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**ISTANBUL SABAHATTIN ZAIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE EDUCATION INSTITUTE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**POLITICAL REPRESSION AND ISLAMIST
MODERATION IN EGYPT AND MOROCCO (1990-2010)**

MA THESIS

Mohamed Eid Abdalaal HASSAN

**Istanbul
October - 2024**

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THESIS APPROVAL

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DECLARATION OF SCIENTIFIC ETHICS AND ORIGINALITY

This is to certify that this MA thesis titled “**Political Repression and Islamist Moderation in Egypt and Morocco (1990-2010).**” is my work, and I have acted according to scientific ethics and academic rules while producing it. I have collected and used all information and data according to scientific ethics and guidelines on thesis writing at Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University. In both the text and bibliography, I have fully referenced all direct and indirect quotations and sources I have used in this work.

Mohamed Eid Abdalaal HASSAN

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ABSTRACT

POLITICAL REPRESSION AND ISLAMIST MODERATION IN EGYPT AND MOROCCO (1990-2010)

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Master, Department of Political Science and International Relations

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This thesis provides a critical analysis of the environment that the Islamists worked in, which affected their process of moderation testing the repression of the political regimes by selecting two case studies, Al-Wasat party in Egypt and the Party of Justice and Development in Morocco. Many factors may affect the moderation process and it will be discussed. This thesis uses a wide range of primary and secondary sources, including personal interviews, media reports, documents, and expert analyses. It analyzes how the behaviors of the political regimes in both Egypt and Morocco can affect the moderation process positively/negatively, in addition, the role of the leaders of the Islamists which can play a vital role in this process, further the interaction between the internal and the external factors.

Keywords: Egypt, Morocco, Al-Wasat Party, Justice and Development Party, moderation, Muslim Brotherhood

ÖZET

MISIR VE FAS'TA SİYASİ BASKI VE İSLAMCI İLİMLİLİŞMA (1990-2010)

Mohamed Eid Abdalaal HASSAN

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez, Mısır'daki Al-Wasat partisi ve Fas'taki Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi olmak üzere iki örnek olay seçerek, İslamcılarının içinde çalıştığı ve ılımlılık sürecini etkileyen ortamın eleştirel bir analizini sunmaktadır. Moderasyon sürecini birçok faktör etkileyebilir ve tartışılacaktır. Bu tez, kişisel röportajlar, medya raporları, belgeler ve uzman analizleri dahil olmak üzere çok çeşitli birincil ve ikincil kaynaklardan yararlanmıştır. Hem Mısır hem de Fas'taki siyasi rejimlerin davranışlarının ılımlılaştırma sürecini olumlu/olumsuz nasıl etkileyebileceğini, ayrıca bu süreçte hayati bir rol oynayabilecek İslamcı liderlerin rolünü, iç güçler ve dış faktörler arasındaki etkileşimi daha da derinleştirerek analiz ediyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Egypt, Morocco, Al-Wasat Party, Justice and Development Party, moderation, Muslim Brotherhood

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

The Party of Justice and Development	PJD
Adalet ve Kalkınma Party	AK Party
The Muslim Brotherhood	MB
Movement For Unity And Reform	MUR
Mouvement Populaire Démocratique Constitutionnel	MPDC
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces	SCAF
Human Rights Watch	HRW
The European Union	EU

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The rise of Islamists in the Middle East pushed many researchers to analyze and explain their mechanisms and ways of thinking because they have a great effect on the politics in the region. It would help analyze their relations with the political regimes, the other political wings, and their relations with societies. This thesis will explore the prospect and development of Islamist moderation in a political environment characterized by political repression, under an authoritarian regime, and the lack of opportunities to participate in elections, public debates, and decision-making institutions. In Egypt, it will focus on Al-Wasat party although it tried to have a legal existence in the political life, the Egyptian regime refused to give it a legal license excluding it from participation in political life, While in Morocco, it will focus on the Justice and Development Party (PJD) which has been allowed by the regime to participate in the political arena after a period of exclusion. In which conditions the first has been refused, and in which conditions the second has been accepted, will be analyzed in this research. This chapter includes the thesis subject, the purpose of the thesis, its scope and content, the research question, the importance of the thesis, the used method, and the literature review related to the subject of the research.

1.1 Thesis Subject

This dissertation will explore to what degree do Islamists change or maintain their beliefs and behaviors in authoritarian contexts in response to closures and openings in the political system? Two case studies will be analyzed, Al-Wasat Party in Egypt and the PJD in Morocco. I chose these two case studies because both Egypt and Morocco have authoritarian regimes, and many different Islamic trends, radicals, and moderates. There are similarities between the two case studies, Al-Wasat Party and the PJD split from a mother group, Al-Wasat Party split from the Muslim Brotherhood, and the PJD split from the MUR. The difference between the two cases is the participation in the political life. Al-Wasat was not allowed from the Egyptian regime to work, but the PJD after prohibiting, the Moroccan regime gave it a license, and these two different

behaviors of the regimes affected the moderation process of the two parties. I will examine both of these political parties in the period between 1990 and 2010. The research uses primary resources through interviews with leaders and members of the movements discussed in this paper and their official media. The research uses secondary resources too such as articles, TV interviews, books ...etc.

1.2 The Purpose of the Thesis

Although Al-Wasat party had applied three times to have a legal license to work in politics, the Egyptian regime refused these applications and did not give it any opportunity to work officially. The PJD was allowed by the Moroccan regime to work and later led the government. So, what are the reasons that pushed the Egyptian regime to prohibit Al-Wasat party? What are the reasons that pushed the Moroccan regime to allow the PJD to work after prohibiting it? Can the behaviors of the regime be the only factor that determines the refusal or acceptance? Or the nature of the party and its ideologies and behaviors can play a role in making the regimes accept or refuse it? This thesis analyzes the interaction between a repressive political environment and the opportunities for Islamists to participate in politics to allow them to moderate. How did Al-Wasat Party and the PJD reacted to excluding them from the political life? What were the dynamics between these parties and the regimes in these countries? The research has one main question, to what degree do Islamists change or maintain their beliefs and behaviors in authoritarian contexts in response to closures and openings in the political system?

1.3 The Scope and Content of the Thesis

This thesis will examine the moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt and Morocco from 1990 until 2010 under the repression of the regimes. It will analyze the interaction between a repressive political environment and the opportunities for Islamists to participate in politics to allow them to moderate. In addition, it analyzes the factors that potentially moderate the Islamists, especially the radicals through the inclusion process. Many Islamist groups rose in the Middle East after the end of the Ottoman Empire hoping to get back the heritage of al-Khilafah (caliphate). Other factors helped the rise of such groups as colonialism and nationalism, and Islamist groups were as a counter defending against them. Some groups used violence refusing to participate in the political life. Other groups did not believe in violence as a method of change. They believed that participating in politics can make them gaining an official existence,

avoiding exclusion, and they can change through politics. The relation between religion and politics still occupies a great space in the thoughts of Islamic groups, it is an important point to understand how the moderation process of Islamists works. There are many hypotheses dedicated to analyzing moderation, such as inclusion and exclusion.

Many factors affect that transformation, the readiness of the Islamist groups to make use of the opportunities under the authoritarian regimes and their capability to develop their ideologies and behaviors to participate in politics. The internal revisions of these Islamic movements play a great role in this moderation process to have both ideological and behavioral change. On the opposite, the behaviors of the political regimes whether they have a real intention to merge the Islamists into the political life.

The inclusion process transition may face many problems and obstacles. In a region like the Middle East, it would be clear that authoritarian regimes are obstacles in sometimes against the moderation of Islamist parties, those regimes categorize the Islamists as a threat to their thrones. So, the oppression, the imprisonment, and the prohibiting are the main tools of the regimes to force them to keep out of the political path. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was prohibited from finding a political party (Ellis, 2011). The leaders and the members of the Brotherhood were facing oppression and prisoning from the regime of Mubarak. The exclusion forced them to cooperate with the other ideological parties.

If moderate Islamist groups became more moderate, and even radical groups became moderate, would wider society accept them and accept this transition? Rachid Ghannouchi realized that society in the 1970s did not accept the movement when it was radical, he said "Islamist militants felt a sense of alienation from wider society" (Cavatorta and Merone, 2013:865) After a long march to moderation, some political wings still accuse Ennahda as a radical group, in 2013, they accused it killing some political opposition members (Hashem, 2021)

The thesis is composed of six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction. The second chapter will discuss the methodology and the theoretical framework. The third chapter will explore the history of Al-Wasat party with special reference to its separation of the Muslim Brotherhood, its moderation process, its ideological and behavioral changes with a mention of two of its leaders who affected the party. The fourth chapter will analyze the PJD history, the relationship between it and the regime, its thoughts,

and its participation in the elections since its foundation until 2010, in addition to focusing on its moderation process. The fifth chapter will analyze a comparison between the natures of the two regimes in both Egypt and Morocco. The last chapter will contain the findings and the conclusion of the thesis.

1.4 Research Question

This study is going to answer one main question:

To what degree do Islamists change or maintain their beliefs and behaviors in authoritarian contexts in response to closures and openings in the political system?

1.5 The Importance and Original Contribution of the Thesis Subject

The importance of this thesis comes from the case studies that will be discussed. Few scholars discussed Al-Wasat Party and his experience has not been discussed enough from my point of view. To understand Al-Wasat Party's experience, it is important to make a comparison with other experiences, so, I chose the PJD in Morocco which managed to participate in the different elections in Morocco since its foundation until now. The relationships between the two parties are opposite, while Al-Wasat Party did not have good relationships with the regime, the PJD had. In addition, it will be the first time to interview the leaders of Al-Wasat party after the military coup of 2013. The JPD is still in the political arena although the Islamists in other Middle East countries are facing a sharp wave of repression. In addition, the two examples changed gradually from radicalism to moderation.

1.6 The Research Method of the Thesis

This study is going to adopt a qualitative method for the data collection. This data will be analyzed to fill up the gap using primary sources such as interviews with political leaders, the documents, statements, and announcements of the politicians of these groups, and the official media of these groups. The interviews are going to be with Abu-Elela Mady, the founder of the Al-Wasat party he is out of jail contrary to the majority of the party leaders who are now in jail like Essam Sultan, and Atef Awwad, one of its leaders and one of the founders and the responsible of the documentation and legalization of the party due to his career as a lawyer and he is free, so, it would be easy reach both of them. In addition, Madi as a founder had a graet experience in during its membership inside the Muslim Brotherhood and he was against many of their thoughts. He was one of the main members who led the split from the MB and he was responsible of founding the party. Awwad was one of the leaders who had many

comments on the thoughts of the MB. In addition, due to its work as a lawyer and responsible of the legal documents, he had good relations of the state's men, a matter that enabled him to have the view of the regime. The paper examines the factors that can affect the moderation process especially the repression of the political regime.

1.7 Literature Review

The literature review contains many secondary resources related to the thesis topic. The literature review is analyzing the differences between moderates and radical, and under which conditions we can call Islamists as moderates. This is related to the definition of moderation itself and the reasons that can push to moderation and it is discussed in the literature review. In addition, the literature review analyzed the foundation of both Al-Wasat Party and the Party of Justice and Development. The two parties were affected by a generation that split of a mother group. This generation was inspired by Al Wasatiyyah scholars such as Mohamed Abdu, Gamal Aldin Alafghani, Mohamed Al Ghazali, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Mohamed selim Al-Awa and others. The literature review discussed the behavioral and the ideological changes in the thoughts of these two parties. These changes were due to many reasons such as the repression of the state, intraparty learning, the political learning, learning from other political wings and other Islamists in other countries and other reasons. The changes were accepting the legitimacy of the state, participating in the political life, separating politics from religion in the administrative levels and others. Further, the literature review analyzed the exclusion which can lead in sometimes to moderation. The literature review is consisting of between moderates and radicals, moderation, its causes and indications, the relation between politics and religion, between the internal and the external factors, and moderation through exclusion.

1.7.1 Between Moderates and Radicals

One of the indications to distinguish between moderates and radicals is their visions to the political regimes. Moderates seek gradual change by working under the legitimacy of the regime, while radicals seek to overthrow that regime. Another indication is using the violence for change. Moderates accept the political tools as elections, while radicals use violence to achieve what they want (Schwedler, 2013:5). Once the authoritarian regimes block the roads against the moderates from participating in political life, they may become radicals. The moderates are being criticized for participation in political life and elections. Schwedler argues that "More

extreme opposition groups challenge Islamists to prove their core commitment to a conservative religious political vision" (Ibid: 1).

1.7.2 The Causes and Indicators of Moderation

Schwedler argues that "Moderation entails a process of change that might be described as a movement along a continuum from radical to moderate, whereby a move away from more exclusionary practices... equates to an increase in moderation" (2013).

She discussed the changes in the beliefs and practices of Islamists focusing on the reasons that may lead to this change. She suggests that one of the main reasons is their inclusion and participation in pluralist political processes and she discusses whether Islamists became more moderate due to that hypothesis (pp.348-349). Schwedler in other research defends inclusion against exclusion, she argues that exclusion forces political opposition groups to work underground in secret ways and manners.

She argues that " one of the most important effects of political inclusion is that it creates strong incentives for various groups to cooperate, even if only at a tactical level" (2013:5). Schwedler argues that three dimensions can demonstrate the effectiveness of inclusion, participation in elections, cooperating with ideological rivals, and the commitment of Islamists to inclusion signs of believing in pluralism (2007:57). For elections, she argues that Islamic parties in different Islamic countries participated in many elections and seized a great percentage of the seats, she mentioned many examples as the participation of Lebanon's Hizbullah, the Hamas victory of February 2006, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, and Yemen's Islamist Islah party (2007:58). She argues that participation in elections is not a sufficient indicator of moderation and that inclusion does not guarantee ideological moderation. She calls for a look at the discussion that happens within the party instead of observing the public statements to judge the inclusion process (2007:58).

Carrie Rosefsky Wickham focuses on the birth of Al-Wasat Party, its thoughts, its differences with the Muslim Brotherhood, and the limits of its moderation process. Regarding the differences between Al-Wasat and the MB, she argues that while the Muslim Brotherhood believes that the Sharia is valid in all times and places, Al-Wasat defines the main and the general principles of the Sharia, it calls for more flexibility in interpretation and application. Another difference is that while the Muslim Brotherhood believes sovereignty belongs to God, Al-Wasat believes sovereignty belongs to the Ummah (nation). Thirdly, pluralism for Al-Wasat means political,

cultural, social, and religious, while for the MB has a religious meaning as a creation of God (2004:209). She compares between the moderation process of the left in Europe and Latin America and that of the Al-Wasat party in Egypt. She argues that the participation of the Al-Wasat party generation in the syndicates while they were members of the MB contributed to that transformation. They were forced to deal with other ideological wings and serve all. They were traveling abroad working with others from different cultures and backgrounds, a matter that participated in the openness to others. Generally, she argues that Islamists may be forced to be moderated to seize opportunities in an authoritarian regime and to avoid more political constraints. She argues that they became moderate through political learning and strategic calculation (2004:211-213). Wickham sees Sharia as the source of legislation as a problematic issue in the thoughts of the Al-Wasat Party because from her point of view, who has the right to interpret Islamic law? She argues that the interpretation of Al-Wasat party of Sharia is problematic. Thirdly, although they became moderate, they are still avoiding using Western terminologies. This may explain the limits of moderation.

Wuthrich and Ciftci discuss " Intraparty dynamics such as organizational strength, social movement linkages, and ideological legacy" as factors that may affect the moderation of Islamists. They argue that the behavioral and ideological change comes " from two internal factors, the level of the centralization of power within the party and the nature of the institutional and ideological linkage with a social movement" (2020:330). It means from their point of view that if the structure and the leadership of the party are strong, it will be moderated because the structure is centralized, and if the power of the authority within the party is not centralized, moderation will not be an easy process.

They gave examples of the first case as the AK party in Turkey and the PKS in Indonesia, while they mentioned the Islah party in Yemen and Malaysia's PAS as counterexamples (2020:330-333). They see that there is an obstacle to full power centralization in Islamic parties, the social movement linkages. They claim that the parties who have linkages with social movement organizations or had been founded by such organizations are less flexible to moderation compared to the others who do not have such a relation. They make a comparison between the split of the Al-Wasat Party in Egypt and the AK Party in Turkey.

Utvik focuses further on the formation of the generation that founded the Al-Wasat party. He gave importance to the environment that the leaders of the party were working in which played a great role in forming their thoughts and behaviors. He argues that the activities in the Egyptian universities in the 1970s and the 1980s participated in enriching the political capabilities and the openness to others of the leaders of this generation, in addition to their work in the different syndicates (2007:299). Further, through their positions in these syndicates, they had been affected by other Islamic political parties in other countries such as Turkey, Tunisia, and Algeria, (2007:301).

They learned from them with their different experiences and this helped in developing their ideologies and behaviors. Many Islamic thinkers and writers affected their mentality such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Fahmi Huwaydi, Tariq Al-Bishri, Muhammad Salim Al-Awa, Muhammad Al-Ghazali, and Muhammad Imara. Those thinkers were the intellectual background of the party and its cultural organization Jam'iyyat Misr Lil-Thaqafa Wal-Hiwar (Utvik, 2007:301-302). Founding this organization was an attempt to have any official existence after the refusal of their party license. The conflict between this generation and the old guard of the Muslim Brotherhood in many visions and opinions in addition to their total domination forced them to take another way apart from the main group (2007:300). Utvik also discussed the program of the Al-Wasat party concentrating on his thoughts about the role of women in public and political life, the role of the family in society, the principles of Sharia as the main source of legislation, and many other points.

Amr Hamzawy (2005) argues that moderate Islamists in many countries such as the Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan and the PJD became more democratic and more pragmatic. Hamzawy noticed that the USA and Europe have the willingness to engage them less ideologically. But in another place in the same article cleared that " Arab regimes have long secured the support or at least the silent approval of the United States and Europe for their repressive measures toward Islamist movements by evoking the so-called Algerian syndrome or the nightmare of anti-western fanatics coming to power through the ballot box" (2005). So, the USA and Europe are satisfied with the oppression of the Islamists in the Middle East committed by the authoritarian regime. That means the USA and Europe are not serious about containing and

empowering the moderates. They do not make a distinction between those who are moderate and those who are radicals and extremists.

Hatina concentrated on describing the differences between the thoughts of Al-Wasat and those of the Muslim Brotherhood. He argues that Al-Wasat leaders were calling for a civic state, equality between Muslims and Coptics, respect for the constitution and the authority, condemning terrorism, the defense of freedom of belief and opinion, and working on building a dialogue between the state and the Islamic trend (2010:174). Hatina –as proof of moderation and a different thought of the Muslim Brotherhood- mentioned that Al-Wasat made a connection with the Egyptian left (2010:176) He argues that Al-Wasat confessed the sovereignty of the people, empowering the women to participate in both public and political life. Hatina briefly discussed the Muslim Brotherhood's campaigns against Al-Wasat party's founding, in addition to the refusal of the Egyptian government to give its leaders a legal license as a political party.

1.7.3 The Relation between Religion and Politics

Wegner and Pellicer argue that Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group) -which merged with others and became the Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR) in 1996 and later many leaders of it formed the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) - transformed since the mid-1980s. The leaders condemned the violence as a means of change in politics, accepted the legitimacy of the monarchy, and exercised democracy in the internal structures. The PJD was founded in 1998 by the MUR to have a separate political branch. Although MUR founded the party, gradually the party started to create its path away from MUR. A step that aimed to separate the politics from Dawa. While PJD was interested in politics, MUR was interested in Dawa, the relationship was a partnership (Wegner and Pellicer, 2009:160-161). There were disputes in point of views on some cases between PJD and MUR. For example, in 2002, the PJD supported the Moroccan personal status code (family laws), while MUR opposed it and opposed the abolition of polygamy and the right of women to arrange marriages without a 'marital tutor'. The protests of MUR were against the secularization of society as they thought (Wegner and Pellicer, 2009:164). Wegner and Pellicer said, "In sum, any possible effect of the PJD's moderation on democratization was canceled out by its increase in strength that was threatening the regime" (2009:169). The separation between politics and Dawah and the separation between the party and movement is a key factor of such moderation.

1.7.4 Between the Internal and the External Factors

The Moroccan Justice and Development Party (JDP) separated from Shabiba Islamiyya which opposed the monarchy and has been oppressed. As a result of oppression, it went to work underground. Spiegel argues that once the separation happened, there was a new generation who believed in politics and democracy, this generation participated in elections confessing the legitimacy of the monarchy. (2015:5-6)

Spiegel argues that there was a change in the thoughts of the leaders of JDP, their speeches changed from religion to focusing on combatting corruption, concentrating on economics, and not opposing the monarchy but working under its umbrella. (Spiegel, 2015: 4-5) He argues that the party became more moderate in its behaviors and speeches. He explains that this change was motivated by three reasons, firstly, the monarchy allowed it to participate in politics with limits and red lines. Secondly, the party controlled the other allied movements such as (“haraka”) and controlled its internal organizations. Thirdly, the competition with other parties and movements such as Al-Adl. (Spiegel, 2015: 2-3) According to this analysis, the moderation process succeeded due to internal and external factors. Wegner and Pellicer see moderation as increasing flexibility towards core ideological beliefs (2009:159). Cavatorta and Merone argue that “ the acceptance of democratic procedures, human rights, and a market economy, comes about through inclusion” (2013:857). Schwedler (2007:57-58) defined three effects considering them as signs of moderation, the first is the participation in elections, the second is cooperation with others and the third is whether Islamists show signs of moderation as a result of their experiences of inclusion.

1.7.5 Moderation through Exclusion

Cavatorta and Merone discussed exclusion as a tool of moderation giving the Tunisian Ennahda movement as a case study. They defined it as “ However, exclusion can be also defined more broadly to include the social rejection of political projects that are perceived to be alien to mainstream society, which can reinforce and to a certain extent underpin and legitimize state’s repression” (Cavatorta and Merone, 2013:859). The writers argue that Ennahda suffered from double exclusion, from the state and large sectors of society, and that pushed the movement to be more moderate. They said “It may appear that the repressive campaign and the imprisonment of the leadership pushed the party towards greater moderation. It is for instance in jail in the early 1980s

that Rachid Ghannouchi produced the theoretical work that is now the pillar of the attitudes and policy positions of the party concerning public freedoms in the direction of cementing democracy as the only viable political system"(Cavatorta and Merone, 2013:868).

1.8 Conclusion

Schwedler discussed the moderation process and its indications. She argues that participation in pluralist political processes may lead to inclusion. She prefers inclusion and refuse exclusion because she thinks that exclusion may push the Islamists to work underground. She argues that there are three indications of moderation, participation in elections, cooperating with ideological rivals, and the commitment of Islamists to inclusion signs of believing in pluralism. The hypothesis suggest the pluralist political processes but it did not analyze the case of the existence of repressive regimes. It cannot explain the environment that the Islamists work in in the case of the repressive regime which cannot give any opportunity to Islamists to work officially.

Cavatorta and Merone are giving a counter point of view. They arguing that exclusion may lead to inclusion. They gave Ennahda movement in Tunisia as an example. From their point of view, the leaders of Ennahda became moderates under the repression of the state. They argue that the repressive measurements of the regime such as the exiles and the imprisonment forced its leaders especially El Gannoushi to revise their thoughts to become moderates. This approach may not guarantee the moderation. It can -as Schwedler argued- lead the Islamists to work underground.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

The research is trying to answer the question: To what degree do Islamists change or maintain their beliefs and behaviors in authoritarian contexts in response to closures and openings in the political system? And to answer it, the interviews will be used as the main method. I choose two interviewees who are leaders of Al Wasat party to examine their experiences. In addition, I used many resources such as books, articles, journals, and the media of the two parties and other media. After that, analyzed the collected data via the different resources arriving to the finding and the results. This chapter will analyze the methodologies used in the thesis. Finally, the key concepts will be discussed which contain two main key concepts, moderation and Wasatiyyah.

2.1 Methodology

This thesis is going to adopt a combination of qualitative methodologies for the data collection. The thesis is using the interviews as one main method. There are many reasons pushed the author for choosing these case studies. One of the reasons is the nature of the regimes in both countries, there are many differences, but both are oppressive regimes, both practiced repression against the Islamists. Another reason, both Al Wasat Party and the PJD got through a long path arriving to moderation, both came out from a mother group that faced repression of the regime which forced some groups to split with new thoughts and new ideologies. In addition, why the Egyptian regime prevented Al Wasat Party from participating in the political life while the Moroccan regime allowed the PJD participating arriving at winning the elections being the first party in the monarchy? Under which conditions both regimes dealt with Islamists in different manners? Is that due to the nature of the regime or the nature of the Islamists themselves or both? For these reasons, I think that the comparative case study analysis can be useful to identify the similarities and the differences between the experiences of Al Wasat Party and the PJD and the similarities and the differences between the Egyptian and the Moroccan regimes too.

In this study I made interviews only with some leaders of Al Wasat Party because there are few sources about the party. There is no official media of the party which I can use to get data. The website of the party does not exist and the social media of the party cannot offer any serious data about the history of the party. In the case of the PJD, the matter is different. There are many sources about the party, the official website and the other official media of the party and its leaders are offering a good data to be analyzed. In addition, the leaders of the party such as Al Othamani and Benkirane have many books, publications, and TV interviews. So, there was a need to make interviews with the leaders of Al Wasat Party and there was no need to make such interviews with the leaders of the PJD.

I selected two of the leaders of Al Wasat party to interview them. Mainly I selected one as he was a witness on the dispute between the MB and Al Wasat members. One who had a vision to split from the Muslim Brotherhood. I suggested two names, the first is Essam Sultan who was the vice president of the party, a lawyer and knows all the details about this dispute and had a great effort in moderation process of the party. The second is Abolela Madi the president of the party and he was a leader of the MB in the syndicates and he had—as Sultan- a great effort to split from the MB leading the moderation process of the party. I made the interview with Madi because Sultan is prisoned since the military coup of 2013.

I selected the second interviewee as an expert in the legal affairs and had a good relation with the state's men to identify the reasons that stand behind declining the request of establishing the party three times and to examine the vision and the behaviors of the regime towards the party. I suggested two persons, the first is Prof. Mohamed Mahsoub one of the leaders of the party and he was the minister of the legal affairs in the government assigned by the ex- president Mohamed Mursi, the second is Atef Awwad who is a lawyer. Both had a good background and details about the process of establishing the party and have good relationships with the official institutions. Mahsoub apologized to make the interview because he had not enough time, while Awwad accepted. I think that Madi and Awwad gave a good data which did not publish before especially the reasons that pushed the regime not giving the party a license and the reasons that forced the group of Al Wasat splitting from the MB.

This data will be analyzed using primary sources such as interviews with political leaders, the documents, statements, and announcements of the politicians, and the official media of these groups.

2.2 The Theoretical Framework

Moderation: there are many definitions of moderation and differ from a researcher to other as it has been discussed in the literature review. All the definitions are western but from an Islamic prospective, Islam and Khatun (2015) argue that the Islamic one is not related only to the political arena as the Western definitions discussed. From their point of view moderation is "a temperate intellectual, legal, moral and behavioral approach includes all aspects of life."

This thesis will use the definition of moderation as the transformation from radicalism to moderation. Accepting the participation in the political life, cooperating with other political powers, accepting the legitimacy of the regime and the democratic values are signs of moderation. This definition will be used to test the inclusion hypothesis with a concentration on exclusion as a great factor of inclusion.

Wasatiyah: a school of Islamist scholars who gave different thoughts of moderate Islam. This school is dating back to famous thinkers such as Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani, Muhammad Abdu, and Hassan Al-Banna. Recently it includes Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Tariq al-Bishri, Muhammad Imara, and Mohamed Selim Al-Awwa. This group was the inspiration of Al-Wasat Party and their thoughts affected its program (Stacher, 2002). Baker argues that this group was different because it analyzed critical issues such as the joint participation of both Muslim and Christians in the Islamic civilization and the need for the democratization of the political order. Further, he sees that this group of intellectuals as the " most critical intellectual force in defining the Islamic Wasatiyyah" (1997). This school especially Al-Qaradawi and Al-Ghazali affected the thoughts of the PJD too.

One of the most important thinkers of Wasatiyah school is Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Al-Qaradawi (2011: 9) stands against extremism supporting Wasatiyah as it can rescue society. He argues that the nation has three ways, extremism, dissolution, and Wasatiyah. Extremism as making the matters difficult for people, making everything prohibited and not giving people any opportunity for using the licenses gave by Allah. While dissolution means the absence of the obligations and violating all the prohibits.

While Wasatiyah is the middle road. He argues that Wasatiyah is the solution of all the problems of the nation. Al-Qaradawi (2011: 41-56) mentioned thirty features of the features of Wasatiyah as he saw. We are going to mention some of them which were a reference and a source for the parties which are the subject of this thesis.

A holistic understanding of Islam: this feature means that there is no separation between the religion and the state. Islam is doctrine and law, science and work, worship and treatment, culture and ethics, dawa and state, life and religion. Al-Qaradawi refuses those who are believing in no peace without Jihad, no doctrine without law, no marriage without divorce, religion without state.

Adopting the facilitation approach in fatwas: Al-Qaradawi calls for the facilitation in fatwas especially in the branches. He refuses the extremism in fatwas because the Islamic religion facilitates the life of people not to make it difficult. So, from his point of view, if there is a need for extremism, it must be in assets not branches. He uses religious bases for justifying his opinion such as, necessities permit prohibitions and need is reduced to the status of necessity.

Adopting a missionary approach to Dawaa: Al-Qaradawi sees that the message of Islam must be sent to others by dialogue not by violence. The dialogue can be with the other Muslims or the non-Muslims. He sees that Islam is a religion of love not hating, a religion of peace not war, a religion of dialogue not collision, a religion of mercy not cruelty, a religion of aggregation not separation.

Wise graduation: Al-Qaradawi argues that Quraan completed within 23 years to teach the Muslims the graduation in their matter. He sees that Islam encourages everyone to be patient and to not be hasty.

Peace and war: Al-Qaradawi argues that Islam is calling for peace not war and avoiding the war scenarios as it can be possible. Islam is calling for making peace with all who want it. Islam is supporting making treaties and conventions between the states. The Jihad must be declared to defend the territories and the holy places of Muslims.

The rights of the religious minorities: Al-Qaradawi claims that Islam doesn't force the minorities to be Muslims. Islam is calling for respecting the others thinking and believes, there is no difference to be Muslim, Christian, Jewish, or any other religion or belief. He sees that all Muslim and non-Muslim are citizens having the same rights

and the duties and there is no difference between them and the state must not practice any discrimination against them. In addition, he sees that Islam ordered Muslims to treat the non-Muslim well.

Human and social values: Al-Qaradawi argues that Islam guaranteed the human rights before the west recognizing it. Islam is calling for justice in politics, economic, and Judiciary. In addition, Islam is calling for freedoms, human rights, dignity, protecting the minorities, protecting the religious freedoms. Further, Islam is calling for founding civil and social associations to protect society.

Justice and honor for women: Al-Qaradawi sees that Islam gave women her rights and did not make discrimination against her. Islam is seeing woman like man in rights and duties. He argues that Islam gave woman the right to select her husband, the right for going mosque, the right of participating in the social and political life, and the right of studying.

The right of peoples to select his leaders: from his point of view, Al-Qaradawi argues that Islam is refusing tyranny and the people must select his leaders through consulting as the main instrument. He sees that Muslims can make use of the democratic values for selecting their leaders. He also argues that the Muslims have the right of opposing the leaders in case of making mistakes with peaceful ways.

Believing in pluralism: He argues that Islam is respecting the political, cultural, ethnical, and linguist pluralism. He sees that Islam is calling for the necessity of Coexistence between civilizations, interaction between them, taking between them.

The necessity of reform and change: Al-Qaradawi thinks that the first step of changing and making reform must start with human beings. He calls for the resistance against the tyrannies and the authoritarian regimes because Islam is calling for freedoms and the right of people to select their leaders. He sees that Islam is standing against the imprisonment of oppositions, the political corruption, the economic corruption, and the moral corruption. He sees that the role of the powers of society is standing against such corruptions.

One of the important scholars of Wasatiyah school is Mohamed Selim Al-Awwa whose thoughts were the theoretical background of Al-Wasat Party. Al-Awwa argues that the Quran described the Islamic nation as moderate because the Muslims are not extremists such as Christians who had extremist thoughts about Jesus. They are not

like the Jews who didn't follow the instructions of the religion in a manner that they killed the prophets. So, he sees that the Islamic nation is in a moderate position (2007:9).

To the relation between religion and state, Al-Awwa claims that the aim of the religion and state expression is accepting the pluralism and opinions of diversity in the political theatre. Al-Awwa claims that Islam doesn't have one political system everyone must follow. The door is open to everyone to work hard for selecting the ideal political system which can be acceptable from the people (2007:12).

About al-Khilafah, Al-Awaa argues that al-Khilafah as an expression was used later by Muslims, but after the death of the prophet Mohamed, there are other names such as the successor of the prophet, Amir al-Mumineen. He sees that al-Khilafah has two main tools, the first is selecting from the consultants of Muslims, the second is accepting by the people. So, he argues that al-Khilafah is just a tool to organize the administration of the people and how to select the leaders (2007:14).

The political pluralism: Al-Awwa claims that one of the main bases of Wasatiyah school is the political pluralism which means accepting the political, economic, ethnic, cultural, and religious differences. He sees that there is no stable political system without the political pluralism, without accepting the different opinions. Further, he argues Islam is encouraging founding the political parties which stand against the repression of the regimes and play a great role to guarantee the speech freedoms (2007:28-32).

The participation of the woman in the public affairs: Al-Awwa criticizes those who did not accept the participation of the woman in the public affairs. This opinion supporters see that the role of the woman is only at home to take care of children and her husband. At the same time, he criticizes those who want to free the woman from everything according to the western model. He claims that the woman in Islam participated in the public affairs. She participated in the wars, she emigrated from Mecca to Ethiopia, and she was a consultant in public affairs especially in the Hudaibiya convention. So, he did not mind if a woman became the president of the state and any other position (2007: 33-41).

The position of the non-Muslims in the Islamic state: Al-Awwa sees that the Muslims and the non-Muslims have the same citizenship which means they have the same rights

and duties. They can take positions in the state like Muslims and they must participate in the military to defend the country from any enemy. In addition, he argues that the non-Muslims must have their own worship places according to their needs and they must not have any obstacles in this issue (2007: 42-45).

The thoughts of the both Al-Qaradawi and Al-Awaa and other scholars from the same school were the sources from which the leaders of Al-Wasat Party and the PJD take their beliefs and concepts. The ideas of the scholars of this school affected the visions of the two parties towards some issues such as accepting the democratic values which includes accepting the legitimacy of the regimes and the participation in the political life especially in the elections. In addition, those scholars have new vision about the freedoms in Islam, a matter that reflected on the programs of the two parties. Further, the ideas of the two scholars affected the two parties in other cases such as the relations with the others like the Christians in Egypt and the relations with the other political wings. The role of the women in the public affairs too, the scholars have a different contribution in this issue which inspired the two parties. Thus, the ideas of Al-Qaradawi and Al-Awaa especially affected the visions, the thought, and the programs of the two parties.

CHAPTER III

THE MODERATION OF AL-WASAT PARTY IN EGYPT

Al-Wasat Party in Egypt came out from the Muslim Brotherhood structures. The majority of its leaders were members of the MB but due to many factors, they separated from them founding a new party. According to Madi and Awwad, one of the most important factors that forced them to separate was their fear of being repressed by the regime. They were watching in which manner the regime was repressing the leaders and the members of the MB. The regime did not give them any official recognition, imprisoned some of its leaders, and prohibited their activities. So they tried to not repeat the same experience.

They were regarding to have an official political party because they were not satisfied with working underground as it was during their membership of the MB. They were convinced to work in public. In addition, there was a huge gap in thoughts between them and the MB on some issues such as freedom, the rights of Christians, the participation of women in public affairs, and others. This chapter is going to mention a brief of the MB which from came Al-Wasat Party, the foundation of Al-Wasat Party, how both the regime and the MB dealt with the party, and a mention of its ideological moderation. This chapter is important to understand in which way the repression of the regime affected the moderation of the leaders of Al-Wasat party who were members of the MB. The chapter is going to identify the relation between the repression of the Egyptian regime and the moderation of the party.

3.1 The Muslim Brotherhood

Before discussing the political life of Al-Wasat party, it is important to shed light on the Muslim Brotherhood which Al-Wasat members came from, in addition, the MB is the oldest and the largest organization of Islamists which stretches not to all the Arab states but also all the Islamic world (Laub, 2019). The organization was established by Hassan Albanna in 1928 (Shehata, 2015). The organization was founded after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to revive the Ummah starting from the individual to the government, in a few years, it became a major political power (Safi, 1995). It

participated in the 1952 military movement, later, it got into a clash with Gamal Abdel Nasser who accused it of planning its failed assassination. Nasser prisoned its members until the arrival of Sadat who became the president of the republic released its members and allowed them to work although it was working illegally. In this period, its members were active in the universities (Muslim Brotherhood, 2011).

Many researchers see that from these campuses came a new generation, more moderate and educated. Meijer (2013) argues that this generation made ideological changes. During this period, under the repression of the regime, there was a split in the different groups of Islamists, some became terrorists, and others tried to maintain popular support (Brown et al., 2006). The MB tried to establish a political party for the first time during the era of Mubarak whose name was the Egyptian Reform Party (Hizb Al-Islah Al-Misri) (Meijer, 2013). El-Ghobashy (2005) argues that the middle-aged Ikhwan made a great change in the organization, this generation was a leader in the universities, the professional unions, and the parliament. This generation was the spokesman of the MB which affected positively its position. She sees a domination from the old generation, described as a "prison generation." El-Ghobashy supports the idea that the middle-aged generation affected the thoughts of the MB due to its openness to others, participation in the elections, and public work in the syndicates. As a result of not being a legal party the MB was excluded from working officially, and the MB tried to cooperate with other political parties that had already licenses. It cooperated with Al-Wafd party to participate together in the elections of 1984, the alliance gained 15% of the votes, and the same cooperation happened during the elections of 1987, the MB cooperated with the Labor Party and Al-Ahrar Party, the alliance gained 17% of the votes (Shehata, 2015).

El-Ghobashy (2005) argues that the MB coordinators with Al-Wafd and the Labor Party were belonging to the middle-aged generation, they were active in the professional unions and later became parliaments. She mentioned names such as Muhammad Abd Al-Quddus, Abd Al-Moneim Abu Al-Futuh, Essam Al-Eryan, Mokhtar Nouh, and Abo Elela Madi. Shehata (2015) declared that the participation of the MB in the elections under alliances with other political rivals affected the Brotherhood positively. He argues that " It gained practical experience with campaigns, voter mobilization, media outreach, and parliamentary affairs—the processes of democracy". It was clear that there was a gap between the old and the

new generation of the MB, a gap that became a split later when a group of its members founded a party and later in this paper will discuss this point in detail. Although the openness to others and cooperation with them, the participation in the parliament, and political life as a whole, there were some points that the two generations did not agree with. Abolela Madi (personal communication, Dec 23, 2023) argues that there was a group that was a part of the “special apparatus” of 1965 that was dominating the Muslim Brotherhood. This group did not activate the mechanisms of selecting, changing, and developing from the inside. It aimed to freeze any attempt at development; in addition, it gave an advantage to those who proved their loyalty, while it was trying to weaken the reformist stream at that time.

The “special apparatus” was established in the early 1940s by the MB, all the political wings had such clandestine militia in that era that was marked by using violence in the political arena. The “special apparatus” was trained to use arms against the British forces in the Suez Canal but also it was accused of using violence in domestic. It was charged with killing Prime Minister Al-Nuqrashi Pasha. During the era of Nasser, its members were sent to prisons because they were accused of attempting to kill Nasser (Shehata, 2015). During this era, the MB members were affected by the radical thoughts of Sayyid Qutb (Ashour, 2014). Atef Awwad (personal communication, Dec 26, 2023) sees that there were two problems with the MB, the first is mixing between politics and Dawaa, and the second is illegitimacy, from his point of view, it is not acceptable to work against the laws of the state. He argues that it is not acceptable to challenge these laws classifying yourself as legitimate without any real organization.

3.2 The Repression of the Regime against the Islamists

To understand the repression of the regime towards Al-Wasat Party, it is important to shed light on the era that comes after the change of the regime in 1952 because the system that founded in this era continued until the era of Mubarak and later (Montada, 2017). After the military coup of 1952, there were two mainly opposite political powers, the MB and Al-Wafd party. The Muslim Brotherhood was a part of the free officers who led the coup of 1952. As reward, they were waiting a great participation in the authority but Nasser started a sharp repressive wave against them. He was considering it as a threat to its secular regime (Leonard, 2008:15). The regime arrested large numbers of its members making a special court to judge its leaders. In 1954 the court judged six of its members to death and executed them while others like Hassan

Al Houdaiby – the second murshid (guide) after Al Banna – had been sentenced to death but they had not been executed (Ibid, 2017). This wave of the 1954 was followed by another wave in 1965 when more than 18.000 Islamists had been arrested. The era of Nasser witnessed a great role to the interior ministry, its intelligence, and security apparatus (Ryan, 2011).

After the death of Nasser, Sadat came to power giving political spaces to the different political powers. He released the prisoners who had been detained since the era of Nasser, he released the members of the MB and other politicians from different backgrounds. In addition, he allowed the MB to work freely to face the power of the left in the political theatre (Montada, 2017). Sadat had a great popularity after the victory of the 1973 war with Israel, but after his failing to impose equality between the different classes and due to the repression against the opposition and other reasons, has been assassinated in 1981 (Finch, 1962). Sadat before his assassination arrested many religious men from different backgrounds in addition to many persons from the opposition. He removed Shenouda III -patriarch of the Coptic church- from his office, further, he arrested Sheikh Kishk, a populist Islamist preacher, and Umar Tilmisani, the murshid of the MB. In addition, he prepared a list of 15.000 person to be detained (Ryan, 2011).

Davidson (2000) argues that Mubarak was seeing all the Islamic movements as terrorists. Even the MB which was described by him as moderate but he accused it supporting violence. He was seeing that if the Islamists could reach the authority, they would make the country as the Iranian model. Maybe that vision explain the attitude of the regime towards the Islamists' movements such as Al Jamaa Al-Islamiyya, the MB, and recently Al-Wasat Party. Mubarak used the law of emergency as a main tool of repression against not only the Islamists but also against all the opposition parties and movement. The law has been issued after the assassination of Sadat and by using this law, Mubarak managed to justify its repression against the Islamists (Ryan, 2011).

That was not only the law used by Mubarak to oppress the Islamists. He issued another law in 1993 to oppress the Islamists who seized a good reputation during their management of the syndicates. Mubarak allowed the Islamists working and participating in the different syndicates such as the syndicates of lawyers, doctors, engineering and others. He gave this space to show that he is expanding the political arena for gaining aids and donors from the donor governments (Davidson, 2000).

The Islamists used this initiative to participate in the political arena and their work in these syndicates forced them to work with the other political wings as Madi and Awwad explained in their interviews with the author. Due to these developments, Mubarak issued the (law 100/1993) which requires 50 % from the total voters in the first round and at least 33% in the second round, and in case of the absence of such percentage, the government has the right to supervise the syndicate until making new elections. A matter that represents repression against the Islamists who were managing these syndicates because the syndicates did not witness high voters' percentages ever (Davidson, 2000).

The military tribunals was another tool used by the regime to oppress the Islamists. Since 1992, it became the main tool to judge the violent and the non-violent Islamists. The regime preferred such tribunals because the regime could control totally the process of the trials. The jury is selected by the minister of defense and the process is so fast comparing to the civilian ones (Davidson, 2000). These laws and military tribunals are means of domestic political control (Davidson, 2000).

Al-Wasat Party was not exception, the state oppressed it like the other Islamists. The state denied its application three times and did not allow it participating in the political arena (McCarthy, 2005). Mubarak did not give any sign that the moderates could take part in the political theatre (Wickham, 2004). Madi (2023) in his interview with the author claimed that the regime did not give them a license because the party was marketing itself as a moderate voice which could contrast with the same thinking of the group of Gamal Mubarak which marketed itself as a moderate voice too against the Islamists. The same reason was mentioned by Wickham (2004) when he argued that the party represented a threat to the regime as a competitor to the power.

So, the party was denied to have a legal existence and was prohibited to make any political activities. The party suffered legal, administrative, and political repression. In addition, the leaders of the party suffered the illegal arrests. The leader of the party Abolela Madi was detained five times due to the law of emergency which was described by him as a scarecrow or a justification of the repression (Voa, 2009). The Islamists among them Al-Wasat Party suffered from the different types of the repression practiced by the regime, they were not allowed to establish a political party, the government did not give them any official recognition, they suffered the illegal detains and the military trials.

3.3 Foundation of Al-Wasat Party as an Indicator of Moderation?

The rich movements in Egyptian universities had a great reflection on political life for a long time. The Islamist movements in universities during the 1970s split into two groups, one violent as Al-Jihad and Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiyya, moderate as the Muslim Brotherhood which had been formed by Omar Al-Tilmisani the murshid of the MB. From this moderate group emerged another one from the students of the 1970s movements who had a different vision from the old guards of the Brotherhood (Utvik, 2007).

This generation later was the most active in the official syndicates and the parliament, at the top of this generation, Abolela Madi, Essam Sultan, and Salah Abdulkareem (Yokota, 2007b). There was a gap between the new generation and the old guard of the Brotherhood and the split was a normal result. Many different visions towards many issues pushed this generation to split. According to Utvik (2007) this generation was more concerned about the need for political change and more committed to democratic principles. Commenting on the joining of some Christian intellectuals to the party Utvik said "This move represented a distinct development in the direction of a modernist interpretation of Islam and a willingness to formulate a program that would be inclusive of Egyptian Christians". Atef Awwad (personal communication, Dec 26, 2023), one of the leaders of the party explained that they did not accept mixing between politics and Dawaa as the members of the MB were making, said,

We should stand at the same distance, you have the right to choose a program with an Islamic foundation, but the use of religious slogans during the elections must be prevented. That is the problem of the Muslim Brotherhood, mixing politics and Dawaa. Due to our openness to the other, we felt that these behaviors were not acceptable. We were not advocates, as a political team, we were working in public affairs for Allah, but we weren't advocates. There must be advocates and politicians, everyone has the right to choose his reference, but that mixing made a great problem.

In the same context, the president of the party Abolela Madi confirms that there were differences between the thoughts of his generation and the old guard of the Brotherhood which forced them to split. He said (personal communication, Dec 23, 2026),

There were many issues to be developed, but they did not develop. The political thoughts were still taken from heritage books such as Al-Mawardi and Al-Ahkam Al-Sultaniye, for example. Our generation had a role in the movement of students in universities and later in syndicates, the matter that made us open to the political parties, the political life as a whole, cases of society inside and outside, and other opinions. For that, we realized those thoughts must be developed, and we made efforts to develop from the inside, but we failed. As I said, Islamic thought is not mature and traditional.

The differences in thoughts were not the only reason that forced them to think about splitting but there are other reasons. The MB structure has two main arms, the Guidance Office (Maktab al-Irshad) and the Shura Council. The Guidance Office (Maktab al-Irshad) is composed of 15 members with a head of the supreme guide (*murshid*). The Shura Council selects the guidance Office members, which is composed of 100 members. All the authority and the important decisions were in the hands of these two arms (Trager, 2011). There was a full power of the old guard and all the positions were in their hands, while the new generation didn't have any position or authority, there were conflicts between them (Utvik, 2007). The old guard was dominating everything in the organization preventing any attempt at development (Madi, personal communication, Dec 23, 2023).

In addition to these reasons, there was another reason that pushed this generation to split from the MB. The Egyptian regime was not allowing the MB to work officially, and this was a political instrument to suppress its activities, this was frustrating for the new generation who thought to have a legal organization (Yokota, 2007b). The regime did not allow the MB to have a political party, but it allowed its social activities and it tolerated that role (Ranko, 2014:501).

Ranko (2014:501-509) argues that the MB during the beginning of Mubarak's era transferred from exclusion to inclusion but it was not followed by ideological moderation. He argues that the MB thoughts in this era were affected by the thoughts of Qutb. Starting from the year of 1987, the MB started to participate in elections believing in democracy and an intention of inclusion, the regime did not accept that and started waves of repression against it. The reason behind that was preventing it from gaining popularity. The illegitimacy pushed the middle generation to search for

it instead of working underground secretly. Atef Awwad affirms the same reason when he said (personal communication, Dec 26, 2023),

The second reason is illegitimacy, it is not acceptable to work against the laws of the state. We asked to establish an official party to work through it because according to the law, we are committing a crime, we are working outside of the law. The Brotherhood was refusing our request because they said that the government could refuse such a request.

Madi (personal communication, Dec 23, 2023) argues that Mohamed Mahdi Akif, one of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders asked him and others to prepare a program for a political party to be the political arm of the Brotherhood. After preparing it, the Brotherhood denied such a decision and asked them not to apply for the official committee of the parties, he said,

The point was that we were tired of the leaders of the brotherhood; they did not accept even the decisions of the Shura council that I was one of its members. We had difficulty with a decision from the council to establish a party. We realized that there was no seriousness in establishing a party.

He also added,

The murshid at that time, Mustafa Mashhor, asked Abdul Latif and me to meet him, but we delayed that meeting after delivering the papers to the official committee. During the meeting, he asked us to freeze everything, but we informed him that we had finished everything. We gave him a copy of the party's program and the founders list; he was shocked and told us we would study the matter. Then, a war started and did not stop. Our movement was trying to reform; if they wanted to continue or not, that was not important to us, but we decided to continue. That is the truth, for Allah and history.

This event reflects a crisis inside the MB, the absence of democracy, and the inefficiency of the decision-makers. As had been discussed before, there was a group of old guards who had all the authority in the MB and did not give any opportunity for others to join the two administrative councils of the Brotherhood. It was clear that there was not any real intention to founding a political party.

3.4 Between the Hammer and the Anvil

Establishing the party was welcomed by hard reactions from both, the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, both were against the party. The application of Al-Wasat party had been delivered to the official committee of the parties three times, in 1996, 1998, and 2004 and all were rejected (Yokota, 2007b). Many reasons can explain the attitude of the political regime. Yokota (2007b) argues that the Islamic movements in the Middle East are suspected to be undemocratic and the political regimes use this point as a justification for curbing democratization, the regime was using the status of illegality to oppress the Islamists. So, it is normal in the light of this explanation to refuse a party with an Islamic background coming out of the Muslim Brotherhood., and this point especially is another reason to refuse the license of the party. The regime saw the party as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood (Yokota, 2007b). Even in the authoritarian regimes, the Islamists could have opportunities to work legally. If the regime had doubts about the believing of Islamists in democracy, the Islamists must change their beliefs and thoughts to acquire the legality to work freely in the political arena.

The Islamists had to react positively to remove the doubts and the suspicions of the regime. Such change would help to facilitate the moderation process. The same conclusion was offered by Madi who argues that there are two dimensions to explain the attitude of the regime, one related to security and another related to politics. Related to security, he realized that reason just in 2007 when he met with one of the high police officers who were responsible for giving the license of the party, Madi (personal communication, Dec 23, 2023) said,

He told me that I stopped that party because I recorded a meeting gathered by Mamon Al-Hudaiby, Mohamed Mahdi Akif, and Mustafa Mashhour. In this meeting, Akif said to let the group of Al Wasat party work; if it becomes legal, it will be mine. Al-Hudaiby said I am going to cut my hair. Akif said I am telling you important words; you are telling me that you are going to cut your hair. Al-Hudaiby replied that because of your words, nicks can be cut; you do not know what you are saying. Al-Hudaiby is gone. And I told that officer, I do not care about that; what is our fault? He wanted to prove that he still accuses us of being Muslim Brotherhood members, and that was a show.

So, the regime had doubts that this party would be a political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, and for that, it did not give the license. The second dimension of the refusal mentioned by Madi is related to the regime too. There was an intention to not give any opportunity to a moderate voice for being a legal party participating in politics without limitations. Madi referred to the group of Gamal Mubarak which was marketing itself as the moderate voice against the radical Islamists of the Brotherhood, so, if a moderate Islamic voice became legal, it would affect their plans. Madi (personal communication, Dec 23, 2023) said,

We knew later that the group led by Gamal Mubarak refused our party because it was against their plan. They planned to produce themselves as a moderate and modern vision against the radical Muslim Brotherhood. So, if an Islamic one came with a moderate vision that would damage their plan. Some of them told me that. The officer told me later that the objection wasn't from us as police but was from Gamal Mubarak. From their point of view, our project was more dangerous for them than that of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Al-Wasat Party sees itself as a moderate voice compared to the thoughts and beliefs of the MB. The leaders who came out from the MB were in dispute with them due to many opposite thoughts and visions. The leaders of Al-Wasat were searching for legitimacy to work officially to avoid the repression of the state which practiced it against the MB that did not have any official existence. The party tried three times to have the license but it was rejected all the times. In addition, the leaders of the party saw themselves as a developed version and different from the MB. They developed their thoughts about democracy, the rights of women, the rights of minorities, the relationship between religion, and other issues.

Another explanation is that the government was afraid of the founders who had a good reputation and experience during their work in the official syndicates and this party was a real party not like the others, Atef Awwad (personal communication, Dec 26, 2023) said,

Those who applied for the party were having real intellectual thoughts and they worked in public affairs, especially in the syndicates. In comparison, the parties at that time were being described as cartoons because they were under control. They were that our party could not be under control. It would have another action, another footprint, which was a reason among others.

The political arena during the era of Mubarak was under control. The regime was giving the license to the parties that had attained the satisfaction of the regime. The licenses of the new parties were issued by a committee headed by one of the leaders of the ruling party (Zayed & Stewart, 2011) The opposition parties during that era were seen as a joke and a tool in the hands of the regime (Ibid, 2011).

That was from the side of the regime, but the attitude and the situations of the Muslim Brotherhood were harder than those of the regime. The Brotherhood although they formed a committee to prepare the program of the party, they denied it later. After giving the application of the party to the official committee of the parties, they asked the founders who were still members of the Brotherhood to resign from the party and to cancel their given power of attorney. They were aiming to not have the requested quota for establishing the party. In addition, they accused the founders who continued in the party as agents of the police (Madi, personal communication, Dec 23, 2023). Atef Awwad (personal communication, Dec 26, 2023) described the reactions of the Muslim Brotherhood against them as immoral, he argued that in the administrative judiciary asked their lawyers to join the governmental lawyers against them.

To understand the situation of the MB against Al-Wasat Party, it is important to explain the relationship between it and the regime. The Mubarak regime starting from 1981 allowed the MB to work in universities, syndicates, and to have social institutions such as hospitals, associations, schools, and others but without giving it the license of a political party. That was an unwritten contract between them. But since 1990, there has been a shift from the regime towards the MB. Due to many national, regional, and international factors, the regime started a wave of repression of the MB leaders. It started to put obstacles against the MB activities in syndicates and universities. The regime saw itself as the only legitimate in the political arena and saw the activities of the MB in syndicates and universities as a type of legitimacy that could represent a threat to its legitimacy (Al-Awadi, 2009). The author of the thesis is arguing that there was an unwritten contract between the regime and the MB. The contract allows the MB to work in all the social fields but having a political party is a red line. Requesting a license of a political party would open the door for blocking the MB from working in the social fields and it would give the regime a reason to start waves of repression against it, a matter that could waste all that they gained in the social field.

3.5 The Ideological Moderation of the Party

The differences in the visions and the thoughts between the old guard of the Brotherhood and the new generation have been reflected in the program of Al-Wasat party. They denied some ideas of the Brotherhood that they saw cannot being adaptable to society. In addition, the experience of this generation in the official syndicates and the parliament gave them a wider vision when they started preparing the program of their new party. Utvik (2007) argues that they gained experience when they worked in the syndicates and the parliament, they were in contact with the other political wings and other ideologies which made them more open to other directions. In addition, he adds, they learned from the other Islamists in other states such as Turkey and Tunisia. Utvik argues that the role of some intellectuals cannot be neglected, Al-Awwa, Al-Bishri, Al-Mesiri, and others had their influence directly on the program although the aim was the same.

Those independent intellectuals affected the thoughts of the leaders of the party and naturally its program, those intellectuals were former Muslim Brotherhood or had a Marxist past, they believed Islam was a basis for social and political reform in Egypt Utvik (2007). Despite that affection, both had different aims, "The Al-Wasat members were attempting to write a program for a party whose intention was to govern, while the New Islamist intellectuals were developing a general philosophy and strove to influence political power at all levels" (Steuer, 2017). Madi confirmed that they were meeting with those thinkers to discuss the program and some of them participated directly in writing some chapters of the program, he said,

We were meeting with a group of thinkers at the home of Dr. Mohamed Selim Al-Awwa. This group gathered Dr. Emara, Tarek Al-Beshry, Al-Awwa, and, of course, Fahmi Howaidy. We were telling them our thoughts, and we were listening to their opinions. Later, we organized workshops to write our thoughts and develop them. Al-Masiry was no't attending these sessions, but we were going to him, and after that, he participated with us in writing the last two programs before his death. He wrote parts of it. (Personal communication, Dec 23, 2023)

Many factors affected the program of the party. The most important one is the environment of repression during the era of Mubarak. In their interviews with the author Madi and Awwad confirmed that the party aimed to avoid the repression waves that were witnessed before when its leaders were members of the MB. In addition to

searching for legitimacy, the party moderated itself and that was reflected on the program of the party. There are other factors such as the experiences gained from the activities in the syndicates and universities, the role of the independent intellectuals, and the split of the Muslim Brotherhood due to different visions. Further, the political experiences of its leaders affected the program.

It is important to mention the political experience of two of its leaders who had a great effect on the program, Madi and Sultan. Madi joined the Muslim Brotherhood when he was a youth and became later one of its leaders in the university and the syndicates (Al Jazeera net, 2015). He was a member of the high council of the engineers' syndicate and the president of the committee which had the responsibility of the coordination between the different Egyptian syndicates from 1989 to 1996 (Al Jazeera net, 2015)—this period of work made him believe in dialogue with the other political parties and open to all. Madi (personal communication, Dec 23, 2023) said: "In addition, we made relations with most syndicates, organized political forums in the syndicates, and hosted persons from all the political wings. We tried to make a national accord document". The same idea was affirmed by Atef Awwad (personal communication, Dec 26, 2023) when he said: " we learned things that we didn't learn while we were members of the Brotherhood. We found independent persons who are more pious than us. We can cooperate with them making use of their experiences". Sultan was selected as the president of the students union of Cairo University in 1985/1986, after graduation, he worked as a lawyer and he was defending cases of public affairs (Al Jazeera Net, 2016). He was not convinced of working underground but he thought the Brotherhood was forced to work secretly because the Egyptian regime closed every door against them to not make them participate in political life (Ali, 2022). All these factors affected the ideological moderation of the party especially the separation from the MB. These ideological changes pushed by the inner intention of moderation to prove that for the regime and some sectors of society that were suspected of the Islamists' intentions and thoughts.

The founders of the party believe that freedoms come before anything else, they believe that there is no renaissance without allowing public freedoms to maintain the creativity of society (Alkhabbaz, 2009). Atef Awwad sees that as a difference between them and the Brotherhood, he thinks that freedoms come before the religion itself. He said (personal communication, Dec 26, 2023),

I remember that I wrote an article criticizing Al-Hudaiby who was the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood at that time while I was a member of it. In a TV program on the Al-Jazeera channel, Al-Qaradawi said that freedoms come before the Sharia, Al-Hudaiby made a call to the program commenting that he was against that idea because Islam as a religion comes before anything else. That made me angry because Al-Hudaiby was not a religious scholar like Al-Qaradawi, he was a politician.

Stacher (2002) argues that the party used some words such as s like coalition building and parliamentary show that the party is using the same words of the democracies of the European Union (EU). He also claims that Al-Wasat party took a progressive step regarding the application of Sharia in the constitution and in the laws. He sees that although the party insisted on including the article of Sharia as the main source of legislation, the party believes that Sharia is " a tool to facilitate modernity if interpreted properly by democratically elected religious officials" (2002).

The party took steps forward compared to the Muslim Brotherhood about the situation of the Christians. They believe that the relation that collects all the elements of society is citizenship with no differences based on religion, race, color, sex, etc (Alkhabbaz, 2009). Madi (personal communication, Dec 23, 2023) argues that Al-Zimma which was the basis for dealing with Christians in the Islamic society came from the past, he thinks that instead of it comes citizenship which grants all the rights for all citizens based on equality. Founders of the party argue that there were many Christians who became members of the party and that is a sign of the party's thoughts. The party in his new vision does not mind if a Christian became a candidate for the presidency different from what the Muslim Brotherhood believes. Awwad (personal communication, Dec 26, 2023) argues that Al-Wasat did not mind if a Christian became the president of the state and applied the constitution. The thoughts of the party towards the Christians are extracted from the thoughts of Tarik Al-Bishri (one of Wasatiyyah's scholars) who believes that the Christians must enjoy equal citizenship like Muslims and the Muslim jurists must create a system of laws to guarantee the inclusion of non-Muslims in the different laws (Stacher, 2002). This view was reflected on the board of the party which included one of the most important Christian thinkers Rafik Habib (Ibid, 2002).

The program of the party gave women all their rights as other citizens, and it declares that efficiency is the only measurement for someone to take a position if he is a man or a woman (Alkhabbaz, 2009). In the same context, Awwad (personal

communication, Dec 26, 2023) criticized the vision of the Muslim Brotherhood toward Women, he argues that they do not believe in the capabilities of Women, even the managers of the department of Women in the Brotherhood are men, while Al-Wasat gave them the opportunity like men on basis of equality. While Madi (personal communication, Dec 23, 2023) argues that Al-Wasat does not mind if a woman became a candidate for the presidency "She can run for any position, even the presidency. It can succeed or not, depending on public opinion and the decision of the majority. The main basis of the position is efficiency, not religion or being a man".

The program concentrated more on nationalism, it did not neglect the identity of Egypt as an Arab and Islamic country, but it did not mean excluding Copts because the "Egyptian cultural identity" contains Copts.

That is why the founders believe that belonging to the civilized Arab & Islamic circle does not mean the exclusion of the Coptic component from the Egyptian culture and they emphasize that the Egyptian cultural vessel has succeeded in mixing the multi-cultural components and has made them like a strong blend which has given the Egyptian culture its particularity and uniqueness among the cultures of the world (Alkhabbaz, 2009).

Stacher argues that the party was going to more liberal model and one of the factors that encouraged such steps-from his point of view- is the repression of the state towards the radical Islamists, a matter that pushed the moderates to express themselves (2002).

3.6 Conclusion

The roots of the problem between the Egyptian regime and Al-wasat Party should be analyzed getting back to the year of 1952 when the military started to govern the state until now. The problem started when the Islamists especially the MB participated in the military coup, but later Gamal Abdel Nasser banned its activities arresting its members and sentenced some of them to death. Nasser saw the MB as a threat to his authority and this was the ideology of the regime until the end of the era of Mubarak. Only during the era of Sadat, the MB has been given a political space to balance the existence of the communists in the political life. After the assassination of Sadat by military Islamists, Mubarak did not allow the Islamists to have a political party. He practiced repression against them and he did not have any vision or plan to contain the moderates in the political life. He saw the Islamists as terrorists. In his era, Al Jamaa Al Islamiyya started to use violence against the authority and the civilians. It launched

a terrorist operation against tourists in Luxor in 1997. Mubarak made use of this terrorist attack to pose more repression measures against the Islamists.

The MB during the era of Mubarak witnessed repression practiced by the regime. The regime did not allow its members founding a party, a matter that forced them to make alliances with other official political parties to participate in the elections such as what happened in the elections of 1984 and 1987. Some research argue that there was unwritten agreement between the regime and the MB allowing them working in the social and cultural fields but that option is not available in the political field. The group suffered the arrests and the military trials.

Due to the repression of the Egyptian regime against the MB during the 1980s and the 1990s, some of its leaders and members decided to work in public not underground to avoid the repression of the regime. They separated from the mother group founding Al-Wasat party. Its leaders tried to attain a legal confession from the regime as a political party, but the request had been refused three times. The regime had many reasons to reject the establishment of the party. The regime saw the party as a competitor to the authority especially the group of Gamal Mubarak which marketed itself a moderate voice against the radical Islamists, but Al-Wasat Party could ruin such marketing. In addition, there was a suspicion from the regime towards the party that it could be the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. Further, the nature of the regime itself did not allow a real political life and did not allow establishing new parties. During the era of Mubarak, the committee that was responsible of approving the requesting the establishing of new parties accepted only the establishment of two parties, Al-Wifak and Al-Umma (Hassan, 2011).

The repression of the regime forced the leaders of the MB to cooperate with the other political wings from different backgrounds. The cooperation extended from the professional syndicates to an electoral alliance. This cooperation affected the behaviors and the mentality of the leaders who separated founding Al-Wasat party. A group of moderate thinkers affected too the thoughts of the founders of the party. Thinkers like Al Awwa, Al Bishry, Emara, and Qaradawi had a great effect on the program of the party and its vision towards many cases. Those thinkers were belonging to Wasatiyah School which extend to old thinkers such as Mohamed Abdu, Gamal Aldin Alafghani, and Rasheed Reda. That is why the founders of Al-wasat Party were different compared to the MB in some issues such as the role of women in public life,

the rights of minorities, the separation between Dawaa and politics, and other issues. They believed that the woman can participate in the political life and to be candidate in the different positions even the position of the presidency. In addition, they believed the citizenship of everyone regardless of his religion. In the light of this vision, they did not mind if a Christian became a general candidate in the presidential elections.

Unlike the MB that did not make a separation between Dawaa and politics, Al-Wasat Party called for such separation. From their point of view, there must be a distance between them but that does not mean a separation between religion and politics. The most important indication of moderation is their desire to participate in the political life officially through founding a party. The MB did not try to found a political party before, but the leaders of Al-Wasat Party who was members of the MB insisted on having a legal recognition to avoid the repression of the state. Although the leaders of Al-Wasat party were willing to work officially, the regime did not allow that. The regime did not allow them to work.

CHAPTER IV

THE MODERATION OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY IN MOROCCO

The Justice and Development Party (PJD) in Morocco experiment reflects the relationship between the repression of the political regime and the Islamists arriving at moderation. The shape and the structure of the political regime in Morocco is different compared to the Egyptian one which was discussed in the previous chapter. The regime did not have any problems with religion in the public sphere and did not have any hostility against it due to many reasons will be discussed in this chapter. The regime allowed the Islamists to work giving them an official confession letting them founding political parties. But before that, there were waves of repression that forced the Islamists to confess the legitimacy of the regime working under its umbrella according to its rules.

The repression of the regime forced the Islamists to collaborate with other political wings because the regime didn't allow them to participate in elections without having a political party. They participated under the name of another political party. The repression led to cooperation with others participating in elections. The collaboration led to organizational, ideological, and behavioral changes. The most important one is accepting the legitimacy of the regime. Accepting the legitimacy of the regime is a key point to understanding the changes in the relationship between the regime and the Islamists, especially the PJD. This chapter is going to analyze the history of the PJD, the relationship between the PJD and the regime, and the thoughts of the party.

4.1. From Radicalism to Moderation, from Repression to Inclusion

Many leaders and members of the PJD were seniors in Shabiba Al-Islamiya (Islamic Youth), which was active during the mid-1970s (Hamzawy, 2008:7-8). Due to the repression of the state toward the movement in the late 1970s and 80s, some of its leaders split and formed a new movement namely Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) in 1983 under the leadership of Abdelilah Benkirane who became later the prime minister from the PJD (Perekli, 2012). The new group was trying to seize official

recognition from the king. They sent petitions to the king and the interior ministry with the group later in 1992 changing its name to Harakat Al-Islah wa al-Tajdid (Movement for Reform and Renewal) (Hamzawy, 2008:8). In 1992, Al-Islah wal a-Tajdid established a political party, namely Hizb At-Tajdid Al-Watani (the National Renewal Party) hoping to obtain an official license from the king but he refused (Perekli, 2012). Between 1992 and 1996, the leaders of Al-Islah got into discussions with Abdul Karim Al-Khatib, leader of the Democratic Constitutional Movement, to form one movement together (Hamzawy, 2008:8).

This unity gave an official way to Al-Islah after the king's refusal to participate in the political life. This can give us an indication that Islamists in Morocco were trying to work officially but the regime was refusing their participation, and the refusal pushed them to cooperate with other official political parties and movements. They participated in the elections of 1997 under the name of the Mouvement Populaire Démocratique Constitutionnel (MPDC) led by Abdulkarim Khatib, and in 1998 they changed its name to the Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD), and at the same time, Rabitat Al-Mustaqbal Al-Islamia (League of the Islamic Future) united with Al-Islah wa al-Tajdid under the Mouvement Unité et Réforme (MUR). So, the PJD became the political wing of Islamists, and the MUR became the grassroots wing of the PJD (Perekli, 2012).

The separation does not deny the idea of cooperation, it was a cooperation and coordination between the party and the movement with partnership (Wegner & Pellicer, 2009:161). Saad Eddine Al-Othmani argues that the separation between the party and the movement was a strategic step that started years ago and went through many phases arriving at the current status (Al-Othmani, 2015:132). For more separation, he affirms that since 2002, the party started to exclude the religious men who were occupying the religious positions and not giving them any political role because they believe that the religious institution must be neutral not belonging to any political side (Al-Othmani, 2015:144).

Perekli (2012) argues that there was a type of cooperation between the PJD and the MUR, both used each other but as independent institutions and this was useful (from its point of view) because it gave the space to the PJD to focus more on the daily issues of politics and the public affairs, while the MUR was involved more on religious issues. The separation between Dawaa and politics was due to internal and external

factors. The repression of the regime forced them to cooperate with another official political party. By entering the political arena and gaining experience, they were convinced of the necessity of separation. So, the repression of the regime and the gained experiences led to such a step.

The first participation of the party in the parliament was in 1997 when it gained nine seats, while in 2002 won 42 seats, and in 2007 won 46 seats (Hamzawy, 2008:8). In the elections of 1997, the party did not aim to gain many seats because the experience of Algerian experience had an effect, the Moroccan Islamists realized that it would be better to participate gradually to not get into a dispute with the regime if they could gain many seats (Al-Hiwar, 2012). In 1992, the Islamic Salvation Front won the parliament elections in Algeria, a matter that had not been accepted by the military making a coup. The military started a wave of repression against its leaders and members. It sent its leaders to the prisons and prohibited its activities. The Islamists started waves of violence to stand against the repression of the regime which lasted for ten years with about 100.000 people died due to the violent actions. This period is called by Black Decade (Wilson Center, 2015).

After the separation between the PJD and the MUR, the party started to use more political terminologies such as human rights, democracy, rotation of power, and civil state (Al-Othmani, 2015:140). The slogans used by the PJD during the election campaigns reflected the new way of thinking of the party, it started to use more political slogans rather than religious ones. Al-Othmani (2015:142-143) argues that instead of using the slogan "Islam is the solution", the party used political slogans, such as the slogan "Authenticity, justice, development" during the parliamentary elections of 1997, while during the elections of 2002, used the slogan "to a better Morocco", and in the elections of 2007, used the slogan "We all build a Morocco of justice". He adds that even during the national conferences of the party, its slogans were political, during its conference of 1999, it used the slogan "together for building", while during the one of 2004 used the slogan "Democracy: obligation and responsibility" and in its conference of 2008 used the slogan "no political life without credibility".

Amghar (2007:2) claims that the parliamentary members of the PJD downplay religious themes in favor of more political and secular matters in addition to adapting their political program to the government's public policies. The repressive

environment forced the PJD to enter the political arena, and as a normal sequence, accept the legitimacy of the regime. Due to the political learning and the gained experiences after the participation, the separation happened. To avoid the repression again and to protect what it gained, the party preferred to separate between religion and politics.

4.2. The Moroccan Regime and the PJD Between the Repression and the Inclusion

Before analyzing the relationship between the PJD and the political regime, it is necessary to shed light on the nature of the regime and its vision, especially regarding religion which plays a great role in Moroccan society. The behaviors of the regime towards the PJD are a vital factor in the moderation process of the party (Spiegel, 2015: 2). The regime practiced repression against the Islamists between the 1960s and the 1990s. During this era, the Islamists did not confess the legitimacy of the regime and they were challenging it calling for a radical change of the authority, a matter that was not accepted by the regime. Once a group of Islamists changed their thoughts and showed an intention to confess the legitimacy of the regime, the regime accepted them. Since the independence of Morocco in 1956, the ruling authority has been described as a semi-authoritarian regime that can share authority partially but controls overall, and before the 1997 elections, the political theatre was dominated by pro-regime parties (Hissouf, 2016:44)

According to Pellicer and Wegner (2015) there are two types of political parties in Morocco, the first that created by the palace and their managers are public figures who are close to the palace and their role is to seize parliamentary support, while the second type comes from the opposition movements which has been founded after waves of radicalism such as Hizb Al-Istiqlal, (the Independence Party), Union of Popular Forces (al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki li-l-Quwwat al-Sha‘biyya or Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires, i.e., USFP), and the PJD. These traditional parties were in a dispute with the PJD thinking that the party came to change the whole political life, which can explain their attitudes in many situations such as accusing the party of standing behind the terrorist attacks in Casablanca in 2003 (Al Hiwar, 2012).

The regime was not in a dispute with religion like other political regimes in the Middle East, the regime considers itself as the protector of religion. Hissouf (2016:46) argues that the identity of Morocco was a mixture of traditional culture, religion, and

modernity; religion and politics are barely separable, and the king who was surrounded by religious scholars, his decisions were in the name of Allah because he is reputedly descended from the Prophet Mohammed. In 1962, Hassan II introduced the king's title Amir al-Mumineen (Commander of the Faithful) to be included in the Moroccan constitution. As a result, the king was seen as "the guardian of an official and 'controlled' Moroccan Islamic model", this vision enabled the regime to control the political life as the only protector of religion (Hissouf, 2016:46-47).

The willingness to share the authority even partially enabled the Islamists to be included in political life. One of the reasons that can explain the willingness of the Moroccan regime to allow the Islamists to work explained by Huntington, argues that the late 1980s which witnessed economic problems pushed the political regimes to decrease their control on the opposition and to renew their legitimacy through elections, the Islamists make use of that (Huntington, 1991:13).

Perekli (2012) argues that the Islah movement changed its name deleting the Islamic reference to send messages to the king who started a period of political opening allowing the inclusion of some parties in the political process. She sees that although the opening was restricted and did not pave the way to a full democratic process, this opening encouraged the opposition to participate in political life. The movement had a desire to participate in political life after years of clashes with the authorities without results. The regime repressed them and there is an opportunity to open a new sheet with the regime accepting its legitimacy working from inside and according to its rules.

Perekli (2012) argues that even the initiatives, the political openings, and the inclusion of some opposition parties to political life did not lead to a fully democratic process, but "led to the establishment of a regime-controlled electoral contestation, which in turn increased the political demands of the opposition forces". From her point of view, the regime accepted the participation of the PJD in political life because it confessed the legitimacy of the monarchy and rejected the change in violent ways. They "played by the legal rules of the political game as well as to search for consensual agreements over the conduct of public affairs" (Hamzawy, 2008:2-3).

The PJD witnessed a great change, it not only confessed the legitimacy of the monarchy but also defended it (Hissouf, 2016:49). In 1996, while the party was preparing to participate in the elections, the regime requested its leaders not to participate (Al Hiwar, 2012). Perekli (2012) claims that the monarchy has a dual

identity, Islamic and secular, so, the regime allowed both Islamic and secular parties to choose from the constitution the articles that justify their political agendas.

The Moroccan people gathered only on two matters, the Islamic religion and the king, and confessing the legitimacy of the king was not a tactical but strategic step (Al-Hiwar, 2012). In its electoral manifesto of 2002, the PJD identified itself as a national political party, from its Islamic reference, and within the constitutional monarchy based on the Principality of the believers (Imarat Al-Mouminin) work for the contribution to building a modern and democratic Morocco, proud of its historical authenticity and a good contributor in the human civilization (Al-Othmani, 2015:134). Accepting the legitimacy of the regime and working under its conditions has been criticized by many members of the PJD, everyone who was calling for a dialogue with the regime and confessing its legitimacy was confronting waves of criticizing and accusing of making deals with the regime abandoning the principles of the movement and the party (Al-Hiwar, 2012).

The Moroccan regime aimed to control the multitude of political expressions in the name of religion through framing the religious identity of the Moroccan society. The regime launched many institutional reforms to control the religious field. The government established Ulema councils (religious scholars), the Higher Council of Ulema and the 1984 regulation on mosque construction. Further, the religious affairs in the Ministry of the Interior had the right to select the high positions related to the religious tasks (Hissouf, 2016).

It is important to mention the effective role of Makhzen in the political life in Morocco which affected not only the repression or the inclusion of Islamists but the whole political life. Makhzen is an apparatus that used by the state for many purposes, state violence, domination, conflict resolution controlled by the king, and representation of traditional royal power (Daadaoui, 2011). Daadaoui (2011) identified Makhzen as " a centralized political system with the sultan (later king) at center of a structure comprising the army, bureaucracy, ulema and the different Sufi lodges (zawiya)". Daadaoui argues that Makhzen became a reservoir of power.

Some researchers argue that Makhzen encouraged the establishment of the PJD which its leaders separated in 1969 from a radical group Al-Shabiba al-Islamiya (the Islamic Youth) which was the first to group using violence in the political life and was rejecting confessing the legitimacy of the regime and participating in the political life. Makzhen

encouraged and tolerated such separation to face the radical Islamists in addition to leftists and secularists (Hissouf, 2016). Later, after the success of the PJD in the elections, the Makhzen started to weaken the popularity of the party. Further, the Makhzen saw the party as a temporary appendage to the stability of the system (Ibid, 2016).

4.3 The Moderation of the PJD

The moderation of the party -according to some researchers- started in the 1990s when the party decided to participate in the parliament elections. The participation in the political arena taught the party to establish partnerships with the political powers inside and outside of the parliament. Al-Othmani (2015) explained the main guidelines of the PJD and the thoughts that they changed over time due to the accumulated experience during the past years before establishing the party. The main guidelines of the party will be discussed to examine to which extent we can notice the moderation of the party.

4.3.1 The Separation between Politics and Dawa

Spiegel argues that once the party has been formed, the destiny of the movement MUR had three scenarios, to disband it, to merge it within the party, or to keep it alive as a separate organization, the third one was the decision (2015:6). In 1997, the PJD became the political wing of Islamists, and the MUR became the grassroots wing of the PJD (Perekli, 2012). This means that there was a new strategy for applying separation between politics and Dawa. The party has been accused that this step was under pressure after the explosions of Casablanca in 2003 but Saadaldin Al-Othmani denies that. He argues this was a strategic step that started years ago and went through many phases to arrive at the current status (Al-Othmani, 2015:132) He explained that they believe in Islam as it covers all the aspects of personal and public life, but that does not mean it is without specialization, every Islamic association should be specialized in one issue and cooperate with others in a mode of integration (Ibid: 130)

He adds, the role of the movement is the education and Dawa, while the role of the party is participating in public affairs, and that has been declared in the document "the political participation and the relation between the movement and the party" which was issued during the conference of MUR held in November 2006 ((Ibid, 131) One of the reasons that made the separation process succeed is the existence of older and

newer members of the party who cannot accept the domination of the movement over the party (Al-Jazeera net, 2016) The separation was useful to both, the party and the movement, the movement managed to send religious messages attracting the youth who are interested more in religion than politics, and the party managed to use the movement for mobilization and getting control on it (Spiegel, 2015:6). There were three themes of separation (Al-Jazeera Net, 2016):

- 1- With full independence of both, no one has domination over the other, and everyone has its structure and its leaders, in that context, it was prohibited for the leaders of the movement to be candidates in the election or to have any responsibility in the party.
- 2- The movement does not participate in politics, but its role is to push the people to participate and raise awareness of the public, and these roles can be played by all the NGOs.
- 3- The partnership between the party and the movement does not mean that there is no dispute or different opinions on some issues, the movement can criticize the party as any NGO can.

4.3.2 More Political Slogans than Religious

As a result of the separation between politics and Dawaa and the separation between the PJD and the MUR, the party started to use more political words and slogans instead of religious ones and this was a translation of focusing on the political issues and the public affairs not on the social and religious as it was before the separation. Al-Othmani (2015:139-140) argues that political speeches of the party were a translation of its program, so, speeches such as the identity and the dispute of civilizations decreased, while speeches on political reform, social justice, and economic improvement increased.

He claims that the party uses modern terminologies such as democracy, pluralism, human rights, civil state, state of law, citizenship, and the peaceful circulation of power is contrary to the Islamist parties in the east which used pure religious slogans such as the Islamic State and the Khilafah. He sees that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire which was a representative of the Khilafah affected the eastern Islamists to make a new Islamic state, while the collapse pushed the Islamists in Morocco to reform the existing Islamic state not making a new one. Benkirane in a TV interview argues that the Khilafah collapsed in Turkey, but it still exists in Morocco claiming the state is a

religious one because it still uses Islamic expressions such as Amir al-Mumineen, in this state, loyalty must be for the ruler (Al-Hiwar, 2012).

Hamzawy (2008:9) argues that the party since 2002 was not involved so much in religious and ideological issues as the other Islamists in Egypt and Jordan did. Al-Othmani (2015:142-143) argues that instead of using the slogan "Islam is the solution, the party used political slogans, such as the slogan "Authenticity, justice, development during the parliamentary elections of 1997, while during the elections of 2002, used the slogan "to a better Morocco", and in the elections of 2007, used the slogan "We all build a Morocco of justice". He adds that even during the national conferences of the party, its slogans were political, during its conference of 1999, it used the slogan "together for building", while during the one9 of 2004 used the slogan "Democracy: obligation and responsibility" and in its conference of 2008 used the slogan "no political life without credibility".

Participation in political life affected the thoughts of the party, Al-Othmani in an interview (Hamzawy, 2008) said,

Without a doubt, the initial controversy in parliament and society had a considerable impact on the development of our thinking and our policies concerning the party and its members. In the beginning, we focused on articulating general principles. Over time we became more experienced and capable of evaluating government policy in a detailed way, as well as making political deals. This is progress, and we are looking to expand this expertise in the future.

The party used more political words than religious as being one of the political actors and that could be one of the regime's rules to accept the party in the political arena. To avoid the repression again and to maintain the gains, the party worked according the regime's rules.

4.3.3 More Concentration on Internal Affairs

As a result of the separation, the priority of the party was the political, economic, and social issues, while the priority of the MUR was defending identity issues and morals (Al-Othmani, 2015:138) although this separation, Al-Othmani did not deny that the party may engage to a religious case. He claims that all the parties in the parliament can discuss the religious affairs. Discussing it is not based on religious views but political (Ibid: 138). Hamzawy (2008:9) argues that the party defended the acceptance of the Mudawwana (the code regulating marriage and family life in the country)

although there was opposition from Islamists the party defended it as it has been accepted through a democratic process.

The party had the same situation as the regime that supported the Mudawwana. This situation reflects the moderation process of the party which stands with the regime against the critics of the other Islamists. It is clear that the party is involved completely in politics and has its own decisions apart from the Mur that could take another different decision and sometimes criticize the party. The party believes that there must be harmony between national, Islamic, and humanitarian dimensions, but the priority must be on the patriot one (Ibid: 141)

4.3.4 The Participation of Women in Public Affairs

Until the year of 1986, the Islamists in Morocco weren't convinced of the role of women in public affairs, but the first step to empowering her was that year by organizing the first conference and establishing the Department of Women, this step was a translation of the writings of some Islamists scholars such as Yusuf Al-Qaradawi and Mohammed Al-Ghazali (Al-Hiwar, 2012). Adopting the ideas of those two scholars could be due to their moderate thoughts. Al-Wasat Party too was inspired by their thoughts and writings. Empowering women inside the party and in the parliament maybe as a sign of moderation. Such steps maybe due to the participation of the party in the political life and due to the political learning, the party may gained political experiences to take such decisions. Gameela Al-Mosly –one of the women leaders of the JPD- shows that the party is confessing the role of women to build society and civilization, so, women are a great power inside the party, the case of women is not only slogans but it is based on a realization of the importance of the role of women (PJD TV, 2020). Abdul Kareem Al-Khateeb-the founder of the party- believed that there is no difference between men and women in politics and he refused the isolation of women inside the PJD (PJD, 2015).

The number of the party women members in the national council reached sixteen members instead of six, in 1999, the party chose the first women to be a member in the party leadership. In addition, six women from the party succeeded in entering the parliament in the elections of 2002 and the same number in 2007 (PJD, 2015). The year 2010 witnessed the birth of the first party organization of women that was responsible for protecting the values of the family, raising the participation of women in politics and public affairs, and other missions and aims (PJD, 2015).

Although these efforts, it was a too late step, the party was established in 1997, but the founding of a women's organization came after about 13 years. Maybe the party in other indications of moderation made speed progresses but in this case the progress was slow. Further, the participation of women inside the party or in the parliament is not equal to that of men, the number of women in the parliament was the same in 2002 and 2007, and women did not have a great participation in the party's management (Brichs et al., 2017:238). Khadeja Al-Riyadhi –one of the feminist activists- claims that these steps are not enough in a country where the equality of opportunities between men and women is not good. According to her, Morocco occupies the rank of 125 from 135 states in the equality of opportunities between men and women (Anadolu Agency, 2013).

4.4 Conclusion

The repression of the regime pushed many Islamists to separate from the violent groups forming new movements with the desire to participate in the political arena to avoid the state's repression. Such separation was not the desire of the separated group only, but also was the desire of Makhzen that welcomed such step to divide the Islamists to dominate and control the whole political life. The regime didn't give this group at the beginning an official recognition. A matter that forced them to cooperate with other official parties to participate in the elections. The PJD cooperated with Al Khatib -which had an official recognition- to participate in the political life.

Makhzen is a system which dates back to the twelfth and sixteenth century, an authority that started with just gathering taxes from the different regions to be the whole government and a deep state within the state. Makhzen formed of generals of the army, businessmen, judges, and elites. Makhzen had wide responsibilities in all the aspects of the Moroccan society. It shaped the political life, foreign policy, economy, diplomacy, culture, and social life of the Moroccan society. Palace and Makhzen to dominate the political life established pro political parties against the opposition parties. Even the monarchy used the Islamists and secularists, one against other to divide the political arena to grant the domination. Makhzen although it's welcoming of the separation of the group that established later the PJD, but later when he felt that the party threaten its stability, started to put obstacles in its way. Makhzen started to weaken the party and decreasing its popularity. It accused it supporting the

Casablanca terrorist attacks in 2003. It supported the pro system parties to stand against the PJD.

The Islamists like the other political powers suffered the repression of the regime especially during the era of king Hasan II. In his rule he practiced repression against all the political powers such as exile, torture, restricting the demonstrations and the public meetings, censorship on newspapers and magazines, forced disappearance, and detentions out of law (Human Rights Watch World Report 1992 - Morocco and Western Sahara, 1992). The era of his successor Mohamed VI witnessed a political openness, releasing the prisoners, expression freedoms, freedoms of demonstrations and public meetings. This period did not last much time because Makhzen practiced pressure to stop the reform steps because such steps could threat its interests and position. The regime made use of the terrorist attacks of 2003 to start waves of repression against the different political wings (Maghraoui, 2001).

The participation of the party in the political life made ideological and organizational changes such as the separation between Dawaa and politics, using political words rather than religious, believing in the democratic process although it could be against their religious thoughts, and confessing the legitimacy of the regime. The party changed its thoughts about the legitimacy of the regime to have an official recognition and to participate in the parliament elections (The PJD: The Vanguard of Democracy in Morocco in the Age of Populism and Authoritarian Entrenchment? | Baker Institute, 2018). In addition to avoid the repression of the regime that practiced against them before and against other Islamists.

The repression of the regime, the incentives, and the initiatives of the regime allowed them to enter the public theatre. The nature of the regime which did not have any dispute with religion helped the inclusion and the moderation of the Islamists. Further, Most PJD members come from the educated urban middle classes and university-educated working in liberal professions such as businessmen, traders, and students (Brichs et al., 2017:238). It is obvious that the members and the leaders of the party play a great role in the moderation process, one of the factors that helped the PJD to get into political life and adapt to it is control, which means the capacity to control the party (Spiegel, 2015:2).

CHAPTER V

COMPARING IDEOLOGICAL AND BEHAVIOR CHANGES IN AL-WASAT PARTY AND THE PJD

In the previous chapter, Al-Wasat party and the PJD were discussed. This chapter is going to make a comparison between both of them to analyze the similarities and the differences. The main point is examining To what degree do Islamists change or maintain their beliefs and behaviors in authoritarian contexts in response to closures and openings in the political system? The experiences and the history of Al-Wasat Party in Egypt and the PJD in Morocco are different. While Al-Wasat Party did not take any official recognition, the PJD was an official party that participated in the different elections arriving at leading the government. Although the environment in which both parties were working was under authoritarian regimes, the PJD was allowed to participate in the elections arriving at forming the government. The differences between the two cases are due to many factors among them are the repression of the political regime and the readiness of the party to work in an authoritarian environment. This chapter will discuss the nature of the Egyptian and Moroccan regimes to understand their attitudes toward Islamists, and the differences and similarities between the two case studies.

5.1 The Natures of the Regimes in Egypt and Morocco

Egypt witnessed a dramatic change in 1952 when the political system changed from a monarchy to a republic due to a coup managed by military officers. Since that time, the main core of the state has been composed of the armed forces and the intelligence services. Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak who ruled Egypt until 2011 belonged to the military. The military didn't rule directly but the president –who is military- had all the powers in his hand. The military enjoyed a position that was superior to that of any other authority (The Second Egyptian Republic, 2012). Nasser was calling for a secular state contrary to the religious themes that existed during the monarchy era (Leonard, 2008:10). The era of Mubarak witnessed neoliberal policies which led to an alliance between the armed forces and the unproductive bourgeoisie. This unproductive bourgeoisie had the upper hand in the alliance, especially with the arrival of Gamal

Mubarak who had great authority inside the ruling party with the new businessmen (Del Panta, 2020).

Some observers are talking about a deep state in the military that refuses any democratic transition in Egypt (The Second Egyptian Republic, 2012). Some argue that the military is seizing all the power in its hands because there are no ready liberal political forces to lead the state and to cut the way against the Islamists to transfer the state to an Islamic state (Ibid, 2012). The political arena during the era of Mubarak was under control. The regime was giving the license to the parties that had attained the satisfaction of the regime. The licenses of the new parties were issued by a committee headed by one of the leaders of the ruling party (Zayed & Stewart, 2011) The opposition parties during that era were seen as a joke and a tool in the hands of the regime (Ibid, 2011).

Morocco has been governed by a semi-authoritarian regime since its independence in 1956. The regime was ready to share authority but with its control. Before the 1997 elections, the political theatre was dominated by pro-regime parties (Hissouf, 2016:44). The system is used to divide the political arena to keep its domination to maintain authoritarian rule (Sater, 2009).

Makhzen is the key point to understand the nature of the political regime in Morocco. Historically, Makhzen literally refers to an institution in the sixteenth century which had the responsibility to gather the taxes before sending it to the Ummah treasury. Starting from the twelfth century, Makhzen had great roles and responsibilities, it became the whole government that includes the army and the administration.. Zakaria (2019) argues that the stability of Morocco is due to the power of Makhzen which practices it in the political life, public affairs, diplomacy, foreign policy, trade, economy, the social and the cultural power of people.

Maghraoui (2001) argues that the regime used cooptation to grant non-violent adversaries within the political elite. He claims that the multi-party system in Morocco was designed to select, forming, and control the political life. Maghraoui thinks that cooptation was useful for the regime in a manner that distribute electoral seats among the political parties to maintain balance, it can push the voters to participate in the elections, and using the tribal, familial, and regional relations may attain selected office through dubious means. In addition, he sees that the mechanisms of cooptation is designed for domestic security and political repression.

To understand the relationship between the military and the Islamists, it is important to go back to the coup of 1952 operated by the free officers. The free officers among them were members of the MB who participated in the coup of 1952. After the success of the coup, they were expecting a great contribution to the government, but Nasser had another point of view. He saw them as a threat to its secular project and a threat to the state and society. So, he started waves of repression against its leaders and members (Leonard, 2008:15).

So, the doctrine of the military state that was established in 1952 is based on secular principles refusing the existence of Islamists in political life because it sees them as a threat to the state and the regime. That may explain the waves of repression against the Islamists. In addition, the founded republic in 1952 cannot accept the rule of a civil president and that also may explain the reasons that stood behind the coup of 2013 against Mursi and their refusal of any democratic process.

The relation between Makhzen and the PJD got through different phases, between accepting and refusing, exclusion and inclusion. In 1969, a group of Al Shabiba Allslamiyya separated refusing its path of violence against the state. The movement in this period was the first to use violence in the political arena. Makhzen welcomed this separation. But later, this group which separated was the group that founded the PJD. Makhzen considered the PJD a threat to its stability and its power (Hissouf, 2016).

The traditional parties were in a dispute with the PJD thinking that the party came to change the whole political life, which can explain their attitudes in many situations such as accusing the party of standing behind the terrorist attacks in Casablanca in 2003 (Al-Hiwar, 2012). That goal is what Sater (2009) discussed, the regime was aiming to divide the political arena to keep its domination. In this context, it is important to mention Makhzen which represents a "deep state". "Makhzen represents a supra-state within the state and includes a network of powerful men in the royal palace, military leaders, and intelligence officers who benefit from surrounding the king, shaping his decisions, and having more clout than elected officials" (Cherkaoui, 2023). Cherkaoui (2023) argues that there are two governments in Morocco, the upper one is composed of royal advisors, and the lower one which formed by partisan and technocratic figures who had the approval of Makhzen.

5.2 The Repression of the Regimes in Egypt and Morocco

The repression during the era of Mubarak took many types, he used tailor made laws to oppress the opposition such as the law of emergency, the law of the elections, the law of the syndicates, etc. In addition, he used the illegal arrests and the military trials as tools of repression (Ryan, 2001). There are many reasons that pushed Mubarak to pose repression during his era. Davidson (2000) argues that the personality of Mubarak affected its authority. He argues that Mubarak did not have any charisma such as Nasser and Sadat and he had not any vision like them, he was a technician not a systematic thinker or visionary. So, he was not interested in making a real reform. Its regime was a restricted autocratic political system and even there were initiatives but were not sufficient, he was governing as his personal fiefdom and had not advisors since the gulf war (Davidson, 2000).

One of the reasons that can explain the repression of the regime against the Islamists is the vision of the Islamists in the eyes of the regime. Mubarak was seeing all the Islamists as radicals, no difference between them. He described all of them as terrorists even the MB which has been described by him as moderate, he described it as supporter of violence (Davidson, 2000). In addition, Mubarak did not give any sign that the moderates could take part in the political theatre (Wickham, 2004).

The repression practiced by the regime is one of its strategies of survival. Ryan (2001) argues that the regime that established after the coup of 1952 used three main survival strategies: containment, repression, and external diversion. To contain the opponents, he aimed to control, absorbing, and balancing the key power centers against one another. While repression is using violence against the opposition, job dismissals, controlling future hiring, and arbitrary arrest. External diversion is a strategy used to turn the attention of the public away from the internal social and economic problems.

Maghraoui (2001) argues that the monarchy during the era of King Hassan II and his son Mohamed VI used repression, corruption, and cooptation to preserve medieval political authority. He claims that King Hassan II used mass political trials, detention, and violent suppression. He argues that during the era of King Hassan II about 6000 citizen considered as victims of torture. He sees that the monarchy used cooptation to practice a political repression.

Amnesty international in his report about Morocco mentioned that the period of king Hasan II witnessed repression of political dissent, enforced disappearance of hundreds, arbitrary detention of thousands, and the systemic use of torture and other ill-treatment (Morocco: Torture in Morocco and Western Sahara: In Summary: Stop Torture Country Briefing - Amnesty International, 2014). The same report mention that the torture was an essential tool in the hands of police to extract confession from the prisoners in addition to the absence of legal access and having a lawyer. The report argues that during the era of king Hasan there were restrictions on expression freedom. Human Rights Watch argues that the demonstrations and the public meetings organized by the opposition parties, unions, and human rights organizations were restricted and the publications were banned or seized due to its political content (Human Rights Watch World Report 1992 - Morocco and Western Sahara, 1992).

After the death of king Hasan and the arrival of his son Mohamed VI in 1999, the case started to change. Maghraoui (2001) claims that Mohamed VI in his first two years made steps to improve the political arena and the human rights. He let the opposition which remained in exile to return back to home, established an independent commission to investigate the human rights violations and its victims. He argues that Mohamed VI set an environment of liberalization which enabled the Moroccans to speak freely after 38 years of repression under the reign of his father. But Maghraoui claims that this situation did not last long. The king under the pressure of Makhzen started to come back to the same measures of his father due to his inability to launch real reforms. He argues that the king put controls on expression freedoms and there was censorship. He mentioned that eight newspapers have been censored because it published reports about the corruption in the army.

The war against Al Jamaa Al Islamiyya was another factor that pushed the regime to impose more repression against all the wings of the opposition especially the Islamists. Al Jamaa Al Islamiyya started its activities since the 1970 s aiming to change the secular regime replacing it with Islamic one through using the violence. It killed fifty-eight of tourists in Luxor in 1997 (Fletcher, 2008). In this time there was a public opinion against the Islamic group due to killing the tourists (Montada, 2016). The war against Al Jamaa Al Islamiyya affected the decision of Mubarak to be more repressive. For example, the government issued the law 93/1005 to penalize the journalists and the writers if they mentioned any news about the Islamists accusing them –according

to the law- harming the peace and the economy. In addition, to cut the road on Islamist from arriving to the authority, the government canceled the local elections giving the authority of managing the local administrations in villages to the ministry of interior (Davidson, 2000).

While in Morocco the terrorist attacks of Casablanca in 2003 affected the human rights and the freedoms in Morocco. The state used these attacks to practice repression against the different political wings. HRW argues that the anti-terrorist law (Law 3/2003) which has been approved by the parliament gave the state broad authorities to convict hundreds of suspected members of terrorist cells in addition to accuse journalists of terrorism. To the HRW, the government due to these terrorist attacks started to practice abuses, torture, absence of fair trials, and restrictions on demonstrations and public meetings (Morocco's Truth Commission: Honoring Past Victims during an Uncertain Present: III. Background: The State of Human Rights in Morocco, 2005).

Mubarak issued many laws to justify its repression against the opposition especially the Islamists. After the assassination of Sadat, he issued the law of emergency which lasted until the end of his authority in 2011 (Montada, 2016). The law gave broad credits to the police for detaining the individuals who seem to be a threat. Further the law posed limits on freedoms of assembly, residence and travel, getting civilians to be sentenced in military courts, and rights to monitor and censor publications (Egyptian Emergency Laws, n.d.).

To control the results of the elections in favor of his party, Mubarak designed the laws that organize the elections. One of these examples is the law which in his light the elections of 1984 has been organized. The law set a minimum percentage that every party should obtain to enter the parliament. Most of the parties did not exceed the 8% percentage which granted a full domination of the National Democratic Party that won 87% of the seats and 72.9% of the votes (Montada, 2016). This law and others enabled the party to dominate all the political life, in 1987 won the election with percentage of 69% and in 1990 won 86% of seats and in 1995 won 94% of the total of seats (Davidson, 2000). These elections excluded both the MB and the communists to participate under their names because the law of parties in this era prohibited establishing a party on basis of religion or classes. This exclusion forced the MB to

make an alliance with Al Wafd Party which won 15% of the votes in 1984 (Ufheil-Somers, 2016).

In Morocco, The willingness to share the authority even partially enabled the Islamists to be included in political life. The PJD “played by the legal rules of the political game as well as to search for consensual agreements over the conduct of public affairs” (Hamzawy, 2008:2-3). The PJD witnessed a great change, it not only confessed the legitimacy of the monarchy but also defended it (Hissouf, 2016:49). Perekli (2012) claims that the monarchy has a dual identity, Islamic and secular, so, the regime allowed both to choose from the constitution the articles that justify their political agendas. In addition, she argues that the regime allowed the PJD to work because it accepted its legitimacy and the regime used the PJD as a party with Islamic reference to foster its political integration into the system.

There was a stream in the palace that did not accept the party due to its Islamic reference and it tried to put obstacles in front of the party (Al-Hiwar, 2012). Pruzan-Jørgensen (2010) argues that the generals of the army realized that king Mohamed VI does not have a charisma like his father, so, to maintain their positions and privileges, they granted a soft transfer of power to not give any opportunity for a political demand of reform. In addition, he sees that this group of generals did not block the way of the PJD only but also it generated a general process of de-liberalization. The same idea shared by Maghraoui who argues that the old guard which has been formed during the era of king Hasan II which their interests meet with the interests of Makhzen stand against any attempt of reform because it threaten their interests and privileges (2001).

Mubarak was afraid of the Islamization of society, and after the won of the Islamists in the syndicates, he issued a law that could grant the domination of its authority over these syndicates. The aim was stopping the activities and the victories of the Islamists who won the elections of the syndicates (Essam El-Din, 2010). The syndicates, trade unions and interest groups were about 89 organizations with about seven millions members (Hassan, 2011). In 1993, he issued the law 100/1993 which give the right to the government to supervise the syndicate in special cases. According to the law, the elections of the syndicate to be legal, the percentage of the voter must exceed 50% of the members, and the percentage of 33 % in the second round. In case of the failure of getting such percentage, the government could supervise the syndicate directly (Davidson, 2000).

In the same context, but in the political area, the regime used the Political Party Affairs Committee as a tool of repression to not give the opportunity for the Islamists to have a presence in the political life. The committee which had the membership of the president of the Shura Assembly and some ministers had the authority to accept or refuse the applications of the parties. The committee accepted only two parties, Al-Umma Party in 1983 and the National Conciliation (Al-Wifak) Party in 2000 and refused all the other requests (Hassan, 2011).

The law 93/1005 was one of these laws that aimed to oppress the political powers and the civil society. The law penalized the journalists and writers if they insult public officials or state institutions with a five-year imprisonment (Davidson, 2000). According to this law, four journalists had been imprisoned for the first time in the history of journalism since 1952 (“Statement by Egyptian Human Rights Organizations,” 2020). In the same context, the government issued another law, the law 3/1998 which gave the government broad authorities to close the independent newspapers, bans on printing some newspapers and magazines, further, any new license must get an approval from the cabinet of ministers (“Statement by Egyptian Human Rights Organizations,” 2020).

The military tribunals was one of the repression tools used by Mubarak to oppress the Islamists. Since the year of 1992, it started to have a great role instead of the civilian ones. Mubarak preferred such tribunals because the trials would be speed comparing to the civilian ones, in addition, the state had the full control on the military tribunals because their judges were selected by the ministry of defense (Davidson, 2000). The military tribunals had been accused of violating human rights. The verdicts could not be appealed to a higher tribunal, in addition, there were reports about torture and denying access to legal counsel during the trials (Refworld - UNHCR’s Global Law and Policy Database, 2024). Another tool of repression was Mabahith Amn ad-Dawla which was a branch of the police forces which have units dedicates only for the investigation and the arresting of the Islamists and the opposition generally (Kingsley, 2017). It had a great authority to detain and torture masses of politicians (Amar, 2011).

While in Morocco Human Rights Watch argues that during the rule of King Mohamed VI press enjoyed freedom and it could criticize the corruption of the government, human rights violations, and financial scandals. The type of the article that were prohibited to be published before, it can be published. HRW confesses that although

this freedom, there were red lines, and if someone violates these lines, the imprisonment is the punishment in addition to the suspension and the closure of the newspapers that violate too (Morocco's Truth Commission: Honoring Past Victims during an Uncertain Present: III. Background: The State of Human Rights in Morocco, 2005).

5.3 The Moderation Success and its Limitations

Schwedler (2007:57-58) defined three effects considering them as signs of moderation, the first is the participation in elections, the second is cooperation with others and the third is whether Islamists show signs of moderation as a result of their experiences of inclusion. Applying that to the two case studies, Al-Wasat party did not have the opportunity to participate in elections because the regime refused their request to found the party three times (Madi, personal communication, Dec 23, 2023), so, it is difficult to apply that measure to identify to what extent it had been moderated. Although the repression of the regime refused their requests to establish the party, its leaders and members did not become radicals or violent. So, the repression did not lead to counter results, the party tried many times to gain official recognition despite the refusal of the regime.

The PJD succeeded gradually in seizing the majority in the parliament. Before participation and before becoming an official party, the regime practiced repression against it by not giving a license to a political party. A matter that pushed them to collaborate with Abdulkareem AlKhateeb. This collaboration shows that the repression led to moderation persuading the leaders of the Islamists to work and cooperate with other political wings to have an opportunity to participate in the political life and avoiding the repression of the regime, this can be behavioral moderation. So, the PJD entered the political arena accepting the legitimacy of the regime refusing the use of the violence within a political process. This was an ideological change.




Figure 5. 1: The number of parliamentary seats won by the PJD between 1997 and 2021

Source: MIPA Institute, 2023




Figure 5.2: PJD's share of votes

Source: Elliott School of International Affairs

The group that separated from the Muslim Brotherhood which founded the party was working before in the syndicates and later participated in the election under the signs of the Brotherhood. The repression of the regime that prevented the MB from participating in political life pushed them to search for other ways to exist. So, the MB participated in the different syndicates, and during this participation, they learned and were forced to cooperate with the other political wings to stand against the repression of the regime. During this period, they were opened on the other political wings.

Madi (personal communication, Dec 23, 2023) said, “We made relations with most syndicates, organized political forums in the syndicates, and hosted persons from all the political wings. We tried to make a national accord document.” This cooperation affected the moderation process of the party, Meijer (2013) argues that this generation which founded Al-Wasat party made ideological changes. El-Ghobashy supports the idea that the middle-aged generation affected the thoughts of the MB due to its openness to others, participation in the elections, and public work in the syndicates. She argues there was “a shift in their ideological plank from politics as a sacred mission to politics as the public contest between rival interests”. As a result of not being a legal party the MB was excluded from working officially, and the MB tried to cooperate with other political parties that had already licenses. It cooperated with Al-Wafd party to participate together in the elections of 1984, Ikhwan had a popular base, while Al-Wafd had a legal channel, and the same cooperation happened during the elections of 1987, the MB cooperated with the Labor Party. She argues that this generation has done this cooperation.

Between 1992 and 1996, the leaders of Al-Islah (who later became the leaders of the PJD) got into discussions with Abdul Karim al-Khatib, leader of the Democratic Constitutional Movement, to form one movement together (Hamzawy, 2008:8). This unity gave an official way to Al-Islah after the king refused to establish a political party. This can give us an indication that Islamists in Morocco were trying to work officially but the regime was refusing their participation, and the refusal pushed them to cooperate with other official political parties and movements. They participated in the elections of 1997 under the name of the Mouvement Populaire Démocratique Constitutionnel (MPDC) led by Abdulkarim Khatib. The participation led the party to many organizational and ideological changes.

Hamzawy (2008:9) argues that the party since 2002 was not involved so much in religious and ideological issues as the other Islamists in Egypt and Jordan did. After the separation between the PJD and the MUR, the party started to use more political terminologies such as human rights, democracy, rotation of power, and civil state (Al-Othmani, 2015:140).

Brichs et al argue that four dynamics forced the Islamists to choose between being pragmatic and being marginalized. The first is the political repression. The second is the Algerian civil war which showed for the Islamists the result of using violence

against the regime and showed for the regimes there is a need to contain the moderate Islamists to confront the radicals. The third is the end of the economic crisis and the recovery of rentierist mechanisms. The fourth is the changes in the grassroots of Islamist movements (2017:16-0)

Munteanu and Seniguer argue that the separation between the PJD and the MUR as a part of specialization did not guarantee the full moderation of the PJD in Morocco. They argue that "the PJD was conceived as the representative of MUR's ideas in the political field. It became a "political party with an Islamic reference" (2023:75). They argue that there is a cooperation between the two wings, the leaders of the party are active in the activities of the movement. Hamzawy sees that the separation between Dawa and political activities wasn't internally convincing but it came under attack to focus more on the economic and social issues and they were "accused of watering down religious commitments to advance in the political process" (2008:2).

Munteanu and Seniguer see that the party did not reach full moderation because, from their points of view, "it seems that human rights could be accepted, but are not superior to sharia law" (2023:96). In this context, Hamzawy argues that the PJD has shown liberal thought when accepted in 2005 Al-Mudawwana (the code regulating marriage and family life in the country) although the refusal of conservative Islamists (2008:9). The party defended its attitude by saying that the acceptance went through a democratic process (Ibid: 9).

Wickham argues that contrary to the logic that inclusion leads to moderation and repression leads to radicalization, even under authoritarian regimes, the Islamists in Egypt moderated themselves to avoid state repression, instead of radicalizing and using violence against the regime (2004: 213). In the case of Al-Wasat party, its leaders separated from the MB preferring to establish a political party to not work underground to avoid the repression of the state that they suffered while they were members of the Brotherhood. Although their requests have been refused, they maintained their way of moderation. In the case of the PJD, to avoid the repression of the state, its leaders tried to have a political party but the king did not accept. The refusal forced them to cooperate with another political party to keep working officially. All these steps were to avoid the repression of the state.

5.4 Conclusion

There are many similarities between the Al-Wasat party and the PJD. Both were working under authoritarian regimes which aimed to have all the powers in their hands and if they were forced to share some of them, but still under control. The deep state in Egypt that formed after the coup of 1952 was ruling the political arena, while Al-Makhzan in Morocco was playing the same role. The regime in Morocco like the regime in Egypt, both were trying to create parties to be a tool in his hand using it against the other popular parties. But the difference is while the system in Morocco is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy, it is a republican in Egypt. While the system in Egypt is based on secular roots advocated by Nasser after the coup of 1952, the regime in Morocco did not have any hostility against the religion. Indeed, the king sees him as the protector of the religion as Amiru Al-Mominin. In addition, the regime in Egypt, despite the moderate thoughts of Al-Wasat party and his desire to participate in the political arena, the system did not give it official confession. While the Moroccan regime gave it to the PJD when it noticed the signs of moderation.

Al-Wasat and the PJD were separated from a mother group due to many reasons. The first reason is the disputes on thoughts and visions related to accepting the legitimacy of the regime, the readiness to interact with the initiatives of the regime to enter the political arena, and the separation between religion and politics. Al-Wasat separated from the Muslim Brotherhood, while the PJD separated from the MUR. The second one is the repression of the state that forced them to separate, they separated to avoid the repression.

Al-Wasat party' leaders separated from the MB because they were working underground, a matter that made them suffer from the repression. The PJD leaders made the step under the same conditions. Al-Wasat did not receive any initiative from the regime to allow it to participate officially in politics because the Egyptian regime -unlike the Moroccan one- didn't aim to use the parties from different backgrounds to make a type of balance by dividing them to maintain its domination. The Egyptian regime did not allow any real political party to work officially. The PJD made use of the willingness of the regime to share the authority with others even if it was under control.

Al-Wasat did not have the opportunity to participate in the elections, but the PJD had it participating in the different elections arriving at forming the government after

seizing the majority. Both cooperated with the other political wings due to the repression of the state that forced them to make such a change. Al-Wasat party leaders were the maestros who led the cooperation between the MB and Al-Wafd, Al-Amal, and Al-Ahrar party during the elections of the mid of the 90s because the MB did not have any official confession. The leaders of the party- while they were still members in the MB- were responsible for the coordination between the MB and the other political powers that cooperated with. The PJD participated in the elections of 1997 under the name of the MPDC led by Abdulkarim Khatib because it did not have a legal existence at that time. The repression of the regimes pushed them to cooperate with others and this cooperation led to many ideological and behavioral changes.



CONCLUSION

This thesis explored to what degree do Islamists change or maintain their beliefs and behaviors in authoritarian contexts in response to closures and openings in the political system? The thesis tried to examine whether repression leads to further radicalization or moderation among Islamists in two countries, Egypt and Morocco choosing two case studies, Al-Wasat Party in Egypt and the PJD in Morocco. The behaviors of the political regimes in both countries were different and affected the moderation process. While the Egyptian regime did not give the party an official license to work, the Moroccan one allowed the PJD to work allowing it even to form the government after winning the majority in the elections.

To examine the success of moderation, measures have been applied such as participation in elections, cooperation with others, and whether Islamists show signs of moderation as a result of their experiences of inclusion. These are behavioral changes, but also ideological changes have been applied to examine both two case studies. In addition, the thesis analyzed the factors that affect the moderation process mainly the repression of the regime in addition to other secondary factors such as the institutional opportunities and incentives, political learning, learning from other Islamists in other countries, the mentality of the leaders of the Islamists, intraparty dynamics, and the interaction between the internal and external factors.

In chapter two, Al-Wasat party is analyzed exploring its history and the circumstances of its birth and foundation. The process of moderation of the party did not start after the foundation but before. The key point to understanding the moderation process of its leaders and members is the repression of the state. The repression made by the regime against the members of the MB forced the leaders of the Al-Wasat party to avoid that repression by distancing themselves from the MB and trying to have official recognition. The repression of the regime is related to its nature and its foundation which started since the military coup of 1952. The Egyptian regime which made a cooperation with the MB to make such military coup, considered the Islamists as a threat to its existence especially after adopting secular thoughts. The regime cannot accept the rule of civilians whether to be Islamist or not.

The repression of the regime was directed to all the political wings not only the Islamists. The regime used the laws to oppress the political movements and the NGOs. During the era of Mubarak, there were many laws that had been used to make restrictions on the freedoms. Mubarak issued the law of emergency and lasted until the end of his rule. According to this law, the government had the right to arrest anyone accusing him by terrorism, putting restrictions on public meetings and demonstrations, closing newspapers and magazines, and the mass arrest. The law of syndicates gave the right to the government to put its hands on the syndicates. The aim of the regime was to decrease the activities of the Islamists who won the elections of the syndicates and were working actively, but Mubarak was seeing that as a threat to his authority.

In addition, he issued the law of founding parties which gave the full authority to a committee of executive men. This committee gave only the permission of two parties during the whole era of Mubarak. Although their three requests have been refused by the regime, the members of Al-Wasat Party maintained their moderation. The leaders of the party such as Aboeela Madi, Essam Sultan, Atef Awwad, and others have been members of the Muslim Brotherhood since they were students in the universities. They were active in politics in the university campus and later when they became leaders in professional syndicates and candidates in the parliament elections. Due to their openness to the other political powers during their activities in syndicates, they learned to cooperate with other political wings, and they learned from other Islamists in Turkey for example. They went into a dispute with the old guard of the Muslim Brotherhood. This dispute was due to differences in visions and thoughts, the new generation was more open to others and had the ambition to work officially not underground, in addition, there was a gap between the two generations in issues such as the participation of women in political life, the rights of the Christians, the separation between politics and Dawaa, and other issues. The old guard had another vision.

The new generation was forced to leave the Brotherhood forming Al-Wasat Party, such a step was opposed by both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian regime which refused the license of the party three times. The refusal had many reasons, there were suspicions that it was an arm of the Brotherhood and that step was a hidden plan of the Brotherhood's agenda. A wing of the Egyptian regime was afraid of the party because this wing was marketing itself as a moderate one against the Muslim Brotherhood, so, accepting Al-Wasat party could be a threat to their plans. The program of the party

was not affected only by the thoughts of its leaders, but also by many thinkers of Wasatiyyah such as Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Fahmi Huwaydi, Tariq Al-Bishri, Muhammad Salim Al-Awa, Muhammad Al-Ghazali, and Muhammad Imara. Those thinkers were the intellectual background of the party and its cultural organization Jam'iyat Misr Lil-Thaqafa Wal-Hiwar which was founded after the denial of the party's license. The thoughts of the party were different from the thoughts of the Muslim Brotherhood which reflects progressive steps of moderation. It gave more space to the freedoms that come before anything from their point of view. The party did not refuse a Christian to be a candidate in the presidential elections. Relating to the role of women in political life, it did not refuse that, it accepted its role and did not mind being a candidate in any elections. Further, the party saw Sharia as a tool of modernity, but it must be translated by moderate scholars to fit the needs of the people.

The party moderated itself to avoid the repression of the regime instead of radicalizing and using violence against it (2004: 213). Al-Wasat Party is a good example to prove that "Islamist movements and parties can moderate their ideologies under both inclusive and exclusive regimes" (Tallmeister, 2013:5). The leaders of the party who were members of the MB were not satisfied to work underground because working underground made them suffer from the repression of the state. Although the party suffered the repression of the regime, it kept its moderation and did not become a radical one. The exclusion led to moderation not to radicalization.

Chapter three analyzed the PJD and its moderation process. The leaders who founded the PJD were belonging to Islamic groups but they split from them refusing violence as a tool of political change. The Moroccan regime denied their request to establish a party, such exclusion forced them to cooperate with an existing official party. The repression of the regime forced them to change their thoughts about politics and the participation.

They moved from a pragmatic position to make an alliance with another political power accepting the legitimacy of the regime playing in the political theatre under the regime's codes and rules. They participated in the elections of 1997 under the name of the Mouvement Populaire Démocratique Constitutionnel (MPDC) led by Abdulkarim Khatib. Since this participation, they used to participate in elections but with the new party the PJD. The elections of 2016 were the greatest won in its history by gaining 125 seats in parliament.

To understand the behaviors of the regime towards the PJD, it is important to understand the nature of the regime, and to understand its nature, Makhzen is the keyword. Makhzen is composing of state's men from all positions in addition to businessmen and independent men. Makhzen has a great effect not only on the political level, but also the economic, religious, cultural, and social levels. Makhzen has its parties and politicians that through them guarantees the stability of the monarchy.

From that prospect, the relation with the PJD can be understand. Makhzen welcomed the separation of the leaders of the PJD from the radical group that were belonging to. Its aim was to divide the political actors to guarantee its domination, the regime allowed both secularists and Islamists to work but under its legitimacy feeding the disputes between them to maintain its stability. But later, Makhzen saw the PJD as a threat to its authority. Makhzen started to put obstacles against the PJD.

The repression of the regime against the Islamists was heavy during the era of king Hasan II. He used many tools of repression such as the mass arrest, the enforced disappearance, the torture, the restrictions on the demonstrations and the public meetings, the exiles of thousands of Islamists, the closure of newspapers and magazines, and the absence of expression freedoms. The leaders of Islamists who founded the PJD were prevented to establish a political party during that era.

The era of Mohamed VI at the beginning witnessed liberal thoughts but for few years. He released the political prisoners, allowing the politicians who were in exile to return, gave a great space to journalism to criticize the corruption, gave another space to the political parties. But under the pressure of Makhzen which saw such liberal steps as a threat to the stability of the monarchy especially after the terrorist attacks of Casablanca in 2003, the regime started to put restrictions on the freedoms and the steps that he took started to get back.

The Moroccan regime sees itself as the only protector of the religion and the king as Amir al-Mumineen. His decisions were under the name of Allah because he claimed to be descended from the Prophet Mohammed. This vision helped the inclusion of the PJD in politics because the regime did not have any critical issues with religion like other countries in the Middle East. The regime allowed the PJD to work for many reasons. Accepting the Islamists as the PJD may encourage other Islamists like Al-Adl movement -which does not confess the legitimacy of the regime- to participate in political life. One of the most important reasons that facilitated the inclusion of the

PJD was its acceptance of the legitimacy of the regime and the readiness to work under its umbrella. The party did not only accept its legitimacy but also defended it on many occasions.

The political inclusion of the PJD led to ideological changes which affected their visions in many political cases. The party believes in Islam as it covers all the aspects of personal and public life, but that does not mean it is without specialization, every Islamic association should be specialized in one issue and cooperate with others in a mode of integration. As an application to this change, the party separated itself from the MUR which represented the religious and social structure of the party. The separation between politics and Dawaa affected positively both of them. The leaders of the party did not accept the domination of the MUR leaders on the party's affairs, and that was a great factor in making the separation succeed.

The party started to use more political words. Speeches such as the identity and the dispute of civilizations decreased, while speeches on political reform, social justice, and economic improvement increased. That was a result of the separation between politics and Dawaa. The party was involved in issues like moral and religious issues, it was concerned about the Islamic subjects which were belonging to other countries. But gradually the party became concentrated on national issues. The party believes that there must be harmony between national, Islamic, and humanitarian dimensions, but the priority must be on the patriot one. The PJD showed liberal thought when accepted in 2005 Al-Mudawwana (the code regulating marriage and family life in the country) although the refusal of conservative Islamists.

Until the year of 1986, the Islamists in Morocco weren't convinced of the role of women in public affairs, but the first step to empowering her was that year by organizing the first conference and establishing the Department of Women, this step was an implementation of the writings of some Islamists scholars such as Yusuf Al-Qaradawi and Muhammed Al-Ghazali. The first party organization of women was established in 2010 and it is responsible for protecting the values of the family, raising the participation of women in politics and public affairs, and other missions and aims.

The PJD leaders was excluded from the political theatre when they were refusing the legitimacy of the regime and using the violence and the radical thoughts as tools of change in the political arena. Once this group of Islamists separated and accepted the legitimacy of the regime accepting the political tools as means of change, the regime

welcomed such moderation, this attitude was not a real intention of the regime to include them, but there were other reasons that push the regime to welcome that separation. As a proof, the regime did not allow them establishing a party. Although that, the leaders of the PJD kept their moderation and they did not come back to be radicals. The exclusion pushed them to make an alliance with other legal and official party to work freely under its umbrella. The regime finally accepted their request to establish a party allowing them to work officially to the extent that the president of the government was one of party's leaders. So, both the exclusion and the inclusion led to the moderation of the PJD.

To conclude, In the case of Al-Wasat Party, the regime used the repression excluding them from the political arena, a matter that forced them to search a legal position to avoid the repression. Although the regime did not accept their request three times, the party kept its moderation steps. So, the exclusion did not lead to radicalism, but to moderation. In the case of the PJD, the party suffered the repression and the exclusion practiced by the regime, such exclusion forced them to separate from their radical group searching for working under the legitimacy of the regime accepting the political means. The regime under some circumstances included them in the political arena and the party managed to win the elections and forming the government. The PJD did not accept the legitimacy of the monarchy only, but it defended it in some issuing standing against MUR its social and religious structure. So, the exclusion led to moderation and the inclusion led too to more moderation.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

Abolela Madi's interview transcript

00:07–00:12, the interviewer

The first question is: What are the reasons that pushed you to establish Al-Wasat party?

00:13-01:36, the interviewee

Look, there are intellectual reasons and organizational reasons. Regarding the intellectual reasons, we realized that the political part of the Muslim Brotherhood is going bad, and there were many issues to be developed, but they didn't develop. For example, political thoughts were still taken from heritage books such as Al-Mawardi and Al-Ahkam Al-Sultaniye. Our generation had a role in the movement of students in universities and later in syndicates, which made us open to political parties, political life as a whole, cases of society inside and outside, and other opinions. For that, we realized those thoughts must be developed, and we made efforts to develop from the inside, but we failed. As I said, Islamic thought is not mature and traditional. Regarding the organizational reasons, there was a group that was a part of the Special Ordinance of 1965 that was dominating the Muslim Brotherhood. This group didn't activate the mechanisms of selecting, changing, and developing from the inside. It aimed to freeze any attempt at development; it also gave an advantage to those who proved their loyalty, while it was trying to weaken the reformist stream at that time. Briefly, these are the intellectual and organizational reasons.

01:40–1:45, the interviewer

What are the differences between you and the Muslim Brotherhood? 01:46–02:49, the interviewee

What makes us different is that we developed the modern civil state, not the state that exists in the old books of Islamic fiqh. The state is not one of the constants of Islam. Islamic constants mean the ruling Islamic values: freedom, justice, shura, etc.; the shape of the state and developing it; the situation towards non-Muslims, towards women; towards others who are different to me politically and intellectually; dealing with the world and the openness of it, etc. That intellectual frame produced by Al-

Wasat made it acceptable in wider circles than those of organizationalists, inside Egypt and outside in both Arabic and Islamic worlds, because the roots are Islamic but offer a new project that is more moderate, more realizing to real-life that we live, and more mature.

02:50–03:31, the interviewer

In a TV program, the ex-murshid of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Mahdi Akif, said Al-Wasat project came from inside the Muslim Brotherhood, and he said that he had a role in establishing the party. Also, he mentioned that you, as the founders of the party, delivered the request to establish the party as the official committee of parties without returning to the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood. So, the aim of establishing the party was to be a political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, or was it a real thought of the youth leaders who believed in your thoughts?

03:34-07:30, the interviewee

The point was that we were tired of the leaders of the brotherhood; they didn't accept even the decisions of the Shura council that I was one of its members. We had difficulty with a decision from the council to establish a party. Later, they formed a committee to prepare a party program, and I was one of the members as well, but they killed it after about one year. Another committee had been formed, adding other members, which was a strange matter for us. Mr. Mohamed Mahdi Akif had formed this committee. We realized that the formation of the committee aimed to absorb the anger of the Shura Council, and there was no seriousness in establishing a party. So, we decided that we would prepare the party's project, whether they accepted it or not, as an insurgency move. At this time, Mohamed Ali Beshr, who was responsible for the professional department of the Muslim Brotherhood, asked for a chance to offer the project again to the leaders as a last warning that if they didn't take any executive steps to establish the party, we could go ahead and establish it ourselves. Then, he met Mr. Ibrahim Sharaf, the secretary of the Brotherhood, who was angry and asked him to wait until the next meeting when they were going to make a decision. We waited until the meeting, and we met with Akif at his home, and he gave us his acceptance of establishing the party. In this meeting, Mr. Mohamed Abdullatif, who later became the general secretary of Al Wasat party, suggested that it is possible to establish more than one party to give more opportunities to pass through the official committee of parties, which was refusing most of the applications. We started working, realizing that Akif

gave us acceptance without returning to the other leaders of the Brotherhood, so we went fast before realizing that mistake. In only seventeen days, we prepared the program of the party, collecting the power of the attorneys of the founders. Two days before delivering the papers of the party, there was a meeting of the Shura Council, and one of the attendants who was responsible for Al-Minya City, Mohamed Saad Al-Katatni, prepared his power of attorney as a founder. During the meeting, one asked about the party; the response was that we are still studying that matter, but Al-Katatni said that what about the steps that had been taken by Abo Alela Mady? The attendants asked him not to deliver his power of attorney, and they called everyone to do the same. They said we don't have a party. After the meeting, Al-katatni told me everything. Later, the murshid at that time, Mustafa Mashhor, asked Abdul Latif and me to meet him, but we delayed that meeting after delivering the papers to the official committee. During the meeting, he asked us to freeze everything, but we informed him that we had finished everything. We gave him a copy of the party's program and the founders list; he was shocked and told us we would study the matter. Then, a war started and didn't stop. Our movement was trying to reform; if they wanted to continue or not, that was not important to us, but we decided to continue. That is the truth, for Allah and history.

07:35–07:40, the interviewer

You said that the Muslim Brotherhood started a war against you; what is the nature of this war?

07:42–08:30, the interviewee

The first thing was that they gathered all the founders—the majority of them were still members of the Brotherhood—and put pressure on them to sign the power of attorney and resign from the party. From about seventy founders, they gathered about forty-nine powers of attorney, more than half. Mukhtar Nouh and another lawyer, who was previously a police officer, delivered these powers of attorney to the court of the parties to reject the foundation of the party. In addition to a media campaign against us and speaking badly about us inside the different activities of the Brotherhood, they accuse us of being agents of the police.

08:32–08:45, the interviewer

That was from the side of the Muslim Brotherhood, but what about the side of the political regime? Do you have any explanation for the insistence of the regime on not giving you a license to work legally?

08:46-10:35, the interviewee

Look, there are two dimensions, one related to security and another related to politics. To the security dimension, I knew it late in 2007 when I met with a senior security official. He told me that I stopped that party because I recorded a meeting gathered by Mamon Al-Hudaiby, Mohamed Mahdi Akif, and Mustafa Mashhour. In this meeting, Akif said to let the group of Al Wasat party work; if it becomes legal, it will be mine. Al-Hudaiby said I am going to cut my hair. Akif said I am telling you important words; you are telling me that you will cut your hair. Al-Hudaiby replied that because of your words, nicks can be cut; you don't know what you are saying. Al-Hudaiby is gone. And I told that officer, I don't care about that; what is our fault? He wanted to prove that he still accuses us of being Muslim Brotherhood members, and that was a show; that is the first dimension. The second, after that dialogue, he promised to give us a license, but he didn't; he told me that I didn't make it. We knew later that the group led by Jamal Mubarak refused our party because it was against their plan. They planned to produce themselves as a moderate and modern vision against the radical Muslim Brotherhood. So, if an Islamic one came with a moderate vision that would damage their plan. Some of them told me that. The officer told me later that the objection wasn't from us as police but was from Jamal Mubarak. From their point of view, our project was more dangerous for them than that of the Muslim Brotherhood.

10:36–10:41, the interviewer

Are there any effects on your work and your organization due to not giving you a license?

10:42–11:57, the interviewee

Of course, we learned from the lessons of the Muslim Brotherhood. I published it in a study, and I said that during the era of Sadat, he asked the Muslim Brotherhood to establish a party without using the word (Ikhwan) but they refused. Haj Helmy Abdulmajeed, who was one of the attendants, told me that. Sadat gave them the green light to work, but anytime he could arrest them because they were working illegally,

an oral license without an official one could lead to corruption. They told me that the same, you can work, and we don't mind, but I refused. No work without an official license; we respect the law, and we cannot do anything against it, except the elite meetings. Every year, we organized Iftar, a small lecture, or something like that, but we didn't do any structural or organizational activities, only some visits to different governorates.

11:58-12:04, the interviewer

At the same time, the Egyptian Association for Culture and Dialogue was an extension of your party, is that right?

12:05–12:16, the interviewee

Yes, that was an intellectual side, the same founders, but in addition to other people from outside, we organized a cultural and intellectual activity to spread moderation. It didn't have a direct relationship with the political party.

12:17-12:32, the interviewer

What is the vision of the party on some issues, such as separating religion from the state, the Christians in Egypt, and the participation of women in public affairs? These points are mentioned in your program, and you are claiming that they are different from those of the Muslim Brotherhood.

12:33-13:50, the interviewee

We don't call for separating religion from the state, but we are calling for separating religious institutions from the state. Al-Azhar or any religious party cannot participate in government. Religion itself is included in the constitution; there is an article that guarantees that, and that is enough for us. To the issue of the Christians, we offered the diligence of scholars who said (Al-zimma) was in an era that came to an end; instead of it, came citizenship. So, all the citizens are connected to a contract; its name is the constitution, and there is equality between all in rights and obligations. So, Christian citizenship has all the rights and obligations of a Muslim; he can work in any place; the same thing is true for women; women, like men, can participate in political life; she can run for any position, even the presidency. It can succeed or not, depending on public opinion and the majority's decision. The main basis of the position is efficiency, not religion or being a man.

13:53–13:54, the interviewer

Who wrote the political program for the party?

13:55–14:36, the interviewee

As the founders of the party, in addition to me, there were Dr. Salah Abdulkareem, Dr. Mohamed Abdullatif, Essam Sultan, and Mohammed Al-Samman; this group was the base during the discussions. We added other people, and we organized workshops. We were meeting with a group of thinkers at the home of Dr. Mohamed Selim Al-Awwa. This group gathered Dr. Emara, Tarek Al-Beshry, Al-Awwa, and, of course, Fahmi Howaidy. We were telling them our thoughts, and we were listening to their opinions. Later, we organized workshops to write our thoughts and develop them. Al-Masiry wasn't attending these sessions, but we were going to him, and after that, he participated with us in writing the last two programs before his death. He wrote parts of it.

14:38–14:43, the interviewer

Do you think that your experience in the syndicates gave you an affection for the program of the party and its thoughts?

14:43-16:28, the interviewee

Sure, especially in the syndicate of engineers, we had a rich experience. The engineers spread into about seven or eight ministries: electricity, reconstruction, irrigation, industry, military production, etc., so that diffusion gave us an opportunity through the forums to have a rich vision about the state, projects, development, industry, etc. In addition, we made relations with most syndicates, organized political forums in the syndicates, and hosted persons from all the political wings. We tried to make a national accord document. We suggested that during a forum held in the syndicate, Dr. Essam Alerian was with us, and an actor has died recently; his name is Shafi Shalaby. We founded a committee to coordinate between the syndicates that were responsible for writing that national accord document. We selected Yahia Al-Rifaye as the head of this committee, and I was the coordinator. In this committee, all the political wings were represented, starting with Khaled Mohy Al-Deen, Ibrahim Al-Desouki Abaza as a representative of Fouad Seraj Aldeen, Saeed Alnajjar, Helmy Mourad, Melad Hanna, Al-Hudaiby, and of course Dr. Al-Awwa, etc., a wide group. We wrote a national accord document. After one year, it came to an end due to two people, Mamon Al-

Hudaiby and Saeed Al-Najjar. They had a strong dispute over some articles that might be overcome, but they stopped it. I would like to say that all these activities, some of them technical or political, such as relations with others and political parties, had a positive effect on the program of Al-Wasat Party.

16:30-16:35, the interviewer

Do you think that the regional and international atmospheres have negative or positive effects on the party?

16:36-17:37, the interviewee

I don't think that there were negative effects, but I think there were positive ones. During the inactivity of the regime and its long period, the inactivity of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the worry of many sides of it, Al-Wasat opened the doors to many things. The reactions and interest of the Egyptians and the international media of our party shocked us. Many visitors were coming to us, and for that, the government issued a decision to arrest us. They accused us of founding the Al-Wasat party. They renewed that decision four times, and they didn't arrest us due to the focus of the media on us. But they arrested us later, in April 1996. There was a great interest, and that was a positive matter that promoted our thoughts more than what was imagined and made them accepted in internal and external circles. That was useful for us.

17:39-17:55, the interviewer

Do you think that the West, especially the USA and the EU, has an affection for the decision of the regime to not permit you or that such permission was a way for them?

17:56-18:29, the interviewee

They are welcoming the idea, but they are saying that if you manage to take something, take it. We are not on either side of that issue. One of the American diplomats visited us, offering help to establish the party. We thanked him, and we said we didn't need any help from you. We are struggling against the authorities in our country; yes, there is no fairness, but we respect the law and the constitution, and we will stay in a dispute until we get permission. We don't need help from anyone. Our situation was clear from the beginning; they welcomed the idea, but no one intervened, and we didn't accept that.

18:30-18:35, the interviewer

From your point of view, what are the most important factors that can merge the Islamists into political life?

18:38–19:26, the interviewee

There are many factors. If the public atmosphere is free, everyone will use it, in addition to the desire of the Islamists themselves, to develop their thoughts, live with society, and give reassurances to all sides. There are Christians, businessmen, and secularist elites. You have many sides inside; before you can merge them, you need to give them assurances and deal with them. The Islamists, if they offer a developed vision to deal with society and not monopolize power, are the factors that could help merge the Islamists into political life.

19:30-19:39, the interviewer

I am delighted to have this interview with you. That is a great honor for Me. Thank you for taking some of your precious time.

19:40–19:43, the interviewee

Thank you, you are welcome, good luck.

Appendix B

Atef Awwad's interview transcript

00:05–00:10, the interviewer what reasons pushed you to establish the party of Al-Wasat?

00:15-09:49, the interviewee

The group that made the decision was inside the Muslim Brotherhood, they belonged to the generation of the seventies who were active in the students' associations and later in the syndicates, and this group was working openly on the other, a real openness but was shackled with shackles of the Brotherhood. We had two problems with the Muslim Brotherhood, although we were active in that period and we managed to beautify the face of the Brotherhood in front of the other political powers many times. We were dealing with the other political powers in the syndicates, the same in the students' associations.

Many of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders were prohibited from making media statements, but we were not, our presence beautified the face of the Brotherhood as an organization has a religious nature. We had two problems, the first was mixing between politics and Dawaa. That was the great problem that we were facing with the other political powers. Among these powers, some are pious, not everyone outside of the Brotherhood is not pious, those were feeling a twinge because they were saying that the Brotherhood was monopolizing religion only for themselves, only the Brotherhood was using religious slogans and Quranic verses, so, when we criticize the brotherhood, they think that as we criticize Islam.

That was a problem for them. In the parliament, I stood against a law that permits the use of religious slogans during the elections, while the Muslim Brotherhood and its party freedom and justice party were accepting. If we could calculate it from a pragmatic view, it would be better for us to accept because our party has an Islamic foundation and that attracts people, but this is a political rudeness. We should stand at the same distance, you have the right to choose a program with an Islamic foundation, but the use of religious slogans during the elections must be prevented. That is the problem of the Muslim Brotherhood, mixing politics and dawaa, you can see the imam

making his speech in the Friday pray, after finishing everyone can kiss his hand, but in the evening you can see his photos on the posters of the elections. The normal person absolutely would choose the imam, he is nearer to Allah than us. Due to our openness to the other, we felt that these behaviors were not acceptable. We were not advocates, as a political team, we were working in public affairs for Allah, but we weren't advocates, we don't classify ourselves as imams or advocates. There must be advocates and politicians, everyone has the right to choose his reference, but that mixing made a great problem.

That was the first reason to separate from the Muslim Brotherhood. The second reason is illegitimacy, it is not acceptable to work against the laws of the state. It is not acceptable to challenge these laws classifying yourself as legitimate without any real organization even if I am not satisfied with the laws. No organization or association has the right to work outside of the law. The Muslim Brotherhood kept working outside of the law. We asked them to establish an official party to work through it because according to the law, we are committing a crime, we are working outside of the law. The Brotherhood was refusing our request because they said that the government could refuse such a request. We were saying that it can be refused, but we must apply. State all the time was accusing us of working underground secretly as an organization that works away from the law and a prohibited one.

Every day state was arresting members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the crime was ready, we thought that was fairness but that was the truth, the organization was working outside of the law. When you go to the government with a list of full information, names, addresses, and professions, in addition to the program, so, the state wouldn't have any excuse. If the state would refuse, it is not our matter, our matter is doing the action. We were pressuring from the inside to establish an official structure to work through it. We were creative in the syndicates because we were elected, no one accused us or arrested us due to our work in the syndicates. We faced many obstacles once we started to establish the party, Essam Sultan and I were responsible for the legal documents and papers. Once we applied, the police arrested a group of the founders. As I remember, when we met with Mohamed Hassanein Hekal, he told us that he advised the government to not arrest those who applied for a political party, but you can arrest others who are members of the Muslim Brotherhood like Akif. Who applied for a political party giving you all the information about the founders, and how

to arrest them? As I told you, those are the reasons that pushed us to separate, the absence of separating between politics and dawaa and working outside of the law.

09:50–10:02, the interviewer

You spoke about the separation from the Muslim Brotherhood, so, there were obstacles and difficulties from their side? What is the nature of these obstacles?

10:05–12:40 the interviewee

We aimed to establish the party from inside the Brotherhood to make use of the powers of youth who are members of the Brotherhood, we pressured until the leaders agreed to form a group to prepare to establish a party. We worked until applying and we didn't go back to the Brotherhood in that matter. By the way, the program of Al-Wasat party was a production of all the Egyptians, not only the group of Al-Wasat party. We met with all the political directions, we took their opinions in economic and political cases but without knowing the reason for such dialogues. We met with Nabil Al-Hilaly, the spokesman of the Egyptian communists, I learned from him a lesson that I cannot forget. Although this man had a hostility to all the Islamists, he defended them in the courts because the difference in thoughts didn't prevent him from defending their rights. We met with Hekal and Dr. Mohamed Emara. Of course, the program's thoughts had been affected by Al-Beshry, Dr, Abdulwahab Al-Mesiry, Dr. Selim Al-Awwa, and Fahmi Howaidy.

12:41–12:45, the interviewer

I think that you founded the Egypt Association for Culture and Dialogue

12:46-17:40, the interviewee

That was later because we were searching for a legal structure, when the application of the party had been refused, we thought of issuing a newspaper and founding an association. Thank god, they approved the association. Our work was under the name of the association after the Brotherhood ignored us. The practices of the Brotherhood

against us were immoral. When we were applying, we didn't inform anyone, just the founders and the correspondent of the Al-Jazeera channel. We gave him priority to take the scene of entering the parliament just to be archived as a memory, not for publishing, and he promised us.

The statements of the Brotherhood after applying were confused. Mustafa Mashhour welcomed saying that they were young and they had the right to search for an instrument of work, later, Mamon Al-Hudaiby pressured on him, so, he retreated. He said that they are not our representatives, they are little. Al-Hudaiby's statements were too bad, he said that they were useless. The statements were confusing, but everyone showed his loyalty to the Brotherhood against Al-Wasat. They said that the government would give them a permit to be against them. We kept 16 years without permission. They forced all the founders of the party who remained inside the Brotherhood to cancel their powers of attorney to lose our case in the administrative judiciary. Also, they asked their lawyers to join the governmental lawyers against us. A prohibited organization that their members arrested stand against the establishment of a political party. A situation that could condemn the Brotherhood. It was a bad situation that showed for all that they were against the political parties and their freedoms. The administrative judiciary refused our case not due to the cancellation of the powers of attorney, but due to other reasons.

17:42–17:48, the interviewer

From your point of view, how do you explain the refusal of the government to your party's application to let you work legally?

17:50–20:18, the interviewee

The regime was so afraid to be a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. I remember that we were accused from all sides at that time. The Brotherhood accused us of being backed up by police. The Islamic group accused us of secularism but pretended to be Islamic. The Egyptian left accused us of being an interface of the Brotherhood. Even the journalist Salah Eissa wrote an article saying that there is a comic front against Al-Wasat. The state, the Islamic group, the civil parties, and the Brotherhood agreed to refuse Al-Wasat party. The state was afraid of us due to our previous relationships with

the Brotherhood. Those who applied for the party were having real intellectual thoughts and they worked in public affairs, especially in the syndicates. While the parties at that time were being described as cartoons because they were under control. They were that our party couldn't be under control. It would have another action, another footprint, which was a reason among others.

20:19–20:27, the interviewer

What is the vision of the party towards cases such as separation between state and religion, the Christians in Egypt, and the participation of women in public affairs?

20:30-24:50, the interviewee

Our program was developed three times. The first one, we were captivated somehow by the thoughts of the Muslim Brotherhood and we were afraid to declare our thoughts to not shock the youth of the Brotherhood who are full of these thoughts such as the separation between state and religion, we were refusing that, it is impossible to separate them. Our idea was to separate the Dawaa and politics. State is an entity, it is neither pious nor infidel. The people may be pious or not. In politics, according to the constitution, the religion of the state is Islam and the Sharia is the principal source of legislation. If we call for separation, so, we are against the Constitution. The right expression that we wrote and promoted is separating between Dawaa and politics. The Muslim Brotherhood didn't abandon that mixture because that was one of their elements of popularity during the elections. It was talking about the Quran and religious texts. We were promoting that we were advocates, we were volunteers for public affairs and politics with our moral and Islamic backgrounds. We developed it later by the background of the Islamic civilization. Neither Christians nor Muslims could shy of belonging to the Islamic civilization. One of the writers of that expression was Dr. Abdulwahab Al-Mesiry who refused to join any party or political organization until he met with Al Wasat group. He and his wife met with them and read their program. Their decision to join our party was a surprise for us.

24:52–24:59, the interviewer

Do you think that your experience in the syndicates had an affection on the program of the party and his thoughts?

25:00–31:33, the interviewee

No doubt that the work in the syndicates allowed us to work with the other political powers. We learned things that we didn't learn while we were members of the Brotherhood. We found independent persons who are more pious than us. We can cooperate with them making use of their experiences. We put them in positions of responsibility, and that was a criticism of us from the Brotherhood because the Brotherhood idea is based on loyalty, not on efficiency. The most important points that prevailed in the Brotherhood's thoughts were the mobilization and the loyalty. Of course, there was loyalty and efficiency inside them, we can't deny that, but if there was a contrast between them, loyalty comes first.

In the syndicates, we depended on efficiency, and for that, the work was magnificent. That affected our thoughts and developed them and encouraged us to cooperate to the extent that we didn't mind to join with Hamdeen Sabbahy at a party. We were aiming to establish a great association but it didn't succeed. After the revolution, we managed to merge with Al-Hadara party because it was so near to our thoughts. We had many criticisms of the Brotherhood but we couldn't declare it. Once you spoke to one of the Brotherhood members, he was saying keep it between us. I started the idea of the public criticism inside that group. I remember that I wrote an article criticizing Al-Hudaiby who was the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood at that time while I was a member of it. In a TV program on the Al-Jazeera channel, Al-Qaradawi said that freedoms come before the Sharia, Al-Hudaiby made a call to the program commenting that he was against that idea because Islam as a religion comes before anything else. That made me angry because Al-Hudaiby wasn't a religious scholar like Al-Qaradawi, he was a politician. I wrote an article, titled (freedoms, the Sharia, and Ikhwan), I wondered how an oppressed group and its members were being arrested every day was standing against freedoms that must come before religion as Al-Qaradawi said. I said the Sharia in Afghanistan brought the Taliban, while freedoms in Turkey brought Erdogan.

31:35-31:43, the interviewer

Do you think that the regional and international atmosphere during the 90s had effects on the party?

31:47–40:17, the interviewee

Before establishing the party, we were suffering a radical stream and terrorist actions in Egypt, and the world heard about it. While abroad, there were other groups such as Bokoharam. At this time, using terrorism as an expression was starting and the Islamists were being accused of it. We were affected by that. The foreigners who came to meet with us at the party usually asked us about our opinion of the terrorist actions and the violence. I remember that even before founding the party, Mubarak invited the political powers to a national dialogue. Essam Sultan and I thought about organizing a national dialogue to give the state a lesson about how to organize such dialogue. It was through the syndicate of lawyers not through the Muslim Brotherhood.

We thought about making it in a magnificent place, so, the important men could come in addition to the news agencies and the media. We didn't care about costs. We were fed up with the same persons who participated every time, so, we invited youth from different political directions, the Muslim Brotherhood, communists, communists, Nasserites, and Al-Wafd. We invited them to know whether they were the old men or they had a different vision. No one listened to them, and even their parties didn't allow them to express themselves. We asked every political direction to select one of their youth with a maximum of 35 years. We invited all the official parties and all the streams who are prevented from establishing a party. We invited also the syndicates, the three churches, and Al-Azhar. We didn't forget any association that had weight, just during 9 sessions within one month and a half, there were only two empty seats which were dedicated to the government and state security.

Also, we invited Al-Watany party. We thought that state security was active and that we should listen to their opinions. The West was writing about that dialogue in a manner that I hadn't seen before. More than seven or eight international news agencies attended the dialogue in addition to a great number of Egyptian and foreign journalists. That was the start to express ourselves by listening to our youth. The Muslim Brotherhood sent Salah Abdulmaksood as a representative while I was the representative of the syndicate of lawyers, and Montasser Al-Zayyat was the representative of Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiyya. From that conference, the initiative to abandon the violence started. Montasser met with the leaders of Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiyya in the prisons, they asked him to declare that they stopped the terrorist action against the state without any condition and they abandoned violence. Only improving the prison conditions and transferring the suspicious persons to the courts to decide

their cases. The conference was talking about women, the role of art in serving the nation, the economic situation in Egypt, and the violence in Egypt. All the discussed issues were critical.

All the parties that were civil with an Islamic foundation didn't overcome the issues of women and Christians, but we overcame them. Montasser Al- Zayyat declared that initiative during the conference and welcomed it. We sent a message to the president of the republic, the minister of internal affairs, the state security police, and the parliament president. Later, there was a start of communication with Al-Zayyat and Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiyya. They stopped the terrorist actions, there was improvement in the conditions in the prisons, and they let the wives and families visit them, the conditions were improving gradually. That was one of the astonishing results of the conference. No one said that the group of Al Wasat managed to stop violence in Egypt. We just gave the state a lesson in managing the dialogues.

40:18-40:30, the interviewer

The last question is, from your point of view, what are the factors that can help contain the Islamists and merge them into political life?

40:31-47:54, the interviewee

The Islamists themselves are the most important factor, they must get rid of the restrictions of the organization and they must stop the militarization of the organization. If they want to participate in real political work, they must work legally. If they can't give an example of respecting freedoms and opinions, no one will respect them or allow them to express their opinions. You are calling for a thing that you didn't give to your sons. When I wrote my article criticizing Al-Hudaiby, I was referred to trial inside the Muslim Brotherhood, that wasn't the first time, again when I joined Al-Wasat without making them known.

The Islamists must finish the concept of loyalty. They must depend always on efficiency even if they are not belonging to us. We were wrong when we thought that the measure is the mobilization. We thought that when we mobilized ten thousand in the Al-Qaed Ibrahim square as a succession. People let you enter the prisons and be killed while you were successful in mobilization, so, that is not the measure. Al Bina we Al Tanmia party played a great role in political life and there was a coordination

between us. I attended a debate at the American University in Cairo about the Egyptian parties.

One of the students asked me, Al-Wasat party is a civil party with an Islamic reference, the same as the party of the Muslim Brotherhood, what is the difference between you? What is new that can attract me to join you instead of the Muslim Brotherhood? I replied that this question must be asked to the Muslim Brotherhood because I have been struggling for 16 years. I offered the idea of a party with an Islamic reference 16 years ago. So, today, once the Muslim Brotherhood has established a part, ask them, what is new that you will offer that is different from Al- Wasat? The Muslim Brotherhood still has a problem accepting women in high positions, and that is an ideology in the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood. The managers of the women's section in the Brotherhood are men. No woman was responsible for that section. They don't believe in the woman's capabilities and her role. They didn't give up even in the new party. A student asked me, if a Christian came to be a candidate as a president, can you select him? I replied that you cannot ask me about my selection, my selection will be in the elections. Every Christian has the right to be a candidate, every Egyptian has this right, but the selection is for the people, the majority. I am not responsible for making him succeed, but I am responsible for giving him the right to candidature. If a Christian became a president applying the constitution and law, I would be happier for him than Mubarak who didn't apply the constitution. These two points still have restrictions in the Muslim Brotherhood.

Our program is more developed than the one of the Brotherhood, for 16 years, we have on the ground open to all, and they confess that. During the crises, we were the mediators who could gather all. I have been asked why you cannot join the Muslim Brotherhood forming one party. I replied that, welcome to the Brotherhood joining our party if they have our same thoughts and vision.

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