore, the collapse of the bipolarity world and the ideological rivalry between superpowers damaged bloc and national politics' allegiance and coherence. The cold war, it is usually accepted, had an impact on domestic politics and helped to keep societal turmoil at bay.

4.2 Ethnicity in Africa during the Colonialization

The term ethnicity was only recently introduced into academia as a new and different way of characterizing something that has always existed. Ethnicity has something universal about it, which can be defined as the human necessity connect, to identify, and thus to exclude, whether it is regarded as a universal phenomenon for which a new moniker is developed, or a distinctively contemporary phenomenon for which a new moniker is developed (Young, 1985:29). This desire, on the other hand, can be expressed and fulfilled in a variety of ways that aren't necessarily ethnic (Smith, 1989: 345).

Contemporary African ethnicities, according to Africanist historians and political scientists, are products of the same world-historical procedure that generated present capitalism, wage labor, and class relations (Horowitz, 1985: 235). The thesis is based on an investigation of ethnicity in Africa. The introduction of this "foreign" type of political institution to Africa transformed established ethnic identities and every now and then created entirely new ones, though not always with the knowledge, much less the aware intent, of individuals who were key players in the process.

The establishment of territorially distinct managerial subdivisions, which made local ethnic groups more fixed but less permeable than before; and the imbalanced distribution of wealth, academic, and other advantages of modernization, which meant that some regions benefited more than others (Smith, 1989:350). As a result, competitive ethnicity surpassed non-competitive ethnicity.

One writer referred to ethnicity as an intellectual "lightning rod" because of its power to reinterpret, captivate, and eliminate difficult categories like race and class. Ethnicity, like many other words, can be used as a euphemistic alternative for other terms (Prunier, 1997). The phrase ethnic serves as a catch-all term that can be used to group together a variety of categories. Ethnicity, for example, serves as a connection between tribes and nations in the evolutionary sequence. It also serves as a synonym for race in a set of concepts that connect race to country and culture beyond national borders, particularly where internationalization has stripped away national borders, resulting in insecurity and socioeconomic disparities (Lund, 1996:20).

Ethnicity has always been the most perplexing issue in the cultural and social sciences. This enigma is viewed as a cancer and virus within nation-states because theorists, political scientists, scholars, and economists believe that nations with culturally diverse groups should be able to calmly satisfy these distinctions within the same political body (Eriksen, 2002:43). The nation-state has existed as a political entity for nearly 5000 years.

Since the second half of the nineteenth century, the nation-state has developed as an independent sovereign unit that must recognize individuals from various ethnic backgrounds due to industrialization, wars, and migratory, among many other factors. Around the world, nearly 200 autonomous entities must accommodate 5000 ethnicities speaking 600 major languages, representing the vastness of cultural diversity. Only about 90% of the population in 10% of these states speaks the same language. Statistics become even more distorted when you visit Africa (Eriksen, 2002:43). Ethnicity has developed into such a comparison of various for global psyche that it is useful to the political process when it stimulates group formation and underpins political structure (Rothchild, 1997:3).

If modernization and sustainable change theories are not realized, the boundaries between individuals within a state will gradually disappear in a fusion. People like the Basques in Spain, Sikhs in India, Tamil-speakers in Sri Lanka, Igbo in Nigeria, Kurds in Iraq, and Indians in the United States and Canada, for instance, articulated unwillingness at first, then outright hostility, to being forced to give up their cultural identities in order to fit into the dominant culture (Malhotra & Liyanage, 2005:909).

Initially, the comeback of ethnicity was attributed to rising economic disparities between the rich and the poor (Van den Berghe, 1983: 230). However, it was becoming apparent that a deeper level of social cohesion was at play. As we know it today, ethnicity is a term that, was formed out of the need to find a conceptual instrument to explain the phenomenon.

Even though ethnic identities are considered as motivational force of behavior in Africa, the origin of their influence in politics and society remained unclear. According to one interpretation, ethnic identities are important in Africa because they reflect traditional familial bonds. According to this viewpoint, ethnic identities are hardwired (inherent in who people are), and their significance stems directly from their relationship to people's natural makeup. Some argue that ethnic origin is

important because it serves a purpose. People in favor of this viewpoint contend that the world is a competitive place, and that ethnicity is a useful tool for organizing people, policing borders, and forming alliances in the pursuit of power and precious resources (Eriksen 2002:45). According to this point of view, ethnicity is inextricably linked to political rivalry.

4.3 The link between Ethnicity and Conflicts in Africa

Ethnic conflicts have monopolised global security agendas in recent years, and academics, policymakers, and peacemakers have worked extremely hard to better understand and control ethno-political violence (Mwagiru, 2006:7). Because ethnic groupings are generally defined by extensive social networks, it is easy to see why national political outcomes, especially in physically split nations, show ethnic alignment, which subsequently serves as a foundation for ethnic conflict (Rothchild, 1997:5). These disputes are often larger than state-centric concerns, and they have the potential to internationalize, affecting regional and stability in the country.

Because of the persistent and perplexing violence, communal conflict, and occasional genocide across several nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, which has roughly 1500 ethno - linguistic groups, historians, political scientists, and policy analysts have confounded many societal problems related to ethnicity by trying to understand the relationship between ethnic forces and violence (Burtler, 2009:53). This issue is not specific to Sub-Saharan African countries; it affects formerly colonial peoples and their lands all over the world. Land occupations throughout colonialism and after independence have created a systemic problem. Today, most battles are fought within countries rather than between them (Sanders, 2002:327).

With another 31 million people relocated within their own country, rising from roughly 2 million in 1970 to over 43 million in 2010. Internal battles are typically fought with light weapons that are commonly available and inexpensive; they are especially dangerous to people's lives and livelihoods; and they are waged against neighbors, friends, and even family members, rather than a faceless and unknown foe. One of the most puzzling and disconcerting aspects of today's "new wars" for both those implicated and those observing and attempting to understand them is how people who have known each other since childhood can act with such egregious brutality and dehumanization as we have seen, for example, in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.

Because ethnicity is not a genuine thing, it cannot be used as a reason for conflict, despite the fact that its power to affect behavior is largely due to its perception as a "natural" trait of a group (Rothchild, 1997:22). It is a relational notion that refers to how cultural differences are passed down, and it is developed and preserved by interaction rather than solitude. While ethnicity is formed in a variety of ways and to varied degrees, it is not fictitious, as has been repeatedly argued. It is true in at least two ways. It is, first and foremost, a subjective reality with enormous potential for organizing and driving collective activity in any situation, not only in conflict. Second, it does not come out of nowhere, but rather thrives in certain historical circumstances (Reynal-Querol, 2002:31). It is the solitary achievement of those who use it as a political tool that they can construct an individuality for their followers that, despite being based on a highly selective and slanted view of their collaborative past, has enough ties to that past to be credible and relevant. The study will assess post-election violence in Kenya in 2008 on three fronts, focusing on the role of ethnicity in the violence.

Even Rwanda's heinous Hutu Tutsi conflict cannot be blamed on long-held ethnic prejudices (Sambasin, 2001:260). This is accurate not only because the mass murder was purposefully concocted by the Habyarimana government's Hutu elite in order to gain control, but also because the ethnicity they utilized and structured was largely a product of recent colonial and post-colonial history. The authorities in Germany and Belgium did not create Tutsi and Hutu identities, and they were unaware of the dangers of their administrative policies and decisions; however, the oblique rule system established in Burundi and Rwanda resulted in rather detailed and thorough classifications of the subject population.

The cattle agreement between a pastoralist Tutsi "patron" and an agriculturalist Hutu "client," which is a critical foundation of conventional Tutsi supremacy, was most probable only common in the central part of Rwanda's pre-colonial kingdom; however, the colonial authorities absorbed the center Rwandan state's ideology of supremacy, enshrined and rationalized it, and extended this throughout the domain (Prunier, 1997). The notion that the Tutsi belonged to a superior Ethiopian-derived Hamitic race and that the Bantu Hutu were clearly inferior justified Tutsi rule and the recruitment of the indigenous elite nearly completely from the Tutsi nobility.

The Belgian government then reversed course a few years before independence was announced in 1962, supporting a Hutu social revolution against the Tutsi minority, which ended in the slaughter

of 10,000 Tutsis and the emigration of 150 000 Tutsi refugees, largely to Uganda. As members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, these exiles' sons and grandsons fought against Rwanda's Hutu government in the armed conflict that began in 1990 with an invasion from Uganda (De Heusch 1995:5). We must assume that their extended exile from Rwanda's "land of dreams" had the same effect on their Tutsi identity as Hutu refugees fleeing the Tutsi elite's ruthless massacres in Burundi in 1972 did on their Hutu identity. For 50 years, the Hutu political and intellectual elite fashioned their politicized ethnicity policy from ethnic resources left over from Belgian colonial rule.

Because the global community failed (or refused) to acknowledge how much Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups were a response to colonialism, it was simple for them to depict the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 as an outbreak of primitive and irrational ethnic enmities, rather than the carefully planned, intentionally executed, and thus avoidable operation that it was (Waal, 1994:3).

Darfur is yet another major ethnic conflict in Africa. Since 2003, when audacious rebel raids on government outposts first made news, Darfur, Sudan's Muslim western region, has been connected to massive war crimes and even "genocide" (Mwagiru 2006:17). Violence against civilians grew substantially as a result of Khartoum's counterinsurgency efforts, with death tolls peaked in mid-2005 with occasional attacks continuing to this day.

Despite the fact that peace agreements come and go, low-level conflict with the rebels continues. Millions of villagers have remained displaced in camps that sprang up immediately after the conflict began. In terms of scale, some camps now outnumber large cities, though not in terms of resources. Many individuals want to return to what's left of their houses, but they don't feel safe doing so. The capital became a haven for some. On the outskirts of Khartoum, massive slums house the poor from Darfur and southern Sudan. Others are refugees, either living in Chad or relocating to Egypt and other nations across the border (Mwagiru, 2006:17).

The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), which was formed among some of the ethnicities of Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit, and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which was formed among the Zaghawa Kobe clan and associated with Islamists who had fallen out with Khartoum, were the first rebel forces (Tishken,1994:151). According to the available evidence, the insurgents had widespread popular support. Their frustrations were long-standing and strongly felt, a lack of economic progress and political influence.

Infrastructure development in Khartoum has been centered since the destructive years of British colonialism, whereas Darfur remains miserably destitute, with only the most basic schools and medical facilities. Fighting, on the other hand, continues to draw ethnic lines and support (Mwagiri, 2006:21). Most of Sudan's periphery suffers from similar underdevelopment, with only the country's oil wealth visible in the central regions.

The Somalia Crisis, a relatively homogeneous group in terms of ethnic tensions, is another long-running ethnically motivated carnage (Francis, 2008:3). General Mohamed Siad Barre, who came to power after a military coup in 1969, was deposed in 1991 by a coalition of Somali armed groups. Following the collapse of centralized power in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, a number of Somali organizations waged a military conflict for personal political control, restricting food and medicine from achieving innocent Somalis suffering from drought and famine. As Somalia was torn apart by internal strife, an estimated 500,000 deaths as a result of conflict, starvation, and illness. In 1992, the US began an operation that effectively tamed warlords and armed factions, allowing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to safely send humanitarian supplies to Somalis.

In May 1993, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) handed over the mission to the United Nations. The UN initiative was dubbed UNOSOM II (United Nations Operation in Somalia). One of the Mogadishu groups attacked UNOSOM II coalition forces in May 1993. On 3 October 1993, eighteen US Rangers were killed in a seventeen-hour combat in Mogadishu between US soldiers and Somali militias. The departure of US soldiers from Somalia was authorized by President Clinton. In March 1994, the US withdrew completely from Somalia, and the UN withdrew the remaining peacekeepers a year later.

Since UN forces left in March 1995, Somalia has been fractured into numerous regions ruled by clan-based organizations, with no central government (Bercovitch, et al 2009:63). There have been fourteen Somali reconciliation or peace conferences since the early 1990s, all aimed at bringing an end to the war. The majority of these measures have failed to create long-term peace. Furthermore, Somalia's peace efforts have been hampered by conflicting foreign activities.

Numerous people seem to believe that Africa is stuck in a never-ending cycle of ethnic conflict (Tarimo & Manwelo, 2009:14). Genocides in Rwanda, Darfur, Somalia, northern Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, and the violent aftereffects of Kenya's contentious elections, to name a few examples,

appear to support this position. The encouragement for ethnically motivated behavior grows as complaint handling mount and are framed on a group level rather than an individual level. Furthermore, the centuries-old inertia that underpins these enmities resists resolution. The conclusion appears to be that Africa's complex ethnic diversity makes it eternally exposed to tragic, never-ending strife (Bercovitch et al, 2009: 65). As a result, the chances for long-term economic growth and democratization are harmed.

4.4. Kenya Ethnic Groups

The research is focused on the Republic of Kenya. The Republic of Kenya has a population of 48.5 million people, covers an area of 582,646 square kilometers (224,961 square miles), speaks Swahili and English, is a Christian country, has a life expectancy of 63 years for men and 69 years for women, and uses the Kenya shilling as its currency (BBC News, 2018). Kenya has been termed the "cradle of humanity" because of its location on Africa's east coast, near the equator.

The Great Rift Valley has yielded some of the earliest evidence of man's forefathers, according to palaeontologists. Kenya's ethnic diversity has produced a vibrant culture, but it has also caused conflict. The Somalia-based Islamist terrorist group Al-Shabab has been carrying out a growing number of attacks in Kenya, including the 2013 attack on Nairobi's Westgate shopping mall and the 2015 attack on Garissa University College in northwest Kenya (BBC News, 2018).

For years, The Maasai, Luhya, Luo, Kalenjin, and Kikuyu peoples, to name a few, have all had their lives researched by anthropologists and other social scientists. The ethnic variety of the country is enhanced by immigration from several European and Asian countries. Kenyans are proud of their cultures and traditions, but they also acknowledge the importance of national unity; since independence, Kenya's government has emphasized the importance of "Harambee" (Swahili meaning "pulling together") (Ntarangwi, Simeon and Ingham, 2021).




Figure 1: A map of Kenya's tribes

Source: <http://themusingsofamzungu.blogspot.com/2012/09/kenya-what-unites-and-divides.html>

Kenya is home to approximately 40 different ethnic groups, ranging from the desert areas of the north to the game-filled national parks of the south. In addition, Kenya's economy has included both privately owned and state-run firms since its independence in 1963 (Ntarangwi, Simeon and Ingham, 2021). The majority of the country's economy is private (with significant foreign investment), but the government controls the country's economic development through different regulatory powers and "parastatals," or firms that it partly or entirely owns. The goal of this strategy is to foster economic growth and stability, create jobs, and maximize foreign revenues by increasing agricultural exports while substitution domestic production items for imported goods (Ntarangwi *et al*, 2021).

Despite being charged with crimes against humanity for election violence five years previously, Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya's founding president, succeeded his father as president in April 2013. Mr Kenyatta, Kenya's richest man, was born two years before the country's independence in 1961, shortly after his father Jomo Kenyatta was released from nearly ten years of imprisonment by British colonial forces. He studied political science and economics at Amherst College in the

United States and is regarded as the top political leader of Kenya's largest tribe, the Kikuyu, which makes up about 17% of the population (BBC News, 2018).

4.5 The Impact of Ethnicity in Kenya from 1963 to 2008.

Understanding the ethnic linkage in Kenya now entails not only comprehending the critical tri-polar link among heritage, bureau, and configurational, but also comprehending the historical continuous thread that runs through this multi-dimensional process (Wamwere, 2008:78). Because Kenya's modern state was not only a result of colonial rule, but colonial establishments were also major factors in ethnicity formation, the process began during the colonial period.

The development and consolidation of the modern state took place throughout the colonial period, which began around 1895. Conflicting policies and a lack of a thorough and consistent framework hampered the process. The policy's main contours, however, had been determined by 1904. Kenya was given its current name in 1920 (Branch & Cheeseman, 2009:6).

Throughout colonial administration, white ethnicity was the dominant ideology, with European colonial authorities and colonists enjoying economic and political benefits over the majority black African population. Within African communities, colonial rule used a "divide-and-rule" strategy, favoring some communities over others, especially in terms of access to colonialism's advanced economic systems (Dercon, et al 2008:1). Kenya gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1963 after a long and drawn-out political process. The colonial state's inheritors, like everywhere in Africa, were a group of elites who had been meticulously groomed and indoctrinated in colonialism's social goals and ethos.

On the surface, the transformation from a colonization to a post-colonial state emerged to have resulted in major structural shifts: the colonial successor state was established on a liberal democratic constitutional framework emphasizing pluralism, the rule of law, and the sanctity of private property. In addition, the African political elite entering the country appeared to be ethnically and socially diverse. And, to the extent that it claimed to share African nationalist ideologies, it appeared to be a fairly stable political class.

Kenya's ruling elite tended to support democratic principles in the early days of the post-colonial country. Elections, for example, were held on a regular basis and were frequently hotly contested, particularly at the local and parliamentary spheres. The democratic curtain, on the other hand, did

not persist long. The strategy of manipulating the democratic process necessitated a concerted effort to undermine growing democratic institutions while also ethnically engraving the political process. While the first cabinet included members of several ethnic groups, the government's head and president, Jomo Kenyatta, was a Kikuyu, and the Vice President, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, was a Luo.

Tom Mboya, the Secretary-General of the ruling party, was a Luo, as were Njoroge Mungai and Mbiyu Koinange, both Kikuyu, who joined the cabinet after the opposing party Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) was dissolved in 1964. Ronald Ngala and Daniel Arap Moi, both from the Giriama and Kalenjin ethnicities, were also showcased in the government (Gettleman, 2007).

Only six years after independence, in 1969, the Kikuyu effectively seized political power, with Kenyatta at the vanguard but bordered by ethnic cousins and colleagues like Mbiyu Koinange, Njoroge Mungai, James Gichuru, and Charles Njonjo (Omolo, 2002:214). Moi, a Kalenjin, was the country's formal vice president, but he was widely assumed to be a symbolic figurehead. Jomo Kenyatta's desire for the Kikuyu elite to inherit the state was clear from the start. Most major public sector and parastatal jobs, including the head of the central bank, the civil service, the police, and many other large public industry and non-governmental jobs, became Kikuyu-only.

The typical Kikuyu was also desired in government jobs, as well as access to state loans for private enterprise and other public resources. Kenyatta purposely downplayed the role of KANU as a political party at the institutional level (Gentleman, 2007). Instead, he imposed the Gikuyu Embu Meru Association (GEMA), an ethnic bloc that would later become Kenya's most powerful political force.

Following Kenyatta's death in 1978, Moi became the country's president. Moi had survived a long campaign by Kenyatta's Kikuyu elite to keep him out of the president, thanks to a combination of luck and effort. Moi wasted no time after assuming power in influencing the political process in favor of his Kalenjin community (Omolo, 2002:214). The Kalenjin now occupied important cabinet positions previously held by the Kikuyu. A small ethnic group was given exclusive access to the civil service and the central bank, and international diplomatic positions in key Western capitals has become the unique realm of a small ethnic group. Except for the ethnic backgrounds of a select few, the state's ethnic makeup remained largely unchanged.

The multiparty elections held in December 1991 and January 1992 marked the start of Kenya's democratic process. Before these elections, a year-old political liberalization process had witnessed reforms such as the reenactment of a legislation reinstating the country's multi-party system. Therefore, actors formed opposition groups, with some even resigning from the governing KANU party. Since late 1991, the country has had a multi-party-political system, with numerous political parties competing with the governing party and conceivably forming alternate solution governments (Sisk, 2013:375).

In 2002, political life in Kenya was much more relaxed, civil freedoms were substantially protected, and associational life had become more robust, typified by a vibrant civil society willing to speak out the ruling elite's failings. Furthermore, In 1992 and 1997, the country held two multi-party general elections and was preparing for a third in 2002. However, a closer look reveals that democratization in Kenya has had relatively little impact on ethnic politics.

Political ethnicity, a key feature of Kenya's one-party state, aided the democracy movement in a variety of ways. Institutional transformation, such as that required by democratization, posed a significant challenge to the Kalenjin's existing political and economic privileges as Moi's ethnic group and preferred community (Wamwere, 2008:82). As a result, they were the least likely to support reforms. Ethnic "outgroups," on the other hand, saw spread of democracy as a chance to disintegrate a system that they saw as anti-ethical to their sociopolitical goals.

The ruling party was naturally supported by the Kalenjin, but ethnic outgroups, particularly the mathematically important Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya, enthusiastically welcomed the new political opponents. Within the opposition, ethnic schisms arose quickly. For example, in the run-up to the first multi-party elections in 1992, the main opposition movement, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), crumbled under the mass of ethnic tensions, as ethnic elites from the major ethnic opposition forces readjusted themselves for the much-anticipated ethnic adaptation of political authority (Holmquist & Ford 1994:7).

In an ethnically divided political context, the Moi regime, which still had the most resources to buy votes, easily won the first multi-party elections in 1992. This was to happen again in the 1997 elections. There were ethnically motivated clashes in both cases right before the polls, which calmed off quickly after Moi won. Kenyan politics is unique in that the institutional expression of

multiparty politics, whether through political parties or informal political alliances and lobbying, is entirely ethnic in origin.

Almost all political parties are ethnically based. A party is usually led by an ethnic patron who primarily recruits clients to engage with voters. The parties themselves have limited social appeal due to their shallow socioeconomic roots, dictatorial leadership, and incoherent political beliefs and practices.

The 1992 and 1997 presidential elections demonstrated that ethnic identity is the most essential form of political institution, with presidential parties and candidates receiving the majority of their support from ethnic regions (Kanyinga, 2000:45). Moi, a member of the Kalenjin ethnic group who primarily lives in the Rift Valley but also in parts of the Western Province, was the KANU presidential candidate in both 1992 and 1997. Much of his popularity stems from his status, particularly in the Rift Valley and Western regions.

Matiba, a Kikuyu, was the second candidate in the 1992 elections, and he garnered a lot of support from the provinces of Central and Nairobi, which are mostly Kikuyu-populated. There is a large Kikuyu diaspora in the Rift Valley, which explains Matiba's strong support in the province. Furthermore, the GEMA tribes show a proclivity towards voting in clans. Matiba's success in Western province was owing to the fact that he chose Martin Shikuku, a resident of the area, as his running partner. The same rationale may be applied to Kibaki, another Kikuyu presidential candidate, to explain his varied fortunes. Similarly, Oginga Odinga was heavily backed by the Luo-dominated Nyanza province. The ethnic voting propensity was reiterated with little variation in the 1997 presidential elections.

The other tribes all joined different political parties, but the Kalenjin were rejected by KANU. To recap, the Kalenjin used political isolation to drive out opposition of Moi (the Kikuyu in opposition) by dispossessing them from land they had inhabited in settlement initiatives or purchased through land purchase schemes. Class and ethnicity became intertwined for a variety of reasons.

The Kalenjin elites, on the other hand, intended to advance their class interests by rallying support for the Moi government among their land-hungry constituents. When KANU Majimboists invaded farms in the Rift Valley in October 1991 to remove non-Kalenjins, the campaign against

"foreigners or settlers" turned violent. This pattern was repeated in the roll to the 1997 national election. The Kalenjin leaders in KANU mobilised once more around the issue of land. They claimed that the Kikuyu had not only seized territory previously held by the Kalenjin, but were also rapidly seizing control of the local economy at the expense of the Kalenjin.

These sorts of violence, however, did not occur during the 2002 election or the 2005 referendum. In the Rift Valley, there were no threats to the Kikuyus. Moi was not a candidate since he had served the maximum number of terms allowed by law (Mueller, 2008:189). As a result, the Kalenjin elite did not feel obligated to fight for him. Moi's decision to choose Kikuyu Uhuru Kenyatta as KANU's presidential candidate is also critical.

This tactic brought together Kikuyu and Kalenjin elites. When Moi and the Kalenjin withdrew from politics, Uhuru Kenyatta would preserve their interests, while a KANU's leadership and the Kikuyu presidency would protect the Kikuyu interests. However, KANU was defeated in the election. A combination of political parties known as the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) won on a program of significant reforms, particularly in the areas of land and the constitution. The alliance fell apart in 2004 due to conflicts about power distribution. These disagreements erupted during the constitution-writing process. In November 2005, a vote on a new constitutional amendment was held, but it was defeated. It laid the groundwork for land administration and access to or control over land.

That after the breakup of the governmental coalition and the subdue of the suggested new constitution in 2006, violent land conflicts erupted in a number of regions, including those outside the Rift Valley. The longest-running clashes occurred in Mount Elgon, Western Province, and Kuresoi, Rift Valley. Local residents objected to the allotment of plots in one Mount Elgon settlement scheme, claiming that strangers were given the land at the cost of natives.

The Kuresoi war was fought over land ownership disagreements between Kikuyu and Kalenjin, which included those farms purchased by distinct groups from departing immigrants (Kanyinga, 2009: 89). The violence in Kuresoi lasted until several weeks before the December 2007 general election, and it is possible that it was intended to reduce voter participation in the multi-ethnic Kuresoi parliamentary seat. The dissolution of the partnership resulted in a missed opportunity to

address the issue of endemic land rights in such communities, which has since resurfaced as a source of contention.

4.6 Ethnicity and the Post-Election Violence in Kenya, 2007-2008

Kenya became a historic case of Africa's democratic wave's deadly retreat after the contested December 27th, 2007, election results and associated massive violence. When nearly 14 million registered voters cast ballots in Kenya's most recent multiparty election on December 27, 2007, to choose a national head of state and 210 legislators, few expected the country to devolve into violence. The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) chair Samuel Kivuitu assured local and international election monitors on December 21 that the election would indeed be calm and that the transfer would be smooth. The polling day appeared to be peaceful, but the storm was only getting started (Throup, 2008:291).

The election controversy of 2007 has fueled an already flammable situation. Harassment, threatening candidates, slanderous remarks, the distribution of hateful leaflets, confrontations between rival groups, a mob lynching of ethnic adversaries, and the ripping up of Kikuyu voter cards were all reported during the pre-election campaign in parts of the Rift Valley. Many others had been brutally murdered in Mount Elgon, Molo, and Kuresoi by December 2007, and over 2,000 families had been displaced. Following the election, bloodshed became increasingly frequent, taking a variety of forms, including spontaneous, coordinated retaliatory, and "state" violence.

The violence escalated on December 29th, as Odinga's early lead began to diminish over withholding of results and suspicions of forgery. However, shortly after Kibaki was declared the winner on December 30th, rioting ensued. The first wave of violence was disorganized, with unplanned property destruction and random assassinations of suspected ethnic rivals.

In the first wave of attacks, suspected Kibaki supporters in the north Rift, particularly from the Kikuyu, Kisii, and Kamba communities, were targeted by Kalenjin, Luo, and Luhya ODM supporters in Eldoret and surrounding areas (Lynch, 2008:545). Farms and shops belonging to displaced or deceased victims were damaged, stripped of their signs, renamed, and confiscated by

ethnic militants brandishing arrows, cutlasses, clubs, and firearms, while dwellings, granaries, and plants in the ground were set ablaze and survivors slaughtered. Violence erupted in Nakuru, Narok, and Naivasha in the central Rift, as well as in parts of the South Rift. There were also reports of Kalenjin settlers attacking Luo and Kisii settlers, who took advantage of the breakdown in law and order to rife living creatures and take the land from their neighborhood regardless of party leanings (Wadhams, 2008).

At last, not just Kikuyu, Kisii, and Kamba of western Kenya were victims of violence, but so were the Bukusu (Luhya) who got to vote for the PNU. Poor peasant homes, farm owners, and tradespeople fled to security in internally displaced people camps in religious substances, federal buildings, Showgrounds, and other state infrastructure by foot, handcarts, bicycles, and lorries. On January 1, 2008, an approximate 200 Kalenjin young individuals burned down to the Kenya Assemblies of God church in Kiambaa, Eldoret, killing approximately 200 women, children, and handicapped people who had sought refuge there. According to the victims, William Ruto, a key member of ODM, was the main instigator and organizer of the Rift Valley violence.

Prior to the 2007 election turmoil, Kenya was widely regarded as a model democratic and peaceful country. By the end of the year, this picture had been forcibly and brutally shattered by the emergence of massive and horrifying ethnic conflict and disorder. Despite the fact that the warring parties quickly agreed to a coalition solution that ended the slaughter, analysts correctly depicted crisis-stricken Kenya as a democracy in jeopardy, with significant tensions. This chapter examines how ethnicity influenced the violence that erupted in the country following the December 2007 election. According to the hypothesis, Kenya's 2007/08 crisis was caused by a legacy of inequity in economic distribution (especially land) along ethnic lines, as well as elite leaders' political use of ethnicity.

4.7 Conclusions

This part of the study looks at the role of ethnicity in the world, Africa, and Kenya. In 2007/08, ethnicity was also linked to post-election unrest, according to the study. The report includes ethnic case examples that are relevant to the African environment. The study employs ethnicity as a conceptual tool to comprehend post-election violence as witnessed by the press, parliamentarians,

victims, academics, and intellectuals. The role of ethnicity in Kenyan unrest in previous elections and events prior to the upheaval in 2007/08 is also investigated. The chapter came to a close with a consideration of ethnicity's role in the violence of 2007/08, as recorded by various human rights probes, commissions of inquiry, and research projects. Ethnicity surfaces as a relational term that may be mobilized through communal action inside constructed 'identities.' Ethnicity's transitory base prior to contemporary political regimes has also been called into doubt. The perpetuation of ethnic and linguistic in political structures reflects the immense driving force that ethnicity possesses.



CHAPTER V

DATA INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction

Ethnicity is central to Kenyan society's divisions and the distribution of power by the elite groups. With over 40 different ethnic groups the largest of which is the Kikuyu political group association in Kenya is driven largely by ethnic and linguistic identity as opposed to ideology. Kenya's highly contested national elections in 2007-08 triggered most of these risk factors concomitantly resulting in widespread violence, dislocation, and deepening political and social schisms in the nation.

This chapter will discuss, interpret, and analyze data on ethnicity as a factor in electoral violence in Kenya. The chapter will begin by discussing the theory that will be used to analyze data, which is John Galtung and Kumar Rupesinghe's model of structural violence. As a result, the overview of the conflict will be interpreted, as well as the main reason for people to resort to conflict, ethnic group tensions between the Lua and Kikuyu, Kenyans' perspectives on the violence, socioeconomic impact, political impact, conflict media coverage, internal peacebuilding mission, and external mediators.

5.2 Theories for Analysis

The study used two theories: John Galtung's structural violence theory and Kumar Rupesinghe's model. The structural violence theory will interpret the reasons for the ethnic conflict in Kenya, whereas Kumar Rupesinghe's model will provide guidance on the peacebuilding and mediation process by various actors.

5.2.1 Structural Violence Theory by John Galtung

The study chose structural violence as defined by John Galtung as a type of violence emerging from a social structure or institution that harms people by intentionally depriving them of the ability to fulfill their immediate human needs. This type of violence has no physical form or image, but instead consists of "unavoidable disorder of fundamental human needs" (Galtung, 1969:32). The theory of structural violence compels one to seek out imbalances within social structures, whether they be disparities of wealth, power, privilege, access, or opportunity. In the same way,

structural violence persuades one to examine the connections between what may appear to be mutually exclusive worlds.

The study of ethnicity as a Cause of Electoral Violence in Kenya will focus on the concept of cultural violence under structural violence theory for data analysis purposes. Any part of a culture that may be used to justify violence, whether direct or institutional, is referred to as cultural violence (Galtung, 1990:302). Cultural violence allows a direct and structural violence appear and feel right, or at the very least not wrong. On the other hand, Galtung, encourages people to look beyond such inequalities and make links in order to dismantle the structures that enable these injustices. In today's world, structural violence, in my opinion, is a timely method of deconstructing conflict. For example, the idea that refugees are a potential source of conflict is a worldview that is implicitly accepted in global policy.

5.2.2 Kumar Rupesinghe's Model

Rupesinghe's model represents an essential theoretical framework for studying ethnicity as a cause of electoral violence in Kenya. This model will assist in the analysis of the roles of other regional actors in this conflict. Internal conflicts and the multidimensionality of protracted social conflicts are emphasized in the model. Rupesinghe (1995) also developed a multi approach to dealing with the complexities of many current and new conflicts.

Rupesinghe is a peace building theorist who believes in a multi-track, eclectic approach to conflict resolution. Furthermore, in civil society, peace constituencies are being formed at the grassroots level and across political parties, as well as peace coalitions with any organizations capable of creating changes, such as corporate, the communications, and the army.

5.3 Brief Overview of Conflict

According to Galtung (1990), violence can start anywhere in the direct structural-cultural violence triangle and quickly spread to the other points. Direct violence, like a hate campaign, becomes integrated, repeated, and ritualistic once the violent framework is in place and the violent culture is absorbed. The 2007 elections discovered the severity of the issue, with post-election violence resulting in a large number of deaths.

The goal will be to prevent ethnic violence by eliminating tribal voting prejudice and encouraging a more democratic voting mentality (Zocci, 2017). If this aim is met, ethnic tensions linked with electoral politics should be reduced, and a more democratic and equal political system will emerge. As Galtung stated, violence begins small, and this can be compared to the Kenyan conflict, in which a specific ethnic group instigates conflict, which then spreads throughout the country.

Following the 2007 elections, Kriegler (2008) state that there were three distinct waves of election violence. Following the release of the election results, youths in Nairobi and Kisumu slums looted government offices, as well as stores and homes of Kikuyu families and members of the Party of National Unity (PNU). Second, violence was planned in section before the election by opposing party and tribal leaders as a reaction to Kibaki's victory.

Third, government supporters and Kikuyu militias launched reprisal attacks in the Rift Valley Province, Central Province, and Nairobi slums, primarily targeting migrant workers suspected of being opposition supporters. Much of the violence was caused by the police, who either used excessive force to disperse protestors or refused to act to avoid violence (Kriegler, 2008).

Furthermore, over 1,200 deaths were reported and 350,000 people were displaced as a result of the election violence. Crop production and transportation were disrupted, resulting in a severe economic slowdown, a drop of 80% in tourism earnings, and a rise in the cost of living. In the areas most hit by the conflict, the bloodshed intensified causing societal disintegration among ethnic groups (Department of International Development, 2008).

5.4. Why People Resorted to Conflict

Most Kenyans react to ethnic violence due to unsubstantiated claims or motives. On December 27, Kenyans went to the polls and cast their ballots. Odinga seemed to have a strong lead in the subsequent counting, and his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) claimed victory on December 29 (Brownsell, 2013). However, as the votes were counted, Kibaki's results improved and the gap between him and his rivals narrowed. Kibaki was declared the winner by about 230,000 votes on the evening of December 30 behind closed doors by Kenya's Electoral Commission chairman (Halakhe, 2013).

These are some of the factors that may have prompted Odinga's group to become enraged and engage in some looting (Brownsell, 2013). A few hours after Kibaki's victory was announced,

street protests alleging Kibaki had "stolen" the election turned violent. Protests were forbidden to take place, and police were called in to try and stop the uprising.

According to the US Department of State (2010), "long-standing frustrations over communal land policies and competing for scarce agricultural land, the pervasiveness of guns, the corporate takeover of classical cattle rustling, the growth of a contemporary warrior culture (distinct from traditional culture), ineffective local political class, and eroded economic outlook for groups affected by a severe regional drought" are all factors contributing to ethnic tension in Ken. (US Department of State, 2010)

5.5. Lua and Kikuyu Ethnic Group Tensions

Galtung (1990:295) states that in the structural violence corner, a vicious violence process can also begin. With increasingly unequal distribution, social differentiation gradually takes on vertical characteristics, and these social facts would then seek social acts for their maintenance, and cultural violence for its justification. As a result, ethnicity, kinship, and neighborhood are significantly impacted by voting in Kenya, as they are throughout the continent, and political parties are formed along ethnic lines. In rural regions, where all three tend to coincide, voting at the voting center level will almost always be in favor of a single candidate, with the result practically being a group decision imposed by violence. The coincidence of family and neighborhood is only broken in big cities.

One probable is tribalism as a cause of rejection of the elections and perceiving it as an excuse to start violence. Tribalism has existed in Kenya since the colonial era. From 1920 until 1963, Kenya was controlled by the British, who adopted the divide and rule form of government. They had been pitting one culture against another for years, notably the Kikuyus and Luos, whom they considered as a danger because of their vast numbers. According to a Kenyan political analyst, "conflict in Kenya mostly emerges when the Kikuyu and Luo are at odds," (Howden, 2010).

According to Gettleman (2010), The Luo are Kenya's third-largest ethnic group, making about 14% of the country's population. There is no single group that constitutes a majority, though the Kikuyu are the largest minority, accounting for 22% of the population. Furthermore, ethnic groups compete for land and resources, which has been exacerbated in recent years by rapid population

growth. Land acquisitions outside of the majority Kikuyu's traditional ethnic homelands have occasionally provoked "ferocious" hostility among other ethnic groupings.

In comparison to the Kikuyu tribe, the Luo people felt they had been treated unfairly by President Kibaki. Many Luos believe that Kenya's first vice-president, Jaramogi Ajuma Oginga Odinga, was duped by the ruling Kikuyus when Kenya gained independence in 1963. (Gettleman 2008). Following the election, ethnic groups that supported Kibaki, notably the Kikuyu, were targeted and attacked. Odinga supporters, mainly the Luo and Kalenjin, faced massive Kikuyu retaliation. Significant fighting between Kikuyu and Luo populations occurred in large cities such as Nairobi and Kisumu, as well as the Nairboi slums of Kibera and Mathare.

In many areas, the post-election violence led to unprecedented ethnic segregation. Long-standing integration among ethnic groups was ended, turning the ethnic makeup of villages, cities, and towns. Kenya has been "ethnically separating itself" since the election, according to a 2008 report, with thousands of people relocating in ethnically homogeneous zones. Luos have returned to Luo land, Kikuyus to Kikuyu land, Kambas to Kamba land, and Kisiis to Kisii land. Even some of Nairobi's densely populated slums have divided along ethnic lines." Police officers were escorting people back to their ancestral homelands, as the government refers to them, which appears to be poorly disguised code for ethnic split.

5.6. Kenyans' Viewpoint about the Violence

The conceptual linkage of identity and politics has become so important as an integral part of contemporary ethnic politics. Smith (2016) contends that a society's specific political environment can influence the significance of individuals' personal and collective identities, as seen in Kenyan politics. In Kenya, a similar divide existed between Odinga and Kibaki supporters prior to the elections, with the precise fear that the counting and disclosing of results would not be free and fair. Voting intentions revealed a strong ethnic component. Afrobarometer (2008) conducted a survey in which citizens were asked to choose between being a Kenyan and belonging to their ethnic group. Only 10% of Kenyans prioritize their ethnic identity over being Kenyan.

These findings were similar among the Kikuyu and Luo, with less than 9% of each group ranking their ethnic group first. Furthermore, more than three out of every four Kenyans 76 % claim that ethnicity has no bearing on their choice of lifestyle. And nearly half 49 % say the ethnic or regional

origin of the party's leader has no bearing on how they vote. Thus, while ethnic factors clearly shape Kenyans' voting behavior in practice, they appear to yearn for a societal structure in which such factors are less relevant.

Prior to the election, over half of Kenyans polled expressed concern about political violence. Only 16% of those polled were unconcerned about becoming a target of violence or threats during the election (Afrobarometer, 2008). Kikuyu participants were noticeably more concerned, with 66 percent saying they always or frequently feared violence, compared to 54 percent of Luo respondents. Similarly, Mwai Kibaki supporters were more concerned about violence than Raila Odinga supporters. These reactions did not differ significantly between Kibaki and Odinga supporters, or between Kikuyu and Luo. Similarly, 78 percent reported that communities were willing to vote out violent politicians, with Odinga supporters significantly more willing to do so (Afrobarometer, 2008).

Identity and biased violence are normally determined over generation (Piraino, 2017) which the Kenyan ethnic can attest to because it has been present for generations. Communities with higher rates of identity and biased violence have more contact with the justice system, which affects ordinary citizens disproportionately. This conclusion appears simple enough, but will our future governments be able to put aside the venomous rhetoric and work to end ethnic violence.

5.7. Socioeconomic and Political Effect

Any conflict must have a specific group suffer the consequences, which is usually the proletariat class. Galtung (1990:293) provided the archetypal violent structure, which includes exploitation as a centerpiece. This simply means that some, the interest group, benefit far more (as measured in needs currency) from the structure's interaction than others, the underdogs. There is also 'unequal sharing,' a euphemism. The underdogs may be so disadvantaged that they die, starve, or succumb to diseases (Galtung, 1990:293).

The serious social and economic problems confronting Kenyans, exacerbated in portion by government corruption and subjugation (both before and after independence), apart from the role of ethnicity in the current conflict (Robertson, 2008) Kenya continues to remain a divided country into ethnic communities, but they all share a common history of an economic situation caused by ethnic violence and neocolonialization, one of which expressions is corruption. Indeed,

governmental abuse of power has played a direct role in Kenya's existing breakdown of order. With funds shifted to enrich the rulers, the government has abandoned its citizens to all forms of violence (Robertson, 2008).

Afrobarometer (2008) research stated people's views on the country's economic conditions that reflect their recognition of the incumbent record, with 51% revealing that the country was doing better or much better under Kibaki's rule, compared to President Moi's tenure. Only 28% thought the country was getting worse or much worse. Furthermore, more people reported bettering than exacerbating living conditions 45%. Even among likely Odinga voters, an equal number believe the country was doing better than worse, despite the fact that more thought their own living standards had deteriorated during Kibaki's tenure.

According to Brownsell (2013), along with witness testimony, bed frames and blankets were lit on fire with petrol and thrown into the building, while women and babies attempting to flee the inferno were shoved back into the church. Kikuyu males trying to protect their place of worship and family members were macheted, shot with arrows, chased and killed. The incident left 17 people dead in the church, 11 people facing death and 54 others extremely wounded but treated and discharged.

Political leaders seek support from members of their own tribes, and they utilize their tribes as leverage when negotiating for government posts and privileges. Analyst Wanyama believes it is no surprise that political elites are accused of exploiting ethnic divisions in order to gain power, because elections were never based on issues, ideologies, or principles (Githuku, 2013). The life experiences that have influenced the ordinary Kenyan's perspective of war are comparable to those seen in post-colonial nations that have fallen victim to authoritarianism. In Kenya, political parties are typically organized along tribal lines, with ethnicity taking precedence over political ideology and policy. This is due to the perception that the party represents the best chance for a tribal member to take power and then share state resources with other tribes (Mutua, 2008: 22).

As demonstrated by this election, Kenya and most African countries fall far short of the concept of democracy. Even so, it is tempting to consider it anything but an ethnic poll in which only ethnic votes are counted. The bigger a country's ethnic group's percentage of the overall population, the more likely it is to win the president. Kenya looks to be growing towards a "procreatorocracy," which

is described as a political system in which ethnic numerical advantage is increasingly used to seize, control, and maintain government power.

5.8. Media and Ethnic Violence

The media has a significant impact in documenting conflict. The essence of that position as a perpetrator of conflict or an operative for peace is heavily influenced by the media's contextual and agenda system set. Kenya has seen its good proportion of conflict, some of which are still ongoing. Article 34 of the constitution protects media independence and states that all government media outlets are free to conduct unbiasedly and impartially in determining the quality journalism of their newscasts and other forms of communication. All state media outlets should be given an equal opportunity to present opposing viewpoints and opinions. (Njigua and Manyengo, 2017).

Therefore, during election violence in Kenya, the media had a conflicting role. Kenya's newsprint is generally regarded as among the best in Africa. Nonetheless, the major media, particularly the state-owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, was biased in favor of the government. Talk shows on some of the smaller, regional FM stations were also used to spread hate speech although others became vehicles for peace.

Njigua and Manyengo (2017) interviewed a journalist during research stated that their main challenge was a shortage of skilled in covering post-election violence. Violence was covered as if it were a regular news story, with the conflict's actors openly mentioned. The researchers discovered that almost all journalists agreed that conflict news should be covered sensitively, particularly when ethnic communities are involved. However, according to Karume (2012), the media was heavily criticized during the contentious 2007 election. The IREC report, in particular, chastised the media for its biased coverage and its role in airing inflammation and politically biased broadcasts. The government was chastised for its lack of a strong institutional framework for media policy.

5.9. Internal Peacebuilding Mission

Kenya has long been recognized as one of the African continent's safe havens, and when a conflict of this amplitude broke out, the having a negative effect and were felt across the continent, attracting the international attention (Ogola, 2008). The conflict needed to be resolved as soon as possible to avoid escalation to the level of genocide experienced in Rwanda in 1994. (Ogola,2008).

According to Rupesinghe (1995:65), due to the breadth of protracted societal conflicts, a knowledge of non-linear peacebuilding processes must be complemented the logical and scientific approach to conflict resolution or change. The Kenyan parliament decided in 2008 to remove the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) with a new electoral management structure, in response to the Independent Review Committee's (IREC) report and in accordance with public sentiment. By adjusting sections 41 and 41A of the former constitution, the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) was established in May 2009 (Karume, 2012).

The government established a commission to investigate the authenticity of the election results in response to the Kenyan conflict and the stabilization of the situation; the commission concluded that serious irregularities occurred in voting and counting in both opposition and progovernment strongholds, as well as in the ECK's tallying of results. The election results' legitimacy was threatened as a result of these anomalies. In 2008, a Kenyan-international panel tasked with evaluating the elections declared that the results were "irreversibly polluted." The election results, particularly those of the presidential elections, look to be skewed, according to the commission.

According to Article 88 of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, the IEBC is assigned to undertake elections and referendums and referendums to any elective body or desk established by the constitution, as well as any other elections prescribed by an act of parliament. The IEBC has also wanted to enhance its capacities for young people's engagement and to develop conflict mediation programs centered on young people across the country (Motsamai and Hawa, 2015).

5.10. External Mediators

Rupesinghe's (1996:167) multi-sectoral strategy also emphasizes the significance of enlarging the number of participants participating in the peaceful resolution of a problem to include all members of society. In other phrases, there should be the formation of engaged, visible, and diverse electorates linked to political elites on all sides as well as external peacemakers. For a variety of reasons, this is a critical juncture in the narrative of Kenyan ethnic violence. After previously serving with UNDP in Zambia (as RC), Mozambique, and Uganda, RC Aeneas Chuma was deployed in 2008, where he gained practical experience in fragile transformation contexts (Einsiedel, Salih, Kaye, MacClinchy, and Galtieri, 2018).

Chuma produced it his prime objective to place the UN as a vendor of appropriate support to the expansion and institutionalization of a nascent national infrastructure for peace, restoring public trust in state institutions, and leveraging the political landscape created by the national government's reform alignment and the productive relationships he was successful in establishing with the parties shortly after his arrival (Einsiedel et al., 2018).

Furthermore, Chuma's overall strategy was to provide technological and formats to public agencies in Nairobi entrusted with progressing peace and unity in the country, while creating political vacuum and securing a formalized role for civil society in national prevention programs on the one hand. First, the RC convened a diversified group of stakeholders for conversations aimed at enhancing Kenya's capacity building and institutions for peace processes, which were then incorporated into a larger system architecture that included a systematic and consistent peace facilities (Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles, 2010).

Second, the RC helped the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management expand its network of local peace committees by providing technical support, direction, and finance. This help also contributed to the unification of Kenya's disparate early warning projects into a single endeavor (Chuma and Ojielo, 2012). Third, the RC developed an inclusive, highly participatory conflict analysis approach, bringing the government, partners, and the UN together in a coordinated effort while impacting policy and program choices.

In 2008, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and British Foreign Secretary David Miliband merged the African Union in demanding an end to ethnic violence and a negotiated solution that prioritizes Kenya's democratic aspirations. The Kofi Annan-led peaceful resolution proposed a reform plan aimed at tackling the root causes of the post-election conflict.

The emphasis is on enshrined in the constitution, electioneering, and land reform, as well as increasing accountability for the country's rampant corruption and violence. On August 4, 2010, a referendum adopted a new constitution. Kenya's coalition government believed it had implemented enough changes by 2013 to prevent a return of violence. However, many Kenyans believed that previous reforms had failed. Long and Kanyinga (2012)

The fighting ended in February when the two parties agreed to make a coalition as a result of global mediation. Candidate President Kibaki kept his position, while Odinga was appointed to a newly

established prime minister role, according to the provisions of the agreement. To address the crisis's core causes, the parties also agreed to adopt a series of constitutional, electoral, and land changes (Kanyinga and Long, 2012)

5.11. Conclusions

Kenyans from all walks of life were part in the post-election violence that erupted as a result of electoral irregularities in 2007. Despite Kibaki's election promise of job creation in 2002, it engaged young people who had limited work possibilities. After being barred from protesting peacefully in public, many young people reacted violently when the questionable Kibaki victory was announced. However, even if Odinga had been elected president, it is simple to argue that little would have changed unless the Kenyan constitution was altered to make executive powers more accountable through a balanced design.

A key underlying cause of both of these forms of structural violence was the misuse of executive power (e.g., jobs and land distribution) as a result of a weak federal constitution. In the absence of a constitutional amendment, potential programmatic ways to reduce violence in Kenya include youth employment skill training and microloan programs, peacebuilding education through women's groups, churches, and schools, and legal and information services to aid in the resolution of territorial conflicts.

By implementing all peacekeeping efforts, elections in Kenya could be restructured into becoming inclusionary, credible, and peaceful mechanisms that can lead to improved governance throughout the country. The structures in place to allow civil society, the IEBC, political parties, the office of the registration of political parties, and other voter interested parties to work collaboratively in monitoring elections have done well in terms of rebuilding Kenya's integrity and ceasefire agreement.

CHAPTER VI

FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1. Introduction

The study looked into ethnicity as a cause of electoral violence in Kenya. It has researched nations with ethnic diversity that are more vulnerable to election violence in order to suppress ethnic groups in attempt to dominate the political space, specifically Kenya. Central to this research and the literature review, methodology, data interpretation, and analysis provided in the previous four chapters is a discussion of how election violence outcomes from 1992 to 2008 shaped people's experiences and living conditions, resulting in the brutal killings of innocent civilians, and how this electoral violence shaped the current political dynamics in Kenya.

Kenya's ethnic divides are mainly the result of a historical past of ethnic biasness by successive Kenyan leaders. The first President, Jomo Kenyatta, is generally believed to have preferred his own ethnic community, the Kikuyu, in a number of ways. Following independence, Kenyatta hired many trustable members of his own Kikuyu ethnic group to high-ranking positions in the Cabinet and other government entities, particularly some from his home area of Kiambu in the Central Province. Furthermore, the land redistribution scheme, implemented soon after independence, was perceived to benefit Kikuyus disparately.

Because Kikuyus were good off than most ethnic groups at the dawn of independence, they were allowed to profit from selling of high productivity land purchased from leaving white settlers by the government and then sold back on a "willing-buyer, willing-seller" grounds. Furthermore, it is widely assumed that Kenyatta distributed prime plots of land and numerous business tenders to co-ethnic followers. Another factor is a history of story driven violence associated with elections, which both reflects and exacerbates ethnic divisions. Significant ethnic violence has occurred in three election rounds in the multi-party era since 1991.

Ethnic conflicts are receiving more attention. Little attention has been paid to trend analysis of these conflicts in order to follow up on the processes by which this electoral violence grow and the types of interventions that can be used to prevent escalation, though it could be argued that each conflict has its own unique characteristics. Kenya's everlasting ethnic violence is commonly explained in terms of ethnic mobilization from on high, with little consideration given to ordinary

involving citizens. Violence may exacerbate conflict management by alienating voters along conflict lines and, in the worst-case scenario, leading to fresh outbreaks of violence. This chapter will look at the study's findings, recommendations, key point summary, and conclusion.

6.2. Findings

6.2.1. Findings Relating to Research Questions

One of the research questions seeks to discover the motivations and outcomes of election violence in Kenya against ethnic social entities, primarily from 1992 to 2008. According to the study findings, with the exception of current ethnicity as a cause of violence even historical ethnic, economic, and institutional divides also play a significant role in ramping up electoral violence in Kenya. Yego (2015), on the other hand, argues that socioeconomic inequality and political marginalization are to blame for Kenya's electoral violence. Party officials have also been accused of using ethnic differences to gain an advantage. It's worth emphasizing that Kenyan elections have always been peaceful when previous ethnic divides have been forgotten and all residents have united as one country.

The research found that, unlike previous times of election-related violence in Kenya, much of it occurred after, rather than before, elections. Another aspect of the violence is that in 2007-2008, the post-election violence was more widespread than in previous years. It hit both urban and rural areas of the country, but two provinces were impacted. Election-related violence was formerly confined in a smaller number of districts, mostly in the Rift Valley, Western, and Coast Provinces.

6.2.2. Findings on Ethnic Groups and Electoral Violence

Kenya is rich in diversity range of ethnicities. The Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo, and Kamba make up the majority of the population, accounting for 66 percent of the total. The research found out that Kenyan voters' behavior has largely remained coherent in previous elections. Ethnic allegiance has been the most powerful motivator at the voter polls, regardless of where they live. The finding indicated that peaceful elections could lead to meaningful economic and social development; thus, It is necessary to prevent electoral violence through increasing public understanding of the importance of peaceful elections and its economic consequences.

According to one of the violence reports, since 1992, Kenya's powerful governing party officials have fostered multiple incidences of so-called ethnic violence (Human Rights Watch, 2002). In the run-up to the 1997 general elections, another report detailed the role of ruling party leaders in violent ethnic violence on Kenya's coast. This report detailed the role of the involvement of ruling-party leaders in instigating earlier occurrences of politically motivated ethnic violence. This confirms that political leaders were the main cause of electoral violence in Kenya before it came down to ordinary citizens.

Some of the findings include that while the violence appeared to be sudden mass riots at first, it soon became clear that Kibaki's ethnic group, the Kikuyu, was being intended to target. Kikuyus residing in racially diverse areas had their homes and businesses destroyed. Many people fled their homes in search of safety in police stations and other government buildings. The brutality of the clashes was broadcast to the rest of the world. Kikuyus fleeing for their lives made their way to the Central Province, where the ethnic group is concentrated. Gangs actually pulled from their cars at stumbling blocks set up along major highways, beating and massacring those who had the wrong identity. As Kikuyu militias sought to quell the violent behavior and exact revenge, retaliatory killings began (Horowitz, 2013)

Another significant finding was that the ethnic violence was motivated more by politics than by culture. According to one of the interviewees in Jenkins' (2012) study, it was not unusual for opposition supporters to be bullied to the point of violence. People wearing t-shirts supporting the "wrong" party were frequently attacked and, in some cases, killed during the campaigns.

Furthermore, the research found that some of those who participated in the violence were compensated, and many more were moved across the nation to fight. But this does not imply that all violence was orchestrated by the ruling class. The danger of, and use of, violence in campaigns, for example, frequently functioned autonomously of elite path. Notably, in many places, the violence sparked by the presidential declaration it seems to have been far extra impulsive in nature.

Additionally, study discovered that following the increase in post-election violence, a succession of events occurred. Protests erupted in response to the notion that electoral vote counts had been tampered with and falsified. Following that, the general people demanded justice to correct vote counts. In addition to protests, governmental security personnel fought protesters by implementing

institutional violence and dispersing them, with the help of the opposition. Finally, politicians and corporate leaders fostered violence by forming criminal organizations to protest election results.

6.2.3. Findings on Mediation Process and Media Coverage

The findings affirm that the ease with which the mediators brought some stability to Kenyan regions, despite ethnic groups splitting apart but violence ceasing. Kenya's electoral legislative framework appears to have been significantly influenced by power-sharing. As a result of the improved legislative framework, elections have become more institutionalized, and both rivals have agreed to collaborate. Elections were more probable to monitor and control rival leaders' and parties' interactions in a way that reinforced the democratic transition.

In terms of mediation, Annan and other members of the mediational team claimed that the successful mediation reflected the triumph of a new global practice known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which requires the international community to safeguard governments from collapse. Despite the fact that his intervention appears to have come at a critical juncture in the negotiations, the parties had made sufficient progress to reach agreement on remaining issues. Annan's successful mediation was also not the outcome of cognizance of R2P, a principle that the international community has failed to put into practice in far more prolonged and controversial internal conflicts.

The research found that the media received harsh criticism during the contested Kenyan electoral violence. It is in the research findings that the media was lambasted for its negative coverage and its role in producing inflammation and politically biased broadcasts. The government was chastised for its lack of a strong legal and institutional framework for media regulation. To strengthen these frameworks, new legislation, and amendments to existing legislation have been enacted.

Another finding is that Kenyans have a strained relationship with social media. They see two kinds of high energy: those who support the opposition and those who support the jubilee coalition. As a result, there is a great deal of hate speech that the government has little control over. Much of the problem stems from the use of fake names. It also begs another question of whether the government employs people to spread social media propaganda.

Moreover, according to the University of Pennsylvania's social media and Post-Election Crisis in Kenya 2008 report, the election was the first time Kenyans felt the strength of blogs and social networking channels to voice their views and constructive criticism of national leadership (Trujillo, Elam, Shapiro, & Clayton, 2014). The reading comprehension and share those points of view quickly and easily was crucial. Indeed, Kenyan blog posts played a significant role in offering information during the five-day broadcast media ban that began on December 30th. Because of the lack of radio and television news, many Kenyans turned to alternative methods of gathering and relaying information.

Kenya's power-sharing arrangement had a quick beneficial impact on post-election violence after mediation process was resolved, but it did little to create incentives for ruling classes to confront the deeper causes of unrest. The adoption of a new constitution in 2010 was a shining light on the reform agenda. However, whether or not this performance can be attributed to power-sharing organizations is debatable. Kenyan political leaders had personal rewards to collaborate in the creation of the new constitution, and conflict, rather than cooperation, has been the more normal progression between coalition partners.

Furthermore, there has been little or no advancement in other critical areas, such as land reform, bringing those held to account for election violence to court hearing, or changing the zero-sum essence of electoral competition. Private interests may have also influenced the key negotiations on the reform's content. For Odinga, the 2007 election proved that he was a viable presidential candidate, and his determination to compete this position in 2012 may have led him to surrender his assertion on parliamentary government (Kramon & Posner, 2011).

6.3. Recommendations

6.3.1. Recommendation to the Government

According to the research, the post-election violence demonstrated that Kenya is an ethnically divided nation, and the government, in collaboration with stakeholders, still has a lot of work to do to bridge those gaps. As a result, the study recommends that, in addition to addressing past wrongs, improvements in ethnic relations be made before any conciliatory attempts can be successful. As a result, ethnic diversity should be valued if it is well managed in order to foster interdependence and a sense of purpose in Kenya.

One of the most important recommendations that the government should make in order to prevent future electoral violence is to conduct local dialogue that can effectively minimize conflicts between communal groups and increase preconceptions of security. Local peace agreements are more likely to be effective in this case if they are fostered by reliable and authentic mediators. They must also include specific implementation and enforcement requirements.

The research recommend that the government should be responsible for educating the community on the main causes of conflicts, and also conflict resolution skills and how to bring about peace at all levels. For example, at the local community school level, as well as at the national and international levels. Furthermore, leaders must make the first move to organize meetings and workshops to educate the general public, and especially opinion leaders, about the importance of inter-ethnic harmonious relationship, peaceful coexistence, and promoting a viable nationhood.

Waki, McFadyen, and Kambale (2008) recommend tangible initiatives to strengthen government security agency performance and accountability, as well as improving joint operational preparedness provisions, implementing rigorous operational review mechanisms, merging the two police agencies, and establishing an Independent Police Complaints Authority under the state security component. They also advocate for the creation of a special tribunal with the power to imprison anybody accused of crimes committed as a result of post-election unrest. The international character of the tribunal will be enhanced by the inclusion of non-Kenyans on the senior investigation and prosecution teams.

The need to improve the integration of protection issues in international humanitarian, as well as the positive experience of cash-based early recovery programs, highlight the importance of quick, timely, flexible, long-term, and dependable funding.

For Kenya to recapture its economic system and integrity, Kenyan political leaders must be empowered to honour their agreements and take action to safeguard the lives and dignity of all Kenyans, and the African Union, the European Union, and many others must also promote the Kenyan government to change the difficult problems of corrupt practices, land reform, and devolution of power. Furthermore, the Kenyan government should enact the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, conduct constitutional reform, and reconstruct the justice system in

order to ensure equal justice for all, particularly the victims of the worst types of violence following the election.

Kenya must make commitment to integrate detailed electoral reform in order to make sure prospective free and fair elections; and unlock the doors for international aid and long-term financial support to Kenyan civil society and religious leaders in intended to facilitate them in rebuilding peace among Kenyans. For Kenya to be free of tribal politics and all that it involves, it must take necessary measures to preserve peace from "sparking, ramping up, and relapsing," which include organizations and processes of negotiation, intervention, forgiveness, and reconciliation (Murithi, 2009). Future research should consider favorable peace concepts, such as peace that seeks to promote reunification and cooperation relying on human rights and social, economic, and governmental justice. Going the specific path guarantees a moral responsibility to promote a genuine peace operations process.

6.3.2. Recommendation for Future Studies

- Issues about election security in Kenya have expanded in recent years. Consequently, it will be critical to conduct research into how insecurity may have influenced election results or the outcome of elections in Kenya. This is significant because the study's findings and analysis will be used by the Kenyan government to solidify election security and protect voters' rights. Kenya must hold elections while also establishing peace.
- Electoral violence is a recurring problem in countries all over the world, threatening political, diplomatic, and economic interests. As a result, in order to recommend future scholars, the study must investigate the mitigation of electoral violence in Kenya and the application of corporate strategy contribution by the government. This recommended study will allow Kenya to combine development assistance with intermediaries to understand actors' motivating factors and methods, deter people from committing violence, and incentivize them to participate peacefully, thereby mitigating the risks of violence.
- Election violence happens in a variety of forms and intensities in not all conflict nations. As a result, every act of violence must have a means of ending it through conflict resolution. As a result, the recommended study for future scholars can be titled The Influence of

Electoral Violence on Conflict Resolution and Democracy in Kenya. The election system's architecture might have a role in promoting violent situations.

- For researchers to better understand Kenyan violence, it is critical that they conduct a study that focuses on tracing the underlying foundations of ethnic violence in Kenya. The researcher will be able to look further into what has gone wrong since the postcolonial era, as well as examine various stages of conflict from the past to the present, in this study.

6.4. Conclusion of the Thesis

The research concludes that there is a connection in both ethnicity and electoral conflict in Kenya. Ethnicity is a somewhat ambiguous term. Identity has emerged as a prominent independent variable as a result of understanding the word ethnicity. It is an 'organization' from which socialization processes produce ideological asymmetry, which is subsequently legitimized by in-group connection, with the purview differing solely between high and low status, explaining the justification of social dominance and other similar inter-group theories.

Given its violent past, historic wrongs, social justice issues, and the irregular nature of hegemonic in the electoral system, Kenya should actively seek peace and stability first, and everything else will eventually follow. For good citizenship, knowledge alone is insufficient; it must be merged with behaviors that encourage justice, lasting peace, and the unavoidable concept of interconnectedness between various ethnic groups. It should be an education that teaches recipients analytical reasoning, informed decision-making, and the development of mutually personally liable and respectful social ties. This sort of education should inspire learners to become individually and communally active in the achievement of the aforementioned public education principles.

In every particular situation, the success of power-sharing agreements is primarily influenced by the alliance itself, the quantity and quality of negotiators' participation, regional and global dynamics, and the interests of the parties to the transaction. Future studies aiming to explain for various variations in electoral violence and its repercussions will need to look for explanations in both structures and techniques. For both opposition organizations and government actors, research can focus on the systemic elements that affect the costs of employing violence in conjunction with elections. The strategies and responses of political parties, police, the military, and the international

community may also be used to describe the influence of violence on election processes and conflict resolution. Furthermore, in order to completely explain electoral violence in a specific nation, we must look at regional variances in violence within that country in order to better understand the local dynamics at play.

Tribalism has long took the throne in Kenya, and the time has arrived for Kenyans, including their leaders, to consciously decide to put an end to it. The 2007 post-election violence, which killed and displaced many people, was a prime example of this. Obama traveled on to give advice Kenyans to avoid tribalism and ethnicity in favor of rebuilding the country based on three strong and critical pillars: "fair and transparent democratic governance, widespread economic growth, and a strong sense of national pride that rejects conflict in favor of a future of peace and reconciliation" (Kimani, 2018). He emphasized the importance of Kenyans building their nation in a common bond, united, and not enabling anyone to split them along ethnic-religious and political lines.

In terms of state security agencies' actions, they failed to forecast, plan for, and limit the violence on a systematic level. Individual personnel of the state security agencies were regularly involved in violent crimes and major social justice breaches. The post-election violence echoed ethnic clashes in the 1990s in some aspects, and it was only one instance in a long-term pattern in Kenya of institutionalizing violence. The ease with which politicians reactivated equipped militia organizations, the bulk of which emerged as a result of ethnic conflict in the 1990s, contributed to the simplicity with which they were reactivated for the 2007 post-election violence. Second, the growing personalization of power in the presidential circle continues to be a factor in the spread of violence.

In a situation at which state has not imposed the rule of law, democratic systems have fueled violence, as societies have succumbed to undemocratic methods to "protect" their desire to influence against those whom they assumed would utilise or exclude them, politicians have decided to seek to mobilize ethnic support bases, and community terror and criminal collectivisation have made a significant contribution to an escalating violence. Elections have become a means of advancing land interests, and ethnic origins have become powerful tool in the hands of political elites. Second, elections have simply redirected the violence. When the problems are as emotionally charged as the politics of connectedness and land rights, and elections are

presented without extra organisations to support a functioning democracy, election periods become vulnerable to inter-group violence.

The common view that the presidency gives benefits to the President's ethnic group motivates communities to use violence to gain and maintain power. Imbalances and economic marginalization, often viewed ethnogeographically, were also major factors in post-election violence in areas like Nairobi's slums. Another troubling effect of this ethnic violence is that thirty-seven women told researchers they have become pregnant as a result of the attacks, and many did not have abortions, which are still illegal in most instances in Kenya. The attackers infected many others with HIV. Women claimed they were pierced with firearms, sticks, bottles, and other objects. Many were sexually assaulted in front of family and friends, including children. Some men and boys were also raped, circumcised, or tortured to death.

The 2007-08 violence may have been triggered by an election result, but it brought numerous old feelings of resentment to the surface in the Rift Valley. Because of perceived wrongs on one side or the other, land disputes, and competition for assets, the conflict quickly evolved. Experts warn that the underlying issues have not been resolved. While the events of 2007-08 were significant in the recently ended electoral process, the concerns that fueled the violence have yet to be addressed. Political expediency along ethnic lines has continued to undermine Kenyan efforts for justice.

Kenyans must recognize that there is a positional value system at work in the country's peacebuilding efforts. This is due to the fact that confrontational parties to a conflict may view the peace negotiations as a possibility to reorganize and reassemble their forces in order to continue their violent behavior. Any secondary parties to the conflict in Kenya must take an ethical stance in order to help resolve it, and external powers must avoid unethical behavior in peacebuilding settings because it impedes efforts to bring order and stability. Furthermore, negotiating team and intermediaries must take an ethical position toward the parties they have been asked to help, and Kenyans must not overlook the importance of forgiveness and reconciliation in the peace process. Kenya must consider how it can virtuously repair the mental and emotional harm that has happened on its soil among various ethnic groups.

To summarize, Kenya's political path ahead persists rutted and perilous. If the constitutional transformation is to be successful, an amount of delicate and difficult issues must be resolved.

Despite the number of detentions and prosecutions in link with the post-election violence, some commentators have expressed doubts about the objectivity of the judicial process, claiming that it has been biased against Kikuyus. The Standing Committee on Human Rights was also said to have performed research into the post-election political violence. However, because the Committee's findings have not been made public, it is impossible to assess their credibility or effectiveness as a basis for future action.



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INTERVIEWS REFERENCES

All interviews were conducted telephonically via Zoom meeting.

1. Gibson Tungo interviewed on the 22nd of April 2022.
2. Edwin Nyakoyo interviewed on the 22nd of April 2022.
3. Albert interviewed on the 26th of April 2022.
4. Daniel Mugo interviewed on the 26th of April 2022.
5. Newton Ambaisi interviewed on the 26th of April 2022.
6. Paul Toshman interviewed on the 28th of April 2022.
7. Quincy Wandera interviewed on the 28th of April 2022.
8. Kelly Kibeu interviewed on the 28th of April 2022.
9. Godfrey interviewed on the 28th of April 2022.
10. Kisalu Musembi interviewed on the 28th of April 2022.
11. Joe Onkeo interviewed on the 30th of April 2022.
12. Stancilus Kipkembu interviewed on the 30th of April 2022.
13. Justice King interviewed on the 1st of May 2022.
14. Denis Murale interviewed on the 1st of May 2022.
15. Marion Taita interviewed on the 2nd of May 2022.
16. Eric Mimbi interviewed on the 3rd of May 2022.
17. Sam Ngole interviewed on the 4th of May 2022.
18. Salim Akudo interviewed on the 4th of May 2022.
19. Daniel Rerimoi interviewed on the 4th of May 2022.
20. Nelson Etyang interviewed on the 6th of May 2022.

APPENDIX A: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH KENYAN NATIONALS

1. The influence of ethnicity in Kenyan elections

- 1.1. What role does ethnicity play during elections in Kenya?
- 1.2. Would you say ethnicity influence voter participation in Kenya during elections?
- 1.3. How has ethnic election violence affected you and Kenya as a whole?
- 1.4. Are ethnic groups in Kenya marked by hatred because some ethnic groups gain more than others in Kenyan elections and politics?
- 1.5. In the future would you say Kenya's politics would not be interconnected with ethnicity?

2. Causes of Election Violence

- 2.1. What drives election violence in Kenya?
- 2.2. What led to the ethnic strife during Kenya elections of 1992, 2007 and 2008 and the post-election violence?
- 2.3. Have you experienced election violence firsthand and how has it affected you?
- 2.4. In August 2022, Kenya is heading towards its general elections, do you think history might repeat itself in terms of election violence or things have improved over the years?
- 2.5. If you were in position to do anything different to prevent election violence, what would you do?

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A: Education

Bachelor of Art in Politics and International Relations
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Social Sciences Graduate Student Congress Istanbul, 29-30 May 2021 titles “Ethnicity as the cause of Election Violence (1992-2008)”. Unpublished