


THE QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY

Examining Civil-Military Relations
in Muslim Societies



EDITED BY
SAMI A. AL-ARIAN

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The Quest for Democracy: Examining Civil-Military Relations in Muslim Societies

Edited by Sami A. Al-Arian

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On one hand, the nature of the security, military, and political challenges that the Egyptian military has been facing since the 2013 coup, leads them to think about these phases and steps; also, the negative repercussions of these challenges, primarily on the military's mental image as well as on the degree of political and economic stability in Egypt, of which indicators are declining as many international reports show.

On the other hand, the civil currents have realized their inability to radically eliminate the domination of the military establishment, while at the same time they have had to maintain their interest in keeping this institution stable in light of the collapses experienced by most Arab military institutions since 1991.

Finally, the current regional and international transformations, many of which are away from the control of civilian and military elites; however, they require the elites to deal with these transformations effectively, otherwise the movement of the angry masses and the waves of successive uprisings will be a factor of fundamental change that will affect not only the stability of these elites, but also their survival and continuity.

6. Challenges of the Post-2011 Civilian Control of Egyptian Military

*Arbi Boumediene**

Abstract

In countries where democracy is still in crisis, a wider debate about civil-military relations and interactions has emerged. The Egyptian experience, in this context, is crucial when examining the political role of the military and civil-military relations. After the 2011 Arab Spring, the issue raised serious academic debates, especially due to the interference of the army in politics, and its unprecedented concentration of power, whether through its alignment with the masses or in undermining the democratization process in 2013. Accordingly, this paper addresses the realities of civil-military relations and the challenges of civilian control of the military in Egypt. It starts with a literature review of democratic civil control with a special focus on the Egyptian experience. The paper also will re-examine the factors and motives of the military's involvement in politics, as well as the challenges of institutionalizing civilian control and consolidating an emerging democratic system. However, the paper cautions that successfully achieving civilian control over the military in Egypt remains a long and complex process that may last for many years.

Introduction

In light of the global decline of the number of military coups, research on civil-military relations has tended to focus on fields that continue to be dominated by militaries and the tutelage they still wield. Such tutelage continues to undermine democratic institutions and many times leads to

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grave flaws in several “third wave” democracies, often without the military itself posing a direct threat to the political process or undertaking a coup against elected governments. In the past few years, questions have resurfaced due to increased military competition and flagrant military interventions in politics in the aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring. Studies have emphasized the military’s role in sustaining dictators facing pro-democracy uprisings.

Since 2011, the nature of civil-military relations in Egypt were the focus of several academic discussions, especially following the army’s heavy-handed intervention in the political process, and its unprecedented concentration of power with the rise of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). SCAF had effectively surpassed the power of the presidency when it forced then-President Hosni Mubarak to resign. SCAF also ousted the democratically-elected President Mohamed Morsi in the midst of his presidential term, two years following the 2011 uprising that had ousted Mubarak. During Morsi’s term, hope abounded that civilian control over the military could be established after the revolutionary uprising. However, the army soon put an end to the democratic process and the nascent democratic hopes quickly evaporated. In this context, many academics draw a connection between civilian control over the military and achieving democratic transformation. This study examines the fields of civil-military competition to clarify indicators of the civilian control’s weaknesses and challenges in Egypt by answering the following question: How can we explain the failure of achieving civilian control over the military in Egypt?

This study aims to cover this question on the following two assumptions:

- (a) A lack of confidence in civil-military relations is considered a key factor in the failure of achieving civilian control and democratization.
- (b) The imbalance of power in civil-military relations in favor of the military at the expense of the civilian forces is an essential impediment to civilian control and democratization.

I. Civilian Control over the Armed Forces

The academic debate on civil-military relations is relatively novel. Pioneering works on this topic like Samuel P. Huntington’s “The Soldier and the State” (1957)¹ and Morris Janowitz’s “The Professional Soldier” (1960)² remain bounded by the Western context, despite their explanatory value in understanding and analyzing civil-military relations. The Western framework is thus inadequate to analyze non-Western contexts where the concept of civilian control is completely absent. Unlike democratic states where armies’ duties are restricted to protection against external threats and defending the country against external aggression, armies in less democratic states are highly involved in maintaining internal stability as well, which makes it harder to enable and achieve civilian control there. Janowitz himself points to this fact when referring to the armies’ interference in the politics of non-Western states as a fundamental standard and rule; consequently, the stable civilian control over the military in such states is an exception that merits a separate study.³

Huntington’s distinguished work in “The Soldier and the State” has laid the foundation for a theory of civil-military relations through his coined concept of “military professionalism.” This concept proposes that a military institution should be separated from political institutions, both materially and ideologically, and subject to civilian control. Nevertheless, a debate has ensued among researchers on how to achieve this kind of

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

² Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier, A Social and Political Portrait*, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960).

³ Ahmed Abd Rabou, al-Ittijihāt al-Ḥadītha fī Dirasat al-Dawr al-Siāsī li-l Juyūsh [Modern Direction in the Study of Armies’ Political Role], in Hamdi Abd al-Raḥmān et al, *al-Juyūsh wa-l Taḥawul al-Dimuqrāṭī fī Ifrīqiyyā: Mu’awwiqāt Binā’ al-Dawla al-Waṭaniyya* [Armies and Democratic Transformation in Africa: Obstacles of Building the Nation-State], (Doha, Qatar: Muntadā al-‘Ilaqāt al-‘Arabiyya wa-l Dawliyya, 2015), p.20.

civilian control, with Huntington recommending a form of “objective control” whereby the army is autonomous with no interference from civilians to protect its own professionalism and to deter against military intervention in politics. On the other hand, Janowitz recommends a form of “subjective control” that integrates the army in civil life (civilianizing the military institution) as a mechanism to prevent the possibility of military interventions.

It is important to point out that Huntington’s classic work, like many works on civil-military relations, derives its theoretical and analytical frameworks from the traditions and experiences of Western democracies where civil and military spheres are already separated. Analyzing the same process in the developing world, especially after decolonization and the establishment of the nation-state, requires grappling with the deep intertwinement of those civil and military spheres, most importantly due to the historical role of the military and its unique social position as the people’s liberator from colonialism. As such, the intervention of the army in politics has become a unique and fundamental characteristic for the political regimes in developing countries, especially Arab regimes.

Ahmed Abd Rabou, an Egyptian political scientist, contends that “civilian control in the context of civil-military relations is an ongoing process whereby civil authorities aim to strengthen its grip and supervision over the military institutions even in independent democracies. It tries to achieve this goal through specifying their roles, duties and budgets.”⁴ The emergence of civilian control, according to Harold Trinkunas, happens when civilian leaders can practice oversight of the armed forces. Trinkunas argues that democratization rests on the

⁴Ahmed Abd Rabou, *al-Ittijihāt al-Ḥadītha fī Dirasat al-Dawr al-Siāsī li-l Juyūsh*, p.23.

extent to which civilian control is institutionalized within the structure of the state.⁵

Democratic civilian control does not just signify the absence of military coups; it is much wider and more comprehensive, as it also encompasses the armed forces’ docility to the civilian government’s authority. This is achieved in the Western context through formulating and implementing decrees organizing the military, determining its duties, and calibrating its roles through civilian authorities—not military commanders. Determining the extent of civilian control depends on the extent to which the military abstains from interfering in public policymaking in any form. According to Harold Trinkunas, strong democratic civilian control has two essential features: Civilian authorities’ institutional oversight of military activities and the armed forces’ professionalism and obedience vis-à-vis civilian authority, along with the armed forces’ political neutrality, which is an essential condition and value to realize that professionalism.⁶

According to Abd Rabou, the deepening of civilian control should take place on three levels: (1) diminishing the spheres where the armed forces continue to dominate the state’s policymaking; (2) regulating the extent of the military’s involvement in economic activities—a predominant model in developing and less democratic states—as a military that controls the state’s economy and operates beyond the oversight of civilian authorities is much harder to control by civilians; and (3) separating military institutions from internal security agencies, given that a blurring of the line between both complicates civilian control. Various experiences around the world have shown that military involvement in public policymaking processes weakens its very own readiness and

⁵ Harold A. Trinkunas, *Ensuring Democratic Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in Asia*, East-West Center Occasional Papers: *Politics and Security Series*, Numéro 1, October 1999, pp.3-4

⁶ *Ibid*, p.5.

military effectiveness, politicizes it as an institution, and leads to political instability.⁷

This study analyzes civil-military relations in Egypt through the models put forth by Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, who have argued that exercising civilian control revolves around five core spheres in the decision-making process: Elite recruitment, public policymaking, military organization, internal security, and external defense.




Figure 1: Factors and Strategies of Civilian Control⁸

⁷Ahmed Abd Rabou, *al-Ittijihāt al-Ḥadītha fī Dirasat al-Dawr al-Siāsī li-l Juyūsh*, pp. 24-25.

⁸ Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, "Civilian Control of the Military and Democracy: Conceptual and Theoretical Perspectives," in: Paul Chambers and

II. Challenges of Civilian Control over the Military in Egypt after 2011

The inclination of Egypt's military to intervene appears when it senses dangers. It has found chances to intervene in times of societal crisis and, eventually, in the presence of a political power vacuum. In turn, three sorts of variables have been at play in those interventions: Military variables rooted in the army itself, internal variables, and external variables.⁹ We will attempt to examine the fundamentals of military intervention in Egypt by referring to the holistic variables delineated in figure 2. We will then try to deconstruct each variable into several elements to answer our question: Why did the Egyptian army intervene after 2011? This will be essential to decipher Egypt's failed democratization and transition to civilian control.




Figure 2: Analysis of Post-2011 Military Intervention in Egypt

Aurel Croissant, eds., *Democracy under Stress: Civil-Military Relations in South and Southeast Asia*, (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), 2010, p42.

⁹ There is a differentiation in this context between the Egyptian army's so-called national role and political role. Consequently, what happened in 2011, according to the army, is part of its national role.

1. *The Military and Collective Memory*

Egypt's army had been enjoying wide popular support since the military's 1952 revolution, and had witnessed an increase in this support after the reforms introduced by Gamal Abdel Nasser. The military institution enjoys immense respect and appreciation in Egyptian society given its recent history, which witnessed several wars between Egypt and Israel that cast the army as a security guarantor and a source of pride, confidence, and esteem.¹⁰ The upbringing in national education has entrenched this positive image of the military institution in social imagination. I myself witnessed this phenomenon in Egyptian universities, where students undergo a one-time, short military training under the university's supervision¹¹, attend patriotic lectures delivered by military officers, and stand in military queues to instill discipline. This positive view of the military induced protestors against the Mubarak regime to call on the military directly for intervention, given its image as a "protector." This image was most evident when protestors distributed flowers to soldiers and climbed tanks to take photos with army personnel in Egyptian streets, adding to the infamous slogan "the army and people are one hand"—though the slogan later changed to "the army and police are one hand" when both were involved in suppressing protests in November and December 2011. Nevertheless, the military continued to enjoy its prestigious position among Egyptians.¹²

¹⁰ An indicator for the respect enjoyed by the army is the term "Tent's Column" used to refer to the military institution.

¹¹ It is a tradition in Egyptian Universities, according to a non-partisan Egyptian university professor who refused to disclose his identity. (Cairo, February, 2018)

¹² According to an Interview with Egyptian youth that participated in the Tahrir square events during my visit to Cairo, in February, 2018.

2. *Post-Revolution Repercussions: New Elites and Political Polarization*

The increasingly severe disagreement between liberal parties and youth movements on the one hand, and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), in alliance with Islamist parties, on the other hand, hindered the process of consolidating civilian control over the armed forces. This situation led to the emergence of a zero-sum game that allowed the army to overthrow President Mohamed Morsi and assume power after angry secular forces were successfully lured against the MB due to the latter's exclusion of secularists from power and its failure to create a national consensus. Later, the army was to override its alliance with the secularists, after successfully undermining the MB's power and establishing control over the political process.¹³ The disagreements between those two camps was no doubt an aspect of a transitional period, and a spark for engineering the post-revolutionary path. The constitutional referendum proposed by SCAF on March 19, 2011, and approved by all Islamists, had allowed the gulf between the two camps to severely surface. This was obvious during the Friday protests organized by the liberal camp to propagate its own demands, beginning May 27 of that year and termed the "Friday of Path Correction" and the "Second Friday of Rage."¹⁴

The parliamentary elections of November 28, 2011, was a key point of contention that eventually caused disagreements within the Islamist camp itself. The MB-backed Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) stood in alliance with a few liberal parties like Al-Wafd—which withdrew just before elections; whereas the Salafist Al-Nūr Party (NP) worked to build an alliance among all Salafist groups. The conflict ensued after Morsi was elected president. This time, the drafting of the constitution took center stage. On November 19, 2012, liberals and Copts withdrew from the

¹³ Hani Sulyman, *al-'Ilaqāt al-Madaniyya al-'Askariyya wa-l Tahawwul al-Dīmuqrāṭī fī Misr ba'd Thawrat 25 Yanāyir* [Civil-Military Relations and the Democratic Transformation in Egypt after the January 25th Revolution], (Doha, Qatar: al-Markaz al-'Arabī li-l Abhāth wa Dirasāt al-Siyāsa, 2015), p.83.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, pp.63-65.

constitution-drafting committee. Liberals and revolutionaries saw the engineered draft as falling short of realizing their aspirations, and being unfair to the thousands of protestors who gathered on December 4, 2012, in front of the presidential palace to ask for a new constitution and to cancel its upcoming referendum. Forces opposing the MB managed to benefit from pulling the army to their side by openly calling for a military coup to change the power dynamic.

Emphasizing common interests and conciliatory issues is a key step in a democratic transformation. The lack of agreement between civil political leaders eventually hastened the military's intervention and aborted the democratization process. In Chile, with the alliance of leftist and centrist political parties for democracy in 1988, it was the alliance between elites and the agreement on a set of rules for the political game that made strengthening democratic rule possible—getting rid of authoritarian legacy and the military rule of Pinochet by 1990.¹⁵

3. *The Internal Environment and Security Problematic*

As the revolution erupted, Egypt witnessed a state of insecurity due to the withdrawal of police personnel on January 28, 2011, concurrent with the break-out of a large number of prisoners that led to the emergence of bullying and intimidation (or “baltaga”¹⁶) and organized crime. After Mubarak's overthrow and the start of a transition period, SCAF used security as a justificatory pretense for holding onto power while restoring stability and security. This also led to people looking up to the armed forces as a “savior.” The complicated security issue under Morsi led to

¹⁵ Shayma' Ḥaṭab, Muḥaddidāt Masār al-Taḥawwul al-Dīmuqrāṭī fi Miṣr [Determinants of Democratic Transformation's Path in Egypt], in: Mahmoud Abd al-Faḍīl (Introduction), *al-Thawra al-Miṣriyya: al-Dawafi' wa-l Ittijāhāt wa-l Taḥaddiyāt* [Egyptian Revolution: Motives, Trends and Challenges], (Doha, Qatar: al-Markaz al-'Arabī li-l Abḥāth wa Dirasāt al-Siyāsa, 2012), p.478.

¹⁶ *Balṭaga* is a term common during the Egyptian Revolution and refers to individuals and groups that vandalize property and spread violence.

calling upon the army—once again—to assume control. A study titled “Managing the Security and Judicial File” has shown that this situation was exploited to prepare for the SCAF to execute the military coup and propell the counter-revolution. The study also refers to political polarization, which pushed several forces opposing Morsi to focus on the lack of safety and security; thus, they organized protests that usually resulted in actions like arson that fomented chaos. The formation of the so-called “black block” forces—which emerged on January 24, 2013, just before the second anniversary of the revolution—was one of those tools, according to the aforementioned study, whereby members of the group hid their faces to conceal their identities.¹⁷ The insecurity issue thus strengthened the army's position vis-à-vis the civil leaders who failed to provide security to its citizens and their properties.

4. *The Military's Political Economy: Swelling Economic Interests*

Egypt's military runs its own economy, which endows it with revenue that is beyond the confines of the public treasury, the publicly declared budget, parliamentary scrutiny, or any other civilian agency for that matter. The secrecy and lack of transparency surrounding the military's economic activities induced some people to refer to it as a “black box.” As long-time Egypt scholar Robert Springborg notes, “the swelling of the army's economic interests and its grip on the country's economy make it closer to a company.”¹⁸ No one knows exactly what the military's share is in the national economy. News reports point to anything between 5% and 40%, or even more according to experts, whereas other reports refer

¹⁷ Basim Jalal al-Qasim and Muhsin Muhammad Salīḥ, *al-Adā' al-Amnī wa-l Qaḍa'ī, Silsilat Miṣr bayn 'Ahday Mursī wa-l Sisi: Dirāsa Muqrīna* [The Security and Judicial Performance, Egypt between Morsi's and el-Sisi's Eras Series: A Comparative Study], (Beirut, Lebanon: Markaz al-Zaytūna li-l Dirāsāt wa-l Istishārāt, 2016).

¹⁸ Shana Marshall and Joshua Stacher, "Egypt's Generals and Transnational Capital," *Middle East Report*, no.262, Spring 2012, p.12.

to about 40% to 60% which include military factories that produce commodities for public consumption, not just arms and ammunitions. The national organization of military production, for instance, owns 14 factories that produce medical equipment, home appliances, computers, and cars.¹⁹

SCAF assumed many crucial roles after the January 25 revolution. It seized the opportunity to restore its economic privileges, which had receded during the Mubarak era under the increasing clout of Gamal Mubarak and his close circle of businessmen. The military strived to protect its activities and gains from scrutiny through legislation. In May 2011, SCAF amended the Law of Military Judiciary by adding a new article granting military judges and courts the exclusive right to investigate inappropriate financial misconduct among military officers. Under Morsi, the MB strove to assure the armed forces that its economic activities would be protected, and the constitution drafted by the Islamist majority intensified the army's economic influence and protected it from public scrutiny.²⁰ With Sisi's takeover, the armed forces had turned from a key economic player into *the* predominant hegemonic actor by expanding their economic activities beyond all previous bounds and limits. Thus, the swelling economic interests of the military, and its fear of losing them, was proven to have been a key factor in its political

¹⁹ William C. Taylor, *al-Istijābāt al-‘Askariyya li-l Intifādāt al-‘Arabiyya wa Mustaqbal al-‘Ilāqāt al-Madaniyya al-‘Askariyya fi-l al-Sharq al-Awsat* [Military Responses to Arab Uprisings and the Future of Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East], translated to Arabic by: Usama Abbas and Amr Basyūnī, (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Rawāfid al-Thaqāfiyya Nashirūn, 2018), p.260.

²⁰ Some observers believe that a reason for ending the short-lived MB-SCAF entente was Morsi's attempt to marginalize the army in large projects like developing the Suez Canal region and the Toshka agricultural land reclamation project. For more details, see: Shana Marshall, *The Egyptian Armed Forces and the Remaking of an Economic Empire*, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), pp.16-20: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/egyptian_armed_forces.pdf

intervention, which aborted the democratic process. As such, the enlarged economic interests of the military pose a real challenge to achieving civilian control.²¹

5. External Factors

Many global experiments attest to external factors being decisive in determining and shaping democratization and, consequently, any attempt to realize civilian control over the military. But the uniqueness of Egypt's military, and Egypt's strategic location at the heart of the Middle East, have all greatly contributed to tilting the balance of power towards the army in light of strategic calculations; most vital of which are Egypt's centrality for regional security in the Middle East, U.S. military aid, and the Camp David agreement with Israel. Zoltan Barany noted that Egyptian army generals were seriously influenced by their relations with foreign countries, most notably the United States. Plenty of evidence attests to this. When the Obama administration decided to let go of Mubarak, and ceased to see him as a "strategic asset" or "treasure," Americans stressed to Egyptian generals directly "not to shoot live ammunitions at protestors."²²

The United States, likewise, supported the military in Egypt during the transition, keeping its military aid intact, worth \$1.3 billion annually. Moreover, the United States supported the MB and commended the democratization process after the MB's first electoral victory and after Morsi's electoral win. Consequently, the external factor seemed to be pushing towards a civilianization of power and enabling civilian control.

²¹ Shihata Awaḍ, *al-Dawr al-Iqtisādī li-l Jaysh al-Miṣri: al-Hisābāt wa-l Tadā‘iyāt* [The Egyptian Military's Economic Role: Calculations and Implications], (Doha, Qatar: Markaz al-Jazīra li-l Dirasāt, 20 November 2016), p.5.

²² Zoltan Barany, *Kayfa Tastajīb al-Juyūsh li-l Thawrā? wa Limādha?* [How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why], Arabic translation by: Abd al-Raḥmān Ayyash, (Beirut, Lebanon: al-Shabaka al-‘Arabiyya li-l Abḥāth wa-l Nashr, 2017), p.242.

Yet, developments soon escalated and revealed that this assumption was a fallacy, culminating in the overthrow of the MB and its expulsion from Egypt's political scene.

We also cannot overlook the role of Gulf countries in Egypt after Morsi's overthrow, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as both supported SCAF to take a firm position against the MB by granting huge financial aid—which largely surpassed US aid—to the Egyptian army.²³ Gulf countries, ever since, have supported Sisi to pull Egypt away from MB rule in exchange for much-needed Egyptian support in their own regional battles.²⁴

III. Absence of Civilian Control over the Military in Egypt after 2011

This section examines signs of civil-military competition, the failure of civilian control, and the military coup against democracy.

1. Elite Recruitment

SCAF managed the transitional period with total focus on its results. It allowed the MB to participate in elections, not as independents as had been the case in the past, but as a party, by scrapping Article 5 of the constitution—as amended in 2007—in the Constitutional Declaration of March 2011. The Article previously banned any political activity within a “religious framework.” The MB, in turn, did not just accept the transitional roadmap proposed by the generals, but also mobilized its supporters to vote in favor of the constitutional amendments pushed for by SCAF. Many observers took this to be a sign of an implicit deal between SCAF and the MB, with the generals putting off the revolutionary movement and positioning themselves as the transitional

²³ Egypt has received, until 2015, more than \$20 billion of aid from the Gulf. See: Shana Marshall, *The Egyptian Armed Forces and the Remaking of an Economic Empire*, p.7.

²⁴ This was evident during the Gulf crisis in summer 2017 when Egypt supported a boycott of Qatar.

leaders supported by the best organized force in the country (MB), while the MB focused its organizational power on the upcoming elections.

Another step taken by SCAF was the document for fundamental supra-constitutional principles, proposed by Ali al-Selmi in 2011. The document granted the army wider autonomy in running its own affairs compared to the previous constitution. Article 9 from al-Selmi's document, for instance, stated that “SCAF is exclusively responsible for ratifying laws pertaining to the armed forces before it comes to effect.” Despite al-Selmi's claim that he acted in his personal capacity, it later surfaced that he likely wrote the document in consultation with SCAF through which he proposed his vision for the future political system, confirming SCAF's absolute autonomy from the political leadership.²⁵

Under Adly Mansour's interim presidency, SCAF's control was evident in the presidential decrees he enacted in February and March 2014. The decrees, which organized the workings of SCAF and the National Defense Council, along with the 2014 constitutional amendments, granted the army an institutional status as the sole decision maker in national security matters, the military budget, and any political issues related to it. The 2014 constitution cast the minister of defense, not the president as per the previous constitution, as the SCAF's chief, with SCAF enlarged to now include 23 members from the military, security, and intelligence institutions. The constitution granted the National Defense Council all power in deciding matters related to the armed forces, including the defense budget, guaranteeing the army's control over its economic institutions beyond parliamentary or presidential scrutiny. Scrapping the upper chamber of parliament, al-Shūra Council, in the 2014 constitution, civilian members of the National Defense Council dropped from 15 to 14 with a clear edge for military members. The constitution affirmed, as well, the autonomy of the minister of

²⁵ Stephan Roll, *Managing Change: How Egypt's Military Leadership Shaped the Transformation*, *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.21, No.1, 2016, pp.28-29.

defense from the president's office, as SCAF was solely entrusted with appointing one during the two successive presidential terms (four years each). The minister of defense had to be a military officer who served as a general for no less than five years in a major military branch. Such a rule made it hard for the political leadership to appoint a minister of defense with loyalty to the presidency; thus, the president was left with no tools to control the army, not even by appointing an ally from the officer corps.

2. Public Policymaking

SCAF continued to dominate policymaking until Morsi was elected president, except for legislative matters which were overtaken by the elected parliament in late 2011 (until the constitutional court annulled the parliament law and dissolved it accordingly). SCAF then granted itself immense powers, according to the auxiliary constitutional declaration of June 17, 2012. Morsi, however, attempted to stem the tide of SCAF's increasing powers by being both firm and docile, until he announced on July 8, 2012, the annulment of General Tantawi's decree to dissolve the parliament. On another note, the MB did not object to many changes undertaken by SCAF, most importantly suspending the 1971 constitution and adding 15 articles increasing its own powers through the constitutional declaration of March 30, 2011.

In the post-Morsi period, the military greatly influenced policymaking and the state institutions entrusted with implementing such policy. Indications of this influence include the consultative apparatus supporting Sisi being comprised of military personnel, including former colleagues of Sisi from the military intelligence—such as Abbas Kamil, Osama al-Gindi, and Hatem Qinawi, all of whom were military generals and came to play key roles under his presidency. Additionally, the group included Ahmed Ali, a former army spokesperson, and Ahmed Gamal el-Din, a former minister of interior and current security advisor for Sisi. Other retired army and police officers came to join the ranks as

governors, ministry officials, public relations officials, or were directly connected to various ministry offices to further 'securitize' policy and decision-making. In brief, policy and decision-making in Egypt is largely impulsive, militarized, and provocative.²⁶

It is noteworthy that the army has expanded its role in economic decisions too, namely the 'New' Suez Canal and New Capital projects in 2015—two large projects that were undertaken with direct military intervention. The "Military Economy," as it came to be known, consists of the following key elements: The annual defense budget, worth 25.5 billion EGP (\$4.3 billion), which is 5.2% of the 2011-2012 budget; annual US aid, worth \$1.3 billion, provided to the army since the 1979 treaty with Israel; arms contracts, which include sales and purchases of weaponry and ammunitions; and factories run by the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), under the supervision of the Ministry of Military Production (MoMP), and the National Services Projects Organization (NSPO), supervised by Ministry of Defense (MoD).²⁷

As for foreign policy and security, Law No. 14 (2012) grants the minister of defense the authority to enact rules and regulations on land appropriation in the Sinai, as well as a decision on December 24, 2012 banning private ownership or renting of land and property in locations deemed of strategic military importance in the Sinai, which includes region "C" according to the 1979 Camp David accords, and any lands within 5 km to the west of Egypt's eastern borders with Gaza/Israel. This effective military ban ended any land ownership by foreigners and, thus,

²⁶ Ahmed Abd Rabou, Decision Making in Egypt: What Has Changed Since Mubarak?, *The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy*, (16.6.2015). Available online: <https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/decision-making-in-egypt-what-has-changed-since-mubarak/>

²⁷ Chérine Chams El-Dine, The Military and Egypt's Transformation Process, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, *SWP Comments* 6, February 2013, p.2.

will have an impact on the real estate market and future land usage in the Sinai, where foreign investment was a key element.

3. Organization of the Armed Forces

The military is characterized by a unique system compared to other state institutions due to its nature and ruling principles. Discipline, hierarchy, and obedience (as key elements for any military) leave no room for the army to become democratic, as Barany points out.²⁸ Egypt's army is not an exception, given its emphasis on seniority and discipline, and can be explained through the uniqueness of the officers' republic established after overthrowing the monarchy in 1952. Despite criticisms of SCAF as a model of confusion and mismanagement of Egypt's transition after January 25, 2011, the army continued to act cohesively and conserved its privileges, especially through constitutional drafting in 2012 and 2014. The Egyptian military's organization was obvious during its army's response to the revolution, and again in how it overthrew Morsi and the MB after protests calling for Morsi's resignation. In this context, we will present a model of a military's organization and its internal cohesion which, by and large, applies to the Egyptian case.

²⁸ Zoltan Barany, al-Quwwāt al-Musallaha wa 'Amaliyyāt al-Intiqāl al-Siyāsī [Armed Forces and Political Transition Processes], *Siyasāt Arabiyya* magazine, No.24, January 2017, p.82.

Military Factors	Internal Cohesion of the Armed Forces, Ethnic or Religious Fault-Lines, Rifts between Military and Security Agencies, Rifts among Military Branches, Generational Conflicts in the Army, Professionalism and Conscription, Autonomy in Decision-making
State Factors	Treatment of the Army by Ruling Regime, Generals' View of the Regime, Regime Instructions to the Army
Social Factors	Extent, Make-up and Nature of Protests, Record of the Army's Interaction with Society, Revolution's Popularity, Revolutionaries' Attempt to Gaining Military Support
External Factors	Possibility of External Meddling, Extent of Revolutionary Tide, Officers' Openness towards Foreign Ideas

Table 1. Organizational and Cohesion Indicators in Egypt's Military after 2011²⁹

4. Internal Security

The year 1991 marks the onset of the "police state" era in Egypt, as its security apparatus rose to prominence in executing the president's authority to maintain the regime. Several developments had relegated the army to the margins and sowed distrust between the military and security apparatus, which eventually manifested in a competition for resources and institutional influence. The internal security apparatus enjoyed the patronage of the "new bourgeoisie," which the army found discomfiting given its marginalization from security matters.³⁰ The security apparatus was not just a regime prop, but its beating heart, for there is no exaggeration, according to Hazim Qandil, in portraying the

²⁹ Zoltan Barany, Mawāqif al-Juyūsh min al-Thawrāt [The Armies' Responses towards Revolts], *Siyasāt 'Arabiyya* mag., 4 September, 2013.

³⁰ Yezid Sayigh, Above the State: Officers' Republic in Egypt, (Washington, DC.: Carnegie Middle East Center, August 2012), p.16.

presidency and the ruling party during Mubarak's era as parasites relying on this "security beast."³¹

Yezid Sayigh disagrees with this perspective, however, affirming that a "security state" marginalizing the army was a mirage, as the army continued to play its indispensable role and protect the regime away from the public eye. SCAF's engagement with the revolution and letting go of Mubarak was mainly a move to protect the regime as a whole. Besides, the robust relation between the military and security agencies proved detrimental to Morsi and the MB's perception of the state and government in Egypt after 2011. The military-security relation strengthened with Sisi's rise to power, which confirmed the unbreakable nature of this bond, constituted by a long history of operating within the 'deep' state, where clientelist relations were entangled and deepened by the regime. Evidently, a revision and deconstruction of this relation will require a long and intricate process, and the military's presence in internal security matters will continue to decide, to a large extent, the future of civilian control over the armed forces.³²

After 2011, the army seized responsibility for the country's internal security by dealing with daily protests, dispersing them, and trying to dilute their effects. After Mubarak's ouster, SCAF came to control the State Security Investigations apparatus, or *mabāḥith 'amn al-dawla*, and General Intelligence (GI), using them to maintain internal security. SCAF worked as well to activate the emergency law to quell strikes and sit-ins that paralyzed workflow in response to incidents at the Israeli Embassy

³¹ Hāzim Qandil, al-'Awda 'la Zahr al-Ḥisān: al-Jaysh byna Thawratayn [Back to the Horse Back: the Military between Two Revolutions], in Bahgat Qurani (editor), *al-Rabī' al-'Arabi fi Miṣr: al-Thawra wa ma Ba'dahā* [The Arab Spring in Egypt: the Revolution and Beyond], (Beirut, Lebanon: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Wiḥda al-'Arabiyya, 2012), pp.246-247.

³² Yezid Sayigh, *Above the State: Officers' Republic in Egypt*, p.7.

on September 9, 2011.³³ Other events served to propel the army to become the key security guarantor.³⁴

5. External Defense

In trying to answer how civilians can control armies, Peter D. Feaver, a senior research fellow and scholar in civil-military relations at Duke University in the United States, suggested a theory for civil-military relations, transforming them to an essential agency relationship where the civil executive authority oversees the conduct of military agents, whom he describes as the nation-state's "armed servants." This hypothesis affirms the armed forces' responsibility in matters of external defense, but in return civilians call the shots in serious decisions.³⁵ On an institutional level, Mackubin Owens, the US Naval College's Professor of Strategy and Force Planning, views this relation as similar to two hands on a sword: A civilian hand, which controls politics and decides when to pull out the sword and how to use it, and a military hand that ensures it is always ready to use in battle. These theoretical hypotheses require great caution and are in clear contradiction with the Egyptian case. Since 1952, and until this day, Egypt's military has been a principal player in defense matters. Evidence for this undoubtedly requires a "constitutional lens" or constitutionalism, since constitutions lay down the general framework through which state institutions work.

Many experts and analysts see that the armed forces assumed a privileged position from the "revolutionary constitutions," pointing to such privileges as those in eight articles in the 2012 constitution, compared to

³³ Ahmad Abd Rabbuh, al-'Ilāqāt al-Madaniyya al-'Askariyya fi Miṣr: Naḥwa al-Sayṭara al-Madaniyya? [Civil-Military Relations in Egypt: towards Civilian Control?], *'Umrān* mag., No.6, Autumn 2013, p.161.

³⁴ We can point here to such presence in the Sinai and the tense security situation it has seen due to terrorist attacks.

³⁵ Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

only two in the 1971 constitution. In the 2012 constitution, the president remained commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Article 146), and the same applies to the 2014 Constitution (Article 152). Likewise, the minister of defense must be a military general (Articles 195 and 201 of the two constitutions respectively), and he is the general commander of the armed forces.³⁶

The army seems to have understood well that matters like security and external defense must remain exclusively in its hands.³⁷ Ibrahim Ghali, a researcher at the Middle East Research and Studies Center, points out that “the military’s insistence on attaining a privileged position in the new constitution was a result of its distrust in civilians in general, and in the MB’s management of state affairs, in particular.”³⁸ From this perspective, the 2012 constitution created two new councils, one for national security (Article 193), and the other for national defense (Article

³⁶ Ahmed Abd Rabou, *Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East: A Comparative Study of the Political Role of the Military in Egypt and Turkey, the Arab Reform Initiative*, Beirut, Lebanon: 28.10.2016, pp 5-6.

³⁷ As for security and foreign policymaking, we can refer to law No. 14 (2012), which grants the minister of defense the authority for enacting rules and regulations on land appropriation in the Sinai, as well as a decision on December 24, 2012 banning private ownership or renting of land and property in locations deemed of strategic military importance in the Sinai—which includes region “C” according to the 1979 Camp David accords, and any lands within 5 km to the west of Egypt’s eastern borders with Gaza/Israel.

³⁸ Hammam Sarhan, *Şafqa li Damān al-Khurūj al-’Āmin? Tasā’ulāt ḥawl Wad’ al-Mu’assasa al-’Askariyya fi al-Dustūr al-Miṣrī al-Jadīd* [A Deal for Safe Exit? Questions on the Military Status in Egypt’s New Constitution], swissinfo.ch, 30 December 2012:

<https://www.swissinfo.ch/ara/صفقة لضمان الخروج الآمن - تساؤلات حول وضع المؤسسة العسكرية في الدستور المصري الجديد/34610968>

197), both of which were carried on in the 2014 constitution (Articles 203 and 205, respectively).

The majority of the National Security Council members is civilians—10 out of 13—while the majority of the National Defense Council is military officers—6 out of 9. This make-up suggests a relative participation by civilians in security and defense matters, yet it remains cosmetic in nature as military and security personnel dominate the National Defense Council, which enjoys wide authority, including responsibility over the armed forces’ budget. Evidently, the military continues to desire a position away from public and parliamentary scrutiny and accountability, which makes achieving and implementing civilian control over the military rather difficult, at least in the short and medium term. As a general inference, we can say that civil-military relations in Egypt after 2011 have witnessed the presence of the army as a principal and active player in political life; and as it seems, the balance has tilted in favor of the military at the expense of civilians. Thus, efforts to consolidate Egypt’s nascent democracy have failed, as the table below attempts to summarize and epitomize.

	Pre-2011	Transition	Morsi’s Rule	Sisi’s Rule
Elite Recruitment	+	+	Conflict	+
Public Policymaking	+	+	Conflict	+
The Military’s Organization	+	+	+	+
Internal Security	+	+	+	+
External Defense	+	+	+	+

Table 2: The Military’s Presence and Failure of Civilian Control in Egypt

Conclusion

Past studies on civil-military relations were usually centered on a standard assumption that civilian control is better in managing state affairs compared to military control. However, these studies had often faced problems in explaining the mechanism of empirically establishing and maintaining this civilian control. The Egyptian case has tested this claim, given the omnipresence of the armed forces as the sole and principal defender of the country constitutionally and effectively.

This study has revealed that distrust between civilians and military officers is a key factor hindering civilian control. The military in Egypt considers civilians incapable of ruling such a large country—an image entrenched in collective memory by the famous aphorism that Egypt needs a strong military man to govern it. This study also showed the imbalance of power between civilians and officers, and that such military dominance is a fundamental hindrance to civilian control and democratization. This is evident in the robustness of Egypt's military, which enjoys historical weight, social omnipresence, and organizational and economic autonomy; unlike civilians who failed in and exhibited a lack of organization and an incapability to offer an alternative vis-à-vis military control. Political debates, dominated by ideology, clouded their visions of post-revolution reality, whereas a focus on common visions to break military control was what they needed. But lacking consensus among civilian elite(s) hastened military intervention and aborted democratization.

In conclusion, this study arrived at several findings:

(1)

The issue of civilian control over the military is an important problem that is strongly posed in states undergoing democratization, and achieving it requires a reconsideration of frameworks that govern civil-military relations in those states.

(2)

The military in Egypt had seized the opportunity of the prevailing crisis

after 2011 and 2013 to justify intervention, and it has established a principle in its military doctrine; that is responding to public demands and casting itself as guardian of the revolution, security guarantor, mediator between political parties, and being firm in undertaking what it believes to be its national mandate to intervene.

(3)

Political polarization and a lack of consensus among civilian forces contributes in granting the army a chance to intervene, and absence of the civilian elites' strong strategies is a key factor in foiling attempts at civilian control.

(4)

The Egyptian experience has proven the difficulty of achieving civilian control due to many factors, most importantly the wide economic privileges of the army. Undoing the military character of political power in Egypt requires, in the medium and long term, a different societal upbringing; also, political parties and civilian elites should do their part through civilianizing and democratizing power.

Links to Presentations

The Quest for Democracy: Examining Civil-Military Relations in Muslim Societies

Opening Session

Link: https://youtu.be/_ailLKiow7I

Session Chair: Dr. Sami A. Al-Arian, CIGA Director, IZU, Turkey

Dr. Nasuh Uslu, Vice Rector, Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University
Dr. Mohammed Mokhtar Al-Khalil, Director, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, Qatar
Dr. Louay Safi, College of Islamic Studies, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar
Dr. Amr Darrag, Chairman, Egyptian Institute of Studies, Istanbul, Turkey
Dr. Sami A. Al-Arian, Director, Center for Islam and Global Affairs, Istanbul, Turkey

Navigating Between Democracy and Military in Muslim Societies

Link: <https://youtu.be/4QqoYSjYxls>

Session Chair: Dr. Sami A. Al-Arian, CIGA, IZU, Turkey

Civilian Control of the Military: Patterns of Successes and Failures

Dr. Aurel Croissant, Heidelberg University, Germany

Guarding the Guardians: Towards Democratic Civil-Military Relations

Dr. Sahar Aziz, Rutgers University, USA

Democracy and The Perils of Civil-Military Dynamics in the MENA Region

Amb. Ebrahim Rasool, Georgetown University, former Diplomat, South Africa

The Case of Egypt

Link: <https://youtu.be/0FFftFJt4O8>

Session Chair: Dr. Amr Darrag, Egyptian Institute for Studies, Turkey

The Military's Role in Egypt after the 2013 Coup: Determinants and Prospects

Dr. Essam Abdelshafy & Dr. Ahmed Zekrallah, International Relations Academy, Turkey

The Grand Bargain in Egyptian Civil-Military Relations

Dr. Risa Brooks, Marquette University, USA

Challenges of the Post-2011 Civil Control of the Egyptian Military

Dr. Arbi Boumediene, Hassiba Ben Bouali University, Algeria

The Case of the Sudan

Link: <https://youtu.be/Jy-jc wdGcn0>

Session Chair: Dr. Fatimah Binti Abdullah, Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University, Turkey

Civil-Military Relations in the Sudan: Local Factors and Role of Regional and International Powers

Dr. Atta El-Battahani, University of Khartoum, Sudan

The Sudanese Islamic Movement and the Military (1989-2019): How, where and when things had gone wrong?

Dr. Mohamed Mahjoub Haroon, University of Khartoum, Sudan

The Role of Elites: Defining the Complex Civil-Military Relations

Dr. Elsadig Elfakih, former Diplomat, Arab Thought Forum, Sudan

The Case of Pakistan

Link: <https://youtu.be/a2viWJbaRUY>

Session Chair: Junaid Ahmad, Center for Global Studies, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan

Pakistan's Persistent Praetorianism

Dr. Aqil Shah, University of Oklahoma, USA

The Impact of Military Agency on Politics and State in Pakistan

Dr. Ejaz Hussain, Iqra University, Pakistan

In the Shadow of the Military Regimes: Politics, Society and Democratic Transition in Pakistan

Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan

The Case of Turkey

Link: <https://youtu.be/9rmCC2LX6F0>

Session Chair: Dr. Ahmet Guida, Istanbul 29 Mayıs University, Istanbul, Turkey

Opening the Black Box: Turkish military and Civil-Military Relations after the 2016 Coup Attempt

Dr. Metin Gürcan, Sabancı University, Turkey

The Role of the U.S. and Foreign Policy in the Civil-Military Relations in Turkey

Dr. Ömer Aslan, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Turkey

The Case of Algeria

Link: https://youtu.be/ed_G7fu2IoU

Session Chair: Fadi Zatari, CIGA, IZU, Turkey

The Role of the Military in Algerian Domestic and Foreign Policy

Dr. Yahia H. Zoubir, KEDGE Business School, France

Civil-Military Relations and the Political Economy of Military Intervention

Dr. Rachid Tlemçani, University of Algiers, Algeria

Continuity and Change of the Algerian Regime and Civil-Military Relations

Dr. M. Tahir Kılavuz, Harvard University, USA

Military Politics and Democratic Transitions: Perils and Lessons Learned

Link: <https://youtu.be/fnq5VmbSc7Q>

Session Chair: Üveys Han, CIGA, IZU, Turkey

Civil-Military Relations During the Transition to Democracy in Spain and Portugal

Dr. Jose Javier Olivas-Osuna, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

Soldiers, Politicians and Civilians: Reforming Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Latin America

Dr. Rafael Martinez, University of Barcelona, Spain

Civil-Military Relations in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Turbulent Odyssey

Dr. Muhamad Hari-pin, Centre for Political Studies-Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Indonesia

The Crumbling Israeli-Palestinian Security Coordination

Dr. Shir Hever, Political Economist and Expert, Germany

Civil-Military Relations: The Way Forward

Link: <https://youtu.be/km7KerXIA-0>

Session Chair: Dr. Abdalrahman Migdad, CIGA, IZU, Turkey

The Military, Politics, and Democracy: Drawing Red Lines

Dr. Louay Safi, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar

The Impact of Civil-Military Relations on Democracy and Human Rights – Lessons from Latin America

Dr. Elin Skaar, Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), Norway

Role of Civil Society and Civic Organizations in Democratic Transitions

Haoues Taguia, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, Qatar

A Paradigm for Civil-Military Relations in Muslim Societies

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Islam, Authoritarianism and Civil-Military Relations

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**The Center for Islam and Global Affairs (CIGA)
Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University**

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To be a premiere research institution for ideas, analysis, and policy recommendations on global affairs impacting the Muslim World, and to foster future relations with world powers based on shared principles, common interests, and mutual respect.

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The Center for Islam and Global Affairs (CIGA) is an independent, nonprofit, research and public policy institution based in Istanbul, Turkey, and affiliated with Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University. Its mission is “To conduct high quality research and analysis, educate the public and policymakers, train experts, and propose novel ideas and policy recommendations regarding global policies and relations impacting the Islamic world, and the development and progress of Muslim societies.”

This book presents important papers that cover a myriad of civil-military relations in multiple countries and experiences including Egypt, Sudan, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Latin America, the Iberian Peninsula, and beyond. Other papers also analyze the conditions needed for successful transitions towards democratic rule and the loosening of the military grip over politics and civilian life, particularly in Muslim countries. But in many societies, particularly in the MENA region, the vision is blurry and the road is arduous since the setback of the Arab Spring. Over time it has become very clear that championing lofty ideals and progress towards democratic governance, pluralistic and inclusive societies, the respect for human rights, the rule of law, transparency, accountability, rooting of corruption, economic development, and social justice and harmony cannot be realized without first addressing and balancing civil-military relations, particularly in Muslim societies. The papers in this volume will contribute to a better understanding and analysis, and eventually help realize these lofty ideals. The sooner intellectuals, thought leaders, and experts in Muslim societies deal seriously with the issue of balancing civil-military relations, the sooner these societies will be able to overcome a variety of other, related problems successfully.

From the introduction

THE QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY

Examining Civil-Military Relations
in Muslim Societies

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SAMI A. AL-ARIAN



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University

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