Book review: Criminal law and the authority of state
Abstract
Although the notion of state, its attributes and its role in public life
has been a subject of perennial and constant discussion, one could
argue that the very function and objective of the state is the creation
and maintenance of peace and safety of subjects under its dominion.
In fulfilling these essential functions the state enjoys various sovereign
rights, which, inter alia, include put in Hobbesian terms, the potestas
coactive, i.e. the power to impose punishments, and the gladium
iustitiae, the power to carry out punishments.1 And since at least the
paradigm shift carried out by Hobbes claimed to be the founder of
modern political philosophy, ‘‘the philosophical justification of the
political system and the law is no longer accomplished by relating the
existing order and the law as practiced to their ontological basis.
Instead, the state and the law are analytically de-constructed and
reconstituted with a view to the specific goal of creating peace and
security for the individual […]’’.2 In line with this tradition of rational
construction of state’s authority, Max Weber provided the most
influential definition of the modern state: ‘‘a state is that human
community which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory […]’’.3 Thus,
legitimacy of the state authority, that is, the legitimate use of power
including ius puniendi is without doubt one of the central themes of
modern political philosophy and jurisprudence. In the footsteps of
this tradition, the present collection of essays brings together criminal
lawyers, criminologists, legal theorists and public lawyers who, in a
wide variety of ways, address the question how the modern liberal
state relates to those under its jurisdiction through the criminal law
(p. 1). In the engaging introductory chapter, the editors emphasise the
fact that the required exchange between criminal lawyers and public
lawyers has been neglected so far, and they argue that the separation
of different discourses on the legitimacy of criminal law, public law,
criminal law theory and sociologically oriented criminal justice
scholarship is problematic as it now stands. Such a dialogue among
various discourses and scholarly approaches is not only desired but
also required on the face of the fact that the criminal law in most
instances wreaks such havoc in people’s lives and the criminal punishment
is such an extraordinary abomination, that it patently needs
all the justificatory help it can get.